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1 INTRODUCTION 
Bara kasaa rapali What is it that she seeks,  
Mandudu kojo momai she who comes so often, 
Je rugi manga linjaki wandering in pain  
Re tana to kasi yasi on the land of the pitiful and poor? 
Tendebomba by Indo Laku1 
This thesis is about people who are described as marginal and who consider themselves 
marginal. But it is also about people who have developed their very own understanding of 
their marginality and who have recently started to use their marginal position as a 
powerful tool to counteract marginalization processes directed towards them.  
The Wana ethnic group is located in Central Sulawesi, Indonesia, living in the 
mountainous region in and around the Cagar Alam Morowali – the largest nature reserve 
of the province, covering an area of 225,000 ha of the eastern peninsula. Most Wana live 
in small dispersed farming settlements in the rugged interior of the Morowali upland, 
some of them within the area of the nature reserve itself. They practice swidden 
agriculture, follow a semi-nomadic lifestyle and adhere to their own distinct religion. Due 
to these ways of living the Wana as well as other upland groups in Indonesia have 
generally been described as isolated and backward communities, while the Indonesian 
uplands are perceived as a “marginal domain, socially, economically and physically 
removed from the mainstream, ‘traditional’, undeveloped, left behind” (Li 1999a: 1). 
People living in the uplands have therefore been constituted as marginal people, as 
geographically distant, politically peripheral and socio-culturally distinct groups. The 
Wana are thus continuously described as “primitive” people who “fit the bill” (Li 2000: 
162) of the “real indigenous”. This conception of upland groups serves state-centered 
discourse in which people like the Wana must be “civilized” and introduced to the 
Indonesian state system. From the point of view of several NGOs, however, upland 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Indo Laku, a Wana woman, expresses her curiosity about the research that I conducted among her 
community – in her words, among those who are “pitiful and poor”. She came up with this verse one 
night in her house in the uplands, when I was sitting on the floor, exhausted from a strenuous hike, taking 
care of a number of little wounds and blisters: I was, according to her, “wandering in pain”.  
The verseform is called tendebomba, an artistic way of articulating feelings and meanings among Wana.  
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groups often serve the idea of the “ecological-noble savage” or of neglected indigenous 
people. Both pictures present Wana people as well as other upland groups as marginalized 
(Li 1999a: 2). External factors such as the state and religion play their part, adding to 
Wana marginalized standing. To some extent, this is, however, part of a self-
marginalization process. Wana tend to speak of themselves as pitiful people, poor and 
helpless. Their marginality is likewise an embodied aspect of Wana culture. They have 
constructed their very own cosmological center, which serves as a central point of 
reference and reveals an indigenous understanding and justification of their marginal 
position. Wana marginality is thus a manifold complex project whose different strands are 
not easily unraveled.  
1.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
My guiding research query is centered on the question of how marginality is constructed 
culturally by Wana people themselves. Following Li (1999a), I seek to understand and 
describe how marginalization processes that are relevant for Wana people, both upland 
and lowland, are perceived and created by Wana themselves and by various local and 
non-local actors. Li has pointed to the importance of the question of how marginality is 
constructed “by the people whom outsiders take to be marginal by nature” (1999a: 33). In 
this regard, specific historical processes of marginalization become highly important for 
understanding current processes that shape Wana ideas and understandings of their 
marginality and the way they grasp their status as a marginalized group. Keeping these 
special foci in mind, I consequently focus further on Wana negotiations of contemporary 
state ideals in their everyday lives and how they relate these to their own marginal 
standing. I will trace definite effects – whether economic, social or cultural – that are 
caused by marginality, in an ascribed as well as self-ascribed sense. Discussing these 
questions requires a clear understanding of the concept of marginality. For Tsing, margins 
“are sites from which we see the instability of social categories” (1994: 279). It is 
precisely their unsteady character that makes them a highly potential analytical field of 
study; these “zones of unpredictability at the edges of discursive stability, where 
contradictory discourses overlap, or where discrepant kinds of meaning-making 
converge” (1994: 279) are what Tsing grasps under the idea of margins. By this means 
margins cannot be reduced to essentializing spatial categories that describe a specific 
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geographic setting. Margins are not descriptions of nonconformity within a given society. 
Rather, margins designate “an analytical placement that makes evident both the 
constraining, oppressive quality of cultural exclusion and the creative potential of 
rearticulating, enlivening, and rearranging the very social categories that peripheralize a 
group’s existence” (Tsing 1994: 279). The constitution of margins and centers as a social 
construction (Shields 1991, Li 1999a) is thus part of a hegemonic discourse, a political 
project that needs to be challenged, disputed and renegotiated: “The cultural, economic 
and political projects of people living and working in the uplands are constituted in 
relation to various hegemonic agendas, but never are they simple reflections of them” (Li 
1999a: 2). Following Tsing (1993; 1994) and Li (1999d), I therefore regard upland and 
lowland regions as situated within one single analytical frame. Marginality, in the context 
of this thesis, therefore, is about complex relations between people, ideas and regions that 
are often subjected to dichotomous categories such as upland/lowland, 
modern/traditional, state/non-state actors, civilized/primitive. 
A great number of anthropological studies have dealt extensively with the socio-
economic and political effects of marginalized positionings among upland people all over 
the world and in Indonesia specifically (e.g., Burling 1965, Spencer 1966, Conklin 1961, 
Tsing 1993). However, three relevant aspects thereby remain largely neglected: First, the 
significance of religion in marginalization processes is often ignored in studies focusing 
on upland–lowland relations. This is due to the fact that most studies focusing on religion 
among upland groups in Indonesia emphasize syncretist elements of religion among 
converted upland groups, now usually Christian or Muslim (e.g. Duncan 2003; George 
1996). Religious affiliation for converted groups is an important category of agency that 
is, however, less important for upland marginalization processes. For Wana, in contrast, 
as a non-converted group, religion becomes a highly politicized marker of identity in 
regard to marginality-related issues since religious association is closely intertwined with 
a Wana self-marginalized positioning and socio-religious hierarchies. Second, studies 
concerning the transformation of marginalization processes mostly ignore the importance 
of those I call “Powerful Friends” – individual or group actors who interact with 
marginalized groups and thereby become influential allies. Third, I stress the politics of 
knowledge that significantly shapes hierarchical relations between upland and lowland 
entities and extensively contributes to the allocation of power and control. Sociopolitical 
orders and formations of knowledge, as well as their epistemological formulation, are of 
Chapter I. Introduction     
	   9 
central relevance for hegemonic structures and cultural practice. Against this background, 
access to knowledge and further education play a significant role for Wana social 
positioning.  
1.2 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
For a thorough understanding of marginality and its construction among Wana, I will 
focus precisely on the construction and deconstruction of Wana marginality in its various 
dimensions. I will offer a threefold approach to marginality that focuses on the 
cosmological, socio-religious and political-economic dimensions of the subject and its 
relevance for Wana people.  
In this introductory chapter, I will provide a brief overview of the regional context and the 
Wana in Morowali Regency of Central Sulawesi as an initial presentation of the local 
context, as well as a short literature review. However, many local details will be 
presented only later, in the relevant chapters when necessary for understanding the 
specific dimension of marginality. For instance, the historical framework will be touched 
upon only briefly in the introduction, but will be portrayed in detail in Chapter 5 where a 
thorough description of colonial intervention becomes necessary for understanding the 
political and economic dimension of marginality. Furthermore, I will present an overview 
of the ethnographic methods used and an initial description of what I call “fieldwork 
politics”, thus introducing the role of the anthropologist in dealing with matters of 
marginality. This aspect will continue to play an important part in the course of this thesis 
and I will come back to it with greater focus in the main three chapters dealing with Wana 
dimensions of marginality.  
The second chapter will dive deeper into the theoretical and epistemological 
understanding of marginality as a concept. The interest in marginality as treated and 
discussed within anthropology as well as other disciplines reveals important theoretical 
considerations and historical developments of the discipline as well as the concept itself. I 
will show how marginality as a concept offers a way to analyze power relations, deeply 
questioning the meanings of “center” and “peripheries” and the ways in which aspects of 
each continuum are perceived by those at both poles. Furthermore, understanding 
marginality as a term that is socially constructed, I will then show how the concept is 
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applied by anthropologists to upland groups in Southeast Asia and especially in Indonesia 
to gain a general understanding of the category “upland group”, and how and why the 
distinction between upland and lowland has evolved. I will then provide a general 
introduction to the meanings of marginality in the Indonesian uplands, showing historical 
developments as well as specific markers of marginalization processes connected to 
aspects such as resettlement and ongoing struggles over land rights. I will also introduce 
Indonesia’s indigenous peoples’ movement, which started in the 1990s, and will then 
discuss the notion of religious marginality within the Indonesian nation-state. 
After these clarifications I turn to the three main critical dimensions of marginality that 
are of central significance for Wana marginalized status:  
The first dimension, presented in Chapter 3 – the cosmological dimension – deals with 
Wana religious or cosmological notions of marginality. Drawing on creation myths from 
a Golden Past, Wana obtain a self-ascribed marginalized standing that is deeply 
intertwined with cosmological narratives and a millenarian movement. Marginality in this 
dimension is represented as a contemporary but transient situation that is rooted in Wana 
cosmology. Through its millennarian character, the cosmological dimension offers Wana 
their very own way out of current marginalization, a way that undermines hegemonic 
constellations vis-à-vis the state. Wana shamanism in this context portrays an important 
bridge between an ideal past, an anticipated glorious future and the marginal present. 
The second dimension discussed in Chapter 4 is, to a certain extent, rather socially shaped 
yet closely related to religion as a social category concerning religious practice and 
affiliation. Marginalization occurs within socio-religious hierarchies in which Wana 
“animists” (often perceived from a state point of view as “non-believers”) feel subjugated 
by their Christian and Muslim neighbors. An important factor here is Wana adhering to 
their own religion, a belief system they sometimes call agama Wana (BI, Wana religion).2 
Since they are not followers of an officially recognized religion they struggle to be part of 
the Indonesian ideal of a modern citizen, which is connected to adherence to a “world 
religion”. Here, marginalization happens on a rather day-to-day basis, forcing Wana to 
situate themselves on the lowest rung of the social ladder in relation to their other-ethnic 
as well as other-religious neighbors. The importance of knowledge, and access to it, for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 All words in languages other than English are set in italics. All words in Bahasa Indonesia, Indonesian, 
are marked with the abbreviation “BI” when quoted for the first time, while Wana terms as well as Dutch 
terms are set without any further indication.  
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discussing matters of marginality becomes further visible as the religious dimension 
hinders those Wana who refuse religious conversion to go to school. Therefore, religious 
conversion is a very important aspect when considering religious marginality for 
indigenous groups like the Wana.  
Finally, the political-economic dimension of Wana marginalized status, discussed in 
Chapter 5, is constituted by the ongoing danger of land loss, historically a well-known 
state of distress for Wana people. Specific marginalization processes include for example 
resettlement programs by the government that were aimed at moving Wana permanently 
from the uplands in centralized villages. The current relevance of resettlement becomes 
meaningful when accompanied by a current threat of land loss for Wana people related to 
the expansion plans of a local palm oil company. The example shows how Wana within 
the Indonesian nation-state struggle to come to fight for their rights since their 
marginality in its complex constitution hinders them from obtaining knowledge of these 
rights. The chapter further deals with strategies of resistance. While locating agency in 
the Wana region, I will further distinguish between strategies of everyday resistance as 
tools of “weapons of the weak” (Scott 1985), and a new form of agency, highlighting the 
role of “powerful friends”, such as NGOs or the anthropologist. I will by this means also 
analyze the politics of “being Wana, becoming indigenous”, portraying the reasons for 
Wana entering the masyarakat adat (BI) movement, the Indonesian indigenous peoples’ 
movement.  
In my view, this analytical and methodological framework of marginality, resistance and 
agency, with its complex relations within the analytical upland–lowland framework, 
offers a new perspective on the concept of marginality, while drawing upon and 
simultaneously expanding Tsing’s famous work on marginal Meratus people (1993), 
thereby, again, confronting common assumptions of a supposed gap between upland and 
lowland in general, and especially in Indonesia.  
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1.3  REGIONAL CONTEXT 
1.3.1 A Brief Introduction to Central Sulawesi 
The Wana live in the province of Central Sulawesi, Sulawesi Tengah, one of the largest 
provinces in Indonesia, covering an area of almost 70,000 km2  (Map 1). Political control 
in Central Sulawesi was historically influenced through outer centers such as the 
kingdoms of Mandar, Ternate and Makassar between the 15th and 17th century.3 The  
Kingdom of Luwu of South Sulawesi extended its regional impact through Morowali and 
Poso regencies into Wana territory (Sangaji 2007: 325). External power in Central 
Sulawesi reached its climax with increasing Dutch colonial expansion at the beginning of 
the 20th century.4 Outside of the island, Dutch colonial intervention had started with the 
Dutch East Indian Company (Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie, VOC) in 1596, when 
the first Dutch trade ship reached West Java. Sulawesi, however, was only marginally 
affected by Dutch interference until the 20th century. Until the turn of the century, the 
two “poles” of the island, Manado in the north and Makassar in the south, were the only 
places in Sulawesi deeply affected by Dutch intervention (Map 2). Although Dutch 
authority did not have control over Central Sulawesi in the beginning, the outcomes of 
colonial rule already became visible in the 17th century: The mass of Buginese migrants 
from the south, who had fled north after the Dutch had conquered the island’s southern 
tip, portray the first indirect impact of colonial rule on Central Sulawesi (Weber, Kreisel, 
and Faust 2003: 402). 
	    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The Kingdom of Ternate had an important influence on Wana who claim that their first raja was the ruler 
of Ternate (Atkinson 1989: 335).  
4 For example, the Dutch began in Western Central Sulawesi by inventing a number of trading ports around 
the region – a common form of colonial control in the Buitenbezittingen, the outer islands – especially 
around Palu (Sangaji 2007: 325). For an overview of the colonial development of Indonesia with special 
reference to Central Sulawesi see table 1 in Weber, Kreisel, and Faust (2003: 404).  
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Map 1 Island Southeast Asia and the Wana Region (Atkinson 1989: 325). 
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Map 2 Central Sulawesi and the Wana Region (Atkinson 1989: 326). Ujung Padang today is called 
Makassar. 
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Apart from this, colonial forces largely ignored the island’s central region. Henley (1989) 
points to a paragraph written by the British naturalist Sydney Hickson in 1885:  
“The central continent of the island has not yet seen the face of the white man, 
and by far the greater part of the four peninsulas is almost unknown and 
undescribed […]. It is true that the Dutch flag flies in name over the whole island, 
but the only parts which are really governed by the Dutch are a small region round 
Makassar in the south, Minahasa in the north, and the district of Gorontalo in the 
Bay of Tomini. These parts are, nowever [sic], as nothing compared with the wide 
acres of land still covered with virgin forest and calling no one master but 
untutored savage” (Hickson 1889: 3-4; quoted in Henley 1989: 4).  
But this general situation in Central Sulawesi was soon to change. Approximately around 
1890, the last period of colonial rule started. A few years later it reached the isolated 
mountains of Central Sulawesi when between 1905 and 1907 the Dutch brought Central 
Sulawesi under colonial authority (see Chapter 4). Although using military intervention, 
the new initiative also indicated a fresh shift in colonial administration through what is 
generally called the Ethical Policy (Coté 1996). The new strategy in this policy was 
linked to the colonial government’s goal of expanding its territory towards the outer 
islands in order to maintain power and control. Local riots in Lombok and Aceh, pressing 
for a new Indonesian nationalism, were perceived as a direct threat to Dutch authority. 
The former practice of onthoudingspolitiek, a policy that attempted non-involvement in 
local power structures outside of areas of direct colonial control, could no longer serve 
the needs of colonial government, nor answer a new pressure from the homeland towards 
a moral obligation connected to the colonial project. As a result, queen and parliament 
commenced the Ethical Policy. However, this meant for Central Sulawesi, which so far 
had not come under direct Dutch colonial rule, that “development” had to be introduced 
via military invasion – the process of so-called “pacification” (Weber, Kreisel, and Faust 
2003: 408). 
Already by 1891, some Dutch entrepreneurs had been sighted near the Gulf of Tomini, 
but without colonial support Central Sulawesi’s forest products, iron ore and coal could 
not be extracted. In 1894 the first trading post was erected on the coast in Poso under the 
authority of the first Dutch controleur (district officer).5 This post experienced an upgrade 
in 1902, when the first assistant-resident was installed. A.J.N. Engelenberg, the first 
governmental official in the region, was trained in Ethical Policy, and highlighted the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The goal was here to employ and monitor tax payments for the evolving trade between local communities 
and Chinese merchants (Coté 1996: 93). 
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moral duties in his work: “Our vocation is to give the native the opportunity to [achieve] a 
high standard of living … [to make him suitable] for a dogged perseverance in the 
difficult struggle which life always imposes” (Engelenberg quoted in Coté 1995: 260). 
The goals behind the Ethical Policy approach for Central Sulawesi can be found in the 
aim for a larger economic benefit, a higher population density and optimized control over 
the people living in the region. New implementations were the introduction of a head tax, 
the prohibition of some forms of local belief praxis, a pressure to change from shifting 
dry-rice agriculture to continuous wet-rice production, as well as the resettlement of 
upland people to the lowlands.6 A series of military actions began in 1905, when “the 
Poso region witnessed a relatively ‘uneventful’ sweep of Dutch forces” (Coté 1996: 97). 
This was part of a military action leading from the Gulf of Tomini southwards to the 
kingdoms of Luwu and Gowa, which were subjugated under Dutch force. Well concealed 
behind a “welfarist rhetoric” (Coté 1995: 261) were particularly economic interests that 
fit neatly with the goals of another form of Dutch intervention in Central Sulawesi: 
Several years before the first controleur was sent to Poso, the missionary Albertus 
Christiaan Kruyt had set foot in the region of Central Sulawesi, where he built the 
Pamona missionary school in Poso.7 The strong governmental support for a missionary 
post in the area finds its explanation in the goal to “undertake ‘civilising work’ where the 
natives […] who had a reputation of ferocious head hunters, would be gradually made 
amenable to a European presence and […] create a barrier against the growing influence 
of Islam in the area” (Coté 1996: 93). A.C. Kruyt’s Poso mission eventually lead to a 
Christianization of the interior of Central Sulawesi, “spark[ing] a religious transformation 
of the highlands” (Sangaji 2007: 324).8 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 For a detailed analysis of colonial implementations see Schrauwers (2000). 
7 I will come back later to the works and results of A.C. Kruyt and the Poso mission in detail (Chapter 4). 
8 It also laid the foundation for the 1947 Tentena establishment of a central Christian organ in Central 
Sulawesi, the Central Sulawesi Christian Church, Gereja Kristen Sulawesi Tengah (BI). 
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Map 3 Central Sulawesi under colonial administration, ca. 1912 (Adriani and Kruyt 1951). 
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Dutch colonial rule was terminated with the arrival of the Japanese in 1942. The Japanese 
occupation ended in 1945 with the declaration of Indonesia’s Independence, but Dutch 
forces returned to their former colony after the Second World War and regained control 
over several islands including Central Sulawesi. It was not before 1949 that the 
Netherlands recognized Indonesia’s sovereignty. With the country’s Independence the 
political diversity of Central Sulawesi transformed “into a single political entity within a 
modern state” (Sangaji 2007: 325). At the beginning of autonomy, the region was 
subjugated under the province of North Sulawesi, but it became a sovereign province in 
1964. Numerous new laws and regulations were formulated that affected regional and 
local constellations. Under the rule of President Suharto, an era called Orde Baru (BI), 
New Order, new ratified state laws deeply impacted land rights and access to resources; 
large areas were converted into conservation areas and protected forest regions, not 
uncommonly leading to the repression of local communities. As elsewhere in Indonesia, 
the Central Sulawesi region had to face the implementation of administrative and thereby 
standardized village units, the desa (BI). Another trait of the New Order was the 
transmigration program, where more than 85,000 Javanese and Balinese families were 
moved to the province (Sangaji 2007: 323).9 Still today the population of Cental Sulawesi 
is growing continually, partially because of inner-Indonesia migration. In market terms, 
Central Sulawesi’s economy was severely influenced already through Dutch colonial rule, 
where most communities were involved in some form of business, trading products like 
resin, ebony, rattan, crocodile skin and copra – the latter product was backed up by the 
government through the official order for Central Sulawesi families to each plant a 
minimum of 50 coconut trees. Under Suharto’s rule foreign investment left its impact on 
local communities. Sangaji notes that 4.6 million hectares of Central Sulawesi’s total 6.8 
million hectares of land are allocated among 130 private companies as well as companies 
that are linked to the government (2007: 326). Another aspect mentioned by Sangaji is the 
immense transformation of agriculture in the province, deeply affecting land control due 
to the “revolusi cokelat” (Sitorus 2002) or as Li calls it, the “cocoa boom” (2002) 
beginning in 1988. Cocoa has become one of the most important export goods of the 
province, with an export value of around 29.6 million US$ in 2013.10 Land that was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Nevertheless migration to Central Sulawesi had already played an important role in the region before. 
When the Dutch subjugated Makassar in 1667 a great number of Bugis fled from South Sulawesi to the 
central province (Sangaji 2007: 323).  
10 Juhrbandt et al. note that smallholders from Central, Southeast and South Sulawesi alone produced in 
2008 75 percent of the country’s cocoa output (2010: 116). See also Sangadji (2014).  
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formerly communally owned is now increasingly subject to individual or family private 
control (Sangaji 2007: 326). While cocoa and copra are subject to smallholder farming 
schemes, in recent years a new product managed generally by large companies has 
become highly important for the province: As in many other regions in Indonesia, palm 
oil has gained significant influence in Central Sulawesi. The province has the lowest 
population density of the island, with around 40 inhabitants per km2 in 2013 
(BPSP Sulteng 2013). The great majority today follow Islam while around one quarter of 
the population are Christians; Buddhism and Hinduism as well as a number of local belief 
systems are only minimally represented. The province experienced a violent conflict in 
the Poso region in the early 2000s that sparked international attention. This conflict had 
its roots in socio-economic tensions but soon became an escalation between Christian 
local inhabitants and Muslim migrant communities and resulted in the loss of several 
hundred peoples’ lives (Aragon 2000). The province today consists of one administrative 
city, which is the capital Palu, and twelve administrative regencies, called kabupaten (BI). 
One of them is Kabupaten Morowali, where the Wana portrayed in the course of this 
work live.  
1.3.2 Kabupaten Morowali 
The regency of Morowali covers a total area of 45,453 km² but due to its coastal location 
around the Teluk Tomori, Tomori Bay, around 30,000 km² is water territory. 
Furthermore, Morowali is the kabupaten in Central Sulawesi with the lowest population 
density: While in 2013 Palu had a population density of 881 inhabitants per km² 
Morowali had only 14 per km² (BPSP Sulteng 2013). The three main ethnic groups found 
in Morowali are the To Mori, who live mainly in the north in and around the city of 
Kolonodale, and the To Bungku, who inhabit the southern region of the regency around 
the capital Bungku. The Wana are found across the Tomori bay area and north of 
Momosolato (see map 5 and 6). Several other ethnic groups, mainly Bugis, Toraja, 
Ternate and Buton, as well as ethnic Bajau Laut, have settled for generations in 
Morowali, and transmigrants from the islands of Bali, Lombok and Java have moved to 
Central-Sulawesi as well. Due to the high labor demand from mining companies and palm 
oil plantation the intra-Sulawesi migration to Morowali has significantly increased during 
the last years (Gogali 2012: 16–17).  
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Since my last research stay Kabupaten Morowali has been divided into two new 
regencies, in late 2013 it was split to form Morowali Utara and Morowali Regency. 
During the time of research this division had not yet been enacted. I will briefly explain 
the process of this division and the current situation of the regency. After the downfall of 
Suharto a new era of government made way for process of general decentralization within 
the Indonesian state. As a result, numerous new regencies (kabupaten) and districts 
(kecamatan, BI), were established all over the archipelago, a process called pemekaran 
(BI), or blossoming. As part of this development the Central Sulawesi kabupaten of 
Morowali was established by Law No. 51 in 1999,11 together with the regencies of Buol 
and Banggai Islands (Aragon 2007: 62).12 The majority of Protestant Mori people in the 
region had high hopes for pemekaran and expected a general improvement of conditions 
with a government now located close by in the new capital of Kolonodale. But with the 
erection of the kabupaten most political offices went to Muslim Bungku officials and left 
Mori frustrated about insufficient political management in the mainly Protestant 
kecamatan of the regency. When in 2004 the capital was moved from Kolonodale to 
Bungku in the south, the feeling of disenfranchisement was great among those living in 
Kolonodale and its surroundings (Aragon 2007: 61). In 2012, the area was struck by 
regional riots in Kolonodale since the northern part of the regency under Mori initiative 
aimed to become an independent kabupaten. The head of Morowali regency, bupati (BI) 
Anwar Hafid, re-elected for a second period in 2012, had promised during the election 
stage to support the splitting of the regency. However, when the parliament held his 
closing session in Jakarta on 14 December 2012, it only announced seven new 
autonomous regions;13 Northern Morowali was not one of them, and its advocates still 
had to wait until the House of Representatives reified their decision in a third session on 
autonomous regions. Meanwhile in the city of Kolonodale riots broke out (Sangadji 
2012). A couple of months later, with the decision of 12 April 2013 the regency was 
finally divided into Kabupaten Morowali and Kabupaten Morowali Utara (Northern 
Morowali). Since Wana people inhabit only the northern part of Kabupaten Morowali the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia 51/1999 tentang Pembentukan Kabupaten Buol, Kabupaten 
Morowali, dan Kabupaten Banggai Kepulauan. 
12 Before this establishment Morowali was under the regency of Kabupaten Poso. 
13 Mahakam Ulu (East Kalimantan), District of Malacca (Nusa Tenggara), Central Mamuju (West Sulawesi) 
Sea Banggai (Central Sulawesi), District Tailabu Island (North Maluku), District Penukal Abab Lematang 
Ilir (South-Sumatra) and East Kolaka (South-East-Sulawesi) (Sihite 2012). 
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decision to establish an independent North Morowali region will probably affect the 
situation for Wana greatly.14  
In the following I will primarily speak of Kabupaten Morowali in its pre-2013 
administrative constellation, since most of my data were collected prior to the regency 
division.  
1.3.3 Wana: Terminology 
In early Dutch colonial literature, people inhabiting the uplands extending from Central 
Sulawesi to South Sulawesi were commonly subsumed under the term Toraja, or 
sometimes Toradja. The root of the term stems from the Makassar term to raja, meaning 
people from the north, or, in a more common explanation, from the Bugis term to ri aja, 
meaning people from the uplands or from above. It was used as an opposite of the term to 
luu or to lau (Bugis), meaning coastal people (Roth 2005: 494). The term achieved such a 
wide popularity that it was still used in more current sources (e.g. Holmgren and Spertus 
1989, see Aragon 2000: 52). However, based on differing local terminologies and terms, 
most scholars today choose to oppose such a generalization when referring to Central 
Sulawesi uplanders.15 Whereas the Southern Toraja have chosen the term as a self-
referential term, the Central Sulawesi upland groups do not use the term for themselves.16 
From the Dutch colonial side it was the missionary A.C. Kruyt who began to use the term 
instead of the former expression alfur, a Ternate term meaning forest or wilderness,  
which was used by Europeans as a general term for all East Indonesian people who were 
neither Hindu nor Muslim (Aragon 2000:52).17 An upland–lowland distinction was thus 
employed in early denominative terms and also in early accounts of Central Sulawesi. In 
the early 20th century, the linguist Adriani described the region as consisting of only two 
main features: The narrow coastal strip inhabited by Muslims, and the “almost 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 A member of the DPRD (Regional Legislative Council for Provinces) even told me in an interview that 
eventual plans existed to give Wana people their own sub-district once the Morowali Utara project 
succeeded.  
15 Aragon lists a number of scholars, e.g., Pakan (1977) and Masyhuda (1977). See also Weber (2005).  
16 According to Bigalke, in the 17th century Bugis and Makassar groups used the term as a general 
appellation for upland people in Central and South Sulawesi (2005).  
17 The adoption of often derogative lowland terms for upland groups by Europeans was a common practice, 
and not only in Central Sulawesi. The terms Karen, Orang Ulu, Ifugao, Dayak, Montagnards, and Batak 
were all invented through the same process (Reid 2010: 46).  
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uninterrupted forest girdle [woudgordel] […] the territory of the uplanders, where one is 
entirely among Toraja” (Adriani 1901: 235, quoted in Henley 2005: 409–10). A.C. Kruyt 
divided the Toraja into three groups: South, West and East Toraja; this division was taken 
further through Kaudern with the categories Palu and Koro Toraja, subdivisions of the 
West Toraja (Aragon 2000: 53; see Map 4).18  
 
Map 4 Distribution of the West Toradja, the East Toradja and the Saadang Toradja (Kaudern 1925: 
166).  
Among the many upland groups in Central Sulawesi, only few are referred to with the 
rather negative connotation of suku terasing (BI), meaning isolated tribe. Aragon, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Today, in an extremely simplifying manner and based on geographic conditions or linguistic patterns one 
can assess twelve main ethnic groups in Central Sulawesi: Kaili, Tomini, Kulawi, Pamona, Lore, Mori, 
Bungku, Saluan, Balantak, Banggai, Toli-Toli and Bual (Sangaji 2007: 322). 
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working on the Central Sulawesi upland group of the Tobaku, notes that the term is 
generally not applied to the Christianized Tobaku, but is instead rather used to refer to 
other groups like the Lauje and the Wana (Aragon 2000: 327). Li, researching among the 
Lauje in Western Central Sulawesi, states however that the Lauje are generally not 
perceived as “truly indigenous” since they “are not especially exotic and have no serious 
competitors for their hilly terrain” (Li 2000: 162). Wana people serve as representing the 
more extreme end of the upland or indigenous continuum here: “[t]here are other groups 
in Central Sulawesi, such as the Wana, who better fit the bill” (Li 2000: 162). The term 
wana itself must be regarded in a similar line with the term Toraja mentioned above. 
Although the term wana itself has no other connotation in the Wana language than 
describing themselves and their land (tana wana), in the Pamona language wana means 
forest. Jane M. Atkinson, who conducted research among the Wana of the Northern 
region around Ulu Bongka (Map 5), concludes from this: “The Wana may have taken as a 
name for themselves a term applied by outsiders to the inhabitants of the rugged forest 
interior” (Atkinson 1979: 5). For Central Sulawesi, Wana in general serve the idea of the 
truly indigenous group that is particularly exotic, lives extremely remotely in the upland 
forests, relies completely on indigenous medicine, is illiterate and ignorant of Indonesian 
language, relies upon a highly primitive subsistence-based agriculture, has no clothing or 
shoes, and lacks religion – just to mention some of the stereotypes I met in discussions 
with government officials or other people living in the lowlands, in nearby Kolonodale or 
far away Palu, all of them pointing towards highly important matters of marginality and 
marginalization processes relevant for Wana today.  
Wana adherence to their own belief system is another highly important marker of 
marginalization developments, especially in an interreligious context. Today, a number of 
Wana mainly living in the lowlands have converted either to Islam or Christianity – the 
two dominant religious sections in the area around the Morowali Nature Reserve. Still, 
the majority continue to follow their own belief system, especially those Wana residing in 
the upland region. Against a continuing pressure to undergo religious conversion from the 
outside, Wana have developed their very own notion of agama Wana, Wana religion. 
Thus, since religion is such an important part of Wana identity I will in the following 
refer only to those Wana who continue to follow their own belief system with the term 
“Wana”. Whenever I will need to highlight the ethnic rather than the religious component 
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of what it means to “be Wana”, I will add the specific religious profession, as there are 
also Christian and Muslim Wana living in Taronggo. 
Furthermore, the living conditions for Wana are neither static nor do all Wana live and 
work in the same setting. In the following I will portray three analytical regions that I use 
to differentiate between the varying living conditions Wana in the Kabupaten Morowali 
nowadays have to face: First, Wana within the Morowali Nature Reserve; second, Wana 
at the border of the nature reserve; and third, Wana in the lowland village of Taronggo. 
These categories of course are just part of a raw picture and are not necessarily fixed 
since Wana in these different regions face multiple challenges. 
 
 
Map 5 The Wana area, with special focus on Atkinson’s research area in the North (Atkinson 1989: 
327).  
 
  
18 
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1.3.4 Wana within the Nature Reserve 
Most Wana today live in the Morowali Nature Reserve – the largest nature reserve of 
Central Sulawesi, covering an area of 225,000 ha of the Eastern peninsula (Map 6). 
Comprising various forms of ecosystems like grassland, mangrove or montane forests 
rising up to 2,600 m above sea level and lacking any infrastructure, the nature reserve is 
difficult to access. According to a WWF study from 1980, approximately 5,000 people 
belong to the Wana ethnic group – but the numbers are extremely vague.  
Like many other Southeast Asian highland groups the Wana practice swidden 
horticulture, planting mainly dry rice and manioc in their gardens. A smaller part of their 
subsistence is drawn from hunting and gathering (e.g. Alvard 2000b). Every year between 
August and October the swiddens are cut and burned and then, between October and 
November, newly planted with rice. When turning to other swiddens, each family moves 
along with the whole household. Regional differences in household formations can be 
found within the Wana area. Atkinson describes the Wana north of the nature reserve as 
living in centralized villages (1989: 3) whereas Alvard (2000) points to the Wana around 
the Posangke region in the center of the nature reserve living in scattered households of 
five to 20 people called lipu (Fig. 1).19 During my first research stay I was able to visit the 
Posangke region myself, but never found households with less than 10 people.20 
Alvard, referring to Atkinson (1989) and A.C. Kruyt (1930), describes those Wana people 
living in the upland area of the nature reserve as rather isolated compared to their coastal 
neighbors: “They have maintained relative isolation from much of the outside world, and 
most adults speak no or very little Indonesian, have little or no interaction with the cash 
economy, and maintain a traditional religious belief system” (2000a: 429). In contrast to 
this I observed an extensive resin trade, meaning that people walk for very long distances 
to the southern settlements like KeaKea that have access to boats to reach the city of 
Kolonedale on a regular basis. The resin trade (and for the people living in the mangrove 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 In order to enhance readability, all photographs in this thesis are listed at the end of each referring sub-
chater. See also: Table of Figures.  
20 In contrast to Posangke, the southern area of Kayupoli encompassed six households each with two to 15 
people, in which two houses were isolated from the rest located on the other side of the Morowali River. 
Further south, in Kea Kea and Marisa, rather centralized villages of up to 15 houses can be found, as is the 
case, as described by Atkinson (1989), for the Ue Bone region. 
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regions also rattan trade) plays an important part in the current Wana economy and shows 
intense interaction with people outside the reserve.  
 
Map 6 The Morowali Nature Reserve and Taronggo (Source unknown; rearranged by Grumblies).21 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 The village east of Taronggo, called Posangke, is a lowland village, not to be confused with upland 
Posangke within the Nature Reserve. 
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The question of isolation itself is a highly controversial topic that should not be too easily 
concluded from geographical isolation and ascribed to communities – I will come back to 
this topic later. Living in a nature reserve has several effects on the community living 
within its boundaries. Officially, the Indonesian state does not allow any people to reside 
within protected areas. However, in the Wana case a local NGO, Yayasan Sahabat 
Morowali, was able to reach a form of consent with the officials in Palu, allowing Wana 
to stay within the Cagar Alam as long as they do not contribute to its destruction. This 
requires a very restrictive lifestyle that is mandatory for Wana people who wish to stay 
within the reserve. Occasional visits by members of local forestry offices guarantee that 
inhabitants shy away from cash-crop production like coffee or cocoa. Their swidden 
agricultural system is accepted by outside officials and is not persecuted; still, Wana, 
especially those participating in cash crop cultivation or in wood or rattan trade carefully 
watch the visits from outsiders since their status remains unclear. The meaning of 
restrictions caused by the status of a nature reserve is most clearly visible on the 
boundaries of the reserve, where Wana living right at the border of the reserve can 
combine swidden agriculture and cash crop production.  
1.3.5 Wana at the Border of the Nature Reserve: Salisarao  
Although the amount of research focusing on the Wana remains low, the area of Kayupoli 
and Kea Kea as well as Posangke and even Uewaju now and then become the target of 
tourists, the occasional anthropologist or documentary filmmakers. All of these 
destinations lie within the nature reserve and are to some extent accustomed to visits from 
mostly European outsiders; Kayupoli is a tourist spot, athough rarely frequented, with a 
number of guides from Kolonodale and other areas of Sulawesi bringing visitors to the 
area – it is also the target of a US-based semester abroad organization, bringing a group 
of more than 20 students to Kayupoli every year.22 Searching for the “ultimate indigenous 
experience” visitors seldom take a trip outside of the nature reserve’s borders although 
the geographic conditions are the same. Salisarao, one of my research locations, is such 
an area, located directly in the mountainous region at the boundary of Morowali Nature 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Where there be Dragons. Accessed 13th December 2015. 
http://www.wheretherebedragons.com/programs.semester.php?action=detail&programLabel=islandsofind
onesia.  
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Reserve, south of Posangke and north to the village of Taronggo. According to Wana 
living in Salisarao, no non-Indonesian visitor had ever set foot on their terrain until my 
own fieldwork started in Salisarao. Even Indonesian visitors do not pay attention to 
Salisarao although it is conveniently located within walking distance of Taronggo – a 
place where most visitors take an occasional rest on their way further north. Since it 
became one of my research sites, I asked a member of a local NGO from Kolonodale 
about the reason for the Salisarao tourist neglect. Although the NGO had been an active 
organization for many years helping and advocating Wana within the nature reserve, they 
themselves had never paid attention to Salisarao Wana. The NGO member asserted they 
“were no longer traditional” and therefore not worth the interest – or support. “They were 
modern”, he insisted, and, according to the NGO’s designated goal, which is to “maintain 
Wana unique culture” (Lahadji 2001), Salisarao Wana had moved too far from their 
“ancestors’ ways”. What he meant was their participation in the modern economy, their 
reliance on Western medicine, their changed lifestyle, their mobile phones, their close 
connections to their Taronggo lowland neighbors, and so on. I did not find the difference 
between Wana living inside and outside the nature reserve to be as striking as the source 
from Kolonodale did. Wana in Salisarao, just like their inner-reserve neighbors, live in 
dispersed settlements, have no access to infrastructure or electricity and have to hike a 
great distance to reach the village of Taronggo (Fig. 2). Wana outside the nature reserve 
however have the opportunity to engage in a broader cropping system, planting cash 
crops like cocoa or, more recently rubber, peanuts or coconut palms for the production of 
copra. The nature reserve’s restrictions do not apply for them. Their involvement in cash-
crop cultivation and the decreasing importance of the swidden farming cycle has led 
outsiders, such as the source in Kolonodale, to come to the conclusion that Salisarao 
Wana are less “backward” than their semi-nomadic neighbors within the reserve. Planting 
cash crops seems to have a significant impact on perceptions of indigeneity. As Li states 
for the Lauje in the Western part of Central Sulawesi, growing cocoa has turned them 
from “primitives” into “real farmers” building up a long-term investment (2002: 421). 
Since cocoa has “the lure of modernity” (Li 2002: 421), Salisarao Wana have become for 
some – i.e. tourists and their inner-reserve relatives – just as my source mentioned above, 
“too modern”. For others, however, Wana following the lure of modernity and planting 
cocoa or copra have not turned Wana “backwardness” into “modernity”: Their lowland 
neighbors and state officials continue to perceive Wana in Salisarao as “backward” 
Chapter I. Introduction     
	   29 
uplanders (see Chapter 4). This distinction becomes highly meaningful when discussing 
marginalization processes among Salisaro and Taronggo Wana. 
1.3.6 Wana in the Lowland Village of Taronggo 
Hiking down the Salisarao mountains (Fig. 3), one reaches a natural border between 
upland and lowland (as analytical categories) – the Soelato River (Fig. 4). Usually 
traversable for an adult Wana, in rainy times the Solato water level significantly increases 
and the surrounding regions are subject to major flooding. Without a bridge or a boat – 
neither available in the area – no person can cross this natural border. Here, the question 
of geographical isolation enters, at least partially, center stage. South of the river bend lies 
the village of Taronggo, my second fieldwork location. This refers to the community of 
Taronggo, a village with state administration and road access, where Wana live together 
with Christian and Muslim neighbors. The small rural community is the last village on the 
road from Baturube, the capital of kecamatan Bungku Utara. Baturube can be reached 
from Kolonodale only by ferry, which takes around six to eight hours. From there it takes 
another hour by motorcycle to reach Taronggo. The road ends in the village. Thus, traffic 
in Taronggo is very low and only a small number of outsiders visit the village. Taronggo 
is an interethnic as well as an interreligious community. The religious majority are 
Protestant Christians, 23 mainly living in the south of the village, its administrative center 
(Fig. 5).24 Second in terms of number are those adhering to the Wana belief system: Wana 
who have resisted a religious conversion, most of them living in wooden pile houses in 
the north of the village, at the very end of the road (Fig. 6). The Muslim community takes 
the third place in numbers, most of whom settle at the entrance of Taronggo in the 
southeast. Further, few members of a Pentecostal church also live in Taronggo.  
In 1930, the missionary A.C. Kruyt already mentions Taronggo as a newly built kampung 
Wana (BI, hamlet), as part of a colonial initiative that aimed at moving upland groups like 
the Wana from the upland terrain to centralized villages. A.C. Kruyt hints at the fact that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Due to the predominance of Protestantism in the research location I will in the following often use the 
term Christian as equivalent to Protestant Christian. As a matter of course I will always explicate 
whenever I am speaking of other Christians, for example Pentecostal.  
24 It consisted of around 72 households in 2011, 27 of them Protestant Christian and 25 of them Wana, 16 
Muslim households, three Pentecostal and one Catholic household.  
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the Wana were unwilling to be resettled and only stayed in the kampung when there were 
visitors from outside such as government officials around.25 Today, Wana have settled for 
more than two generations in Taronggo, whose inhabitants’ roots lie in the area of 
Posangke and Ratobae, both within the nature reserve, and Salisarao. Most of Taronggo’s 
residents are ethnically Wana, but many of them have married other ethnic people, like 
Mori, Bugis or Torajan (see Chapter 4). 
Taronggo today is a village with a full administrative apparatus – the administrative head 
of the village is the kepala desa (BI). In the year 1979, the New Order government, 
inventing a new village administrative structure and unit as the lowest level of 
governmental organization, submitted a new legislation. From that year on, the authority 
of every village was ascribed to a kepala desa. As in other villages throughout Indonesia, 
Taronggo was attributed with an outsider kepala desa who did not speak the local 
language.26 The current kepala desa is a Christian from Uemasi, Bungku Utara, married 
to a Muslim woman from Baturube. No administrative position in Taronggo today is 
occupied by Wana. 
Given the various religious affiliations found in Taronggo, the village is home to a 
Christian Protestant church – the largest building in the village – which belongs to the 
Central Sulawesi Christian church (Gereja Kristen Sulawesi Tengah, BI), the main 
Christian church formation in Central Sulawesi. There is also a small mosque in the 
Southeastern entrance to Taronggo and a Pentecostal church building that is currently in 
expansion planning, although the Pentecostal community is marginal in numbers. Plans 
for the erection of a rumah adat (BI), a house for Wana local custom,27 are irregularly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Since the era of A.C. Kruyt the kampung of Taronggo has three times changed its location; currently it 
has for almost thirty years been located at the area of the former Wana kampung Uemasi, a kampung that 
had a school in the past but was relocated to the east, and took its name with it to the place of the current 
kampung of Uemasi. 
26 Furthermore, Law 5 (Undang Undang Republik Indonesia 5/1979 tentang Pemerintahan Desa) insisted 
on an appointed village consultative assembly (LMD; Lembaga Musyawarah Desa) and village 
community resilience board (LKMD; Lembaga Ketahanan Masyarakat Desa) under the authority of the 
kepala desa. In 1999 a new Law (Undang Undang Republik Indonesia 22/1999 tentang Pemerintahan 
Daerah) was passed and defined the unit desa, formerly a territorial unit, as a legal unit. Further, the new 
law made the unit desa more autonomous from broader governmental entities and paid more respect to 
local structures and customary regulations. Additionally, the LMD and LKMD were united in the 
structural unit of BPD (Badan Perwakilan Desa), which is, at least according to the law, elected by the 
villagers. BPD and kepala desa are supposed to work together and decide on financial, organizational 
issues, i.e. the village government. The BPD itself can terminate the legislature period of the kepala desa 
(Antlov 2003: 198–99). 
27 The term adat (BI) has ambiguous meanings. It can be translated as local right system but also as culture, 
customs, traditions or values. For a discussion of adat in relation to agama, religion, see Chapter 4.3.2. 
For a general discussion of adat in Indonesia see Davidson and Henley (2007).  
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discussed but so far have not been realized. Taronggo is also home to an elementary 
school, the sekolah dasar (BI), also called SD, where the village’s children, regardless of 
their religious profession, can go to school. For medical care, the government has erected 
a stationary medical center, a small house supposed to function as a home for a nurse.28 In 
case of medical need, people also turn to one of the three local kiosks to buy medication, 
or visit the puskesmas (Pusat Kesehatan Masyarakat, BI), a local community health 
station, in Baturube – an hour’s motorcycle drive away. The closest hospital can be found 
in Kolonodale, which from Uewaju up in the mountains involves an approximately four- 
to five-day hike, and from Posangke a two- to three-day hike. For people from Taronggo 
it means driving first to Baturube and then crossing the Tomori Bay by ferry. Despite the 
strenuous route to the hospital, transportation costs are relatively high for the Taronggo 
community and especially for upland Wana.  
Most people of Taronggo are peasants, planting cash crops like cocoa and copra; some of 
them have just recently started to engage in rubber plantation. In the 1990s, a national 
palm oil company, PT Kurnia, opened a plantation in the vicinity of Taronggo. Taronggo 
today is enclosed completely by palm oil plantations; the village is nested between the 
nature reserve to the north (Fig. 7) and the plantation around the settlement itself. Some 
villagers have working contracts with PT Kurnia while others only work occasionally in 
the plantation, and others plant their own oil palms (see Chapter 5). The palm oil 
plantation has become the biggest source of quick cash income for the villagers, with 
even Salisarao Wana occasionally working a few days or weeks in the plantation, though 
seldom on a regular basis.  
 
So far no specific research on marginality has yet been conducted among the Wana. 
Nevertheless, the extensive literature by the US anthropologist Jane M. Atkinson touches 
relevant aspects on this topic (1979, 1983, 1984, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1996, 2004). 
Her conclusions from a two-year research stay between 1974 and 1976 in the area of Ue 
Bone, north of the Morowali Nature Reserve, mainly cover dimensions of shamanism, 
religion and gender among the Wana that are very relevant to my own analysis. Although 
her research location was far away from my own I draw a great deal of my understanding 
from her insights. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 However, the appointed nurse was only rarely apparent during the time of the field study. Months passed 
by without the nurse setting foot on Taronggo. 
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An M.A. thesis by Cynthia Riccardi (1999) submitted at Ohio University deals with 
agriculture among the Wana of Kayupoli, focusing mainly on the documentation of the 
swidden cycle. Between 1995 and 1996 the US anthropologist Michael Alvard conducted 
research on hunting practices and sustainability among the Wana of Posangke (2000a; 
2000b). Additionally there are two short articles by the environmental activist and current 
governmental representative Jabar Lahadji dealing with minority rights and the impact of 
reserve zones on the Wana (Lahadji 1999, 2001, 2008), and Nasution Camang, director of 
the NGO Yayasan Merah Putih in Palu, has written a short case study on Wana of the 
Northern Bulang area (2003). Based on his cooperation with the latter, Marcus Colchester 
has also written a short overview of the area (2009). The extensive work by the Dutch 
missionary Albert C. Kruyt, published in 1930, offers highly valuable insights into 
historical conditions among the Wana (1930). Regarding literature on my specific 
research area there is only the work by Alvard on the Posangke area; no research has been 
conducted on Salisarao or Tarrongo.  
Chapter I. Introduction     
	   33 
Figure 1 Wana house in Posangke, within the nature reserve. 
 
	  
 
Figure 2 A Wana lipu in Salisarao.	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Figure 3 The Salisarao Mountains.	  
Figure 4 The Soelato River.	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Figure 5 House of a Christian family in Taronggo.	  
	  
Figure 6 House of a Wana family in Taronggo.	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Figure 7 Houses in Taronggo, the forest demarcating the nature reserve’s border.	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1.4 FIELDWORK SETTING AND METHODS 
1.4.1 Entering the Field 
In 2010, I entered the field for an initial preliminary research stay. Based on extensive 
communication with the documentary filmmakers Gerard Nougarol and Martine 
Journet,29 who have known the Southern Wana area for more than 20 years, and also 
further communication with Jane Atkinson, who had helped with important insights, I 
decided to take a first tour covering the southern region of what Atkinson has called “the 
Wana region”. Accompanied by Ajeran Donda, a local guide, I passed through a number 
of Wana settlements located within the Morowali Nature Reserve, starting in the alluvial 
plain of Kayupoli, where we added Apa Ingus, a middle-aged Wana, to our group. From 
Kayupoli and KeaKea we hiked to Taronggo, the village mentioned above, where we 
only rested for provisions and a good night’s sleep – though in the end this would become 
my main fieldwork location. We left for the North, hiking up the strenuous route through 
the Wana mountains towards Posangke, located high in the uplands of the nature reserve. 
In Posangke I got the chance to observe my first healing ritual, the momago. This ritual, 
bringing together a great number of people, played an important part in Atkinson’s 
studies on Wana shamanism and I was eager to observe it myself. There I met Apa De’e, 
the head, kepala suku (BI), of the Posangke Wana, one of the four Wana sub-clans. 
Despite his very advanced age, Apa De’e had walked a great distance through the rugged 
terrain in the upland to take part in the momago ritual. I was deeply impressed by his 
person and was excited when he offered me the opportunity to come back and spend my 
fieldwork time with him and his family.  
After this first initial stay in the Morowali mountains, back in Germany I arranged my 
actual field research plan, applied for a fieldwork permit with RISTEK (Kementerian 
Riset, Teknologi dan Pendidikan Tinggi), the Indonesian Research Unit, and prepared my 
equipment for a stay in the mountainous Wana area of Posangke. However, my plans 
were to change significantly. After I had arrived in Jakarta in September 2010, some 
problems arose with regard to my securing a one-year research permit for the nature 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 The filmmakers Gerard Nougarol and Martine Journet have produced a number of outstanding 
documentaries on Wana shamanship, for example, “Indo Pino” (2002) and “Gods and Satans” (2005). 
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reserve where Posangke is located. It was with great sadness that I further received news 
that Apa De’e had died soon after I had left for Germany.  
For the moment I had to reorganize my plans. I quickly decided to begin my fieldwork in 
the village of Taronggo as a starting point. However, I planned to leave for Posangke as 
soon as I arranged for another place to stay there.  
My initial research question was focused on local knowledge and epistemologies among 
Wana people and was based on theoretical considerations that I had worked on in my 
Master thesis. However, the realities I was confronted with when I entered the field in 
Taronggo, the lowland village, were too unsteady and disruptive to follow such a study. 
Very soon I noticed that my focus was of no actual relevance, not for my informants, and 
not even for myself any longer. Most of my early discussions touched upon the topic of 
marginality and circled around Wana positionings towards the state and in relation to 
their other-religious and other-ethnic neighbors, around their marginal beliefs and their 
economic situation, as my interlocutors continually described themselves as “stupid”, 
“poor” and “helpless”. I therefore adapted my study to the local social, economic and 
religious realities that were presented to me through my field stay and I decided to write 
about Wana marginality. 30  Living in Taronggo shed light on the daily forms of 
marginalization and resistance between the religious “camps” mingled in the village. I 
was further struck by the difference between Wana living in the lowlands and their upland 
neighbors in Salisarao, just a few hours’ walking distance from the village. I never left for 
the Posangke Mountains for further research as I had initially intended, for I did not 
receive an opportunity to renew my Natural Reserve Forest research permit. But, just as 
Atkinson had written a couple of years earlier, mobility continues to play an important 
role in Wana culture: Wana from Posangke as well as Kayupoli, Marisa, KeaKea – 
settlements in the area south-west of the nature reserve – frequently visited Taronggo to 
sell their resin, to buy coffee, to visit friends, to attend ceremonies and for various other 
reasons. Because of this mobility I got plenty opportunities to discuss matters with Wana 
from inside the reserve as well.  
I lived in Taronggo with the family of Apa and Indo Dheri and their 7-year-old daughter 
Udu. Apa and Indo Dheri are Wana who had moved from the upland area of Posangke to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Tsing describes a similar process of coming to write about marginality; in her research setting among the 
Meratus Dayak “it was difficult to have a discussion about almost any topic I might want to explore – 
gender, forest use, ritual etc. – without paying attention to the context of ethnic asymmetry and political 
status vis-à-vis the state” (1993: 13). 
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Taronggo a couple of years previously after one of their daughters had died. They had 
never converted to another, “world” religion but continue to follow their own Wana belief 
system. Their two elder daughters, one already married and the other going to school in 
Tentena, are converted Christians. Apa Dheri started a couple of years previously to work 
for the local palm oil company. Every morning except for Sunday he left early on his 
bicycle to go to work at the plantation, while Indo Dheri during daytime either stayed at 
home or worked in the family garden as well as on several fields owned by family 
relatives in the surroundings of Taronggo. Apa Dheri had already worked for three 
months as a sporadic assistant for the anthropologist Michael Alvard in the 1990s, so he 
felt it would be suitable for me to stay at his house. Due to his experience with an 
anthropologist he had an understanding of what I wanted and what I needed right from 
the beginning – and he never forgot that my stay had a goal.  
As many other anthropologists have described for other fieldwork situations, I was soon 
somewhat “adopted” by Apa and Indo Dheri and I began calling them father and mother, 
and they calling me daughter – even though Indo Dheri was only a couple of years older 
than me. Needless to say, my status as a paying tenant and a privileged white female were 
often reflected upon by all of us. We openly discussed problems that entered their 
household with me moving in – jealous neighbors, skeptical bosses, a large number of 
new pets and frequent visitors were only some of the problems that I brought upon them. 
I am mentioning this to pay respect to the sometimes over-romanticized notion of 
“becoming adopted” by a field family. We all knew and discussed this delicate matter but 
in the end, despite the unequal power distribution, I certainly cannot refer to our 
relationship without using the word friendship.  
I have used my interlocutor’s real names where I believe it would have been their wish. 
Anonymizing all informants would not have been in the interest of my informants who 
were amazed by pictures and names they saw in the book by Jane Atkinson as well as in 
the writings of A.C. Kruyt. However, due to sometimes controversial standpoints and 
politically hot topics presented in this thesis I have used pseudonyms when necessary. In 
those cases I have replaced names with typical regional names and details of location, age 
or gender of my interlocutors will only be revealed if they are of relevance to the content 
of the statement. 
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1.4.2 Methods 
The thesis is based on a total of 14 months of field research; the first phase took place 
between February and March 2010, followed by the main field stay from September 2010 
until July 2011, and a final visit lasting from March until May 2012.  
Most of the empirical basis of this thesis rests on research methods that were of 
qualitative character. During the first weeks I worked with a field assistant, Ajeran 
Donda, who had accompanied me from the city of Kolonodale and introduced me to the 
people of Taronggo and the upland Wana region. Thanks to his occupational status as an 
occasional tourist guide and sporadic film assistant for the above-mentioned filmmakers 
Nougarol and Journet he knew the area very well. However, since he was not Wana 
himself, I early decided to continue on my own and to look for another assistant who 
lived in the area. However, the politics of doing research in a multi-religious and multi-
ethnic community as diverse as the field situation I had entered made me realize that this 
would be an impossible task. Many interviews I conducted were about highly delicate 
matters centering on felt dimensions of marginalization and religious difference. Bringing 
an assistant from another religious or ethnic division would have made many interviews 
impossible. For example, a number of interviews came to an abrupt halt when an 
uninvited guest came along and, often unintentionally, disturbed the intimacy of the 
interview with his presence as an other-religious or simply other-ethnic person. Hence, I 
worked mainly on my own and only received sporadic assistance for the upland census 
from a young male Wana.  
Contested Participation 
Participant observation was the main strategic method (Bernard 2006: 343) I used during 
my fieldwork. However, participation cannot be a neutral endeavor within a culturally 
and religiously diverse field setting such as my field site. Hauser-Schäublin points to the 
difficulties of “contested participation” (2008: 45) in polarized communities, where a 
constant (re-)negotiation of distance and nearness is necessary to be able to participate; 
participation can be misunderstood as taking sides.  
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In terms of my housing situation, I located myself in the Wana area of Taronggo. This 
was a source of surprise at first for other religious members of the Taronggo community 
and soon became a source of skepticism for some of my Christian interlocutors. 
Christians in Taronggo believed me to be a Christian myself and I struggled during the 
first months to position myself neatly within the religious politics of Taronggo, which I 
only later came to understand (see Chapter 4). While Wana within Taronggo were in the 
beginning surprised to see me stay with one of them, as they felt their houses were not 
suitable for my imagined needs and desires, they soon accepted my decision and they 
would come to visit me without any hesitation. Upland Wana from Salisarao were 
suspicious at the start, since I lived in the lowlands and interacted with all the people from 
Taronggo more or less equally. Once they understood my interest in their culture and 
realized I would not come to the upland region with any missionary goals they also 
started to come to my place, as I was able to visit and stay with them in their upland 
houses on a regular basis. Only a few of the wealthier (Muslim or Christian) community 
members of Taronggo came to visit me where I stayed. Most of the non-Wana 
interlocutors would not come to my house for interviews or for some small talk where I 
lived, but instead insisted I should visit them in their own houses. The choice of a living 
place, the frequency of visits, as well as the places and people I talked to were all part of a 
negotiation process for the community I lived in and were often a subject of discussion, 
and thus were deeply affected by social boundaries and fields of power within the 
fieldwork area, and I had to work out how to wander between the different camps without 
breaking any social rules – a difficult task.  
While Taronggo constituted half of my fieldwork base, the other half was the upland area 
of Salisarao, a region within walking distance from Taronggo, where Wana live in 
scattered households instead of centralized villages, have no electricity or road access, 
and in rainy times cannot cross the river, the natural border between upland and lowland 
regions in the area. Here, I mainly stayed with Apa Main, the single male leading shaman 
of the area, or with the families of Indo and Apa Laku, and Indo Ica and her husband Apa 
nDenda. I hiked at least 4-5 times a week up to Salisarao and I often spent the nights up 
there. My fieldwork was dual-sited; it gave me the opportunity to see and compare upland 
and lowland dynamics of Wana marginality and general realities there. In the lowland 
region of Taronggo my main interlocutors variously represented all the religious sections 
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within the village as I tried to research Wana marginality from all possible angles relevant 
for Wana.  
Interviews 
The other main method I used in the field was interviews. I conducted a number of 
structured and standardized interviews, following a question catalogue, but soon I 
realized that most of my informants were highly skeptical concerning these methods and 
resisted my attempts with creative attitudes. Thus, it was mainly in long, semi-structured 
and problem-focused interviews that I ended up gaining the relevant information. A few 
interviews were conducted in strict privacy, between anthropologist and interviewee only, 
while most were conducted in the interviewees’ houses where frequent visits from 
neighbors, family and friends were normal; similarly, Barker notes: “Where social ties are 
dense and privacy is not a priority […] almost all interviews are likely to be group 
interviews of one sort or another” (Barker 2012: 56). Consequently, I would also 
distinguish between a group interview and an individual interview. There were interview 
situations where visitors appeared, but did not interrupt the content of the interview and 
were just passive members. In those cases I would not use the term group interview. 
However, since a large number of interviews went on for hours, often from dusk until 
dawn, an interview would change its character from single interview to a spontaneous 
group interview once visitors arrived, only to end with a two-person situation by the end 
again. I chose interview partners in the beginning following local recommendations, and 
later based on daily conversations or information that I had gained in an opportunistic 
manner. I chose a number of central informants based on their expertise and status. Apa 
Main for example was the main shaman living close to Taronggo, and an expert for 
discussing questions of religious concern. I also made sure to conduct interviews with 
Christian and Muslim Wana, and thus had three Christian interview partners with whom I 
conducted several interviews, as well as two Muslim informants for recurring interviews.  
When the situation in Taronggo changed (see Chapter 5), and political and immediate 
actions were increasingly coming to dominate the daily conversations, I also used focus-
group interviews that were related to recent developments, meetings or events. I further 
conducted focus-group interviews in relation to specific rituals.  
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Language  
Part of my methods, as well as a daily necessity, was the task of learning the local 
language. Especially with upland Wana, who are seldom fluent in the Indonesian 
language, it was indispensable to learn their own language. Furthermore, the fact that I 
was studying Wana language, called Bahasa Taa, was interpreted as a sign of respect 
towards their culture that Wana appreciated very much. I was able to learn Taa with the 
aid of notes provided by Jane Atkinson in her PhD thesis (1979); a dictionary by Adriani 
of the Bare’e language (1928), of which Taa, considered by its author, is a subdialect; and 
especially the huge and indispensable unpublished notes by the documentary makers 
Nougarol and Journet. Most important was the daily necessity to communicate, and my 
best teachers were Indo and Apa Dheri with whom I lived. However, time in the field was 
not sufficient to become fluent in Taa and my interviews were thus dominated by 
Indonesian language, mixed with small Taa sections. Whenever paragraphs taken from 
interviews are quoted in the course of this work I will use English translations in the 
interest of easier comprehension.  
It is important to note that most Wana interlocutors were greatly pleased with my 
Indonesian language skills since they were not as perfect as they had expected. I had 
started to learn Bahasa Indonesia in Germany and took a short but intensive language 
course in Yogyakarta, but when I arrived in Taronggo my Indonesian skills were still 
basic. I improved my language skills with the Wana people I spent most time with. The 
result was astonishing; while I had (and still have) problems understanding well-educated 
or city-based Indonesians, I can freely take in conservations with Wana who are generally 
too shy and timid to speak Indonesian with their more educated village neighbors or with 
visitors from outside. Once they realized that my language was “more like theirs”, they 
felt encouraged to engage in a discussion with the privileged white female whose 
Indonesian, to their surprise and often amusement, was “as poor as theirs”. This was an 
important “ice breaker” for my initial phase of fieldwork. The decision to choose a 
language became a political tool with respect to the interreligious and interethnic setting I 
lived and worked in, concentrating on questions of marginalization and marginality. 
Whether I chose to speak Taa or Indonesian had a deep influence on my discussion 
partners and made me re-position myself within the social structure. Let me illustrate this 
with an example with my non-Wana interlocutors: Whenever I traveled to other villages 
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or cities like Bungku or Kolonodale and accidentally met non-Wana people from 
Taronggo there, my Wana skills were proudly presented to friends and relatives in the 
cities. However, when outsiders came for a visit to Taronggo, Indonesian was the 
language chosen and I was seldom addressed in Taa by non-Wana interlocutors.  
1.4.3 Fieldwork Politics – Some Preliminary Remarks 
The anthropological “field” is a construct and it is easily asked where the field actually 
begins and ends, and where its borders lie (Gupta and Ferguson 1997). I believe “my 
field” started way back in Germany. Since “the field” is hardly a merely geographical 
location I follow Gupta and Ferguson (1997) in questioning the notion of a clear 
distinction between home and field. The field started for me in the library of my 
university where I began researching possible fieldwork sites that would suit my research 
goal. In order to find answers to my initial research question, which focused on 
indigenous knowledge systems, I was looking for an area containing the most “other of 
others” possible, to use Hannerz’ words (1986: 363, quoted in Gupta and Ferguson 1997: 
8). Speaking with other academics and Indonesia experts, the picture I – and we – had in 
mind of my possible field site was similar to the pictures that were presented to me when 
I came to Indonesia. From Jakarta to Palu and the closer city of Kolonodale, “pictures of 
the primitive” followed me, and I took a central role in searching for them. The acts of 
searching for, reproducing and thereby producing pictures of the “primitive” are therefore 
placeless connections between home and the field; local discourses I heard, wrote down, 
and took home with me were always intermingled with other local discourses that I had 
brought to the field. Exchanging and sharing knowledge, experiences, assumptions, 
generalizations, and questioning them and criticizing them, are not single, independent 
spheres of either here or there. They are parts of a spaceless field that cannot be easily 
reduced to an actual, positivist place that is strictly different and apart from the discourses 
and persons that fill it. Fieldwork, and the role of anthropologists, are thus always a 
political matter, especially when dealing with marginalization processes. Even though 
anthropologists should remain neutral and often choose to observe rather than participate 
too deeply in the community in which they conduct their fieldwork, many struggle with 
this difficult task – as did I. Although I will draw upon the issue of my own role in the 
field in detail in Chapter 4 and 5, it is necessary to briefly introduce the contested role of 
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the anthropologist in the course of this thesis. I had tried to pay respect and attention to all 
religious and ethnic camps in the community of Taronggo. Wana nevertheless were 
generally very shy and cautious regarding my presence there. Many assumed I had some 
missionary attemptions, since in the beginning I portrayed myself as a Christian, and I 
believe there were a number of Wana who did not trust my intentions at all. The general 
distrust weakened over time and after a few months I felt welcomed and respected by all 
parties in the village as well as in Salisaro regardless of ethnic or religious belonging.  
This changed when I started to take part, at least behind the scenes, in some concrete 
action against the potential loss of land for Wana from the upland area. In 2010 Salisarao 
Wana were facing the threat of losing their land for the sake of an expansion of the palm 
oil plantation and feared they would be resettled to the lowlands. While some lowland 
neighbors were welcoming this idea as a development initiative, I listened to my 
interlocutors from Salisarao. All Wana have experienced historical and ongoing 
marginalization processes. They are not helpless victims who waited for the 
anthropologist to save them. Instead, they turned to the privileged and therefore powerful 
outsider for some support – a plea I felt I just had to try to answer. I tried my best to be of 
support for them and for example initiated network-building activities with a local NGO. 
While I was supporting the Wana, my situation within the lowland village of Taronggo 
had changed. A number of my non-Wana interlocutors were not pleased about my support 
for their upland neighbors for various reasons. The result was that I could no longer easily 
engage in conversations with some of my former interview partners, and some people 
started to ignore me. I had taken sides, and so had they. 
Although I paid attention to opinions and explanations from non-Wana locals as well as 
officials and outsiders, I am writing this thesis mainly from the Wana perspective. In the 
following, I will therefore relate a story in which the reader will doubtless perceive the 
role the anthropologist plays in its outcome. I “participated” – to a certain extent. Once I 
had started to do so, my role in the field began to change immensely. Since my research 
question focuses mainly on the way in which Wana perceive their marginalized standing, 
this thesis will therefore present a biased perspective. I will come back to this topic of an 
Engaged Anthropology in Chapter 5 but for now I wish for the reader to keep this 
situation in mind.  
 
	  	  
2  MARGINALITY AND UPLAND GROUPS  
2.1 THE CONCEPT OF MARGINALITY  
Marginality has become a key term in the humanities as well as in the social sciences.31 
Anthropology as an academic discipline has focused from its very beginnings on 
minorities and marginal communities, while other fields, for example psychology and 
geography, also have a special focus on the subject, developing scope models for 
assessing and measuring marginality and scales of marginality. Despite the common 
interest in marginality, the approaches towards marginality have developed quite 
differently.  
Before discussing the meanings of marginality more closely, a first glimpse at the 
etymology of the term provides a useful starting point for investigating the concept. 
“Margin” stems from the Latin term margo, which means edge or border. The existence 
of an edge or border implies a counterpart, the core or center. It displays the relational 
character of the term margin that has its roots in a dualistic dialectic. This counts for the 
phenomen of marginality as well as for marginalization, i.e. the resulting process. 
Marginality is furthermore a term that exists alongside a great number of terms describing 
similar relations: for example, “‘border’, ‘frontier’, ‘limit’, ‘boundary’, ‘edge’, 
‘periphery’, ‘threshold’, ‘space between’” (Dowdy 2011: 2).32 Just recently Harms et al. 
dedicated a section in the HAU Journal of Ethnographic Theory to the idea of remoteness 
and described the concept as having a quite similar meaning to the way in which I use the 
concept of marginality within the scope of this thesis:  
“remoteness is never fixed; it is not a predetermined and enduring place but a 
process situated in dynamic fields of power. The condition is always infused with 
the edgy feeling experienced by people living in a world where the relations of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 A reduced version of this chapter has already been published elswhere (Grumblies forthcoming). 
32 Dowdy further points to the fact that many fields “employ ‘margins’ and ‘centers’ as conceptual metrics 
to grasp the hierarchical entailments of socio-historical flux. Moreover, much of this literature unites 
normative and descriptive methods, thereby giving ‘margins’ a rhetorical charge it often lacks in ordinary 
discourse. In other words, the margins concept is not simply a way to represent and index social 
inequality, but can be used to communicate” (Dowdy 2011: 1-2). 
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inside and outside, near and far, proximate and remote are always contested” 
(Harms et al. 2014: 364). 
Although a great variety of terms similar to marginality have been developed, 
anthropological literature remains surprisingly vague concerning the meanings of 
marginality. Rösing even asserts that although cultural anthropology has a very close 
connection to marginality due to its focus on indigenous communities, “the field could 
not care less about the concept, which is a rather surprising fact” (2000: 89). 33 
Marginality has been a matter of analysis in anthropological studies from the beginning of 
the subject’s history and is treated in a variety of ethnographies and articles. Yet 
anthropological literature has so far kept a strategic distance from a general methodology 
towards marginality as a concept and instead most authors assess marginality with a 
specific focus on local relations and regional concepts. Röttger-Rössler and Stodulka 
assert how anthropological studies tend to highlight specific “situated contingencies of 
marginality” (2014: 16). What is lacking, it is claimed, is a more general theoretical 
insight into marginality; “As an inherently anthropological topic, it is surprising though 
that marginality has rarely been scrutinized conceptually beyond the particularities of its 
respective ethnographic setting” (2014: 16).  
Nonetheless, revealing the concept’s genealogy as an emerging focus of anthropological 
studies shows that a profound conceptualization of marginality and margins is a tool of 
analysis within the discipline. In the following I will show how marginality entered the 
anthropological domain as a theoretical contribution. Since the term is widely used in 
other disciplines it is therefore necessary first to briefly assess the genealogy of 
marginality itself as a term and its application in sociology and geography to assess the 
quite different ways in which marginality entered anthropological discourse. I will then 
show how marginality is conceptualized as an anthropological field, tracing its 
disciplinary development and entanglement with other analytical markers like center and 
periphery; yet the representation of “marginality theory”, as undefined as the field is, can 
at best be partial. In order to analyze the construction of marginality within the context of 
Wana dealings with their own socio-cultural positionings within the Indonesian society in 
the rest of this thesis, I will then show how marginality is an integral part of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 She bases her observation on the lack of references to the term marginalization in indexes in 
anthropological literature, which “reveals a conspicuous absence of the concept” (Rösing 2000: 89). The 
argument that the (non)existence of a concept in textbook indexes can be used as a reliable indicator of 
the relative importance of a given subject in a theoretical field remains, however, unconvincing in my 
opinion. 
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anthropological elaborations of upland–lowland relations, and will further assess the 
specific Indonesian context. 
2.1.1 The Birth of a Concept  
Robert Park is generally considered the “father of marginality” and related concepts. In 
his seminal article “Human migration and the marginal man” (1928) he describes 
migrants as marginal people who are cast between two cultures. Focusing on American 
Jewish immigrants, Park concentrated on the psychological problems that would occur 
through a position “at the margins” of society as he asserts: “It is in the mind of the 
marginal man – where the changes and fusions of culture are going on – that we can best 
study the processes of civilization and of progress” (Park 1928: 893). His initial ideas 
were extended by Everett Stonequist, an American sociologist and student of Park, who 
wrote the influential book “The Marginal Man” (1937) and concentrated on the situation 
of second- and third-generation American Jewish immigrants as well as African 
American immigrants. For Stonequist marginality was closely intertwined with the 
category of race as presenting one of the ideal types of marginal person. The traits of 
marginality cast within “mixed racial ancestry” according to Park portray a complex 
position for the “marginal man” whose location within a society becomes thereby highly 
conflicted:  
“The most obvious type of marginal man is the person of mixed racial ancestry. 
His very biological origin places him between the two races. Generally he has 
distinctive physical traits which mark him off from both parent races. He also 
frequently possesses some characteristics of manner, thought and speech which 
are derived from both lines of his ancestry. Because of these peculiarities the 
mixed blood presents a special problem for the community: what is to be his place 
in the social organization?” (Stonequist 1961 [1937]: 10–11).  
Stonequist’s marginal man is cast between the wish to integrate himself into the new 
culture and the resistance coming from the new society towards him. According to 
Stonequist and Park, such a marginal position may result in a personality disorder, since 
marginality could easily be “manifested in the changed type of personality which it 
produces” (Park 1928: 887), the outcome of emotions raised by the negative experience. 
Of course, from a current perspective, Stonequist and Park deserve heavy criticism – not 
only for the inherent essentialist positioning but also for generalizing a marginal person, 
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relating to a much narrowed version of the person who stands on the other side of the 
marginality spectrum. Similarly, Deegan (2005) argues, referring to Park and Stonequist:  
“They assumed that the hegemonic view of white, able-bodied, capitalist, and 
heterosexual men was the standard, ‘normal’ experience. Within a competitive 
society, however, only a small number of white men fit the image of capitalist 
success, political power, youth, heterosexuality, and health that is idealized. The 
marginal person is, therefore, the most typical person in American life” (2005: 
220).  
Despite this quite essentialist positioning, the genealogy of the term marginality starts 
with Park and Stonequist, who had opened the door for a new generation of scholars 
dealing with various aspects of marginality. Stonequist and Park conceived of marginality 
as a situation between two or more cultures, describing the point of contact, where both 
cultures meet and overlap, where hybrid identities are “cast between two fires” 
(Stonequist 1961 [1937]: 101) and are “poised in psychological uncertainty between two 
or more social worlds” (Stonequist 1961 [1937]: 8). It was only later that the idea of 
marginality was used, fashioned in an oppositional dialectic, to describe a position at the 
edge relative to a center instead of focusing on the situation of individual in-between-
ness.  
2.1.2 Sociological Approach 
Stemming from these early considerations of marginality a major approach towards the 
concept became established within social science research. The model developed by Park 
and Stonequist was replaced by the term “marginal situation” by Dickie-Clark (1966), 
who criticized the earlier approaches for not clearly differentiating between marginal 
personality and marginal situation, the latter not necessarily leading to the former, 
“especially as it affects the structure and the functioning of groups” (1966: 1). For Dickie-
Clark,  
“the marginal situation is a special case of hierarchical situations. What makes an 
hierarchical situation marginal in character, is any inconsistency in the ranking of 
individual or collectivity […] such inconsistency is the essence of the marginal 
situation or what might be called sociological marginality” (1966: 185, see also 
Dunne 2005: 13).  
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This new approach argued that the idea of marginality was not as simple and one-
dimensional as it had been portrayed in the original writings of Stonequist and Park, but 
was rather a complex and mulitfaceted condition (Dennis 2007: 2763). The heyday of 
marginality theory within this approach in sociology and political geography can thus be 
seen as set in the 1960s when the concept was mainly discussed with respect to two 
dimensions – cultural marginality and economic marginality – studied mainly by scholars 
working on Latin America. At that time this was a new form of marginality theory that 
“emerged at the shatterbelt of two conflicting paradigms” (Ward 2004: 184) called 
dependency and modernization theory.34 In Latin American studies the concept was 
generally applied to inland migrants who lived at the edges of big cities and presented an 
idea of absolute marginality towards a system that was utterly capitalistic. With 
increasing hyper-urbanization the growing demand for jobs was not satisfied. People at 
the margins of these cities, left without jobs to make a living, were considered a 
hindrance to national progress and useless for the goals of monopoly capitalism (Munck 
2013: 748). Against this background marginality in its theoretization was criticized 
deeply by Perlman, who revealed a very new perspective towards the concept based on 
her extensive sociological study on poverty in favelas around Rio de Janeiro, called “The 
Myth of Marginality” (Perlman 1976). Countering central ideas of modernization theory, 
she highlighted how the concept of marginality was used to justify claims by the state to 
remove the “urban poor” from Brazilian favelas. The idea of the poor as excluded from 
the mainstream and profoundly different from the rest of society had been backed up by 
social scientists and had helped to legitimize government policies to remove them from 
the favelas, she claimed. In this view, Perlman described the idea of marginality as a “a 
material force as well as an ideological concept and a description of social reality” 
(Perlman 1976: 15). Perlman however showed that favela residents were very well 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 The basis of modernization theory was a capitalist economic system, in which the “modern industrialized 
state” was the result of a linear historical process consisting of different phases of development. 
According to this scheme “underdeveloped countries”, cast in a prehistoric stance, will have to pass 
through these phases to reach the level of “developed” countries. Hence marginality was caused by and 
explained through a specific cultural condition. According to the theory, countries of the South were given 
a “promise of a better future to the new ruling classes that were accumulating tokens of Westernization” 
(Rist 2002: 109). A counter point of view was given by so-called dependency theory. In this interpretation 
the problem was identified in terms of the integration of the South into the world-market-system. 
Marginality is in this view the result of colonial as well as post-colonial structures, with an emphasis on 
economic reasoning. It is the inextricable link between development and underdevelopment which makes 
the countries of the South dependent on the North; or, in other words, the existing structures benefited 
from the desire for development. Both modernization and dependency theory received heavy criticism and 
lost soon their initial importance. 
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integrated into the society economically as well as politically, but were by these means 
simultaneously victims of repression and exploitation, culturally stigmatized and socially 
excluded from a closed system (1976: 195; 2005), but not at all marginal to the society. 
Perlman’s critique had a huge impact on marginality studies and the term came to lose its 
significance for scholars working on Latin America who were turning more and more to 
the “the less ‘toxic’ (see Sachs 1992) concepts of social exclusion, inequality, injustice, 
and spatial segregation” (Perlman 2005: 11). However, the sociological approach to 
marginality continued in some way to mingle in the shadows of supposed meanings and 
fuzzy interpretations, critiqued by many sociological scholars as an extremely vague 
concept, or, as Cullen and Pretes make clear, “leaving these terms [i.e. marginality and 
marginal regions] open to manifold definitions” (Cullen and Pretes 2000: 215).35 
The sociological approach, generally shared for example by geographers, economists and 
sociologists, conceives of marginality in a positivistic understanding as something 
differing from a social norm. Marginality here is considered backward compared to the 
general social mainstream, either in political, economic or social life. Grasping the field 
of marginality in such a sense usually aims at improving a specific disadvantaged 
community and implies a drive for applied research. Researchers following this approach 
usually seek “quantitative indicators of marginality […], while others have tried to use a 
survey approach to come up with qualitative indicators” (Hussain 2009: 4). The 
sociological approach towards marginality differentiates profoundly from anthropological 
concerns with it. Valentine even points out that the two approaches towards marginality 
rarely reference one another, and displays this fact as “a sad example of academic 
segregation” (Valentine 1994: 36). However, while sociological approaches to 
marginality have certainly influenced anthropological concerns at least in some ways, the 
concept has entered anthropological discourse in a quite different way.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 In the same line of critique, this danger of an unclear meaning of marginalization within the sociological 
approach has been presented by del Pilar and Udasco, who have reviewed research approaches towards 
marginality in geography and social science, showing “that there is no agreement in the social science 
literature about the meaning of [it]” (Del Pilar and Udasco 2004: 5). Their outcome showed that there was 
no common connection between any of the approaches they studied. For the authors the result is clear: 
“This is clear evidence that marginality lacks construct validity. […] As a scientific concept, marginality 
cannot work if it has multiple levels of meaning. However, this is just what has happened. […] [T]he 
construct lacks validity” (Del Pilar and Udasco 2004: 11). 
Chapter II. Marginality and Upland Groups   
	   52 
2.1.3 Anthropological Approach: Marginality as Social 
Construction 
In anthropology the notion of marginality is nowadays generally based on an approach 
towards marginality as a social construction. A great number of anthropologists draw 
from the idea of marginality as socially constructed to write about essentializing and fixed 
categories such as center and periphery, questioning the power of a naturalized center and 
studying the relationship between margins and centers, which mutually define and co-
create each other (Hussain 2009: 5).36 This is the approach I will focus on in the course of 
this work.  
In the beginning of the discipline’s history, anthropology as a subject needed to find its 
own specific “intellectual space” (Rapport 2014: 12) to strengthen its position as an 
academic institution. Grounded in a scheme of evolutionary development, the first 
anthropological authors were studying marginal communities as a way to understand how 
Western societies had developed over time. Marginality here was connotated as an earlier 
stage of human progress. When later theories made space for new conceptualizations of 
culture and cultural diversity, anthropology continued searching for alternate 
communities while confirming essentialist notions of the “primitive” and the “civilized”, 
largely ignoring interrelations between supposed centers and their peripheries (e.g., 
Hussain 2009: 6). Focusing on the “primitive other” (Fabian 1983) as the academic 
substance of the discipline, early anthropologists like Malinowski thus produced a vast 
amount of anthropological literature in a naturalist fashion, invented and inspired by 
Malinowski’s rhetorical genre, which closely resembled other “studies of nature” 
(Rapport 2014: 12).37 Following a realist style to present indigenous communities, “the 
Trobrianders were naturalized, and thereby marked as an uncivilized part of nature, 
something to be dominated, tamed and transcended by modern civilisation” (Rapport 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Hussain also points towards psychological scientists who determine the concept as a way to cope with 
individual responses to the dominance of a system, while political geographers highlight the meanings of 
borders and frontier relations within a center–margin approach, taking “marginality as residing in certain 
stereotypical beliefs and their markers, such as race and ethnicity […]. Marginality is studied as a 
deviation from the norm, but the norm itself remains unquestioned” (Hussain 2009: 5). 
37 Early anthropological concerns with the “savage, primitive mind”, e.g. Lévy-Bruhl The “Soul” of the 
Primitive (1928) or Lévi-Strauss’ The Savage Mind (1966), aimed at searching for differences in mind 
between people from varying background: “Do non-Western peoples think differently from Western 
people and, if so, how?” (Dove et al. 2007: 130). Dividing between Western-scientific and local 
traditional knowledge systems is reified in the rise of the interest in local knowledge in the 1980s (Dove 
2000), continuing until today. 
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2014: 13).38 Just as Malinowski himself has propagated: “the final goal, of which an 
Ethnographer should never lose sight […] is, briefly, to grasp the native’s point of view, 
his relation to life, to realise his vision of his world” (Malinowski 1961 [1922]: 25).  
When increasing numbers of critical voices protested against colonial and imperialist 
constellations around the world, anthropology started to reflect upon its own history 
nested within the colonial project. Triggered by Asad’s “Anthropology and the Colonial 
Encounter” (1973) anthropology set the ground for a self-reflective mode of writing. 
Post-colonial thinkers were on the rise, like Said (1978), who pointed out how the 
“Orient” was nothing but a mere projection of the West, a construction, simultaneously 
reaffirming its authority and power while homogenizing those cultures that were 
traditionally subject to exploitation by the “West”. As one of the most influential post-
colonial writers, Spivak paid some critical attention to marginality as a concept; for her, 
as she writes in 1993, it was a “buzzword in cultural critique” (1993: 55). Drawing upon 
Foucault’s work on sexuality, she claims:  
“One must not suppose that there exists a certain sphere of ‘marginality’ that 
would be the legitimate concern of a free and disinterested scientific inquiry were 
it not the object of mechanisms of exclusion brought to bear by the economic or 
ideological requirements of power. If ‘marginality’ is being constituted as an area 
of investigation, this is only because relations of power have established it as a 
possible object” (Foucault 1978: 98; textual modification added by and quoted in 
Spivak 1993: 59).39 
For her, the conceptualization of margins and the inclusion of those who are marginalized 
within a center-based discourse have to be perceived as mere constructions of the center 
(1988). Postcolonial ideas were further developed when Homi Bhabha put forward the 
view of hybridity “that entertains difference without an assumed or imposed hierarchy” 
(1994: 5). Hybridity as an ambivalent concept, and thus enabled a view of permeable 
borders between dominance and subordination, between the self and the other. Its 
mutually constructed character thus portrayed a new notion of culture and the position of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 However, Lewis points to the fact that Malinowski was in fact analysing indigenous groups within their 
relation to market centers in his work “The Dynamics of culture change” (Malinowski 1961, see Lewis 
1998: 724). 
39 Original quote by Foucault: “One must not suppose that there exists a certain sphere of sexuality that 
would be the legitimate concern of a free and disinterested scientific inquiry were it not the object of 
mech- anisms of prohibition brought to bear by the economic or ideological requirements of power. If 
sexuality was constituted as an area of investigation, this was only because relations of power had 
established it as a possible object” (Foucault 1978: 98). 
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margins as a field of hybridity. Subaltern studies were nevertheless also criticized for 
their dualistic notion of domination and subordination. Dei for example points out how 
postcolonial studies largely failed to pay attention to specific historical settings in which 
marginalized spheres were situated:  
“Postcolonial theory dehistoricizes and homogenizes human identities as 
totally/completely fragmented, multiple and transient. In so doing, postcoloniality 
negates/repudiates the repressive presence of collective oppressions, colonial 
exploitations and group marginality, as well as the shared histories of collective 
resistances of marginalized groups” (Dei 2000: 116).  
However, within the so-called literary turn (Scholte 1987) anthropology focused on a new 
conceptualization of margins and other essentialist categories as fundamentally socially 
constructed. Appadurai pointed towards “the anthropological construction of natives” 
(1988: 36) and Gupta and Ferguson indicated that the anthropological field, and thus 
space, is never a natural category but rather is socially constructed, and is the result of 
what they call powers of difference. They put a new focus on questions contesting the 
meaning of and entanglement between margin and center, such as: “how are spatial 
meanings established? Who has the power to make places of spaces? Who contests this? 
What is at stake?” (Gupta and Ferguson 1992: 11). The idea of margins as social 
constructions can be found in a number of anthropological studies (e.g., Tsing 1993; Li 
2000; Hussain 2009), stressing the dynamics nested within the term marginality. Tsing 
also draws her theoretical considerations from postcolonial thinkers like Fanon, Bhabha 
and Spivak, as a highly important field of reflection; she even refers to “the promise of a 
postcolonial anthropology that goes beyond the re-analysis of its own problematic past 
depends upon engagement with the questions and challenges raised by those concerned 
with cultural heterogeneity, power, and ‘marginality’” (1993: 14). For example, bell 
hooks (1984) has related to marginality based on her own experience and highights the 
potential that can be found by taking a marginal position. For her, marginality was a 
notion she was faced with in her youth as a black American woman in times of US racial 
segregation:  
“To be in the margin is to be part of the whole but outside the main body. As 
black Americans living in a small Kentucky town, the railroad tracks were a daily 
reminder of our marginality. Across those tracks were paved streets, stores we 
could not enter, restaurants we could not eat in, and people we could not look 
directly in the face. Across those tracks was a world we could work in as maids, 
as janitors, as prostitutes, as long as it was a service capacity. We could enter that 
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world but we could not stay there. We had always to return to the margin, to cross 
the tracks to shacks and abandoned houses on the edge of town” (hooks 1984: ix)  
Later on she overcomes the negative assumptions of being in, or being part of, the 
margins. She regards the margin no longer as a space of “deprivation” as she calls it, but 
instead as a productive field of agency, or in her own words, as a “site of radical 
possibility, a space of resistance” (hooks 1990: 341). It is in this sense that the margin 
becomes its own space of power – why would one wish to leave it behind? Instead, hooks 
takes the marginal space and transforms it into a tool of “counter hegemonic discourse” 
(1990: 341). Marginality, then, is not something “one wishes to lose, to give up, or 
surrender as part of moving into the center, but rather as a site one stays in, clings to even, 
because it nourishes one’s capacity to resist” (hooks 1990: 341). It is this potential of 
marginality, which makes it such an attractive heuristic tool for anthropological 
discourse. Deconstructing the authority of centers is thus best engaged from the site of the 
margin. Anthropologists have focused on how people living in the margins have found 
their very own ways to deal with power constellations palpable at the periphery, giving 
them meaning, challenging them and reconstituting them in their very own fashion. 
Marginality has thus gained new importance and significance through the work of 
anthropologists who have presented margins as sites from which processes of 
marginalization can be analyzed and understood (cf. Hussain 2009: 11). While 
postcolonial ideas made way for marginality’s entrance into anthropological academia, 
the notion of center vs. periphery also became a topic of intense debate within the field, 
along with a closely related and highly important topic related to the ideas of margins as 
constructed phenomena (e.g., Douglas 1966; Ortiz 1969; Tambiah 1977).  
Drawing deeply from Weber and Parsons, the British sociologist Edward Shils postulated 
a periphery that is marked by its distance from a center, which is characterized as a 
conundrum of concentrated power. For him, every society draws upon a center that 
affects and impacts people who are living within its radius. Individuals relate to the center 
as a point of reference and positioning that constitutes membership in the society. 
Belonging to a society is not only a question of physical location within a certain 
territory, nor is it sheer adaptation to the expectations of people sharing the same 
environment, but rather it is established through one’s relationship with this central core. 
The center is the pivotal place of a symbolic societal system, “the order of symbols, of 
values and beliefs, which govern the society” (Shils 1982: 93) and thus serves as a 
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general point of orientation for individuals on the periphery. By this means, the belief in a 
center gives meaning to a society:  
“It is the centre of the order of symbols, of values and beliefs, which govern the 
society. It is the centre because it is the ultimate and irreducible; and it is felt to be 
such by many who cannot give explicit articulation to its irreducibility. The 
central zone partakes of the nature of the sacred. In this sense, every society has 
an ‘official’ religion, even when that society or its exponents and interpreters, 
conceive of it, more or less correctly, as a secular, pluralistic and tolerant society” 
(Shils 1982: 93). 
Robert Dunne by contrast points to a variety of centers. He shows that marginality is not a 
one-dimensional phenomenon, but instead people are always subject to one or several 
centers relative to which they may be marginal, while at the same time they may also be 
integrated into one or several other centers (Dunne 2005: 15). Communities who are 
distant from a center can therefore only be portrayed as marginal to a certain extent. 
Marginal groups can thus be included in a range of local centers, which differ from the 
societal center, or, Dunne adds, “perhaps even a local centre that is marginal in relation to 
the societal centre” (2005: 23). Consequently Dunne’s conclusion comes around 
succinctly: “marginality is not an absolute” (2005: 15).  
Shils’ above-mentioned rather simplified and static vision of a center and its periphery 
indicates the idea of the state that needs to be addressed when considering the margins. 
Steedly (1999) draws upon the connection between marginality as a theoretical starting 
point and its entanglement with the state; she has pointed out how the state has become a 
“must” in anthropological writing, especially among anthropologists working on 
Southeast Asia. Culture, she argues, is considered “as an attribute of the state – as an 
object of state policy, an ideological zone for the exercise of state power, or literally a 
creation of the state – whereas the state itself is comprehended in ways analogous to 
totalizing or superorganic models of culture” (1999: 433). With the rise of state-centered 
anthropological focus, marginality became an even more important analytical angle:  
“The idea of marginality offered an important corrective to the anthropological 
yearning for a bounded, autonomous place for culture, outside the circuits of 
global capitalism and state power. It insisted that even the most isolated locales 
were shot through with – indeed, one might say constituted by – power and 
influence emanating from dominant centers located elsewhere” (Steedly 1999: 
443). 
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However, Steedly also points to the danger of analyzing minorities through a state-
centered lens; thereby neglecting people at the periphery as fundamentally marginalized. 
“[E]verything comes through the state or its subsidiaries/surrogates”, Steedly writes 
(1999: 443); a phenomenon that becomes highly meaningful for the Indonesian context, 
as I will show in the following subchapters.  
Strongly connected to the notions of center, periphery and the state is the concept of 
power – who has full power and who has only limited power at his or her disposal? It is 
important to note here that power and authority by this means are not reduced to state 
apparatus alone. Foucault has highlighted the necessity of avoiding an equation between 
power and sovereignty, “if we wish to analyze power within the concrete and historical 
framework of its operation”, (Foucault 1978: 90) since it hinders a useful inquiry. Power, 
for him, is “the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they 
operate and which constitute their own organization” (1978: 92). He further distinguishes 
between power, i.e. force relations, and “Power”:  
“Power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes 
from everywhere. And ‘Power’, insofar as it is permanent, repetitious, inert, and 
self-reproducing, is simply the over-all effect that emerges from all these 
mobilities, the concatenation that rests on each of them and seeks in turn to arrest 
their movement. […] [P]ower is not an institution, and not a structure; neither is it 
a certain strength we are endowed with; it is the name that one attributes to a 
complex strategical situation in a particular society” (Foucault 1978: 93).  
Likewise, Ferguson shows that it is not always the state that is exclusively exercising 
power; he moreover states that within center and periphery relations the notion and origin 
of power is not a clearly distinguishable scheme:  
“The place from which power is exercised is often a hidden place. When we try to 
pin it down, the center always appears to be somewhere else. Yet we know that 
this phantom center, elusive as it is, exerts a real, undeniable power over the 
whole social framework of our culture, and over the ways we think about it” 
(Ferguson 1990: 9).  
This phantom center, let me add, is part of an interdependent complexity between center 
and margin, in which power is never exclusive. This entanglement is discussed by Shields 
in his book “Places on the Margin” (1991) in which he asserts that spaces obtain a 
specific ranking position in relation to other places, some of them relatively marginal, and 
also, importantly, other groups, some of them likewise relatively marginal, all of which 
are part of a culturally determined ranking scheme. The constitution of margin and center 
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thus underlies a classification of high and low spaces. Accordingly, all features that 
designate a space, place or culture belong to this scheme of categorization of social 
relations, objects, beliefs and practices. Shields also refers to Said’s concept of 
Orientalism, which placed margins on the “edge of civilization” and revealed the 
“positional superiority” of the center (Said) that determines the “symbolic exclusion” of 
the margins (Shields): “one which puts the High in a whole series of possible 
relationships with the Low without ever losing the upper hand” (Shields 1991: 5). 
However, as I mentioned earlier, the interdependence of spaces in this scheme relegates 
power to a relational concept; drawing on insights from Stallybrass and White (1986), 
Shields points out that the High is in a constant need of the Low, and that the High in 
some part includes the Low, portraying a binary relationship between margins and centers 
that are deeply entangled by social, political and economic ties. He asserts the notion of 
marginality as social construction: “The social ‘Other’ of marginal and low cultures is 
despised and reviled in the official discourse of dominant culture and central power while 
at the same time being constitutive of the imaginary and emotional repertoires of that 
dominant culture” (Shields 1991: 5). To be part of the margin, living in it and being 
assigned to it, being marginalized and experiencing marginalization continually indicates 
a a certain symbolic exclusion from the center,  
“[b]ut social, political and economic relations which bind peripheries to centers, 
keep them together in a series of binary relationships, rather than allowing 
complete disconnection. In this way, ‘margins’ become signifiers of everything 
centers deny or repress; margins as ‘the Other’, become the condition of 
possibility of all social and cultural entities” (Shields 1991: 276).  
The center therefore needs a counterpart, a mirror, displaying, portraying, representing 
and reconstituting the former’s own character as center. This is clearly visible in the 
relationship of the Indonesian state to its very own margins in specific historical 
constellations, as I will show in the following. So far, I have presented some general 
implications crucial for the understanding of the concept of margins, marginality, 
marginalization, and concurring neighboring terms. Marginality can thus be defined as a 
dualistic concept that includes a center and its peripheries, both constituted by mutual 
relationship and subjected to entanglements of power within the sphere of relationships, 
not only to each other but also to other centers and margins.  
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2.2 LOCATING MARGINALITY AMONG SOUTHEAST ASIAN 
UPLANDS 
Before we turn to the idea of marginality as conceptualized by Wana themselves, it 
becomes necessary to shed some light on the category of “upland people” in general to 
show its own deep entanglement with marginality constructions within the Southeast 
Asian and Indonesian context. Since marginality, as an overall notion with which upland 
communities are associated, is itself a dualistic term as portrayed above, the associated 
center always plays a significant role in constituting a marginal region and marginal 
peoples, and thus shaping processes of marginalization. Taking an analytic position in the 
margins consequently offers the valuable opportunity to comprehend the goals, 
mechanisms and functions of the center, its multiple modes of power operating to 
constitute itself and its peripheries.  
After elaborating on the main research questions and themes underlying anthropological 
studies on upland communities in Southeast Asia, I will therefore focus on the emergence 
of a dualism that I portray as an “upland–lowland gap” in Indonesia, and on the 
constitution of the Indonesian uplands as a realm of marginal groups. For a discussion of 
marginality within the Indonesian context it is necessary to shed some light on central 
patterns and state developments that deeply affect upland groups and that are of relevance 
for the analysis of marginality among Wana people. Historical developments therefore 
serve as a starting point for identifying structural disadvantages for people living in the 
uplands. In a second step territorial entitlements are a vital  point of analysis: Land rights 
are of particular importance for upland people who are often subject to struggles over 
land with local neighbors, the state and companies. Territorial claims therefore display 
analytical markers of marginalization processes, but also depict the role of agency 
connected to it. The emergence of upland people as “indigenous people” in the so-called 
masyarakat adat 40  movement is another issue drawing deeply on marginality 
conceptualizations and a new form of articulation of self-government. One aspect mainly 
ignored in studies highlighting indigenous peoples of Indonesia concentrates on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Masyarakat adat is a political term that can be translated as indigenous people, customary 
community,“people who adhere to customary ways” (Li 2001) or adat community. The term gained 
importance for Indonesia’s indigenous peoples movement, which I will discuss in detail in Chapters 2.2 
and 5.5.  
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marginality according to religious categories. Since most of these points will receive 
detailed attention in the subsequent chapters where they are best placed so as to explain 
local relations and development, I will in the following outline a general perspective on 
these processes for upland groups, in order to situate Wana constructions and relations of 
marginality within the broader scheme of upland marginality in Indonesia and Southeast 
Asia in the course of this work. If we now turn to the idea of marginality among upland 
groups we have to see it as one aspect of a dualistic, complementary interrelationship 
with lowland concepts, as I have made clear in the first part of this chapter. 
2.2.1 Establishing an Upland–Lowland Gap 
Upland groups in Southeast Asia are often perceived as categorically different from 
lowland people. Portrayed as so-called “backward animists”, upland peoples’ alleged 
distinctiveness is subsumed for instance under features such as a particular agricultural 
system, a special religion, or social stratification. Burkard (2007), taking up this notion, 
has tried to bring together some of those stereotypes commonly related to upland–lowland 
categorical units in Indonesia, reproduced for example on the one hand by government 
discourse and on the other hand by several NGOs’ conceptualizations: 
 
Lowland Upland 
Commercialization, market production Subsistence production 
Settled agriculture Shifting cultivation 
Individual land titles Ancestral lands/use rights 
Dominance of wet rice cultivation Dominance of non-rice annuals (maize) 
Agrarian structures (green revolution) Nature conservation vs. degeneration 
Disparities in individual land ownership Community based resource management 
Agrarian change Environmental change 
Affiliation with world religion Animism 
Fluency in national language Local language 
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Table 1  Taken from Burkard (2007: 4); rows set italic added by Grumblies.  
 
Such stereotypes as categories of upland and lowland are constituted in a specific 
naturalizing and essentializing manner and, as Li points out, are “theoretically moribund 
and empirically unsupported” (Li 1999d: xvi). The upland domain is often displayed as 
opposed – and often inferior – to the lowlands. Both terms function as epistemological 
meta-categories whose definite existence of course remains highly questionable; the 
conceptual dichotomy between both can easily be related to other modes of dichotomies 
within the sphere of cultural designation, for example between local and scientific 
knowledge, which is likewise questioned by various scholars (e.g., Agrawal 2009; 
Aikenhead and Ogawa 2007; Ellen 2004; Escobar 1995; Hunn 1982; Nygren 1999). 
Contrasting the two displays a conceptual dichotomy, which Ellen calls 
“another manifestation of what anthropologists have called ‘the great cognitive 
divide.’ Even though the opposition between primitive and civilized thought has 
fallen under the weight of the evidence […], the apparent need to divide the world 
into just two ways of thinking persists” (2004: 411).  
The conceptual division between upland and lowland falls within the same cognitive 
divide, just as does the division between margin and center.41 The terms upland and 
lowland thus need to be conceptualized in quotation marks to hint at the underlying 
stereotypical nature of these categories. Apart from this conceptual dichotomy, the upland 
regions of Southeast Asia are continuously marked and stressed by their pluralistic 
patterns and cultural diversity, and most importantly, as Cramb makes clear, by their 
marginal standing: “Despite this heterogeneity, the uplands are frequently depicted as 
sharing the characteristic of marginality, in the multiple sense of that term” (Cramb 
2007).  
In geographical terms, Li refers to Allen giving a definition of the uplands as a category: 
“uplands could be defined as containing a core of ‘hilly to mountainous landscapes of 
steeply inclined surfaces and the table lands and plateaus lying at higher elevations’” 
(1999d: xvi, citing Allen 1993). The contrasting counterpart is the category of the 
lowlands, indicating valley fields, riverside or coastal plains where irrigated rice farming 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 This essentialism is for example easily traceable in terms of agricultural difference: Swidden cultivation 
is also sometimes practiced in lowland areas while irrigated rice farming can be found in upland regions, 
for example in Java (Cramb 2007: 7). 
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is practiced.42 The distinction is furthermore a local category, used throughout Indonesia, 
but is also quite common for the rest of the Southeast Asian mainland; likewise, academic 
literature as well as development-oriented writers tend to rely upon the same dichotomy 
(Li 1999d: xvi).43 
The categorical distinction between upland and lowland areas was not always the main 
criterion for explaining diversity in Southeast Asia. King and Wilder (2003) show vividly 
how the analytical framework for coping with Southeast Asian complexity has set the 
stage for an evolving dualistic concept of upland and lowland criteria. Furnivall (1948) 
was one of the first authors who tried to make sense of ethnic diversity in colonial 
Indonesia and Burma while developing an analytical grid that focused on the market as a 
point of reference. Migrants and local people meeting at the market were deemed to 
maintain ethnic distribution and hierarchies through the predominance of commerce and 
trade (King and Wilder 2003: 194). Later, scholars writing on post-colonial and post-war 
Southeast Asian societies still focused on the aspect of migration and the large numbers 
of immigrants to explain pluralism, but it was during that period that a new category was 
introduced to academia to explain identity in this regional context,  
“that is the relationship not so much between indigenous peoples and immigrant 
Asians, but between indigenous plains and valley dwellers, the majority of whom 
were wet rice cultivators and members of the great civilizations and state structure 
of South-East Asia (Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam and Hispanized Roman 
Catholicism), and the minority interior or hill people who were predominantly 
forest-based shifting cultivators, hunters and gatherers” (King and Wilder 2003: 
194).  
Through this development the popular and still very powerful categorization of “lowland 
peasants” and “upland tribespeople” was born. King and Wilder quote Kunstadter as the 
first scholar who, in the course of his writings on Southeast Asian tribes, minorities and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Allen especially underlines the significance of water irrigation management as a feature of lowland 
agriculture: “In Southeast Asia the term [upland] is often used rather loosely to refer to unirrigated land 
but, if water is available, it is possible to irrigate almost any land, even steeply sloping land […]. Nor is 
altitude a useful criterion; if “uplands” imply steeplands, or hill and mountain country, they may begin at 
sea level, Irrigable land of low relief may be found at over 2,000 meters above sea level […]” (Allen 
1993: 226). 
43 Upland people in Southeast Asia, sometimes called non-state peoples (Steinberg and Chandler 1987), 
received special attention for example in the work of R. Burling (1965) Hill farms and and padi fields. 
Life in Mainland Southeast Asia, in LeBar, Hickley and Musgrave (1964) Ethnic Groups of Mainland 
Southeast Asia or the already cited two volumes by P. Kunstadter (1967) Southeast Asian Tribes, 
Minorities and Nations. Special attention to swidden agriculture is paid in Spencer’s (1966) Shifting 
Cultivation in Southeastern Asia as well as in Geertz’ (1963) Agricultural Involution and Conklin’s 
(1961) The Study of Shifting Cultivation.  
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nations (1967), introduced an academic focus on the upland–lowland distinction. Further, 
Leach added to the great interest on upland communities with his work on Burma and 
strengthened the difference in social organization and ecology between “hill people” and 
“valley people”, the former designated as “patrilineal and hierarchical” and the latter as 
having “a non-unilineal kinship organization linked with charismatic despotism” (Leach 
1960: 51). He stressed that “the coexistence is not a necessary one” (1960: 51). Instead, in 
his explanation, upland people in Burma were strongly influenced by China regarding 
their kinship and trade system, while the lowland “peasants” had borrowed their social 
stratification and political system from Indian influence. Leach was not hesitant to 
underline the alleged sharp distinctiveness of both categories: “it is very clear that the 
process of interaction […] has not been one of simple cultural diffusion. Hills and Valleys 
stand in radical opposition and there is evidently a certain level at which Hill culture and 
Valley culture are totally inconsistent with one another […]” (Leach 2000: 239). 
Ethnic terms that were used by lowland populations in Southeast Asia and applied to 
upland people have grown into generally used terms, but all too often they bear negative 
connotations, e.g. “‘savages’, ‘barbarian’, ‘primitives’, ‘slaves’, ‘hicks’ or ‘hillbillies’” 
(King and Wilder 2003: 198). Ethnicity for upland Southeast Asia is often closely 
connected to aspects of boundary making: where hill people are defined as primitive 
upland barbarians by their lowland neighbors, the ethnic boundary making between 
upland and lowland groups becomes highly meaningful and powerful. 44  Leach for 
example has already asserted that highland Burmese Kachin identity – which, he 
declared, is very distinct from that of lowland people (see above) – was mainly formed 
and shaped in relation to their lowland Shan neighbors, “so that importantly the Kachin 
define themselves and are defined as ‘other than Shan’” (King and Wilder 2003: 198-9). 
Burling made a very powerful distinction between hill farms and padi fields, stating as his 
basic argument that the one signifying marker of diversity in Southeast Asia was the 
difference between upland and lowland people (Burling 1965: 4).45 Geertz has talked 
about sawah (BI) and swidden, highlighting the difference between both systems – “the 
contrast between such a terrace – an artificial, maximally specialized, continuous-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 For discussion of ethnic boundaries see Chapter 4.4.3.  
45 For a discussion of swiddens as a category of alterity, used to signify the “poor Third-World peasant 
destroying nature” see Dove et al., who note: “Western deprecation of swidden agriculture is not so much 
a function of its geographic, historic and technological distance as it is part of a political effort to make it 
distant” (2007: 134). Already in the 1960s Conklin was able to show and cement the sustainability of 
swidden agriculture (1961). See also Sillitoe (2007: 2).  
Chapter II. Marginality and Upland Groups   
	   64 
cultivation, open-field structure to a swidden plot could hardly be more extreme” (Geertz 
1963: 28). Geertz postulated the still popular distinction between Inner and Outer 
Indonesia according to the use of swidden or sawah agriculture, for him the cause of an 
uneven population allocation, and “the ineluctable social and cultural quandaries which 
followed from it” (1963: 37). Geertz’ as well as Burling’s clear-cut distinction46 is part of 
the aforementioned classical divide in academia.  
In other regions the dichotomy received attention as well. Gellner for example invented 
the term “marginal tribalism” to describe the social structure of the ethnic groups of High 
Atlas in the Maghreb. He described how Berber people decided consciously to refuse 
incorporation into the rest of the state, an active decision they made out of the 
“inconveniences of submission [that] make it attractive to withdraw from political 
authority and the balance of power, the nature of the mountainous […] terrain [which] 
make it feasible” (Gellner 1969: 1–2). Important here is that Gellner refers to marginality 
among the Berber not with reference to geographical, cultural, economic or religious 
reasons; instead he asserts: “Such tribalism is politically marginal. It knows what it 
rejects” (Gellner 1969: 2; see also Scott 2009: 30).47 This political line separating “tribal 
group” and “non-tribal” entity is taken up by James W. Scott to underline the distinction 
between valley and hill groups, for Scott a difference between the “governed” and the 
“ungoverned”: “the linkage between being civilized and being a subject of the state is so 
taken for granted that the terms subject peoples on the one hand or self-governing peoples 
on the other capture the essential difference” (Scott 2009: 31). James W. Scott 
reconstitutes the dichotomy between upland and lowland as a historical development. His 
infamous book The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland 
Southeast Asia (2009), focusing on upland–lowland relations, evoked quite a lot of 
academic interest. Scott tries to give a general definition to commensurate the 
characteristics of upland people:  
“Hill societies are, as a rule, systematically different from valley societies. Hill 
people tend to be animists, or, in the twentieth century, Christians, who do not 
follow ‘the great tradition’ salvation religions of lowland peoples (Buddhism and 
Islam in particular). Where, as occasionally happens, they do come to embrace the 
‘world religion’ of their valley neighbors, they are likely to do so with a degree of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 A similar argument was made by Burling (1965).  
47 Gellner makes another important, but outdated, distinction here between primitive and marginal tribalism, 
where the latter refers to groups connected to larger state systems and the former to groups displaying 
self-contained units (1969: 9).  
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heterodoxy and millenarian fervor that valley elites find more threatening than 
reassuring. Hill societies do produce a surplus, but they do not use that surplus to 
support kings and monks. The absence of large, permanent, surplus-absorbing 
religious and political establishments makes for a sociological pyramid in the hills 
that is rather flat and local compared with that of valley societies. Distinctions of 
status and wealth abound in the hills, as in the valleys. The difference is that in the 
valleys they tend to be supralocal and enduring, while in the hills they are both 
unstable and geographically confined” (Scott 2009: 21).  
This definition or generalization is certainly critical: Distinguishing between lowland 
sawah and upland swiddens portrays one of the stumbling blocks of the manifold critique 
Scott’s recent publication has unraveled. For example, Dove et al. blast Scott’s argument 
for essentializing the upland lowland division and thereby ignoring the fact that often the 
categorical units overlap with people practicing both types of agriculture (Dove, Jonsson, 
and Aung-Twin 2011: 87–88).48,49 Scott portrays upland groups in mainland Southeast 
Asia and their current situation, identity and culture as a result of their own escape from 
the state – fleeing into the mountainous regions of Zomia, the hilly interior region of 
Mainland Southeast Asia. Almost all aspects of upland life – religious beliefs, social 
structure and organization, and agriculture – can be viewed, Scott argues, through an 
upland–lowland lens, hence constituting uplands as an eternally intermingled counterpart 
of lowland regions. In an argument quite similar to the one given by Cramb (see above), 
Scott explores a general marginal character for the Zomia region of mainland Southeast 
Asia: “Zomia is marginal in almost every respect. It lies at a great distance from the main 
centers of economic activity; it bestrides a contact zone between eight nation-states and 
several religious traditions and cosmologies” (Scott 2009: 14). Even if Zomia does not 
refer not to insular Southeast Asia, Scott’s elaborations can readily be related to the 
Indonesian context as well.50 For Scott, the upland people of Zomia are concentrated 
where the state is no longer potent. Scott writes: “Virtually everything about these 
people’s livelihoods, social organization, ideologies and (more controversially) even their 
largely oral cultures, can be read as strategic positionings designed to keep the state at 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 However, Scott makes clear that he is trying to grasp markers significant for upland and lowland regions, 
but he is also shying away from a mere over-essentializing gestus: “Swidden[…] which requires more 
land and requires clearing new fields and occasionally shifting settlement sites, is far more common in the 
hills” (Scott 2009: 18; italics added by author).  
49 Just for example, Wana people have made an economic surplus and used it to pay tribute to kings and 
rajas as far as the Kingdom of Ternate. 
50 Li however asserts for the Central Sulawesi Lauje that in contrast to Scotts assertion for mainland 
Southeast Asia they did not perceive of themselves as culturally distinct from their lowland neighbours 
(Li 2014). 
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arm’s length” (Scott 2009: x). However, what does it mean not to be governed nowadays? 
General stereotypes of upland people seem to serve for their lowland neighbors as what 
Scott calls “civilizational discourses about the ‘barbarian’, the ‘raw’, the ‘primitive’” 
(Scott 2009: x), to him, merely other terms for “not governed” or “not incorporated in 
state activity”. According to Scott, upland people voluntarily escape state influence and 
enter (or remain in) a “barbarian” state. “Ethnicity and ‘tribe’ begin exactly where taxes 
and sovereignty end” (2009: xi), he postulates. Although Scott’s influential and widely 
discussed thesis shall not be of major concern for this theoretical construction, the idea of 
marginality as a choice will play an important role in analyzing Wana marginalization in 
the upcoming chapters and especially within the sphere of Wana self-marginalization.  
2.2.2 Marginality and Upland Groups in Indonesia 
In Indonesia, the category “upland” is non-exclusively determined by a mountainous 
geographical location, but is also extended to apply to upstream or upriver regions as well 
as regions in the hinterland. Li lists the term pelosok (BI) as circumscribing roughly the 
social aspects of being upland people, the English translation referring to “the 
boondocks”. Another, more popular term, and highly interesting in terms of questions 
concerning center–periphery relations, is pedalaman (BI), meaning people living in the 
interior, i.e. far away from centers (Li 1999d: xvi). In my regional fieldwork setting 
however, the most often used term was simply orang gunung (BI), mountain people, used 
by both upland and lowland people to describe, for example, Wana from Salisarao, but 
also applied to Wana living in the lowland village of Taronggo, where the stereotypical 
picture of “being lowland” did not match most Wana individuals making a living in the 
area – they in some way remained in the category orang gunung even though some of 
them had never actually lived in the mountains.  
In Southeast Asia, distinguishing between upland and lowland people has a long tradition 
as I have shown above; the same counts for Indonesia: “The lowland/upland distinction is 
an ancient one within Indonesia itself, finding expression directly in the myths and rituals 
of probably the majority of Indonesia’s pre-colonial peoples, not just as a means of 
distinguishing one group from another but also of underpinning status differentials within 
groups” (Kahn 1999: 81). Tania Li’s book Transforming the Indonesian Uplands (1999b) 
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is the first edited volume that focuses explicitly on the Indonesian uplands, and was 
written as an answer to Hart et al.’s Agrarian Transformations: Local Processes and the 
State in Southeast Asia (1989) – a study dealing exclusively with lowland Southeast 
Asian case studies. Tania Li’s academic works have become, next to those of Anna Tsing, 
guiding research lines for scholars interested in upland–lowland relations in general or in 
questions of relations between state and indigenous peoples. In her introduction to the 
1999 volume, she explicitly focuses on the aspect of marginality – in terms of power and 
production – among upland groups. By this means, the relational character of the term 
“marginal experiences” becomes palpable. As I have mentioned earlier, a margin cannot 
stand for itself but connotates a dualistic dialectic. The same accounts for the 
phenomenon itself, i.e. marginality, and the process resulting from it, i.e. marginalization. 
Therefore a conceptualization of the Indonesian uplands as marginal must lead to the 
logical conclusion that the uplands and lowlands, as categorical units, define and mediate 
each other. Furthermore it has become clear that marginality is a social construction. 
Now, turning our focus to the category of upland people in Indonesia we face the social 
construction of marginality, which deserves special attention while analyzing the 
Indonesian uplands as a marginal area. In this context, Li makes out three central 
implications:  
1) Uplands and lowlands need to be analyzed and perceived as existing within 
“one single analytical frame”. Both are parts of the “same integrated system” 
(Li 1999a: 1–2), which is why both deserve and require analytical attention; 
2) As I have already shown above, marginality is a relational term that cannot be 
seen as a natural, ontological whole, but must be understood as socially 
constructed; 
3) Finally, uplands and lowlands are not all equal partners. Marginality is always 
the result of unequal power relations, “the constitution of margins and centers 
is best understood therefore as a hegemonic project, subject to contestation and 
reformulation. […] the cultural, economic and political projects of people 
living and working in the uplands are constituted in relation to various 
hegemonic agendas, but never are they simple reflections of them” (Li 1999a: 
2).  
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As applies to all generalization attempts, often simplifications and essentializations are 
made which are then ascribed to a category that is just as great as the unit of the 
Indonesian uplands. On the one hand, the uplands in Indonesia are often characterized 
with negative assumptions, describing hill people as primitive, lazy, backward, stubborn 
and ignorant. On the other hand those same people often are depicted as keepers of 
special knowledge concerning the environment and conservation. However, the various 
attributes associated with what is actually meant by the category upland are not easily put 
into a common framework; consequently, mutually contradictory models have emerged to 
grasp this situation (see above). Moreover, what is often called tradition in the upland 
context must be read as “the outcomes of marginalization” (Li 1999d: xvii). 
2.2.3 Historical Perspective: Marginality in the Uplands 
The uplands were not always the peripheral analytical unit of the archipelago. As Li 
reminds us, Indonesia’s interior regions were for a long time known and feared for their 
spiritual power. But with the spread of Islam throughout the archipelago power became 
increasingly allocated to coastal settlements and Muslim communities.51 A gap emerged 
between those who became Muslim or chose to live close to Muslim communities along 
the vast Indonesian coasts, and those who lived in the upland regions of the islands (Li 
1999a: 4). The rise of maritime trade relations around the 15th and 17th century 
supported a great number of these political centers, enabling them to attain significant 
power and size – for example, kingdoms such as Aceh, Melaka, Brunei, Makassar, and 
Ternate. Lowland coastal centers depended on trade with upland or upstream 
communities, also called hulu (BI), meaning upstream, and hilir (BI), meaning 
downstream relations (Andaya 1993). Access to the interior, usually geographically 
difficult to reach, was often possible by river, and offered a suitable solution for 
transporting products from the interior to the coast for trade with imported goods by inter-
maritime dealers (Andaya 1993). Due to their access to the sea and their position at the 
mouth of the river, most coastal states were able to assert some political control over 
upstream communities.52 Owing to the increased importance of maritime trade the focus 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Exceptions are the kingdoms of Minangkabau and Mataram, both located inland (Li 1999a: 4). 
52 However, there were also occasional upland–lowland relations that presented a different picture, as 
Andaya reminds us. In some cases upstream communities were authoritative powers because the lowland 
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was consequently turned away from social or cultural similarities relative to a common 
terrain – either upland or lowland – and instead placed on inter-coastal relationships and 
ranks, thereby determining and emphasizing a “marked social distinction between ‘people 
of the littoral kingdoms and the barbarian population of the tribal interior’” (Li 1999a: 4, 
citing Henley 1989: 8). Reasons for living in the uplands might include the motive of 
escaping lowland domination by coastal centers, for example by slavery and the slave 
trade, and also the lure of the high yield of upland farming (Li 1999a: 4). While the 
upland regions generally served as a point of escape from authoritarian rule they also 
offered a form of wealth in form of forest products or minerals for example that were (and 
remain) valuable for national and international markets and trade. This point of income 
was a precious source for coastal authorities. Various trade arrangements and agreements 
had been established throughout Indonesia. As Wana were involved in trade networks 
with coastal powers and had to pay tribute to Sultans from Ternate and Bungku (see 
Chapters 4 and 5), other regions like Tana Toraja in South Sulawesi experienced a close 
cooperation between coastal regimes and upland elites, resulting in the enslavement of 
upland groups (Bigalke 1983; Li 1999a: 7). In some upland or upriver areas, people 
resisted lowland claims, “thus in economic and political matters the relationship between 
upland and lowland systems has long been marked by tension” (Li 1999a: 8). Coastal 
regimes relied often on upland products, but relations and social order were multifaceted 
rather than egalitarian. By contrast, upland communities were perceived as “inferior and 
treated in a derogatory way” (Hauser-Schäublin 2013: 13). 
In a closely related generalization, Li points to a common lack of historicity for upland 
groups in Indonesia, nested in an evolutionary scheme often applied to Indonesia’s upland 
sphere: History functions as a marker used to deepen or emphasize the gap between 
upland and lowland, with people belonging to the former portrayed as lacking any 
“historical development”, manifested in their current state of “backwardness”. Here, a 
unilineal development from tradition to modernity is applied to an Indonesian context 
under colonial and post-colonial New Order government, where Java, the “showcase of 
development” (Tsing 1993: 23), sets the terms for measuring progress and modernity 
ranking. The Indonesian uplands, part of Indonesia’s outer islands’ “unorganized 
periphery” (Tsing 1993: 23), accordingly “are deemed marginal because they have failed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
states were suffering heavily from malaria in the coastal swamplands or were often subjects of coastal 
attacks (Andaya 1992: 92). 
Chapter II. Marginality and Upland Groups   
	   70 
to change, ‘develop’ or modernize. […] [T]he difference observed at the margins 
confirms the distance that the center has progressed” (Li 1999a: 5). Thus, “traditional” 
elements of upland groups should not be depicted as mere traces of a past, but rather as 
markers of “processes through which diverse cultural forms are generated and 
maintained” (Li 1999a: 5). Numerous studies however have been published showing the 
long histories of inclusive lowland–upland trade networks and relations as well as 
intervention from external rulers, the state etc., who were partly responsible for upland 
change, thus negating a “lack of historicity” for the Indonesian uplands.53 However, 
traditions that are specific for upland people have to be regarded as the result of constant 
change, and not its opposite. Neither is this change solely due to the influence of 
outsiders, nor can it be reduced to a simple choice between modernity and backwardness, 
state and local community. Instead it must be perceived as “the result of creative 
engagement and cultural production” (Li 1999a: 5). Thus, the “traditionalization” of the 
Indonesian uplands is a process that does not necessarily result in marginalization, but 
instead “exclusion depends upon assessment of the ways in which ‘tradition’ and its 
associated images are taken up by various players, including uplanders themselves, in the 
formation and contestation of policies, practices and identities” (Li 1999a: 10). Despite 
the fact that the term “traditionalization” is socially constructed, significant historical 
experiences underline Li’s argument. Joel Kahn describes processes of culturalization of 
the Indonesian uplands: He uses the example of the Minangkabau of West Sumatra to 
explain the process of shaping, transforming and evolving imaginations of distinct 
cultural features that are nonetheless products of a biased upland–lowland relationship. 
According to Kahn, inequality among Indonesia’s people is nowadays interpreted mainly 
in the form of cultural difference, and not with reference to varying access to sources of 
power or resources, but is instead “read […] as problems in intercultural relations” (1999: 
83). The second half of the 19th century brought significant transformations for the 
Indonesian uplands. Economic and political changes brought about new power 
constellations, often resulting in further disadvantages for upland groups and “the 
formation of power matrices linking peasants, village élites and Dutch rulers” (Kahn 
1999: 101). According to Kahn, part of the roots of the cultural constitution of difference 
can be found, inter alia, in the establishment of the Leiden School of adat law studies 
(Kahn 1999). Van Vollenhoven, the school’s founder and professor at Leiden University, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 See for example Kenneth George (1996), Jane Atkinson (1989), Anthony Reid (1985), Anna Tsing 
(1993) and Robert Hefner (1990). 
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was one of the leading figures constituting various adat rights groups in Indonesia. In a 
comparative attempt to analyze the differing law systems in the Philippines, the Malay 
Peninsula, Madagascar and the Indies, he described between 1906 and 1918 around 19 
Indonesian adat law regions or circles.54 The Leiden School can serve as an example of 
the changing perception of the Dutch East Indies in times of colonial rule by colonial 
administrative personnel and lawyers (Benda-Beckmann and Benda-Beckmann 2011: 
174) and scholars like van Vollenhoven (Kahn 1999: 89). Both of these groups began to 
explore Indonesian exceptional culture and to lead away from the sole guiding principle 
of modernism and Westernism as a tool to deal with the archipelagic diversity:  
“contrary to the assumption that civilisational narratives always and everywhere 
characterised the discourse of European colonial rule in Asia, a counter- or anti-
evolution-ism [sic!] began increasingly to inform the way the Dutch represented 
their colonial subjects in the first decades of this century. It led them [….] to a 
view of relations between themselves and their subjects as intercultural relations 
first and foremost” (Kahn 1999: 89).  
For example, Henley and Davidson consider van Vollenhoven’s perspective  as similar to 
that of current “international advocates of indigenous rights” (Henley and Davidson 2008: 
825).55 By this means, the Leiden School can be seen, according to the authors, as early 
protectors of customary land rights (Henley and Davidson 2008: 825).56 Kahn’s main 
argument however can be found in the discovery of culture as a categorical unit that 
would serve to explain difference among the archipelago’s people:  
“this period witnessed the development of a new language for understanding 
human diversity in the Netherlands Indies: a language of culture and 
multiculturalism. Consequently, Dutch scholars and colonial advisors as well as 
certain members of the local rural élite began to understand social interaction in 
the colony, and even in the empire as a whole, as instance of intercultural 
interaction” (1999: 101).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 His results are compiled in the three volumes of Het adatrecht van Nederlandsch-Indië (1918-1933). 
55 Exemplified through the Leiden School’s invention of the beschikkinsgrecht – the allocation law that 
would serve every adat community to avail themselves of land from their own terrain. For a detailed 
discussion of beschikkingsrecht see Burns (2007).  
56 Kahn however also hints at another root of the “cultural turn” and turns to the Minangkabaus’ own 
interpretations of modernity and culture in their setting and experience. Therefore, indigenous dealings 
with difference were not a reaction of Dutch scholarly interest, but had happened way before the Leiden 
school, as a response to the modernization dictum they had experienced, firstly through secular initiatives 
calling for progress and, secondly through advocates of Muslim reforms. Islamic modernism in West 
Sumatra resulted in allegations of un-Islamic practices and defenders of the Minangkabau tradition. 
Thereby the indigenous conceptionalization of what cultural difference represents was born (Kahn 1999). 
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The interest in cultural diversity and thus upland groups of the Indonesian archipelago 
had been quite low until van Vollenhoven took charge; “until the middle of the nineteenth 
century the Dutch knew next to nothing about the adat law of the Javanese and other 
Indonesians whom they had been ruling for such a long time” (Fasseur 2007: 51). 
Acknowledgment of adat law communities by the colonial state was part of the colonial 
Ethical Policy, beginning by the end of the 19th century, focusing on “the issues of 
education, emigration and irrigation” (Arizona and Cahyadi 2013: 46) and thus the moral 
development of the Indonesian population. Subsequently, upland communities, habitually 
living in dispersed settlements in the hilltops, were often forced to resettle to centralized 
lowland villages where they were compelled to practice wet-rice cultivation. The new 
recognition of different adat laws was a further tool to help to rule the outer islands 
indirectly “through the local elites and in the absence of the colonial authorities” (Arizona 
and Cahyadi 2013: 46). 
All these pre-colonial constellations and colonial interventions had significant effects on 
Indonesian upland groups with regard to questions of territorial claims and authority that 
are still traceable in current legal arrangements today.  
2.2.4 Marginality and Territorial Entitlements in the Uplands 
In colonial times, the state of Indonesia was deeply concerned with a territorialization of 
their colonial subjects, with maps functioning as a central source of power (Anderson 
1983). Li cites the example of lowland Java by the end of the 19th century, where most 
desa, villages, were born out of territorialization efforts by the colonial government: 
“everybody was set in place‘, freezing the agrarian social structure in the ‘harnessed 
construction’ of the desa community” (Li 1999a: 13, citing Breman 1980: 41).  
Land Rights 
When land became the most important resource for the colonial project in the 19th 
century, the state put all its focus on the territorialization of the archipelago and its 
inhabitants (Li 1999b). With the Agrarian Act of 1870 all land not under private 
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ownership was ascribed the status of land under state domain, the so-called 
domeinverklaring principle, thereby in direct control of the Dutch colonial government; it 
“allowed the colonial authorities to take over any land which did not appear to be in use 
and to lease out such land for other uses” (Cleary 1996: 41). In general this meant that 
forest use and swidden agriculture became illegal (Li 1999a: 13). Direct outcomes were 
the alienation of land formerly under the tenure of indigenous groups, often upland 
groups. Although the act also provided the opportunity to respect customary land rights of 
local authorities, in practice Dutch claims were given priority and all land that was 
perceived by the authorities as uncultivated became a source for colonial production, thus 
making forest use and swidden agriculture – a cultivation system that involves letting 
land lie fallow – an illegal practice (Li 1999b: 13), an interpretation that cast a shadow 
that still lies over current Indonesian communities (Fitzpatrick 2007: 133). Many upland 
communities thereby lost the right to cultivate land that had traditionally been under 
indigenous land tenure. Kahn shows that between 1870 and the 1920s more than 110,000 
hectares of Minangkabau land in West Sumatra, declared “waste land”, suddenly became 
official state land that was available mostly for European companies for tenure periods of 
max. 75 years (Kahn 1999: 93) – the initial goal of the Agrarian Act.  
But the 1870 Agrarian Act was just the opening of a long chain of unjust land allocation 
in Indonesia.57 Already implemented in the Agrarian Act of 1870, land rights remained,  
and still remain, a highly important issue relevant for marginality among upland groups. 
In this sense, “the agrarian issue of legal control over local land by the nation-state 
constitutes perhaps the most resented usurpation of local rights” (Acciaioli 2007: 308). 
After the colonization era, unjust treatment of swidden cultivators and minorities 
especially in the uplands continued. Under Dutch colonial rule Batavia (Jakarta) had 
evolved as a center of trade, while former political centers located “at the newly 
constructed geographic and commercial peripheries in the archipelago’s eastern islands” 
(Röttger-Rössler and Stodulka 2014: 12) lost importance. The island of Java also played a 
central role in the fight for independence before and after Japanese occupation. After 
independence, state interventions that aimed to bring order to the “barbarian hinterlands” 
of the archipelago, still lacking pembangunan (BI), development, are clearly observable 
in the spheres of the transmigrasi (BI) program and other resettlement schemes, and most 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 In the beginning, the first state domain principle was applied to Java and Madura alone, but it was soon 
also enacted for other provinces like Manado and Sumtra (Galudra, Fay, and Sirait 2007: 2). 
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importantly in the constitution and negotiation of land rights and their effects for upland 
people. In 1960 Sukarno, who became the first Indonesian president in 1945, inaugurated 
the Basic Agrarian Law (Undang-Undang Pokok Agraria), which put an end to legal 
pluralism and “established a single, unitary land law that represented a ‘classic’ form of 
agrarian reform legislation for the times. It promoted land to the tillers and ceilings on 
private landholdings based on quality and location of land (with different ceilings for 
irrigated land and dry fields or uplands)” (Peluso, Afiff, and Rachman 2008: 381).58 Most 
importantly, it declared all land that was not in private ownership again to be state land. 
The result was that indigenous communities sharing communal land ownership according 
to adat rights, called hak ulayat (BI),59 were now working on state land to which they 
only had usufruct rights, hak pakai (BI).60 By this formulation customary land rights were 
subordinated to national goals while the overall sovereignty over the land remained with 
the state (Acciaioli 2007: 312). All adat land that was not under permanent cultivation 
was therefore “virtually ‘up for the taking’, without compensation” (Wallace 2008: 203). 
Although two years later a new regulation61 added to the law that adat rights could be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Under the Basic Agrarian Law a number of land regulations were formulated, among them ownership 
(hak milik), exploitaiton (hak guna usaha), building (hak guna bangunan), the right to use land (hak 
pakai), lease (hak sewa), the right to collect forest products (hak memungut hasil hutan) and the right to 
open up land (hak membuka tanah). A number of further, temporary and special rights are formulated in 
the Basic Agrarian Law. For a detailed discussion of the Basic Agrarian Law see for example Wallace 
(2008), Gold and Zuckermann (2015), Fitzpatrick (1997; 2007), Hooker (1975) or Haverfield (1999).  
59Hak ulayat, customary land rights, can be described as the Indonesian version of the Dutch colonial right 
of beschikkingsrecht (Acciaiolo 2007: 309), see Chapter 2.2.3. The right to land of indigenous 
communities was formulated in the Basic Agrarian Law as follows: “Hak ulayat (the village adat right of 
disposition over land cultivated or claimed as waste by its members) and similar rights of adat law 
communities, in so far as they still exist in fact, must be exercised in such a way as to accord with national 
and state interests based on national unity, and so as not to contradict laws and other regulations which are 
of a higher order” (UUPA Art. 3, translation by Hooker 1975: 291-2, cited in Acciaioli 2007: 311). By 
this formulation the Basic Agraian Law recognized hak ulayat not as land rights but as mere national 
interest. It excludes hak ulayat from the aforementioned land rights that are subject for registration such 
has hak milik or hak pakai. It thereby offers no option to differentiate between state land and adat land, 
leaving all uncultivated adat land “virtually ‘up for the taking’, without compensation” (Wallace 2008: 
203; e.g., Haverfield 1999; Fitzpatrick 1997: 186). 
60 Hak pakai generally describes usufruct rights. A person can gain the right to cultivate a specific area of 
state-owned or privately owned land to which he is obliged to cultivate it continuously; otherwise the land 
will go back to the state after a duration of five years. Hak pakai can be passed on to someone else or can 
be sold. A major disadvantage can be found in the fact that it is only temporary and the government can 
claim it back anytime (UUPA Art. 41-43; cf. Rössler 1997: 155). By contrast, hak milik portrays 
ownership and includes a legal certificate. Hak milik is not temporary limited and can be sold, transferred 
or bequeathed as well as mortgaged (Art. 20 and 26; cf. Rössler 1997: 155). Rössler has pointed out that 
in his research context locals usually would not differentiate between hak milik or hak pakai. The idea of 
ownership was not linked to a legal certificate but rather to the fact that the land was cultivated. Further, 
land ownership by means of hak milik was very rare since the price of land exceeded local possibilities 
(1997: 155-6). 
61 Regulation of the Minister of Agrarian Affairs 2/1962 (Peraturan Mentri Pertanian dan Agraria 2/1962 
tentang Konversi Hak Adat).  
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transferred into private ownership (hak milik, BI), the procedure came out as time 
consuming and costly because of a general “dysfunction of the registration system itself” 
(Haverfield 1999: 57) so that only very few land areas were registered under private 
ownership (Haug 2010: 87).  
Suharto, who came to power in 1966 and reigned until 1998, became a master of ruling 
with his New Order regime and intensified the centralistic government with the promise 
of fast economic growth for the nation. The materialization of rule accomplishment in the 
form of the Basic Mining Act of 196762 and the Basic Forestry Act of 196763 – both 
implemented only one year after Suharto’s initiation as president – increased the 
opportunities to accomplish more and more rule over land and minorities by the state. 64 
The Basic Forestry Law declared all the forested land in the entire archipelago to be 
under the control of the Indonesian state, represented by the Department of Forestry in 
Jakarta. Under Sukarno, forest control had been in part the responsibility of the central 
governments and in other parts of the provincial governments. Until 1967 provincial 
governments had the authority to grant forest concessions up to 10,000 hectares and to 
manage forestry and other natural resources in their respective regions – they were not 
obliged to report to the Department of Forestry in Jakarta. The 1960 Basic Agrarian Law 
had further weakened the latter’s influence since it paid, in some sense, respect to 
customary land rights. However, Suharto changed the game, and all authority over 
Indonesia’s forest land, more than 74 per cent of the overall territory,65 was ascribed to 
the Department of Forestry in Jakarta (Gunawan 2004: 72). The consequences for 
swidden agriculturalists and forest dwellers were undeniable, as expressed through 
Article 17: “The enjoyment of adat rights, whether individual or communal, to exploit 
forest resources directly or indirectly … may not be allowed to disturb the attainment of 
the purposes of this law” (Ross 2001: 168).  
Since among the Indonesian uplands “cadastral surveys and land titles are almost 
unknown […] and territorial control is exercised most directly through forest law and 
policy” (Li 1999b: 14), authority over upland land was therefore mainly exercised 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Undang Undang Republik Indonesia 11/1967 tentang Ketentuan-Ketentuan Pokok Pertambangan.  
63 Undang Undang Republik Indonesia 5/1967 tentang Ketentuan-Ketentuan Pokok Kehutanan. 
64 Other New Order laws on natural resources focused on natural gas, irritation and fisheries. 
65 A plan from 2006, the Indonesian Long-term Forestry Development Plan, declares 127 million hectares, 
that is, 67 percent of the entire land territory, to be forest land, divided into the four categories of 
production, protection, conservation, and conversion, and the additional category of “other land” 
(McDermott, Cashore, and Kanowski 2010: 171).  
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through the Forestry Department. With the downfall of Suharto and the enactment of 
regional autonomy, Law 22/1999 transferred a great amount of political power to local 
authorities. While those aspects considered “strategic”, for example foreign affairs, 
remained under central control, natural resources and conservation, among others, were 
subjected to regional responsibility (Resusodarmo 2004: 107).66 With the revision of the 
law, the new Forestry Law 41/199967 became the main piece of forestry legislation 
(McDermott, Cashore and Kanowski 2010: 171). In general, it continued the line of the 
Basic Forestry Law of 1967 through the ongoing declaration that 65 per cent of the 
country’s terrain was state forest. However, changes brought about through the process of 
reformasi (BI) also can be found in relation to the Forestry Law 41/1999: Law 22/199968 
on Regional Autonomy gives a somewhat contradictory regulation through the 
establishment of a  
“non-hierarchical distribution of authority among the federal, regional, district and 
local levels, in some contradiction to the strong central government role asserted 
in Forestry Law 41/1999 […] leading to considerable conflict among the various 
levels and branches of government, and resulting in various incongruecies such as 
the granting of overlapping forest concessions and development of conflicting 
forest practice laws” (McDermott, Cashore and Kanowski 2010: 171). 
Despite the reformation process through which Indonesia has transformed its political 
system within only 15 years from a highly centralized state to one of the most 
decentralized nations in the world, forestry legislation still remains weak. This ambiguous 
legal framework underlines what Dunne (2005, see above) has postulated as the plurality 
of margins and centers. While customary land rights are subject to national law, with the 
invention of regional autonomy they had also become subject to regional law, leading to a 
confusing and complex situation regarding land rights. The new governments succeeding 
Suharto still lacked serious efforts to back indigenous people’s rights. The effects are 
particularly relevant for those people living in forest areas, like Indonesia’s upland 
population, just like the Wana in Morowali regency who were facing a serious threat of 
land loss during the time of my research due to palm oil plantation expansion plans. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 The situation became further complicated with a government regulation 6/1999 that gave districts the 
authority to hand out small-scale timber licenses for areas of max. 100 ha, but only in areas where no 
large-scale concessions had previously been issued (Resusodarmo 2004: 112). 
67 Undang Undang Republik Indonesia 41/1999 tentang Kehutanan. 
68 See also Chapter 1. Law 22/1999 on Regional Government mainly aimed at reorganizing political power 
within the country. While tasks like the legal system and religion were still regulated as the national 
governement’s concern, authority over fields such as health or education were shifted to regional 
governments.  
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Upland marginality plays a significant role in this context. For example when upland 
peasants or swiddeners are suddenly in urgent need of land certification to defend their 
land against newcomers who often share good relations with local officials, patronage 
becomes an essential tool of power in this context – the stigma of the “unproductive 
orang gunung” is not a helpful card to be played in land disputes or to profit from 
patronage, as Wana continuously experience (see Chapter 5). Li sums this context up: 
“Patronage is one way in which the categories center and margin are articulated” (Li 
1999a: 19). Without any legal documentation of land ownership and in a context where 
local governments and individuals do often interpret the legal situation quite freely, local 
communities like the Wana, who do not know their rights, are not well equipped to resist 
land claims by the government (see Chapter 5). Rule over the Indonesian uplands is thus 
accomplished through the role – and rule – of forests.69  
A new trend in forest- and land-rights regulations that is deeply connected to an 
indigenous peoples’ movement within the country, the masyarakat adat movement, is 
currently drawing more attention to indigenous communities’ legal rights over land. 
Because the legal situation regarding their land remained unclear, Wana have recently 
become involved in the politics of the so-called masyarakat adat movement as well. The 
constant danger of land loss and enforced resettlement has led several Wana to establish 
new networks with several NGOs. The acquisition of the status of masyarakat adat 
brought with it a new attitude towards their position as a marginalized people, leading to 
what might be called empowerment through marginality. The process of decentralization 
and democratization after Suharto’s downfall inaugurated a new era for formerly 
marginalized peoples and “offered the opportunity to the indigenous peoples (masyarakat 
adat) and to the government to recover the injustices and dispossessions which these 
people had suffered” (Hauser-Schäublin 2013: 7). By means of marginality this process 
reconfigured the idea of power and the notion of opportunity tremendously. I will come 
back to this development in the following sub-chapter as well as in Chapter 5.6. For now, 
it is important to note that deeply connected to the masyarakat adat movement is a new 
trend in forest- and land-rights regulations that focuses more on customary land rights. In 
2013 the Indonesian Constitutional Court implemented a new decision that demarcates a 
big turning point in the history of land rights for indigenous communities. On May 16 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Although, as Li reminds us, here trees are of minor importance since a significant part of the alleged 65 
percent of state forest is not covered with trees.  
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2013, the Indonesian Constitutional Court announced in Decision No. 35/PUU-X that 
customary forests are no longer declared state forest. This case was based on a petition by 
AMAN (Indigenous Peoples’ Alliance of the Archipelago) and two indigenous 
communities filed in March 2012 (Arizona and Cahyani 2013: 53). It basically objected 
to the Forestry Law of 1999 which ignored customary rights of local communities to land 
and forest in favor of issuing concessions over natural resources to commercial 
enterprises. With the state’s decision, approval by customary landholders thus became 
mandatory, and AMAN celebrated the decision as the return of rights to around 40 
million indigenous communities in Indonesia (Butt 2014: 59). Although this decision was 
celebrated as a milestone for indigenous communities its outcome remains vague. Butt 
asserts that the result has to be regarded in a rather pessimistic manner since Indonesia’s 
Court has only narrow formal power; it cannot induce its regulations to national 
parliament. It rather can, jurisdictionally, review statutes against the constitution. Most 
cases that affect indigenous communities are challenging “statutes granting the state legal 
authority to issue concessions. However, that authority is usually exercised by way of 
subordinate regulations – most commonly ministerial decrees or local government 
bylaws” (Butt 2014: 71). A second reason can be found in the fact that the court so far has 
not paid attention to the “practical difficulties facing traditional communities to achieve 
formal ‘recognition’ of their status as such” (Butt 2014: 72).70  
Relocation 
For the New Order regime, upland people and indigenous people in general “sullied the 
modern image Indonesia sought to project to the outside world” (Henley and Davidson 
2007: 10). Cultural variety that had gained attention during the colonial period was now 
backed away from as somewhat pejorative, and upland communities were no longer 
perceived as symbols of diversity but were instead combined under an “overriding 
common cultural pattern – that is by their alleged ‘primitive’ nature” (Colchester 1986: 
91). The government aimed for modernity and invented a new strategy to make sure that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 The Jakarta Post noted that “[u]nder Environment and Forestry Ministerial Regulation No. 12/2015, 
which was issued in March, the percentage of areas dedicated for local people increased to at least 20 
percent. While technical details of the regulation are still being formulated, the association is worried that 
the government would require its members to reduce the size of their existing industrial forest area to 
fulfill the 20 percent quota for use by local communities” (Amin 2015). 
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the nation followed by classifying possible hindering factors in this process: “a ‘by-
product’ of this dynamic development was the creation of categories of marginal peoples: 
people […] who refused or were refused the experience of modernity” (Kuipers 1998: 
15). Indigenous communities received a new entitlement in this period as suku terasing, a 
term created by the government in 1976, and meaning isolated tribe. In 1987 it was 
replaced by masyarakat terasing (isolated community) (Duncan 2008). As I have stated 
above, a center is generally in constant need of its periphery since it is the supposed 
fundamental difference between the center and a margin that forms the center’s pre-
eminence in the first place. Both are therefore deeply entangled with each other not only 
by economic and political but also symbolic means. The margins, according to Shields, 
portray the opposite of the center, i.e. all those aspects that the center tries to repress 
(1991). During the New Order the marginality of upland groups in this regard was 
interpreted as a certain ‘backwardness’. Opposed to Suharto’s objective of development 
and modernity, the marginality of upland groups was therefore marked by socio-cultural 
aspects that included for example swidden agriculture in contrast to state-promoted wet 
rice cultivation, a nomadic or semi-nomadic lifestyle that opposed the national idea of 
permanent settlement units, and the lack of an officially recognized religion, with upland 
groups characterized by their adherence to indigenous belief systems.  
Probably the most drastic example of accomplishing rule over upland groups is therefore 
the praxis of resettlement. Resettlement programs in the name of development during the 
New Order regime were a common picture in Indonesia, to quote Li’s account from 1999: 
“The target group is expected to move from isolation and backwardness to the status of 
‘ordinary villagers’ culturally normalized and enmeshed in the regular system of village 
administration and national development” (Li 1999c: 302). During the New Order regime 
these resettlement initiatives were a common procedure in Indonesia and aimed at the 
transforming supposed “isolated” and “primitive” uplanders into modern citizens of the 
Indonesian nation-state by assembling them into centralized, administrative villages, 
following the national idea of pembangunan (Li 1999c: 302). The roots of this program 
can be found in colonial strategies to move upland groups to the lowlands, and was then, 
in 1950, revitalized through DEPSOS, Indonesia’s Department of Social Affairs (Haba 
1998). Haba shows four different types of such programs under way in Indonesia in the 
1980s. For example, one resettlement program was aimed towards shifting cultivators 
(peladang berpindah-pindah, BI) under the guidance of the Forestry Department while 
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another, called the Program for the Development of Social Prosperity of Isolated 
Communities (Pembinaan Kesejahteraan Sosial Masyarakat Terasing, PKSMT) (Duncan 
2008: 86), targeted “‘remote’ or ‘isolated’ people (masyarakat terpencil or masyarakat 
terasing). Remote or ‘isolated people’ are officially defined as a ‘people or a group of 
people whose habitats/residences are located 24 hours or more in traveling time from a 
provincial capital city measured by using public transportation’” (Haba 1998: 2). The 
latter program was retitled by 1999 as the Program for the Development of Social 
Prosperity of Geographically Isolated Customary Law Communities (Pembinaan 
Kesejahteraan Sosial Komunitas Adat Terpencil, PKAT) and its goal was formulated as 
that of helping more than one million people “that the government feels need special 
assistance” (Duncan 2008: 87) in development.71 State programs affecting upland groups 
throughout Southeast Asia and Indonesia are often subject to failure, and many groups 
heavily resist such measures, as I will show in the course of this work (Chapter 5). But 
although state power is not endless, upland people on the other hand are also not general 
opponents of the state. Aspects of citizenship such as identity cards or land certificates are 
often desired objects among upland people; further, many wish for school education, road 
access, hospitals, government jobs or the opening of plantations as a source of income. A 
romanticized notion put forward by many NGOs, or popular images depicting “isolated 
tribes” who refuse claims to modernity, do not match the lived experiences of many 
upland people; nor does the imagination of “helpless victims” living in the Indonesian 
uplands portray detailed accounts. However, these popular notions serve a goal:  
They are simplifications necessary to the critique of state policies, which rely, as 
noted above, on equally simplified representations of upland lifestyles and 
ecology. Instead of a dialogue between the state and its critics, a mirror effect 
simply inverts the categories (wise swiddener/destructive swiddener, valuable 
traditions/backward traditions) leaving the categories themselves essentialised and 
fundamentally unchanged (Li 1999a: 23). 
Likewise in Central Sulawesi resettlement programs have a long history and are a 
common picture for Wana people as well – they remain a government objective, of which 
Wana are all too aware. Colonial as well as recent resettlement initiatives continue to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Duncan notes the renaming from terasing to terpencil has its roots in the meaning of distance; while 
terasing implied to be “isolated from the society’s mainstream”, the term terpencil connotates a rather 
geographical isolation, “removing the stigma of having been left behind developmentally and shifting the 
blame to geographical barriers that hindered previous efforts” (Duncan 2008: 91).  
Chapter II. Marginality and Upland Groups   
	   81 
leave their mark on Wana relations with the government as well as with companies; I will 
return to this aspect later (see Chapter 5). 
Yet another form of relocation that was established during the New Order was the 
transmigrasi program. Within this initiative under the Suharto government, more than 6.8 
million people were resettled between 1969 and 1994 from the densely populated islands 
of Java, Madura and Bali to Outer Indonesia’s islands (Weber 2005: 89).72 73 Through the 
exploitation of natural resources and labor, the government apparatus moved closer to the 
uplands, bringing with it “the administrative and coercive machinery of the state” (Li 
1999a: 16). In Central Sulawesi and Morowali regency, intra-Sulawesi migration has 
however affected the local circumstances more profoundly than did migrants from Bali or 
Java. Buginese migrants and other Southern-based Sulawesi inhabitants have increasingly 
moved to the resource-rich central province of the islands, searching for sources of 
income and land. Competition between locals and migrants is a matter of concern for 
transmigrants as well as inner-island migrants, where local hierarchies define power 
constellations and often influence access to resources and land and are often sources of 
conflict in Central Sulawesi (Acciaioli 2001; Aragon 2001; Li 2000). In a similar way 
Li’s argument points to the regulation of spontaneous settlement, especially in border 
areas, which has as its goal the extension of state rule even in the fuzzy periphery: “once 
newcomers have been organized into administrative units (desa), their daily activities can 
be monitored and regulated through the various village committees and institutions 
specified in law” (Li 1999a: 16).  
2.2.5 Upland People as Indigenous People: Masyarakat Adat 
Movement 
When in 1993 UNESCO declared the Year of the Indigenous Peoples, Indonesia’s 
indigenous communities also began their first moves towards official recognition of their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Boomgard points out that the praxis of locating Javanese population to more sparsely populated islands 
was already part of the colonial program; it was called “colonization” and had “the stated aim of 
improving the exploitation of the ‘natural riches there’” (Boomgaard and Gooszen 1991: 55, see also 
Weber 2005: 89). 
73 Just recently the government inaugurated a new transmigration plan, encompassing the replacement of 
four million people within five years “to bolster employment opportunities and create new villages in 
Indonesia” (The Jakarta Post 2015).  
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rights and status as masyarakat adat. From 25-29 May 1993 the “Workshop on the 
Development of adat community and legal resources and natural resource management in 
the forestry sector” was held in Tana Toraja (Tyson 2008: 74). Already in the 1980s, the 
Indonesian Forum for Environment – Friends of the Earth Indonesia (Wahana 
Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia, WALHI) started discussing the legal situation of 
indigenous rights, at that time still under Suharto’s regime. With the 1993 workshop, an 
initial set of goals for a new emergent development for the archipelago was initiated, and 
resulted in the first indigenous activists network, called the Indigenous Peoples Rights’ 
Advocacy Network (Jaringan Pembelaan Hak-Hak Masyarakat Adat, JAPHAMA), while 
simultaneously leading to similar formations all around Indonesia. Ongoing discussions 
and activists’ organization finally culminated in the First Congress of the Indigenous 
Peoples of the Archipelago, held in Jakarta in the year 1999. This meeting was also the 
birth of the nation’s biggest masyarakat adat organization, called the Indigenous Peoples’ 
Alliance of the Archipelago (Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara, AMAN) (Arizona and 
Cahyadi 2013: 43-44). The end of the New Order regime in 1998 initiated a number of 
reformatory regulations towards democracy and decentralization for the Indonesian 
nation-state. This opened the door for a new era of formerly marginalized peoples; it 
“offered the opportunity to the indigenous peoples (masyarakat adat) and to the 
government to recover the injustices and dispossessions which these people had suffered” 
(Hauser-Schäublin 2013: 7). After decades of indigenous communities voices going 
unheard, AMAN’s use of the slogan ““If the state does not recognise us, we will not 
recognise the state” in 1999 made it clear that indigenous peoples had organized 
themselves and had become a powerful organ in the new era of reformasi (Hauser-
Schäublin 2013: 7). The choral response to this slogan, echoed numerous times, “Hidup 
masyarakat adat! ‘Long live indigenous people!’” (Acciaioli 2007: 295), also signified 
another important change. With the 1999 formation of AMAN, Indonesian indigenous 
communities found a new promising term under which to subsume the variety of different 
groups that saw their rights and claims formulated by the new umbrella organization: 
masyarakat adat. According to AMAN, masyarakat adat defines “communities that live 
on the basis of their hereditary ancestral origins in a specific customary territory, that 
possess sovereignty over their land and natural riches, whose socio-cultural life is ordered 
by customary law, and whose customary institutions manage the continuity of their social 
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life” (AMAN, quoted in Acciaioli 2007: 299).74 The category “masyarakat adat” is 
deeply infused with claims to indigenous rights and recognition of communities that have 
suffered various forms of marginalization; it is thus a political term that offers 
multifaceted meanings, hopes, expectations and claims for communities that declare 
themselves to be masyarakat adat, diverse as they are; “most of them are no longer 
nomads roaming through the forests and living only from what nature offers them as the 
term in its original and romanticizing sense suggests” (Hauser-Schäublin 2013: 12). 
While upland groups like the Wana can easily be acknowledged as “upland groups” and 
as masyarakat adat, the latter was, until a couple of years ago, a broadly unknown field of 
political engagement to them. Wana entered the masyarakat adat movement in 2011; it 
was a political decision born out of land-rights issues. It offered them a new opportunity 
to fight against their marginalization in economic terms; marginality in this context 
received another meaning that I will come back to in Chapter 5. 
2.2.6 Marginality and Marginalization According to Religious 
Categories 
It becomes clear that the amount of research on upland marginalization in Indonesia is 
rich, and categories of socio-economic and political effects of marginalized standings 
among upland people are broadly covered. Upland marginalization processes in Indonesia 
meanwhile continue, not only in terms of land rights, but also for example in terms of 
indigenous peoples’ struggles for an official recognition of local belief systems. The role 
of religion is often ignored in studies focusing on upland–lowland relations – in Indonesia 
and in general – thereby neglecting one of the most critical aspects of marginalization 
relevant to Wana people.  
A number of studies focusing on religion among indigenous groups in Indonesia point to 
Christianized or Islamized uplanders who combine their old belief system with a newly 
acquired world religious belief (e.g., Duncan 2003; George 1996). For example, Duncan 
shows how the Forest Tobelo in Northeastern Halmahera had resisted religious 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 For a discussion of the development of the category masyarakat adat see Acciaioli (2007), Moniaga 
(2007) and Benda-Beckmann and Benda-Beckmann (2011); for a legal analsysis of the term see Arizona 
and Cahyani (2013).  
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conversion for a very long time, then finally gave in in the course of the efforts of the US-
based New Tribes Mission (Duncan 2003).75 Schiller, among others, describes how in 
1980 the Ngaju Dayak in Central Kalimantan have managed to get their belief system – 
formerly Kaharingan, now Hindu Kaharingan – acknowledged as a section of Hinduism 
through a government “world-religion” certification process (Schiller 1997). In Central 
Sulawesi, Aragon portrays the – as she calls it – dialogue between Tobaku belief system 
and Christian missionaries and their formulation of an “indigenized Christianity” (2000). 
In these examples, religious affiliation becomes an important category of agency that is, 
nonetheless, less important for upland marginalization processes. The edited volume by 
Tania Li (1999a) for example, touches upon the issue of religion or religious conversion 
only briefly. For Wana though, as a non-converted group, religion becomes a highly 
politicized marker of identity in regard to marginality-related issues since religious 
association is closely intertwined with a Wana self-marginalized positioning and socio-
religious hierarchies.  
Indonesia has a long history of religious influences. Today it is the country with the 
world’s largest Muslim society, but it cannot be considered an Islamic state. Instead, 
religious pluralism offers other religions, such as the group of more than 30 million 
Christians, an equal standing within the society. When Indonesia became an independent 
nation religious freedom became an important topic. Generally, the Indonesian state 
follows the principle of Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, “Unity in Diversity”, including in a 
religious sense. The Constitution of 1945 states the following concerning religion:  
(1) The state is based on the belief in the One and Only God. 
(2) The state guarantees each and every citizen the freedom of religion and of 
worship in accordance with his religion and belief.76 
A similar statement is made in the national principle of the Pancasila, manifested as the 
preamble of the 1945 Constitution. It comprises five pillars that function, according to a 
New Order interpretation, as “the source of the Indonesian soul” (Platzdasch 2009: 182). 
The first pillar designates the belief in Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa, the Belief in One God, 
thereby declaring Indonesia to be “neither an Islamic state nor a secularist one” (Beck 
2002: 216). After the downfall of Suharto and on the onset of Indonesia’s era reformasi 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 See also Chapter 4. 
76 Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945 (The Constitution of the Republic of 
Indonesia of 1945). 
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religious freedom continued to be a state concern, and was reinforced in Law 39/1999 on 
Human Rights, stating that:  
(1) Each person is free to profess his/her religion and to worship according to 
his/her religion and belief. 
(2) The state guarantees all persons the freedom of religion, each according to 
his/her religion and belief.77 
In 2001 the Second Amendment of the Constitution inserted a new section on 
“Fundamental Human Rights” – religious freedom is especially of concern for Article 
28E and I:  
(3) Each person is free to worship and to practice the religion of his choice, to 
choose education and schooling, his occupation, his nationality, his 
residency in the territory of the country that he shall be able to leave and to 
which he shall have the right to return.  
(4) To uphold and protect human rights in accordance with the principles of a 
democratic and law-based state, the implementation of fundamental 
human rights is to be guaranteed, regulated, and laid down in laws and 
regulations.78  
Based on this generally neutral and open condition for religious freedom it is easy to 
make the assumption that indigenous groups with an indigenous belief system should face 
no difficulties within the Indonesian state. However, the same constitution also places the 
above-mentioned religious freedom within a context of political stability. In Article 28J 
(2) issues of morality, security and public order are given preference over the stated 
fundamental human rights from the same article:  
“In exercising his rights and liberties, each person has the duty to accept the 
limitations determined by law for the sole purposes of guaranteeing the 
recognition and respect of the rights and liberties of other people and of satisfying 
a democratic society’s just demands based on considerations of morality, religious 
values, security, and public order.”79 
On an international level too, the Indonesian state affirms religious freedom. Through the 
ratification of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia 39/1999 tentang Hak Asasi Manusia (Law 39/1999 on Human 
Rights), translation by Crouch (2012: 548). 
78 Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945 (The Constitution of the Republic of 
Indonesia of 1945), translation by Crouch (2012: 548). 
79 Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945 (The Constitution of the Republic of 
Indonesia of 1945), translation by Crouch (2012: 548). The same paragraph was already implemented in 
Law 39/1999 on Human Rights as article 70, which “allows for permissible limitations on the right to 
religious freedom” (Crouch 2012: 548) . 
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(ICESCR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
Indonesia emphasized tolerance towards religion. Both of these agreements were then 
turned into Indonesian law, through Law 11/2005 and Law 12/2005.80 All of these 
agreements indicate that the Indonesian state is committed to religious freedom at the 
international, constitutional and domestic scale (Crouch 2012: 549). However, taking a 
close look at the internal dynamics of religious regulations reveals a slightly different 
picture.  
The declarations in Pancasila and the Constitution imply a monotheistic imperative 
regardless of confession, but omitted to provide a general definition of what could be 
regarded as religion. The Ministry of Religion, which was founded in 1946, strove to find 
a definition of religion and anticipated an Islamic understanding of it, thereby allowing 
Muslim voices a significant role in “framing and shaping all the debates about religion” 
(Picard 2011: 13). These definitory attempts culminated in the curtailing of religious 
freedom through the so-called Blasphemy Act of 196581 – the presidential Decree No 
1/PNPS/196582 on the Prevention of the Misuse/Insulting of a Religion. By this decree the 
idea of “insulting a religion” was officially articulated by then President Sukarno and was 
initially influenced by the fear of a communist threat. In Paragraph 1 the exclusivity of 
the term “religion” within the Blasphemy Law becomes plain as it officially 
acknowledges only six religions: Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism 
and Confucianism. The choice of these six religions is explicated through the “historical 
basis” of these confessional categories within Indonesia. The next sentences nevertheless 
assure the legal existence of other religions (agama-agama) such as Judaism, 
Zoroastrianism, Shintoism, and Taoism, which are, as specifically mentioned, not 
forbidden (dilarang, BI). Instead they are guaranteed the same rights as other religions as 
long as they abide by Indonesian law. Blasphemy is very much an ongoing concern of 
Indonesian public opinion – a recent example from January 2012 is the fate of civil 
servant Alexander Aan, who was jailed for posting on his Facebook page the sentence 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia 11/2005 tentang Pengesahan Kovenan Internasional Tentang Hak-
Hak Ekonomi, Sosial Dan Budaya (Law 11/2005 on Ratification of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights); Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia 12/2005 tentang 
Pengesahan Kovenan Internasional Tentang Hak-Hak Sipil Dan Politik (Law 12/2005 on Ratification of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights). 
81 Four years later, in 1969 it was given, through President Suharto, the official status of a law. 
82 Penetapan Presiden Republik Indonesia Nomor 1 Tahun 1965 Tentang Pencegahan Penyalahgunaan 
dan/atau Penodaan Agama (Presidential Decree 1/1965 on the Prevention of the Misuse and/or Insulating 
of a Religion). 
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“God does not exist”. The problem, it was stated by the Dharmasraya Police Chief, was 
“that Alexander had used the Koran to highlight his atheist views. ‘So it meets the criteria 
of tainting religion, in this case Islam’” (Pasandaran 2012). 
Albeit the strict regulation of the original Blasphemy Act of 1965, religious pluralism in 
daily practice was however far more free than what was formulated in official state rule. 
This changed when Suharto came to power. Against the background of the 1965-1966 
massacres of members of the communist party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI), 
religious affiliation received new significance. Religion became a marker of 
“unsuspiciousness” when the fear of being associated with communism – and therefore a 
danger to the state – was great among Indonesian citizens. Citizens were obliged to 
announce their religious confession via their official identity cards and atheism was 
declared prohibited (Picard 2011: 14). In 1969 Suharto changed the Decree on Blasphemy 
into law, thus “turning state-sanctioned religions into mutually exclusive categories, 
putting increasing pressure on heterodox views to conform” (Picard 2011: 14). This also 
included indigenous groups whose beliefs were excluded from the official definition of 
agama. Since a number of upland groups relied on their own belief system and had not 
converted to one of the religions recognized in the Blasphemy Law, the official state 
decree on managing religious affairs became especially relevant for people who “do not 
yet have a religion” (orang yang belum beragama, BI). Henley and Davidson make this 
clear for the interpretation of the Pancasila’s meaning for indigenous people,  
“as proscribing […] all the traditional polytheistic or ‘animist’ beliefs of those 
marginal, formerly tribal groups , subsequently identified as masyarakat adat or 
indigenous peoples, which had not yet converted to Islam or Christianity. 
[…‘L]acking religion’, these groups were regarded as vulnerable to communism 
and other forms of sedition. Many were literally forced to make an immediate 
choice between Islam and Christianity” (Henley and Davidson 2007: 10). 
The authors quote a regional official in West Kalimantan: “I don’t care which religion 
they have […] as long as they have one” (Henley and Davidson 2007: 10).  
All issues connected to those officially recognized religions became subject to the 
Ministry of Religion. Indigenous religions however were considered aliran kepercayaan 
(BI, mystical beliefs) and since 1978 were subordinated under the Ministry of Education 
and Culture. The definition of kepercayaan as culture or custom also designated 
indigenous beliefs further as belonging to the arena of tradition, a sharp contrast to state-
oriented goals of modernity when Suharto’s government aimed for the development 
Chapter II. Marginality and Upland Groups   
	   88 
(pembangunan) of the Indonesian nation. Thus, adherence to one of the six officially 
recognized “world religions” functioned as a marker of modern citizenship and 
juxtaposed traditional, and therefore “backward”, kepercayaan while religion was further 
“associated in nationalist culture with education, cosmopolitan orientation, sophistication, 
and progress” (Atkinson 1983: 688). Up until today indigenous belief systems are still not 
officially recognized religions and are still handled as spheres of culture rather than of 
religion. Wana people as well as other upland groups are thus subject to ongoing 
discrimination because they are continuously perceived as people without a religion and 
therefore as “primitives awaiting conversion” (Aragon 2003: 33). Moreover, “Wana 
failings to match the ideal of a progressive citizenry are summed up for nationalist 
Indonesians in the fact that the Wana lack a religion” (Atkinson 1983: 688). As Saputra 
claims for the Indonesian state: “[H]ome grown animism has always been given a devil’s 
image” (Saputra 2012). Consequently, religious conversion to either Christianity or Islam 
is a central subject for perceptions of “civilizatory modernity” among upland people in 
Indonesia. Most upland Wana have effectively managed to oppose conversion attempts 
made by colonial governments, their lowland fellow citizens, or current missionaries. In 
my research findings, this condition of marginalization processes according to religious 
boundaries was especially relevant in Taronggo, the lowland research location. Taronggo 
is the geographically closest full administrative village to the upland area of Salisarao, 
and is populated by an interreligious community. Non-converted Wana, Wana who have 
converted to a “world religion”, and Christians and Muslims all live together. In this 
interreligious context as well as among upland Wana, Atkinson’s analysis of how Wana 
religion is shaped alongside this outside pressure, although written long before the 
downfall of Suharto’s regime, remains meaningful today: Wana 
“are acutely aware of and sensitive to the way they are regarded by others more 
powerful than themselves. What they call agama [religion] Wana represents a 
self-consciously constructed response to the judgments of the dominant society. 
This response builds on the images of what constitutes a religion that the Wana 
have received in their dealings with Muslims and Christians” (Atkinson 1988: 
53). 
Religious marginalization is thus a highly important aspect of the question quoted above, 
of “how rule is accomplished” and how power is exercised, which I will discuss in depth 
in Chapter 4. It is another political project intended to implement control and to extend 
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national citizenship to upland people in Indonesia, deeply affecting Wana who are living 
in interreligious and other settings.  
 
2.3 INTERIM CONCLUSION 
Marginality has become a standard relational term in anthropological discourse to guide 
debates on social and economic inequalities. The works of scholars like Li, Shields and 
Tsing have revolutionized the idea of marginality, revealing the potential that marginal 
spheres have to resist and counteract hierarchical center–periphery relations. Shields has 
shown how the “social definition of marginal places and spaces is intimately linked with 
the categorization of objects, practices, ideas and modes of social interaction as belonging 
to the ‘Low culture,’ the culture of marginal places and spaces, the culture of the 
marginalized” (1991: 4-5). Marginality thus offers a way to analyze power relations in an 
interrelational setting between a center and its peripheries, and the way in which aspects 
of a given continuum are perceived by both ends. Within the Indonesian context, 
territorialization, historicity, and the dynamics of politics are important issues for the 
investigation of marginalized regions all over the archipelago. People’s socio-religious, 
economic and political environments among the Indonesian uplands are comprised by, 
and related to, hegemonic schemes, which constitute them as peripheral. However, the 
margins have never been solely reliant on a supposed center but always managed to find 
their own ways independent of nationalist agendas, thereby continuously reformulating 
center–periphery relations. Considering marginality as an essential concept for Wana in 
Morowali Regency, I believe it is the politics of state power on the one hand, and the 
performance of marginality on the other hand, that significantly shape hierarchical 
relations between marginal and central entities. Although, as I have shown above, the 
upland–lowland distinction is a social construction, and its connotations have been 
guiding points of reference in early attempts to categorize Central Sulawesi upland people 
(see introduction). It is in the Indonesian uplands that we can simultaneously observe how 
state intervention and local agency come together and how categories become permeable. 
In the sense that “the conflation of overlapping dimensions of marginality produces an 
apparently ‘natural’ fact, masking social and economic processes and the operation of 
power” (Li 1999a: 33) the Indonesian uplands, as a historically depicted marginalized 
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region, are confronted with aspects of cultural and structural marginalization processes 
that shape, define and transform a group’s identity as marginal.  
In the same framework Wana are imagined, perceived and described as marginal people 
by their neighbors, state officials, NGO activists, tourists and anthropologists. They have 
lived at the edges of the state and at the borders of the realm of cultural citizenship, where 
they have developed a sophisticated notion of their marginalized standing, as I will show 
in the following chapters – always in interaction with outsiders and state programs. Wana 
living in Central Sulawesi to a certain extent and in certain ways do fit the stereotypical 
picture commonly found in the Indonesian context for upland groups. A deep analysis of 
Wana living in upland areas and trying to find a neat positioning in the lowlands, 
underlining the hybridity of exactly these categories, touches upon the common features 
of marginality typical in the Indonesian uplands, but further adds another category to the 
topic: Religious marginality and the performance of marginality (see Chapter 3 and 4).  
 
	  	  
3 COSMOLOGICAL FOUNDATION OF A MARGINAL 
STATUS 
“Kita taw bea – We are a stupid people (orang bodoh, BI); kita taw masi yasi – we are a 
pitiful people”. This verbal expression was a sentence that I heard frequently from my 
interlocutors. It followed me throughout my time in Taronggo and Salisarao. Wana used 
this self-denigrating illustration habitually, in daily conversations, in interviews and 
meetings. “We are stupid people” or often the singular form, “I am stupid, I know 
nothing”, were phrases that took me a while to understand its deeper meaning. At first, I 
believed it to be a notion of mere timidity and politeness, used to excuse oneself for 
missing knowledge or information on a specific topic simply because a lack of formal 
education. I also had thoughts about whether it could be a general self-denigrating habitus 
as an ethnic minority just like de Vidas has witnessed among the Teneek in Mexico. The 
Teenek describe themselves as “’less than nothing,’ ‘smelly,’ ‘dirty Indians,’ ‘idiots,’ 
‘cowards,’ and [...] ‘very timid’[...] we are stupid’“ (Vidas 2004: 290,121), accepting 
their marginal stand within the Mexican society as an ontological given. I also came to 
believe it to portray feigned ignorance as a sort of resistance against government and 
outer, unwanted influences – similar with what Scott had in mind when he talked about 
“the ordinary weapons of relatively powerless groups”83 (Scott 1985: 29). Not knowing 
how to vote, how to participate at a community meeting for example, could be interpreted 
as a way of refusing state interaction. In a sense of resistance, ignorance can be a useful 
tool for marginalized groups to defend one’s interests; it “require[s] little or no 
coordination or planning; [it] represent[s] a form of individual self-help; and [ignorance] 
avoid[s] any direct symbolic confrontation with authority or with elite norms” (Scott 
1985: 29). All three interpretations deserve some consideration in the course of this thesis 
(see Chapter 5). Similarly to Scott’s assertions, the above mentioned Teenek marginal 
standing within the Mexican nation can also be understood as a rather potent and 
powerful chosen societal positioning: “the Teeneks place themselves outside other social 
groups, renouncing any eventual emulation of them because they cannot conceive, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 Scott understands under these weapons forms of daily resistance like “foot dragging, dissimulation, false 
compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander, arson, sabotage, and so forth” (Scott 1985: 29). 
Chapter III. Cosmological Foundation of a Marginal Status 
92 
	  
structurally, the possibility of envying them. They thus affirm their specific (although 
negative) identity in relation to the Others, which can also be understood as a language of 
resistance” (Vidas 2004: 174). However, Wana verbal expressions of a self-denigrating 
status yet portray another meaning, which became clear to me by listening to 
cosmological narratives that Wana were sometimes eager (and sometimes hesitant) to tell 
me. Although their self-deprecation was also nested neatly between notions of resistance 
and politeness, it rather finds its explanation and causal derivation in the cosmological 
foundation of Wana marginal standing.  
Cosmology is a term frequently used in anthropological studies and describes a rather 
vague notion of worldview, belief, symbols and rituals stories but also an important 
influence on social practice. Cosmology has been applied as a concept to explain “the 
theory of the universe as an ordered whole, and of the general laws which govern it. In 
social anthropology, the meaning of cosmology […] is closely connected to the empirical 
study of religions” (Barnard and Spencer 2002: 129). Thus, it is deeply connected with 
the idea of cultural classification and structure; Lévi-Strauss’ writings on cosmology were 
highly influential and inspired a wave of interest in cosmology in anthropological studies. 
Lévi-Strauss distinguished social structure between two systems of order, first the “order 
of elements” encompassing kinship and marriage rules, and second an “order of orders”, 
“the formal properties of the whole made up of sub-wholes, each of which corresponds to 
a given structural level” (Lévi-Strauss 1963: 333). The latter can be divided further into 
lived-in orders like the political and thought-of orders including religion and myth,  
“mechanisms which can be studied from the outside as a part of objective reality. 
But no systematic studies of these orders can be undertaken without 
acknowledging the fact that social groups, to achieve their reciprocal ordering, 
need to call upon orders of different types, corresponding to a field external to 
objective reality and which we call the ‘supernatural’. These ‘thought-of’ orders 
cannot be checked against the experience to which they refer, since they are one 
and the same as this experience. Therefore, we are in the position of studying 
them only in their relationships with the other types of ‘lived-in’ orders” (Lévi-
Strauss 1963: 312–13).  
Stressing the heterogeneity of orders for a given society, he stirred wide interest in the 
study of cosmologies for means of theorizing human mind. Southeast Asia in particular 
became a field of structural analysis of indigenous cosmologies. In Indonesia, through the 
structuralist Leiden school, a special tradition emerged out of early Dutch academic 
interest on empirical data on the country. Its outcome, Barnard and Spencer note, is still 
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traceable today: “ethnographic accounts from Indonesia cannot ignore this Dutch 
tradition. Whether the focus is on kinship, ritual, house construction, or even on social 
change, most find it impossible to discuss cultural and social practices without relating 
them in some way to indigenous cosmologies” (Barnard and Spencer 2002: 198). 
Examples for anthropological research dealing also with indigenous cosmologies are the 
work of Elizabeth Traube Cosmology and Social Life: Ritual Exchange among the 
Mambai of East Timor (1986), Gregory Forth who offers a detailed analysis of Nage 
cosmology in Eastern Indonesia (1998), Rössler who discusses ritual practice among the 
Makassar of Gowa, South Sulawesi (1987), Aragon who examines pre-colonial 
cosmology in Central Sulawesi (2000) or Atkinson who explains Wana belief in a divided 
realty with cosmological narratives.  
It is these cosmological narratives and understanding that deeply embed and explain 
Wana marginal standing as one central factor. In Wana creation myths, a specific 
millennial theme explains their contemporary situation as taw bea. In this chapter I will 
therefore show how Wana construct their current state of desolation as a temporary stance 
of marginality. I choose two of these powerful narratives that demonstrate how Wana first 
explain their poverty and misery as an ethnic community and second how they have 
conceptualized their past as a Golden Age, the so-called tempo baraka.84 Further, nested 
within the baraka narrative Wana believe in the reversal of their current pity in a 
retributive logic by expecting a return of the Golden Age in the future. This millennial 
emphasis offers a powerful and highly significant scheme for Wana articulations of their 
marginality. Then, I will show how specific agents of Wana cosmology function as 
brokers of these two temporalities of Wana marginality and thus portray bridges between 
the golden past and golden future. To conclude this chapter, I focus on Wana performance 
of marginality as a specific form of self-marginalization that results from Wana 
cosmological explanations of their current standing.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 The Wana probably have adopted the term tempo, meaning fate or time, from Bahasa Indonesia, itself a 
loanword from Portuguese, the lingua franca of the archipelago between the 16th and 19th century that 
left manifold traces on the Indonesian national language. Baraka, meaning power, is in itself an Arabic 
term (see also Atkinson 1979). For a discussion of baraka see Chapter 3.1.4. 
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3.1 COSMOLOGICAL NARRATIVES 
Wana shamanship and concurrently Wana cosmology and epistemology has already been 
described and analyzed by Jane Atkinson. In her study she chose to focus on the most 
central Wana healing ritual, the mabolong – in the Morowali area called momago – and 
unwinds its double function as religious ritual evoking parts of a divided reality Wana 
refer to and further as a political stage that serves the affirmation and reaffirmation of 
power and political authority (see Chapter 4). Atkinson’s writings were evidently central 
to my research but since my study questions were of different concern, I was, in the 
beginning not genuinely interested in Wana cosmological explanations of the world. It 
took me a couple of weeks to realize that what Atkinson has referred to as cosmological 
narratives were still of uttermost importance for Morowali Wana. Before I portray Wana 
cosmological narratives, let me first clarify my overall understanding of Wana cosmology 
within the context of this chapter and the conceptualization of Wana mythology for 
elaborating on Wana marginality.  
Atkinson recalls her first “intimation” with Wana cosmological realms during her first 
weeks of fieldwork in a chat with one of her informants, Indo Lina; “Looking out at the 
dense forests covering the mountain flanks that faced us, Indo Lina told me that those 
forests were full of “people” (tau) who for some reason were not seen, people who lived 
and farmed like the people here, but who kept themselves out of sight” (Atkinson 1979: 
36–37). What the anthropologist first understood as people who had fled to the forests 
and now seemed to live in the mountains, she later realized, was a first insight into Wana 
understanding of their surrounding; these people Indo Lina had mentioned were taw 
bolag.85 Taw bolag or sometimes called taw bolagi are invisible people living in the 
Wana forests that are of the same shape and appearance like Wana. Only sometimes they 
become visible, mostly for shamans and only when they want to. I recite this episode 
from Atkinson’s research because her perplexity about the way Indo Lina spoke about the 
taw bolag is helpful for understanding Wana cosmology, the research situation, and 
change in Wana cultural explanations;  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Atkinson uses the spelling tau (see also Camang 2003), whereas Journet and Nougarol use the term taw 
just like my informants who were literate – a version I prefer simply out of habit and that I use in the 
following.  
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“the terms in which Indo Lina described these people were […] terms by which 
ordinary Wana settlements might be described. It was only later that I could be 
sure that these hidden people were not humans […], but a spirit population whose 
characteristics were drawn from the Wana social world” (1979: 38).  
I stumbled over the taw bolag more or less by accident. One night during my first weeks 
in Taronggo, I was talking to Apa nTina about dogs and their ability to sense measa, a 
general term for a number of Wana demonic spirits. Apa Ensi was sitting next to us. Apa 
nTina told me that one-day he went with a friend and his three dogs in the forest to search 
for soga (resin). After a long day of collecting soga, they were surprised by nightfall; it 
went dark and they had not managed to get home in time so they had no choice but to 
sleep in the woods. The forest is home to a variety of powerful beings that Wana usually 
fear – except for shamans or those who wish to become one. After they had lied down and 
finally managed to get to sleep, they were suddenly woke during the night by the dogs 
loud barking. Alarmed and afraid they got up to see the dogs yapping angrily. To the 
humans’ relief, the dogs were wagging their tails and were in fact highly exited in a 
friendly way. Apa nTina explained: The dogs had seen taw bolag, he said simply. 
Recalling what I had learned about them from Atkinson, I was eager to receive more 
details about them, but Apa nTina made it hard to obtain any specific particulars. It was 
only later, when I was in the upland region of Salisarao that people talked more open 
about the taw bolag. In retrospective, I believe Apa nTina had in that moment refused to 
talk about the taw bolag in detail, since a) he had not known me too well at that time and 
b) the presence of another person hindered him. The interreligious situation of living 
together door to door with Christians and Muslims shaped not only the research situation 
to a great extent (see also Chapter 1 and 4) but also Wana presentations of cosmological 
explanations and the way they are or are not eager to talk about it (Chapter 4).  
The notion of the taw bolag served Atkinson as an introduction of her access to Wana 
cosmogony. The taw bolag, just like other spirits that populate the Wana area, are agents 
of a hidden realm in Wana cosmology. For Wana the world is divided into “ordinary and 
hidden realms” (Atkisnon 1989: 38) that people can differently have access to. While 
people may experience usual diseases or accidents like breaking a leg, these incidents can 
also have a deeper hidden cause and are perceived of as results of intervention on human 
bodies by spirit agents. These, to use Atkinson’s term “extraordinary” diseases can be 
seen and cured only by shamans who by their special competence and powerful 
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knowledge gain access to these hidden realms of the world. Just like the notion of saruga, 
heaven, that for Wana exists as a separate afterworld once attached to earth (see Chapter 
4), these hidden realms of the earth are part of Wana cosmology. Wana perceive of their 
world as a divided realm, or as Apa Jendi asserted: “There is this world that everyone can 
see, and then there is this other [place] that only people can see like taw walia [shamans] 
during a momago, or when you are alone in the dark, in the forest, or sometimes when 
you do not expect anything”. Wana separate the reality to which everyone has access and 
those spheres of reality that is limited in access. Against this background, cosmological 
narratives gain an important status: it is in these stories and other “conventional narratives 
[…] that outline typical sequences of action involving extraordinary dimensions of 
reality, people can discuss and interpret events with reference to hidden sources” 
(Atkinson 1989: 41). For understanding the cultural meaning of marginality from Wana 
perspective, so-called katuntu, powerful creation myths become therefore meaningful in a 
twofold way. First they are prevailing narratives demonstrating Wana cosmological 
understanding of the world while they further explain the construction of Wana current 
socio-cultural as well as political and economic positioning.  
3.1.1 Conceptualizing Creation Myths 
These katuntu are potent stories of a time long gone; Atkinson calls them cosmogonic 
tales. They can also be called creation myths, since they usually present a somewhat 
sacred description about how humans and the world were created. Thus, Wana katuntu 
easily fit the category of a myth as “a sacred narrative explaining how the world and man 
came to be in their present form” (Dundes 1984: 1). Before turning to the two relevant 
creation myths necessary to understand Wana conceptualizations of their marginal 
standing, let me first clarify the meaning of myths as analytical categories explaining 
marginality.  
Segal (2005) gives an overview over the various theoretical approaches concerned with 
myth; that is myth and philosophy, myth and religion, myth and ritual, myth and 
literature, myth and psychology, myth and structure and myth and society. Based upon a 
comparative study of these approaches, Segal analyses a unifying matter for all 
disciplines concerned with the study of myths. He makes out three major questions 
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relating to origin, function and subject matter of the myth. The first question on origin 
asks how and why a myth occurs. The question for function concentrates on the reasons 
and circumstances a myth is persevered; “the answer to the why of origin and function is 
usually a need, which myth arises to fulfill and lasts by continuing to fulfill. What the 
need is, varies from theory to theory and from discipline to discipline” (Segal 2005: 372). 
The subject matter often asks for the myth’s referent; that is whether a myth is interpreted 
symbolically or rather literally. Broadly speaking, 19th century academics were mainly 
concerned with the study of myths and chiefly concentrated on the representation of the 
natural world within mythical accounts. For example, James Frazer und Edward B. Tylor 
both formulated a clear cut border between religion and science (Nader 1996: 4) and 
interpreted myth as part of religion and excluded from the realm of natural science; 
instead a myth serves as “an explanation of a physical event” (Segal 2005: 339) which is 
not based on scientific but on spiritual assumptions or as Frazer claims, “from the earliest 
times man has been engaged in a search for general rules whereby to turn the order of 
natural phenomena to his own advantage” (Frazer 1993: 50). For example, the physical 
event of rain or a volcano eruption is interpreted as the will of a godly being or a deity. 
Such an explanation would be part of the area of magic, the “bastard sister of science” 
(Frazer 1993: 50). Both, Tylor and Frazer saw myth as oppositional to science, the latter 
interpreted as modern whereas the former is associated as a primitive practice. According 
to 19th century evolutionist thinking, one had to cling to science and give up belief in 
myth to become modern. A different position took the 20th century theorists, where both 
was possible: one could be modern but at the same time could also keep hold of myth. 
Even though they criticized former theorists inter alia for declaring myth as false, they 
nonetheless did not try relativizing science.86 Instead, they kept on “accepting science as 
the reigning explanation of the physical world” (Segal 2012: 118) and tried to grasp myth 
quite differently. The most influential of 20th century scholars reinterpreting the function 
of myth, however, were Bronislaw Malinowski and the historian of religions Mircea 
Eliade. Both argued that myth is about physical or natural phenomena but that it is also 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 According to Segal 20th century theorists concerned with myth can be distinguished into three groups of 
theorists. One subsumes scholars like Freud and Jung theorizing myth as neither explanation nor claiming 
a necessity to read myth literally; for them a myth’s function is solely the experience of the human mind 
and its subject matter is exactly this mind. The second group is lead by Rudolf Bultmann and Hans Jonas. 
These scholars do not take a myth’s subject matter as the natural world; instead it can be the world’s 
influence on people or also people themselves and thus a “myth is not to be read literally” (Segal 2012: 
118). The third group is described above.  
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further about social phenomena and institutions like law or custom (Segal 2012: 119). 
Malinowski for example distinguished between legend and myth on the ground that a 
myth becomes relevant when a ritual, a ceremony or a social and moral rule is in need of 
justification (Malinowski 1973: 89). For Eliade, myth (and rituals) serve the return to an 
original place and time, while “imitating the exemplary acts of a god or of a mythic hero, 
or simply by recounting their adventures, the man of an archaic society detaches himself 
from profane time and magically re-enters the Great Time, the sacred time” (Eliade 1960: 
23). While both scholars perceive of myths as a “a narrative resurrection of primeval 
reality” (Eliade, quoting Malinowski, 1960: 20), the latter sees the spiritual power of 
myth as a source of knowledge and experience while the former highlights the social 
power of myth as part of social interaction (Mader 2008: 135). Winzeler has collected a 
number of characteristics of myths that I recite here:  
1) Myths is a story rather and a statement of belief or doctrine 
2) It includes personalities that may be human, animal, or supernatural, or a 
combination of these, who do things or to whom things happen. 
3) It is a story that is not just known but ‘believed’ and is regarded as important 
and sacred 
4) It has no known author or authors; myth is different in this way from religious 
revelation and prophecy, to which it may otherwise be similar. 
5) It involves events or activities that are in some way extraordinary, ‘larger than 
life’, if not necessarily supernatural, and cannot be confirmed or disproved 
(Winzeler 2008: 104). 
A general definition of myth, against the background of numerous disciplines focusing on 
it, is not an easy task. The most simple, and for my intention the most intriguing 
definition is the one by Dundes mentioned above, myth as “a sacred narrative explaining 
how the world and man came to be in their present form” (Dundes 1984: 1). However, as 
we will see in the course of this chapter, general characteristics of Wana myths can differ 
from one to another. I will come back to this definition later and we will see in the 
following how Wana katuntu matches with or differs from this definitory attempt.  
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Wana myths: Katuntu or Creation Tales 
Atkinson mentions for her research that some katuntu were “popular accounts with wide 
currency” (Atkinson 1979: 64); today they are still popular but people are highly careful 
to speak about them or even retell them when they are not sure about their audience (see 
above).87 Apart from Christian or Muslim critics, another danger comes along with citing 
katuntu. These stories possess special power that can cause fatal damage when told in the 
wrong setting. To prevent this, a duku or lango, a ritual offering tray used also in a 
number rituals, would be needed for retelling these stories in order to concentrate powers 
towards a specific point “that have dispersed to the ends of the earth” (Atkinson 1989: 
43). Then, if one would find a person who can tell the complete cosmogonic corpus the 
recitation would take seven days and seven nights and the earth would answer with an 
immense earthquake. However, most people only know fragments of katuntu, and 
Atkinson notes, that the entirety of these stories presents “an ideal that my sources believe 
once existed but does no longer. […] Wana make no pretense […] of full knowledge of 
cosmogonic stories, nor do they go to lengths to judge ‘narrative competence‘” (1989: 
43). I had a similar impression during the course of my research but the longer I stayed 
people started referring to one single Wana individual from Kayupoli within the nature 
reserve who, despite earlier assumptions, was said to know the complete corpus. Curious 
as I was, I managed to meet him a couple of times – Kayupoli is a day’s hike away from 
Taronggo and Salisarao – but according to him, time was always scarce so we never 
started the recitation of the full corpus. Whether or not narrative competence and 
competition is an issue of difference between Wana from the North in Atkinson’s 
research site and those from my research region or whether my example is just related to 
a single individual from Kayupoli is not easy to answer. On the other hand, it is 
interesting to note that Kayupoli is the tourist “hot-spot” for Morowali Wana; most 
outsiders interested in Wana culture usually visit Kayupoli and its surroundings. Further 
some minor research conducted there 88  and the work of the documentary filmers 
Nougarol and Journet (Journet and Nougarol 2002, 2005) include a number of 
interviewing techniques and approaches focusing in detail on religious accounts, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 Atkinson (1989: 44) calls these stories of a time when wishes would become true katuntu. During my 
research, the meaning of katuntu appeared to be extended to all stories of a magical and powerful past.  
88 For example (Nurfanyiwi 2000; Sudaryanto 2005). 
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shamanic interpretation and Wana cosmology. Thus, it could be assumed that narrative 
competence has become an issue in areas with greater fluctuation of outsiders and people 
willing to pay for cosmological stories, in a sense of a commodification of culture.  
A Wana katuntu is described by Atkinson as “a story of an earlier age characterized by 
magical powers which is sung in a distinctive way” (1979: 385). Katuntu presented to me, 
however, were never sung but instead eloquently told by knowing people.89 Although a 
duku (ritual offering tray) was not necessary for me listening to katuntu, the situation 
however required a special setting. Only a few people were usually present, it was 
typically dark in the night and dinner had been served; a certain amount of rice wine, 
betel and cigarettes were necessary ingredients for telling katuntu. People capable of 
reciting katuntu were usually older people, women and men alike, although women 
usually were seldom openly claiming katuntu knowledge. Interestingly, younger Wana 
often did not know about the difference between general story-telling from the past, in the 
sense of history, and katuntu. Here is a short extract of an interview I took with Indo 
nSerli, a young upland woman and Apa nDenda, a well-respected Salisarao elder. In the 
following section I was asking about katuntu:  
Me: Oh, I thought there is a difference between history (sejarah, BI) and katuntu.  
Indo nSerli: No, history (sejarah) is the same like katuntu, there is no difference 
between telling a story from the past and katuntu…  
Apa nDenda interrupts her 
Apa nDenda: Ha, it’s like that: katuntu is, ya, a little different between katuntu 
and history; the former (katuntu) relates to the history of the world and how it all 
began (si’i sejarah dunia dari mulanya). From there, people began to spread their 
stories; the stories from this time are called katuntu.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 Nougarol (n.d.) also hints to the root of the verb as tuntu, meaning cerita (BI), to tell and give the 
following example sentence: “Na tuntu wesi’i-wesi’i = dia cerita begini-begini” (BI: s/he was telling this 
and this). 
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Some parts of katuntu that were portrayed to me were of secret nature and some special 
names that I got taught obtained specific powers. Of course, I will not sketch them out in 
the course of this work.90 Instead, I will present only a short section of these stories that 
are relevant for Wana marginalization and I will begin with an account concerning the 
creation and the shaping of the cosmos. In a second step I will present versions of the 
narrative of the Golden Past. 91 Both serve as an explanation for Wana current marginality 
and poverty. 
3.1.2 Kaju Parambaa: The Felled Tree 
In the beginning, the world was only water. Then Pololoisong, a mythical figure, came 
down from heaven and placed a small amount of earth in the ocean, enough to set out a 
tree. This first piece of earth is, in Wana accounts, the seat of the world, tunda’n tana, 
where everything began, located at gunung (mountain) Loyong, close to Uewaju in the 
North. This tiny portion of earth became the foundation of the land. Pololoisong went 
back to heaven to ask Pue, God or the Owner, for permission to plant a tree. Pue granted 
him the right, thus Pololoisong returned to earth and put the first tree in the ground, the 
mythical kaju parambaa (big tree). Once the tree had grown a little, Pololoisong returned 
to heaven and asked Pue for a pair of chickens to take to earth and set free. The chickens 
started to scratch the ground, as is their habit, and thereby expanded the ground a little. 
But it was not enough. So Pololoisong went another time to Pue and returned with a pair 
of pigs, that he used to plow the ground by means of enlarging the earth. Another time he 
left for a pair of birds. However, the earth was still too small and the tree, kaju parambaa, 
had grown fast and had become too tall for the tiny earth. Again, Pololoisong made his 
way to heaven and asked for permission to fell the tree. Pue granted him the right to cut 
kaju parambaa but gave him an important advice: The tree was not to fall with its tree top 
on the waterside but on the tiny piece of earth. Pololoisong went back to earth and began 
to fell the tree; once he had already worked on one side of the tree and then started with 
the opposite side, the former had already grown back. Eventually, Pololoisong managed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 Similarly, Atkinson refers to the incompleteness of the accounts she had collected as well as the stories 
A.C. Kruyt had collected almost hundred years ago (1989: 43).  
91 Her account and the accounts I collected are in general of similar content. 
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to fell it completely; due to the great difficulties however, fate took its course’ and kaju 
parambaa’s treetop landed on the water. Seven days and seven nights Pololoisong waited, 
hoping the tree would eventually change back its position to earth, but his hopes were not 
fulfilled. Because kaju parambaa fell with its treetop on the water and not on the soil, 
Wana people are poor, it is told; wealth is lost to those areas beyond tunda’n tana.  
In some versions that are told, the treetop was the source of money that could then be 
easily harvested by people living ”over there’. A.C. Kruyt has already written down this 
story in the beginning of the 20th century. Here, it is connected to the story of wiaa 
siwangoe: In the chapter “De Oorsprong de To Wana” (A.C. Kruyt 1930: 414–15) he 
asserts, heaven and earth were once connected by a liane, the wiaa siwangoe. At this time 
there were two Gods, named Poee ri arantana (Pue ara’n tana) and Poee lamoa (Pue 
lamoa), also named Lai and Ndara (see also Chapter 4). Both were brothers who could 
easily shift between heaven and earth. One day, heaven moved away from earth and the 
liane broke. Pue Lamoa managed to hold on to heaven with the end of his spear and could 
rescue himself to heaven. His brother, Pue ara‘n tana had to stay on earth. Pololoisong, 
here called Pololoiso, climbed down the liane and set the first tree, here called tree 
parambae. Once the tree had fallen on the water side, Pue Lamoa spoke to him: “Now the 
people shall be poor. They shall beat bark cloth into clothing and enjoy no well-being” 
(translation taken from Atkinson 1989: 198).92  
The story of kaju parambaa serves Wana as an explication for their marginalized 
standing. Because Pololoisong had failed to fell the tree according to Pue’s advice, Wana 
remained disadvantaged and poor. In the kaju parambaa version Wana marginality is 
constituted as a permanent condition. This eternal setting serves as an explanation for 
Wana current situation and the inequality they experience in direct contact with their 
surrounding neighbors. In some versions, the direction of the tree top is located in Java: 
“because the tree fell in the water the Javanese became rich and the Wana poor; God had 
warned us,” Apa Ensi told me. Others see the location even further away in the West, 
“where white and rich people live. If the tree had landed on the earth, maybe you would 
now be poor and Wana people would be rich”, another of my interlocutors, Apa Jendi, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 Atkinson had met similar accounts concerning the figure of Pololoisong, with differences in names. She 
recites in another context a ritual invocation of a Wana shaman, who uses the word Pololoisong; the 
explanation here seems to be for narrative intentions solely; “Pololoiso (called variously Palalaeesong and 
Pololoisong here for rhetorical effect” (Atkinson 1989: 204).  
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referred to me. In Apa Jendi’s explanation, the creation myth explains further the extreme 
social inequalities Wana experience with reference to the “West”. Although the eternal 
marginality constituted by this narration lacks a millenarian setting, it is however an 
explanation of poverty where Wana have not actively caused their marginalization. The 
tree falling to the wrong side is rather interpreted as bad luck, or at least the fault of 
Pololoisong. Wana actors themselves do not appear at all and thus could not influence the 
outcome. Furthermore, the interpretation of pusen tana, the navel of the earth, as the 
source – albeit not the location – of wealth for the whole world, including rich islands like 
Java and the complete Western civilization offers a powerful tale of origin. 
The difference between this account and the second cosmological narrative can be found 
in a specific millenarian setting of the upcoming myth of the taw baraka who left Wana 
in a marginalized standing but also offers them a way out of their current misery. 
3.1.3 Tempo Baraka: Past and Future Golden Age  
As I have already mentioned Wana see their land as the navel of the world, pusen tana. 
This land is furthermore, the source of baraka (power), kasugi (wealth) and pagansani 
(knowledge).  
A very long time ago, the navel of the world was home to a special group of people, the 
so-called taw baraka, people of power. These days are also entitled as tempo baraka, the 
time of power. All Wana were able to access and use these sources of power through, as 
Atkinson has shown, wali m panto’o, meaning “the becoming of the word” in Atkinson’s 
translation (1989: 43).93 One would just need to close his or her eyes, for example, use a 
spell called adi adi and speak the following words “adi adi indo dua apa to si aku to 
momonso, kulepa matak …., ‘adi adi of mother and father that to me is the true. I (have 
only to open my eyes)’” (Atkinson 1979: 65) and the wished-for object would appear. In 
the 1970s, stories stemming from these days had to be sung and adi adi in them was used 
by the protagonists to wish for goods like edible items, houses etc. Forty years later 
however, these stories were simply narrated. The exact formula as it was cited by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Stemming from mewali= to become and to’o= to say, to speak.  
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Atkinson was not known among my informants; people just recalled the spell’s short 
form of closing one’s eyes and speaking adi adi. 
However, in Atkinson’s words, “the Golden Age was not to last”. One day, the taw 
baraka, decided to leave pusen tana and go to another place at the end of the world, a 
process called joe n tana. Their departure ended the tempo baraka, the Golden Era. 
Atkinson recalls how the departing taw baraka were using a number of utensils to travel 
to this far away mythical place, some were using hats, others shields etc. Some were 
becoming stone, timbuso watu (stone statues)94 or other natural landscape features – this 
is the version most commonly told among Morowali Wana. Then, the taw baraka’s koro 
uli, a special part of their soul, would go joe n tana, where the others had already gone.95 
In these accounts, an important individual appears: Parangesong, who is a trickster figure 
in Wana cosmology96; he is also often referred to as taw mafuti, a person who lies. This 
figure is further repeatedly recited in katuntu as a person who was “up to no good”. In one 
version, Parangesong used a specific spell to turn a very delicate sort of ubi wakai, a 
sweet cassava plant, into a deadly form of poison. No one could ever eat that plant again. 
In some versions of the stories concerning Parangesong, he is held responsible for the fact 
that people have to face a final end through death: In the past, it is told, in times of tempo 
baraka, people would not die the way they do today. They would die for a certain amount 
of time but could eventually be brought back from the dead through the power of the 
word, adi adi. One day, however, Parangesong felt annoyed by this human feature and 
used his own magical formula to cause people to stay dead once they have passed away. 
Atkinson gives a similar account on the temporary condition of human death with people 
usually reawaking after three days. She brings up a trickster person, Ngkasi, who “cried 
and stamped in the ground in rage (mangaru) when a person died” (1989: 46). After this 
incident, people would die permanently. Interesting is here the appearance of a trickster 
figure causing permanent human death, but the difference of the two accounts, where 
Parangesong intentionally ends the temporary character of peoples’ afterlife (my account) 
and Ngaski, who was mourning and crying and thereby caused the same result 
(Atkinson’s account).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Atkinson calls it tompuso.  
95 Atkinson notes only the word “spirits”, but my informants insisted on the special attribute of koro uli.  
96 Atkinson calls him Langesong, a name unknown to Morowali Wana.  
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Parangesong, known as Langesong in the Northern Wana region, is a common figure in 
accounts that Atkinson and I have collected that share a similar content; for example, 
Parangesong seduces a demon, measa, who formerly was happy to eat the insides of trees 
and stones: The trickster figure asked the demon whether he would not prefer the insides 
of people over the insides of rocks because they were more tender. In Atkinson’s version, 
the demon took off to ask Pue, God, for permission. Pue granted the measa the right to 
feed from human’s inside “but only when they are ripe” (Atkinson 1989: 45). Thus, in her 
version, Wana tell accounts of a demon eating a person’s liver once his times has come. 
The details of the end of this story were not known among my informants, but people 
indeed blame Parangesong for the fact that measa now have developed a hunger for 
human livers. Parangesong is also held responsible for the hardness of today’s daily work. 
In an account from Atkinson, baskets were able to walk by themselves until 
Parangesong97 managed to trick some humans in carrying them with the result that 
baskets would need to be carried. I heard a similar account on trees; in the past, trees were 
soft and people could easily grab some wood from them to get firewood or else. After 
Parangesong used his magic, trees became hard and people would need an axe to cut one 
down. 
Concerning the tempo baraka, Atkinson notes that “Langesong did not refrain from 
badgering the powerful” (1989: 45). She recalls a version where Langesong, seeing a taw 
baraka sitting in a flying boat departing for joe n tana, he would call out to him, 
remarking, magagang, on how the things worked normally, “thereby causing those things 
to lose their efficacy” (1989: 45). Through his call, the boat immediately fell from the 
sky. The power of the word, wali mpanto’o was reversed by Langesong’s power. In those 
accounts I heard, Parangesong, the Southern equivalent to Langesong, was not only 
disturbing taw baraka while departing tana Wana, the Wana homeland. Instead, 
Parangesong was in fact the source and cause of the taw baraka exodus. In these stories, 
Parangesong mainly disturbed the taw baraka. He possessed, as some of my interlocutors 
insisted, more knowledge, pangansani, than the taw baraka. This fact serves as an 
explanation why the trickster figure could manage to make flying boats fall from the sky 
like dead birds. The taw baraka finally were so upset by their malicious villain that they 
decided to leave the earth, departing for a faraway place unknown.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 Here called Langesong.  
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The consequence the exodus of the taw baraka was utterly tragic: The taw baraka took 
along the attributes of the Golden Era: baraka (power), kasugi (wealth) and pagansani 
(knowledge). In Atkinson’s account, pabriik (factories) is also another attribute of the 
tempo baraka, serving as an explanation for Wana lacking knowledge to sew clothing, 
relying instead on bark cloth, ronto kojo, “considered by the Wana to be grievously 
inferior to cotton cloth” (Atkinson 1979: 65). During my research, some people 
mentioned the parting of a buku (book) connected to the taw baraka exodus. One of my 
interlocutors, Apa Jendi, insisted that the taw baraka took with them a book that had all 
Wana katuntu, cosmological narratives, and pangansani, powerful knowledge written in 
it. Apa Jendi claimed that it was similar like the Koran or the Bible; this version 
underlines the reformulation of Wana belief within interreligious dynamics as they can be 
found today in the research area (see Chapter 4). In another version I heard by Apa nTina 
the departure of the taw baraka is the reason for the current inequality between Wana and 
the rest of the world nested in the relocation of pangansani. 
Apa nTina: Well, in fact, they [taw baraka] did not really leave this world [i.e. joe 
ntana], they did not really move. When we say they went to the end, I mean it is 
to the end of the island only. They only went to the end of the island so actually 
there is still pangansani there. Because the taw baraka did not carry it all the way 
with them. They only took it to the end of the island and left it there. Look, there 
are still people who are rich. But here, on our Wana land, there is no one rich, 
right? They only went to the beach, and left it there.  
Me: On this earth? 
Apa nTina: Yes, on the same earth, but at the end of the world they stopped. That 
is why there are still rich people. And why here is no one rich.  
Apa Jendi: Only poor [Wana] people. 
The departure of the taw baraka however demarcated the end of the Golden Age and 
opened up a new age of poverty where “powerful knowledge is no longer a commonplace 
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but limited to a very few”, and ordinary Wana were left behind, “powerless, poor and 
limited in their access to knowledge” (Atkinson 1989: 44) – taw bea as I mentioned in the 
beginning of this chapter. Magical knowledge, wealth or power as well as pabriik and 
buku were no longer accessible to Wana people. Therefore, Wana today often present 
themselves as a poor and pitiful people, taw masi yasi, caught in a marginal stance.  
However, this positioning is nested profoundly within a millenarian framework, as also 
Atkinson has called it previously. This framework presents an on-going dialectic between 
past, present and future that deeply rests on each of these components. The entanglement 
of different temporalities constitutes the central paradigm Wana situate themselves in 
their lives: It presupposes and similarly induces faith, aspiration and longing forasmuch 
as there is hope: Wana believe that one day, their powerful allies, the taw baraka, will 
return to pusen tana and introduce a new Golden Era for them. These days will be 
foreshadowed by a number of events like multiple earthquakes, brutal wars, especially 
religious wars, a worldwide flood of water and oceans of blood that will color the rivers, 
as my interlocutors asserted.98 After all these events, however, Wana will be compensated 
with the return of the taw baraka and the attributes of the Golden Era: baraka (power), 
kasugi (wealth) and pagansani (knowledge).  
This glorious future, notwithstanding, requires a certain and highly important 
precondition: It is essential for Wana not to break out of their current state of misery in 
the meantime. Only those Wana who remain in the current powerless state of pity, 
kasiasi, and have not converted to another religion will be rewarded by the returning taw 
baraka (see also Atkinson 1989: 44).  
3.1.4 Myths and Marginality 
In this cultural construction, marginality is cosmologically constituted as a temporary 
condition. A departure from marginality is possible with the help of the taw baraka, 
expected to come back one day. This explanation becomes crucial for the marginalized 
status of the Wana when talking about resistance and empowerment, as I will show in the 
following course of this thesis. Both myths presented here are similar in the way they are 
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Wana katuntu and can be easily categorized as myths. The baraka myth further has a 
specific millennial outcome.  
Millennialism  
The term millennialism, often used in an active form of a millennial movement, has its 
roots in Christian eschatology that claimed a dogma for the “last days”; it precisely 
concentrated on the Book of Revelation that predicted the rule of a thousand year lasting 
messianic earthly realm after the Second Coming of Christ until the days of the Final 
Judgement. Although the initial meaning of millenarianism was rather specific the term 
itself was used early on in a rather liberal meaning – in Christian eschatology for 
example, but also in the way sociologists and anthropologists make use of the terms 
designating “a particular type of salvationism” (Cohn 1970: 13). In a classic and very 
influential attempt concerning salvation studies, Cohn has defined millenarian movements 
perceiving salvation along five central components central to them. First it is a collective 
movement shared by the believing community, second salvation will take place on earth 
and third it will happen soon and is thus an imminent event; fourth, it will transform life 
itself into perfection and fifth, it will happen with the aid of “supernatural agencies” 
(Cohn 1970: 13). This definition has been expanded by Wessinger who claimed that not 
all millennial movements do in fact exert a salvation concept that is strictly limited to 
earth but also on heavenly sphere. Further, the idea of a supernatural agent alone was 
ousted by the possible assistance of other agents, like “‘history’, ‘progress’ or the 
‘consciousness of the people’” (Wessinger 2011: 5). Thus, Wessinger postulates a 
definition of millennialism that is based on its functional character; millennialism is  
“belief in an imminent transition to a collective salvation, in which the faithful 
will experience well-being and the unpleasant limitations of the human condition 
will be eliminated. The collective salvation is often considered to be earthly but it 
can also be heavenly. The collective salvation will be accomplished either by a 
divine of superhuman agent alone, or with the assistance of humans working 
according to the divine or superhuman will and plan” (Wessinger 2011: 5).  
McVey in her study of religion in Southeast Asia asserts that upland groups like the Wana 
had, historically, the opportunity to resist superior outside influence, state order or rule 
and related religious ideologies due to their location in far reachable terrain in the upland, 
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and thus were “satellites whose distance and inconsequentiality permitted them to 
maintain an eccentric orbit” (1999: 12), albeit in a marginalized connotation. There are 
various reasons why these communities did not participate in the new forms of rules; 
either they could not produce enough surplus to advance further development, or they had 
been inferior in former struggles for authority. Regardless of the descent, common to 
most of these communities is according to McVey a cosmological construct that mirrors 
their unequal standing towards “the greater center, to establish through ideology (an 
ideology intended as a comfort for their souls if not as a call to rebellion) an equality that 
everyday experience denies them” (McVey 1999: 13). According to the author, “myths of 
origin will show their superior descent, and they will claim to be the custodians of old, 
true values which have been abandoned or distorted by major power” (McVey 1999: 
13).99 Sprenger asserts that upland communities in Southeast Asia usually had four ways 
of dealing with lowland state religious influence. While upland groups either could 
implement lowland religious aspects into their own belief system, other chose religious 
conversion either to the dominant lowland religion or, as many Wana in the research area 
did, chose to convert to a different world religion, in Central-Sulawesi usually 
Christianity which has stronger entanglements in the uplands due to colonial 
constellations (see Chapters Four and Five). A fourth option can be found in a religious 
transformation through millenarianism, that usually offers an interesting option for groups 
that can be regarded as marginalized. While Sprenger points to the fact, that mainland 
Southeast Asia experienced more millennial uprisings, there are nevertheless Indonesian 
examples like Wana cosmology reveals. The concept of millenarianism “denotes the idea 
that a catastrophic upturning of the established order is near, often leading to a more just 
leadership, a Golden Age or the predominance of a previously oppressed group” 
(Sprenger 2015: 336).100 Ishii asserts that millenarian initiatives have a specific goal that 
is not content with the adjustment of current social inequality to an improved level; 
instead the vision in mind of millenarian tendencies is a complete reversal of the current 
structure: “What they seek is the collapse of the whole existing order and the realization 
of a completely new and perfect world” (Ishii 1986: 173; see also Jackson 1988: 136). 
Ishii, focusing on Thai Buddhist millenarianism also postulates the emergence of a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 McVey related here, among others, to Atkinson’s study of Wana.  
100 For an analysis of millenarian movements and violence along conflict in Eastern Indonesia see Bubandt 
(2004).  
Chapter III. Cosmological Foundation of a Marginal Status 
110 
	  
charismatic leader. However, such leaders are not a necessary prerequisite of millenarian 
movements. According to Jackson,  
“Millenarian movements typically foretell or actively seek the complete 
destruction or inversion of the existing social order, and are often linked with 
prophecies of an impending time of great social turmoil, in which the rich and 
powerful will be overthrown, to be followed by an ideal and materially abundant 
society” (Jackson 1988: 136, see also Baird 2013: 259. 
It is important to note that Wana expect a millennial outcome only when they remain in 
their current state of pity. The Golden Era will start one day but without active 
involvement of the Wana. The taw baraka myth places Wana as agents of a millennial 
outcome insofar as they need to remain in their current marginalized stance if they want 
to be part of the future tempo baraka. Meanwhile they are obliged to cling to their 
religion, to their poverty, their powerlessness as well as their absence of knowledge (see 
above, “we are a stupid people”). Unlike other millennial movements, Wana are not 
expected to instigate a specific action that will initiate the new Golden Era. Instead a 
rather passive behavior of stagnation in a temporal marginality serves as the key to 
participate in the future glory. McVey has noted that marginalized upland communities 
may focus even stronger on their internal values and social structure; “Indeed, resistance 
to the sources of inequality as well as fear of the loss of culture cohesion generally 
encourages strong ideological sanctions against involvement in the market economy” 
(McVey 1999: 12). In this context the taw baraka narrative and its related focus on 
current marginality may thus serve such a model to deal with state power among 
historically marginalized communities as the Wana are.  
Coming back to the characteristics of myths collected by Winzeler (2008) and cited in the 
beginning of this chapter, the author’s first and third point deserve some attention: “Myth 
is a story rather than a statement of belief or doctrine”, Winzeler states in a first account 
and then, in a third, he asserts that a myth “is a story that is not just known but ‘believed’ 
and is regarded as important and sacred”. Both Wana katuntu I have recited here are 
“just” stories; they do not represent a religion or a moral set of guidelines in itself. 
Nonetheless, they are both deemed sacred and powerful and thus are believed. Even so, it 
is exactly this criterion that explains the profound disparity between both myths. To 
explicate this in detail, let me come back to Eliade’s theory on archaic myth. For Eliade, 
myth serves in general three functions. First, a myth gives a detailed explanation of how 
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the contemporary world evolved, “[m]yth narrates a sacred history; it relates an event that 
took place in primordial time, the fabled time of the ‘beginnings’. In other words, myth 
tells how, through the deeds of Supernatural Beings, a reality came into existence” 
(Eliade 1960: 5–6). Further it serves as a normative initiative – I would add, its narration 
is the normative regulation, not the myth itself – since the myth “become exemplary, and 
consequently repeatable, for it serves as a model, and by the same token as a justification, 
for all human actions” (Eliade 1960: 23). And then, third and most famous of Eliade’s 
theory, myth serves as a means of transport into an original time (see above). Roughly, I 
would agree with Eliade’s assumptions. The narrative of the taw baraka would eventually 
serve Eliade’s interpretation of myths as the cosmological return. Through retelling the 
myth, the narrator and his audience place themselves back in a mythical place of original 
times full of power and wealth. Here, we can observe a double function of the return – 
through the narration itself and as Eliade has postulated by “imitating the exemplary acts 
of a god or of a mythic hero”, people can detach themselves from “profane time”, which 
is the marginalized standing of the presence and “magically re-enter […] the Great Time, 
the sacred time” (Eliade 1960: 23). The same applies analogously for the myth of kaju 
parambaa. Second, I believe, it is the millenarian marker of hope in the narrative of the 
taw baraka that serves the picture Eliade has pointed out. Holding on to one’s 
expectations of a magical return of the taw baraka, the recitation of cosmological 
settings, origins and fates, the hope is reformulated and reaffirmed. Still, the myth of kaju 
parambaa does not receive its strength through the retelling of a “golden time”. It is an 
explanation of recent day phenomena and worldly inequality but at the same time it does 
not offer a version of parity. Therefore I would only agree with Eliade’s third point for 
the millennial myth of the taw baraka.  
Nevertheless, even though I label this myth millennial, the taw baraka myth itself does 
not present a millenarian setting. It is rather the form of narration that constitutes a 
millennial framework. This becomes another fundamental distinguishing feature between 
the myths concerning taw baraka and kaju paramba. The difference becomes palpable by 
looking at the contextual reality of the myth that cannot be found in the myth itself. The 
quality of millennialism does not lie within the taw baraka myth itself. Rather it is the 
way it is narrated and interpreted by narrator and audience that is accompanied with great 
expectation. Thus the anticipated paradise becomes in some way the final stage of the 
myth itself, although it has no original part in it. One could speak of a “becoming myth” 
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in Deleuze’s and Gattari’s (2002) sense, exemplified by their example of the wasp and the 
orchid. In this example, a wasp takes the pollen of an orchid and redistributes it to other 
flowers. By doing so, the wasp is already part of the orchid in some sense; she is a 
becoming-orchid. Both enter a relation that is described as a rhizome. The taw baraka 
myth itself tells a story, maybe even a history from the past. It is a creation myth 
depicting a description of a time long gone. It is, in itself, not connected to a different 
temporality or substance. However, once it is narrated and infused with aspiration, the 
myth changes its dimensions and thus changes its essential core. It becomes expanded and 
is now connected to a future sphere; thus it has changed into a “becoming future”. This is 
a process where the myth has started to be less itself, which is a creation myth, while 
being attributed more and more the character of a future; it is “becoming future”, or at 
least an imagined future. It is in this sense that the creation myth is also a millenarian 
myth.  
Lost Attributes – (Con)current Attitudes  
The term baraka is in itself an Arabic term. Westermarck (1926: 35) notes for the 
Moroccan context, baraka “is used to denote a mysterious wonder-working force which 
is looked upon as a blessing from God, a ‘blessed virtue’” (cf. Venzlaff 1977: 2). For the 
same context, Geertz ascribes a number of values connected to baraka: “material 
prosperity, physical well-being, bodily satisfaction, completion, luck, plenitude, and, the 
aspect most stressed by Western writers anxious to force it into a pigeonhole with mana, 
magical power” (Geertz 1968: 44). Based on these ideas associated with baraka, Geertz 
stresses the connection to the world and refuses a simplifying understanding of the term 
as a “paraphysical force”; instead baraka has a direct appearance in the world as an 
“endowment – a talent, a capacity, a special ability – of particular individuals. […] [T]he 
best […] analogue for ‘baraka’ is personal presence, force of character, moral vividness” 
(Geertz 1968: 44). Concerning the endowment of baraka in Marocco, Crapanzano 
distinguishes two types of special power; one concerns genealogic descent where 
individuals inherit the baraka of their ancestor (in his example descendants of a saint). 
This is also called “institutional baraka” and cannot be lost. The other form is “personal 
baraka”, in the same sense as Geertz understands the term it is a quality one has to 
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achieve and which rests “upon his character, his piety and spirituality, his moral fiber and 
his therapeutic gifts” (Crapanzano 1973: 73).  
Just like baraka, the second aspect of the Golden Age, kasugi, comes from the Buginese 
term for wealth (Atkinson 1989: 343).101 The third aspect, pangansani, knowledge, is the 
only word for knowledge that “is autochthonous conceptually and linguistically” 
(Atkinson 1989: 343).  
I mentioned above how Apa Jendi added to the sources of the tempo baraka the idea of a 
book that got lost as well by the departure of the taw baraka. Among Southeast Asian 
upland groups the concept of lost texts is a common scheme. Scott asserts examples from 
the Southeast-Asian mainland portraying how upland groups with accounts of lost written 
sources have “one scheme: the people in question once did have writing but lost it 
through their own improvidence, or would have had it had they not been cheated of it by 
treachery” (Scott 2009: 221). Just like for the Karen or the Wa of mainland Southeast 
Asia, a trickster figure in form of Parangesong is held responsible in this version of Wana 
tempo baraka for losing their book. However, while Scott points to the imminent matter 
of literacy that is attributed to the lost texts of upland groups, my interlocutor emphasized 
the religious connection of the book while placing it in line with the Koran and the Bible. 
Literacy itself was not the central aspect of the account of the book but rather a religious 
equation in relation to Islam and Christianity. This account nevertheless is as well 
“powerfully influenced by an implicit dialogue with more powerful groups associated 
with state and writing is reinforced by its occurrence outside the region as well” (Scott 
2009: 222). Entangled in an interreligious framework that I will explain in detail in 
Chapter 4, the Wana loss of literacy thus receives a cosmological explanation that finds 
its roots in religiously marginalized standing. The loss of all attributes we find in the 
baraka myth portrays a multidimensional meaning of Wana marginality that encompasses 
interaction with other ethnic groups, exemplified by the terms baraka and kasugi 
stemming its roots from external languages, an inherent Wana cosmological aspect of the 
loss of Wana pangansani as an indigenous concept as well as an interreligious dialogue 
that places Wana religious setting in one line with other Christianity and Islam. The lost 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101The following version of sugi are used in Wana grammar; it is a daily term used in everyday talk and not 
specially ascribed to katuntu: sugi / kasugi / kasugimu / kasugingku / kasuginya / mampakasugi / masugi 
(Nougarol n.d.).  
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attributes are therefore a highly meaningful marker of current Wana cosmological 
explanation of their marginality as an ethnic group.  
3.2 REMAINS OF THE PAST – BRIDGES TO THE FUTURE 
In Wana cultural construction of their current state of being, living, suffering, Wana 
cosmology plays a central role. Wana conceive of their ethnic community as a 
transformed stage, nested between two complete endings. In the past, a condition of unity 
experienced an abrupt ending, disturbed in the most extreme sense of Wana being left 
back. The current state is a mere sad memory of glorious days that have long ceased. 
Although the misery is great, Wana expect a future change, “a reunion of that which was 
divided at the original source. In their historical moment, after dispersal and before 
reunification, Wana portray themselves as existing in a cosmic state of entropy, which, 
mimetically, their discourse about the past represents” (Atkinson 1989: 42). Atkinson’s 
approach on Wana cosmological narratives places a special focus on the aspect of 
separation within these myths, she speaks of a “A Divided Reality” (1989).102 What 
Atkinson wrote a number of years ago is still relevant for Wana today. The story of taw 
baraka presents a separation of knowledge, wealth and power from Wana land to another 
place, the separation of taw baraka and Wana, while the kaju paramba myth tells a story 
of separating wealth from Wana land through felling a tree.103  
These cosmological themes and the stage of expectation are still of the utmost importance 
for Wana today and their explanation of a marginal standing. The feeling of living in a 
transitional stage continues to play an important part in Wana culture as is portrayed 
sharply in the following tendebomba, a Wana form of short verses, that Indo Laku made 
up during a long conversation we had:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 Atkinson asserts that Wana however do not overwhelmingly pay attention to them: “[W]hat is to be 
treasured and coveted is not the narratives about the division of the cosmos, but instead the words that 
pass across the partition” (1989: 50). She is referring to what she calls spirit gifts to humans (1989: 53). In 
my research context though, Wana indeed deeply treasured and coveted these narratives along the 
millenarian setting described above. Reasons for this disparity in both research findings might be found in 
the specific setting of my fieldwork locations, where intercultural and interreligious dynamics and 
constellations seem to have caused a shift in the valuation of millenarian scenarios, as I will discuss in 
Chapter 4. 
103 Other myths that were central for Atkinson’s research dealing with the theme of separation were for 
example about the separation of peoples and religions from Wana land (1989: 50).  
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Aku jewa si’i semo  
 
 
That is just the way I am,  
 Masi yasi wuri eyo  
 
Poor and pitiful from day to day, 
from morning till night,  
 
Jemo mampeya si tempo  
 
I am just waiting for the time  
 Ratila mantoro lenso When I can wave my piece of 
cloth to greet happiness. 
 
The verse form of tendebomba104 is an artistic way of expressing feelings and meanings 
that many Wana are capable of; the content does not necessarily needs to be of serious 
character but can also be used as a form of game, where one tendebomba needs to be 
replied with another. This highly creative form of amusement also serves political 
agendas, when people can hide their intentions in sophisticated verses without openly 
expressing one’s meaning. By contrast, the kayori,105 is more authoritative and relates 
only to powerful stories from the past, katuntu (see above). In the above-cited 
tendebomba, Indo Laku expresses her feeling of being caught in the intermediate stage of 
being and waiting. The only sense she sees in her everyday life can be found in the 
anticipated change that finally will bring joy to her. Masi yasi, a term meaning pitiful and 
poor (kasihan, BI) is often used in conversations about the past and displays a similar 
meaning like the sentence kita taw bea (see above). Atkinson notes kasiasi as “a state that 
elicits pity”, and masi yasi as “poor, wretched, pathetic” (1979: 385). Indo Laku 
underlines the act of waiting as part of her identity, “that is just the way I am”; caught in a 
pitiful stance and longing for a future that will bring relief. In the context of a transitory 
waiting stage and a future anticipation, bridges that cross the divided reality Wana live in 
today play a very important part. One form of these bridges passing the gap between now 
and then, hidden and seen dimensions, can be found in what I call witnesses. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 Word coming from tende, to throw. Bomba could be stemming from bombang, the word for wave. 
Tendebomba is a form of Wana poetry. Atkinson (1984) describes tendebomba as love poetry whereas in 
my research region tendebomba was considered as an artistic way of expressing all sorts of themes, 
emotions as well as political matters. 
105 Nougarol sees a relation between tende bomba / kayori and syair, a common form of Arabic verse-
making of four-liners (n.d.); Atkinson uses the form “kiyori” (1984). 
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3.2.1 Witnesses of Tempo Baraka  
Witnesses serve as reminders of the former days of a Golden Era and as markers of hope 
and anticipation. One form of such witnesses can be found in timbuso watu. These are 
rocks or big stones that can be found scattered all over Wana upland regions. They 
symbolize the petrified bodies of taw baraka who left the Wana homeland (joe n’tana) 
and left behind their bodies. A part of their soul, the koro uli, departed while their bodies 
remained and turned into stone. Timbuso watu are sacred places of worship that possess 
special powers or baraka. No strangers are supposed to visit these places and disturb the 
silence of the places. I felt very honoured when I was one day asked by Apa Yare from 
Salisarao whether I would like to come with him to see one of these timbuso watu. It was 
a great privilege and I went with him and two other Wana, Indo Felu and Apa De’u, to 
see the sacred place. The timbuso watu was hidden in a small cave and was very well kept 
in secret from outsiders. Apa Yare and the others were very humble when we entered the 
place, Apa De’u eventually decided to stay outside because he sensed the strong baraka 
of the site. The timbuso watu need to be kept clean and undisturbed in expectation of the 
great return.106 Their presence is thus a turned-into-stone-proof of the cosmological 
narrative of the taw baraka and functions as a witness of the millennial promise that lies 
within the cosmological narrative.  
Another witness is a more daily utensil connected deeply to the taw baraka myth. One 
night I was sitting together with several of my Salisarao interlocutors in the house of Indo 
De’u, a middle-aged Wana woman from the upland. As the time passed by and the 
morning began to rise we already had talked for hours about the issue of religion, 
exchanging thoughts and experiences. In the background, Apa Nevi was silently playing 
the geso-geso, a Wana instrument involving a string attached to a coconut shell that 
functions as a resonance body.107 Once we touched upon the millennial myth of taw 
baraka, Indo De’u leaned forward to me, touched my arm and told me with strong voice 
that this music is not just music, but that it is connected to the story itself. She explained: 
When the taw baraka took off for joe ntana, the remaining Wana were struck by deep 
sadness over the loss of their friends. They were crying and in a deep state of desperation. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 Further they become relevant in questions of land rights and resettlement (see Chapter 5). 
107 Atkinson calls this instrument du’e (1979: 296).  
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Thus, the taw baraka left them a gift to ease the pain of separation: the tolali, a bamboo 
flute, the geso-geso, and the popondo. Playing these instruments helped Wana leaving the 
sadness behind and remembering their lost friends. Thus, it becomes a way of crossing 
the gap between them, an ongoing connection to the sphere of magical times, to their 
“powerful friends” that can easily be evoked by everyone capable of playing it. Atkinson 
does not recall such an interpretation; she makes only one mention of music instruments 
among Wana in the context of shamans singing about to lono, still-born babies. Shamans 
state the to lono are not able to communicate by language but instead rely on playing 
instruments; girls using the tolali and boys using the du’e (geso-geso). Thus, the tolali 
and the du’e “are female and male instruments respectively and their melodies ‘talk’, that 
is, on them one can play messages of love, longing, loneliness and far-off places” (1979: 
296). Even though our accounts diverge in this context, the instruments’ character of 
expressing emotions such as loneliness and longing are equivalent in both versions. 
Further, both recount a contextual setting of unwanted separation – through departure and 
through death. Thus, Wana musical instruments serve as tools to help to come to terms 
with the effects of a traumatic separation.  
Witnesses of a Golden Era like the timbuso watu or Wana musical instruments are in 
themselves equally a lost past and a “becoming future” but also a marker of current 
conditions that deeply affect Wana cultural standing. Since Wana have to remain in their 
current marginalized positioning to gain access to the millennial promise found in the taw 
baraka narrative, their presence is signified by pity and poverty. Wana rely on a form of 
millennial-motivated self-marginalization. In absence of open millennial engagements 
that directly unify and reify a millennial scheme within a community as it is common for 
other millennial movements, Wana remain in a waiting positioning signified by a 
mandatory marginality. Witnesses like the timbuso watu or the instruments function in 
this setting as necessary testimony of past, presence and future promise and thereby 
continuously reenact the millennial setting refered to by Wana.  
Another important bridge between time and realities is portrayed in the figure of the 
shaman. That night, when Indo De’u told me about the meaning of Wana instruments, she 
also mentioned another relic of the taw baraka, deeply connected to Wana shamanism. 
They left pangansani – one attribute of the Golden Era that, according to Indo De’u, now 
is partly still evocable through Wana shamans.  
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3.2.2 Shamans as Brokers of Dimensions, Temporalities and 
Knowledge 
Shamanism, or shamanship, is a central theme in Wana life and culture. I do not wish to 
elaborate in detail on the question of shamanistic features since I believe most has been 
said by the great work of Jane Atkinson (1989). However, concerning the question of 
marginality as a cosmological concept, deeply intertwined with a millenarian outcome, 
shamanism nevertheless plays an important role. As already mentioned, Wana belief 
divides the world in two dimensions, a hidden and a current, visible dimension. Mc Vey 
notes that subsistence communities in Indonesia “are not marked by a division between 
sacred and profane. Rather, the critical line is between the sphere of man and that of 
ancestors/spirits, the seen and unseen world” (1999: 6). She asserts further: “Certain 
people may be recognized as having particular access to the realm of the spirits, and are 
accordingly appealed to for advice or intercession, but this enhances rather than 
monopolizes contact with the [unseen] world” (McVey 1999: 6). Taw walia, shamans, a 
core aspect of Wana culture, are such intermediaries between these two worlds as they 
can shift from here to there, following their spirit friends. Wana shamans do occasionally 
visit Taronggo; Apa Main who resides around a 20 minute walk from Taronggo across 
the Solato river is the closest by. There is currently no powerful taw walia living in 
Taronggo; villagers usually either call for shamans from the upland or hike the way up to 
meet competent healers (see Chapter 4.5).  
Atkinson emphasizes that “defining what a shaman is requires examining Wana 
conceptions of the world and the self, questions of what knowledge is, as well as 
exploring what shamans can do that others cannot” (1979: 37). Although Wana reality is 
a divided one, the borders between both realms, hidden and apparent, are fluid. Divided 
realities refer not only to Wana dimension but also to the individual person, who is 
divided in some sense, explicated through a number of soul parts and hidden elements 
within the body;  
“the individual is seen to be characterized in a similar way, composed of facets 
hidden from the ordinary experience and perception of most people. These hidden 
aspects of the person participate with hidden elements beyond the person in ways 
that exceed an individual’s awareness or control. This participation can be 
negotiated only by shaman, aided by knowledge and spirit familiars (the source of 
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knowledge) who offer access to what is otherwise hidden in the person and in the 
world” (Aktinson 1979: 121).  
Aspects of the hidden sphere, like the taw bolag, every now and then become visible. 
Immediate encounters or exchanges with creatures from the hidden dimension can 
potentially happen to all Wana and usually do so in the forest. Certain forms of diseases 
and sickness are recognized to be caused by specific spiritual beings and thus are 
perceived as manifestations from the other side. Within the framework of separation and 
hybrid borders Wana shamans play a special role. Atkinson brings it straight to the point: 
“shamans negotiate not simply matters of physical health, but also social, moral and 
spiritual concerns as well” (Atkinson 1988: 48). 
Thus, on the one hand, shamans function as healers who cure diseases, on the other hand 
they play a key role for compensating the loss of knowledge and power and wealth (see 
also Atkinson 1987: 349). They function as intermediaries of knowledge between two 
spheres, of which one is hidden to most ordinary Wana. Shamans and shamanistic rituals 
thus become brokers between spiritual realm and Wana agents. Healing rituals, further, 
thus serve as arenas of ritual practice but simultaneously also present spatial 
entanglements between now and then, hidden and apparent spheres. Within these 
dynamics, shamans and their spiritual allies, their walia, become agents of normative 
guidelines that are of special significance for all participants. Thus, they become an 
important factor analyzing marginality constructions and knowledge politics among 
Wana. Shamans consequently are important actors within the cultural and religious 
production of identity, the negotiation of this identity and the concurring scopes of action.  
Let me come back to Indo De’u’s explanation of shamans and their knowledge as 
connected to the time of the taw baraka. Shamans in Wana society inherit an important 
position but they are not considered as being much different from ordinary people. The 
power to heal is not found within the figure of the shaman itself but associated with 
external powerful beings that the shaman has encountered and retrieved knowledge from; 
“being a shaman involves not a different spiritual inner self, but special knowledge of 
powers in the outside world. Through such knowledge and the associations it brings, a 
shaman can temporarily undergo changes in his physical and emotional experience” 
(Atkinson 1979: 121). This special knowledge here is considered as pangansani – a term 
popular within the taw baraka myth. The word itself means simply knowledge but it is 
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used in a different context than its verbal form, nsani or mangansani which “is used for 
commonsensical everyday kinds of knowledge, as well as for the esoteric facets of Wana 
life” (Atkinson 1979: 182). Conversely, pangansani is special knowledge and thus not 
used to refer to everyday forms of knowledge; “[r]ather, it applies to the extraordinary 
and powerful knowledge of an earlier age and to a highly developed understanding of 
special knowledge obtained from hidden sources in the world today” (Atkinson 1979: 
182). This powerful knowledge is manifested within words, like spells, do’a,108 or names, 
sanga. These forms of knowledge however are not solely restricted to shamans.  
Do’a, “the preeminent form of powerful verbal knowledge” (Atkinson 1979: 382) are 
spells or formula that can be learned by anyone. They usually are acquired through 
relatives or friends who are not reluctant to share their knowledge. Through this praxis 
some do’a have been around for generations. Another possibility to gain this form of 
verbal knowledge lies within the teaching through a shaman – if the latter is willing to 
give away. It is said that do’a will lose their potential once too many people know its 
formula and are used too frequently. Thus, it can happen that people eager to teach do’a 
alter the words to some extent. As a result, people can never be sure whether do’a 
received through this option is still potent. The same procedure of studying do’a accounts 
for obtaining sanga. Sanga simply means name, but in a sense of a genuine name, sanga 
kojo. Related to forms of healing and magical knowledge sanga portrays the real name of 
a thing, like the name of a tree, a plant, body part etc. but also conditions like the weather; 
most importantly sanga is usually a secret name. Contrary to ordinary everyday names, 
the real names are powerful instruments in the sense that their knowledge “gives one 
influence or control over what bears those names” (1979: 183). The uses of sanga are 
readily summarized by Atkinson:  
“For example, the name of the first measa [deamon] to descend to earth (sanga nu 
measa uyu ng katudu) may be used to halt the attack of threatening measa one 
meets in the woods. The ‘name of mother and father’ (sanga indo dua apa), 
which refers to the female and male generative organs, can defeat sorcery. The 
secret name of rice may be used to destroy the rice crop of others. A shaman uses 
the secret names of shamanistic paraphernalia to make the articles useful to him in 
his performance. The name of wine serves to prevent drunkenness. The names of 
pythons and crocodiles insure that one will not meet those animals on a journey. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 The Wana term do’a derives from Bahasa Indonesia, doa, meaning prayer or blessing and has its origins 
in the Arabic word doa’a (Aktinson 1989: 64).  
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The names of the sun and of tobacco are means to beautify one’s appearance by 
appropriating attractive properties of each” (1979: 183). 
Now, in Wana society, magic is a straightforward business as it seems or as Atkinson puts 
it: “Magic very simply consists of words told by spirits to humans” (1989: 52). Although 
everyone can meet spirits potentially, not everyone does. The forest is a good place to 
meet spirits; certain places are said to be favorite places where spirits mingle. Wana who 
go soga, searching and collecting tree resin, often tell stories of having met a certain spirit 
along the way. Others who are eager to meet spirits would go by night to a grave, sit atop 
of it awaiting a spiritual encounter. Although meeting a spiritual being could happen to 
everyone, only some gain knowledge from these communions. Some are just seeing 
spirits in passing, some are scared and run away while others only hear or sense the spirit. 
Thus only a number of Wana have the potential to retain knowledge from beings that are 
usually part of the hidden reality. And not everyone receiving do’a or sanga from these 
encounters becomes a shaman. The spirits who help humans with the knowledge of do’a 
and sanga sometimes cling to that person. They enter a relationship with that person who 
can count on their assistance and can call them during healing rituals for assisting. These 
spirits are called walia – a shaman thus is called taw walia or ka walia – a person with 
walia. To become a taw walia several prerequisites have to be fulfilled. Although many 
people might have the chance to meet a spiritual being, not everyone can bind a walia to 
him or her. Thus, to become a shaman, one usually would study with an elder, 
experienced shaman to learn spells and names or instructions for walia. This, as I have 
already made clear, everyone can do. But meeting a spirit on one’s own is a complete 
different matter.  
One necessary feature of a becoming shaman is a certain hand line, the so called ua m 
pale. Aktinson explains: “Having the ‘palm line’, by the way, is a retrospective assertion; 
if someone is thought to have had an encounter with some spirit being, it is then surmised 
that he or she has the palm line” (1979: 70). Then one would go and search advice by an 
elder shaman. Instructed with spells and names and other instructions, one would then 
either go malinja, walking around, through the woods by daylight, hoping to meet a spirit. 
The other opportunity would be to bartapa, “to keep vigil at a place or object usually in 
the dark of night” (Atkinson 1979: 135). For either way it is necessary to be dressed as 
poorly as possible to evoke the pity of the spiritual beings. Only in this combination he or 
she might bind powerful spiritual being to him or her. With these new connections he is 
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able to gain new knowledge, pangansani, in forms of do’a and sanga and he can summon 
his spirit familiars to help during healing rituals, for example. There are a number of other 
practices essential to become an effective shaman, described in detail in Atkinson’s work. 
Relevant for my analysis however is the millenarian setting in which shamanistic actions 
and careers are perceived and interpreted. Wana perceive of their land as the source of 
knowledge, power and wealth, that “Wana look to shamans to monitor both the wellbeing 
of individuals and the imminent return of ‘knowledge, power and wealth’ is consistent 
with this analogy” (Atkinson 1987: 349). 
Shamanistic features and possibilities are regarded as remains of the past, a bridge to a 
hidden dimension but also to a golden past and an expected glorious future. In this sense 
Wana “verbal magic provides a semblance of the former power of words” (Atkinson 
1989: 52). Atkinson has already mentioned part of this understanding while talking about 
the taw baraka myth:  
“A future resolution is anticipated when those who left and that which was borne 
away will return again to seek their place of origin. In the meantime, the Wana 
have only a few powers left to them, including the kuasa walia, ‘the power of 
shamanistic spirit familiars’, which may be used to combat sickness and 
suffering” (1979: 64).  
This is what Indo De’u confessed to me: Pangansani that shamans and some other Wana 
individuals still possess, or rather have obtained, is a relic from the past and a glimpse to 
the future simultaneously. It is by this means that Wana shamanism plays such a central 
role concerning the cosmological understanding of Wana marginalized standing.  
Interestingly, another parallel can be found within the performance of shamans and the 
inappropriateness (taboo) of speaking about his success. If one is to call out to a shaman 
who is performing a flight or something other outstandingly special it would not work any 
longer. Atkinson mentions her informants calling this to magagang, to remark. Similarly I 
could observe that shamans are very reluctant to speak about their power and success 
during a healing condition. What I took first as a notion of sheer modesty I later came to 
understand that using words to describe a shaman’s power could seriously harm his 
efficacy. Often shamans are hesitant to admit they are shamans at all; talking about one’s 
own influence does not match the ideal of a performed marginality that attracts spirit 
familiars and grants healing powers. Instead, it destroys the potential. This is similar to 
the practice of Parangesong’s magagang presented in the taw baraka myth above, who 
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caused flying boats to fall from heaven just by remarking their flying condition. 
Parangesong’s habit of causing Wana magic to fail finally led to the departure of the taw 
baraka and the diminishing of the Golden attributes. In the same sense, Wana today are 
not very keen to magagang either.  
Due to these aspects of Wana shamanship, taw walia are of highest importance regarding 
a comprehensive analysis of marginality constructions and knowledge politics, they are 
crucial actors in the cultural and religious production of identity and negotiation processes 
of identities as well as the scope of action and flexibility of these processes. 
3.3 SELF-MARGINALIZATION OR PERFORMING MARGINALITY 
Aku na sikola yami  I have already learned a lot 
Yako more panga jadi From times when everything began 
Atora re kasi yasi The rule of the poor and pitiful 
Nee wara kalingani Don’t let it be forgotten  
Tendebomba by Indo De’u 
Nested in Wana cosmological narratives and their role for current and future expectations 
is a strict imperative for Wana social behavior. If the millennial promise shall fulfill one 
day, bringing them a new Golden Era, Wana need to remain masi yasi, pitiful, poor, 
dumb, in other words: marginal. Only by keeping up this orientation Wana will be able to 
become part of the glorious future. As a result Wana openly engage in a self-denigrating 
discourse, portraying Wana poverty and weakness, “we Wana are very dumb” (samua 
bea, bea kojo). In a somewhat similar case the Teenek in Mexiko, mentioned in the 
beginning of this chapter, rely on a cosmological explanation that situates them as 
subordinate towards external ethnic groups. In their worldview their pre-human ancestors 
fled to the underworld, leaving behind Teenek in an intermediary positioning that 
constitutes them as marginal by contrast to other groups (Vidas 2004: 390). The result is a 
“self-denigrating discourse […] [that] justifies this situation, and at the same time – 
because such discourse is linked to the history of their ancestors – [...] also serves as a 
support for their ethnic identity” (Vidas 2004: 390). Teenek use to portray their 
marginalized standing in relation to other ethnic groups, just like: “‘We are worth 
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nothing’, ‘we are dirty, smelly, stupid’” (Vidas 2004: 174). Part of Wana marginality is 
settled profoundly within the cultural cosmological understanding of the becoming of the 
world, the rise of human beings and specifically the fate of Wana people. This 
marginality is caused through events that happened in the past and is remembered through 
cosmological narratives popular among Wana story tellers; simultaneously, it is through 
the act of re-telling, constantly re-affirmed and reconstituted. It is part of a process one 
could call “self-marginalization”. Wana also rely on a self-denigrating discourse and tend 
to describe themselves as subordinate and outside of Indonesian mainstream and 
modernity. Degrading the own identity is a strategy Wana apply due to their millennial 
guideline. A subordinate outsider positioning grants Wana the advantage of taking part in 
a future Golden Era. 109  Keeping Wana faith alive and following the impetus of 
marginalization thus offers Wana, within the millennial setting, the only way out of 
marginality. 
The self-marginalization of Wana is severely entrenched in a specific performance of 
marginality. This performance finds its roots in cosmological narratives and the 
concurring millennial setting but touches Wana everyday life (see also Chapters 4 and 5). 
Joanne Gilbert distinguishes between two types of marginality. The first type she draws 
from the early schools of marginality thinkers like Stonequist (see Chapter 2). For her, 
sociological marginality is dependent on “some immutable physical reality such as sex, 
race/ethnicity, age, size, or disfiguration/disability” (Gilbert 2004: 6). According to her, 
people who are physically different are constantly living their marginality; “they cannot 
help but perform their marginality – they do not voice it, but rather it – nonverbally – 
voices them” (Gilbert 2004: 6). People who are able to circumvent these alleged physical 
markers, in her example closeted gays and lesbians, function as examples for only 
“rhetorically marginalized” (Gilbert 2004: 6), i.e. people, who “may avoid discrimination 
by ‘passing’” (Gilbert 2004: 6). Further, she elaborates:  
“Even when they are ‘out’, however, many gays and lesbian are still only 
rhetorically marginalized, as there is no apparent physical feature that 
marginalizes them sociologically. By choosing to ‘perform’ various ‘gendered’ 
behaviors, gays and lesbians may construct a nonverbal marginality, but sexual 
orientation does not necessarily manifest itself in an overt sociological 
marginalization as biological sex or race/ethnicity does” (Gilbert 2004: 6).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 It is on the other hand as well a “language of resistance” that enables Wana to resist state and outsider 
claims towards them as an upland group, see Chapter 5. 
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Interesting in this point of view is the aspect of agency nested within Gilberts account. 
The choice, or rather the active decision to perform a specific behavior attributed to 
another physical marker, eventually leads to the construction of a new form of 
marginality: the nonverbal marginality that changes the issue of marginality to its 
rhetorical character – relevant for people who do not offer a physical resemblance of the 
sphere of sociological marginality. Wana are marginalized in several sociological ways, 
based on difference such as race and class or religion as Chapter 4 will show. 
Nevertheless, Wana still choose to perform their own marginality, their poverty, their 
pity. “We are a stupid people”, the introductory sentence for this chapter reveals how 
Wana construct a verbal and non-verbal marginality simultaneously. Contrary to the 
example given by Gilbert, Wana culture does manifest itself in sociological marginality. 
But even though rhetoric marginality might be possible for a hypothetical Wana who 
adapts to social expectations, most Wana however choose to perform their marginality. 
Following Judith Butler (1990) I understand performance or performativity on the one 
hand as an embodied practice. Butler describes the performativity of gender:  
“The act that one does, the act that one performs, is, in a sense, an act that has 
been going on before one arrived on the scene. Hence, gender is an act which has 
been rehearsed, much as a script survives the particular actors who make use of it, 
but which requires individual actors in order to be actualized and reproduced as 
reality once again” (Butler 1990: 272). 
In a similar way this accounts for the condition of marginality as well. Wana marginality 
is not something suddenly imposed upon an ethnic group or a natural given. Rather it is 
the result of an endless number of actions and acts that “have been around”. If a Wana 
individual uses the sentence “I am stupid”, in the most direct example, he performs his 
marginality in the sense that his way of acting in a specific way is also the use of a script 
that is not at all his own innovation. Instead, by drawing on these former acts of 
marginality performance, rehearsing them, he or she once again reproduces this 
peripheral condition as a concrete reality.  
However, on the other hand, although the performativity of marginality explains some of 
the conundrum marginality presents within Wana community, there is another quality 
connected to the performance character of it. Marginality among Wana is very well 
connected to the state of being marginalized as well as being marginal. Marginalization, 
as a process (see Chapter 2), offers an active form that includes an acting subject, 
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someone or something performing the act of pushing someone towards the edge of 
something, e.g. the society, a community, a region. Marginality, on the contrary, displays 
a current state of being, although not a sort of ontological or assumed natural given. I 
would say that what Wana do in their daily interactions, is to perform their marginality. If 
we take performance as a term that “run[s] the gamut of complexity from mass rituals 
[…] to small, self-deprecating jokes and mundane comments on the weather” (Palmer and 
Jankowiak 1996: 226), it is marginality that we find in many Wana everyday 
performances. Palmer and Jankowiak state further:  
“It is through performances, whether individual or collective, that humans project 
images of themselves and the world to their audiences. […] When we observe 
performances […] we experience them as mental imagery. When we self-
consciously monitor our own performances, we re-experience the imagery that we 
think they project to audiences. Thus, performances may weave complex webs of 
interaction and experience, all mediated through imagery” (Palmer and Jankowiak 
1996: 226). 
In this point of view, performance becomes a sort of conscious choice of interacting. This 
is what Wana portray in their everyday actions: a performance of marginality in a sense 
of how Wana project ideas and understandings of their own current standing – their 
marginality – to an audience, e.g. their interlocutors. Performance in my example 
encompasses thus everyday forms of interaction that serves the mindful process of 
performing marginality among Wana actors.  
This process serves two goals. First, it underlines the cosmological meaning and 
significance of marginality for Wana. The millennial expectations of a golden future are 
subject to certain conditions – Wana shall so far not break out of their current state of 
misery and are not to convert to another religion. If a person chooses not to follow these 
terms he or she will be deprived from any positive perspectives according to Wana 
cosmology. In order to stay poor marginalized, i.e. poor and helpless, a certain amount of 
performance supports the outer image of being marginalized. Another goal of the process 
of performing marginality can be found in a form of subtle resistance. Choosing to appear 
marginalized, i.e. poor and helpless can also be interpreted as a form of opposing 
government and state claims – a aspect that I will discuss in detail in Chapter 5.  
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3.4 INTERIM CONCLUSION 
Creation myths or cosmological narratives are always giving a meaning to the present 
since they create and cause contemporary settings. Millenarian myths however are 
furthermore becoming futures. It is this relation that shows the meaning of cosmological 
narratives for Wana marginality. Both myths presented in this chapter explain the setting 
of the world, the distribution of wealth and power and the role Wana take within this 
relation. Their marginality in both cases is caused by unfortunate events, the wrong 
direction of the felled tree and the departure of the taw baraka. Noteworthy is the fact that 
in both scenarios no Wana had a direct impact on the happenings. In one case it was the 
trickster figure of Parangesong and in the other case it was Pololoisong’s fault. 
Marginality find its roots in both pictures but in both settings the potential of Wana 
people constituting today a central entity is a given. Wana land is narrated as the source 
of power and wealth. Thus, its inhabitants, who are ordinary Wana people, are genuinely 
connected to attributes of a sphere of non-marginality like power and wealth. 
Simultaneously they are part of the source of prosperity. Through this interpretation of 
Wana marginality, today’s advantaged people owe their wealth to events caused on Wana 
soil. It is in this understanding that at least one meaning of Wana marginality becomes a 
marker of power – it constitutes Wana land as the original center. Only later this center 
becomes in some way a peripheral region with marginalized people but remains, for 
Wana, an uttermost cosmological center. In the millenarian interpretation of the taw 
baraka myth, this cosmological center will, one day, become a real center again. Wana 
cosmological foundation of their marginal status is deeply embedded in their conception 
of a divided reality in which shamans and witnesses of the tempo baraka pertain bridges 
between these dimensions. A self-marginalization as imposed by the millennial promise 
of the taw baraka narrative leaves Wana in a temporary marginality with the ultimate 
promise of the reversion of temporary inequalities.  
	  	  
4 SOCIO-RELIGIOUS DIMENSION: WANA IN 
INTERRELIGIOUS DYNAMICS  
The current chapter aims at elaborating deeper on the understandings of periphery and 
margins within the Indonesian context that affect Wana society and will be evaluated as a 
product of complex power relations that were deeply influenced by colonialism, the 
creation of the modern nation-state and in this context, the field of religion. As we have 
seen in the preceding chapters, the praxis of deducing Indonesian upland groups as 
marginalized people with a lack of religious confession is a rather common scheme 
among the archipelago’s population. The Indonesian state underlines its religious 
diversity that has been legally anchored in the Pancasila, the philosophical foundation of 
the Indonesian state. However, as Schröter makes clear for the nation’s Christian 
minority, religious plurality is still today not easily implemented: “[T]he relations 
between the various social, ethnic and religious groups have been problematic down to 
the present day, and national unity has remained fragile” (Schröter 2010b: 2). Due to 
historical constellations, nested within colonial relations, Christian people within the 
Muslim-dominated state are still “perceived as a threat to Indonesian unity” and obtain, as 
Schröter asserts, “a precarious role in the struggle for shaping the nation” (Schröter 
2010b: 2). Up to this day, Schröter writes, the future of Indonesia’s Christian minority is 
not settled but rather critical, “and pluralist society is still on trial” (Schröter 2010b: 2). It 
is essential to keep in mind that in the context of the Indonesian state, the factor 
“religion” embodies the notion of modernity and progressive ideas of Indonesian 
citizenship. Thus, if the situation is bad for Christian and other-religious minorities it is, 
as Colbran asserts, “even worse for persons who do not have a religion or belief” 
(Colbran 2010: 682). Religion is an important sphere of marginalizing constellations 
within Indonesia that affect Wana people, especially in interreligious constellations. 
However, Wana have created their very own notion of their marginalized standing within 
the Indonesian society. Implicit in discourse on upland communities like the Wana is the 
assumption that upland culture and belief is isolated and untouched by outside influences 
(see Chapter 2). Wana now and then, however, have never been isolated or stateless but 
have always been incorporated in wider state systems and trade networks and thus have 
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been engaged in interreligious contexts for ages (see Chapter 2 and 5). The goal of this 
chapter is to show how Wana religion is shaped along outside, other-religious influences 
and how Wana people in this context have managed to constitute their own belief as a 
religion – just as Atkinson stresses: “To characterize their religion, they draw on models 
of world religions familiar to them and construct an image of what religion is supposed to 
be” (Atkinson 1983: 690). Traces of the interreligious interchange are found in many 
aspects of Wana religion and ritual and still testify for the long-time interreligious links 
that are part of Wana constructions of their religion. Some of them I will present shortly 
in the following, depicting further continuities and change between Wana in the 1970s 
and in the 21st century. I will first portray central elements of Wana constitution of their 
belief. Then, against this background I will draw attention to the formulation of 
marginality through regular day-to-day actions that Wana experience within the 
interreligious environment of Taronggo and its surroundings, drawing as a tool of 
analysis on Frederik Barth’s elaborations of ethno-religious boundaries. Then I will focus 
on aspects of agency within this interreligious setting by demonstrating how and why 
some Wana choose to break out of their religious marginality through acts of conversion, 
how and why others continuously resist conversion attempts or chose to deconvert from 
Islam or Christianity. I will close this chapter by linking the socio-religious sphere of 
marginality with Wana access to knowledge.  
4.1 THE CONSTITUTION OF WANA RELIGION 
There has been a long tradition of scholarly dispute concerning the content, theoretical 
scope and definition of religion in anthropology. Beginning with Edward B. Tylor’s early 
attempt to grasp religion as the “belief in spiritual beings” (1871) a number of 
anthropologists have tried to give a detailed characterization of the meaning of religion. A 
more recent and widespread attempt was given by Spiro who has tried to define the term: 
“On the assumption that religion is a cultural institution, on the further assumption that all 
institutions […] are instrumental means for the satisfaction of needs, I shall define 
‘religion’ as ‘an institution consisting of culturally patterned interaction with culturally 
postulated superhuman beings’” (Spiro 1966: 96). While Spiro draws back on a 
supernatural core just like Tylor had, he however postulated religion as a cultural 
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institutional system: “This means that the variables constituting a religious system have 
the same ontological status as those of other cultural systems: its beliefs are normative, its 
rituals collective, its values prescriptive” (Spiro 1966: 97). Such a rather broad approach 
towards religion is also given by Clifford Geertz, who defines religion in a highly famous 
and influential attempt as:  
“(1) a system of symbols which acts to (2) establish powerful, pervasive, and 
long-lasting moods and motivations in men [and women] by (3) formulating 
conceptions of a general order of existence and (4) clothing these conceptions 
with such an aura of factuality that (5) the moods and motivations seem uniquely 
realistic” (Geertz 1973: 90).110 
Just like Atkinson has pointed out, this definition opens the stage for perceiving religion 
from within a society and the way its members find “ultimate reason” in it (Atkinson 
1988: 47). With this general approach towards religious systems analyzing Wana 
conceptualizations of their belief within the interreligious background of my research 
location, I will focus on the internal dynamics and perceptions Wana link to their 
cosmology and interreligious standing. In this regard, I do not intend to give a general 
definition of religion and then examine whether or not Wana belief may account for this 
category or not. More important are those discourses that are formed nationally, culturally 
and politically and that are central for an analysis of interreligious coexistence within 
Taronggo and its surroundings. Following Atkinson, I therefore understand religion as 
what my interlocutors see in it: “religion is, in methodological terms, a matter of what 
informants say it is” (Atkinson 1988: 47). Among Wana, this understanding is deeply 
influenced by the contact to other religions and belief systems. Only by national agendas, 
historical and political developments and interaction with other-religious definitions 
Wana came to rationalize and justify their own belief system as a religion. By this means, 
it is necessary to pay attention to religious influences that shaped Wana understandings of 
the concept of religion in a meaningful way.  
At least since the mid 19th century, Wana have been acquainted with Islam. Their pre-
colonial relations to the former ruler of Ternate, to the surrounding Rajas of Bungku and 
Tojo, and business relations with Islamic traders as well as with their coastal neighbors 
account for a vivid interaction Wana had with Muslim people. Against the background of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 Although this definition is a relative broad attempt to grasp such a wide term, it received heavy critique, 
for example by Saler (2000) and Asad; the latter explicitly pointing to the ahistorical quality of Geertz’s 
definition that ignores hegemonic structures (1983). 
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these early interreligious networks some Wana chose to become Muslims. In terms of 
religious conversion, Atkinson recalls for example the To Ampana, a related linguistic 
ethnic group on the Northern shore of the Teluk Tomini who converted to Islam. Many 
Wana had family ties with To Ampana members and thus chose to follow their example 
and to become Muslim (1979: 30). With the beginning of the 20th century colonial 
interventions introduced Christianity to Eastern Central Sulawesi. The Dutch colonial 
project came along with a strong focus on Christian values and indigenous groups like the 
Wana were regarded as heathens in need of religious salvation. Accordingly, Christian 
missions and schooling heavily influenced the region, leading to further conversions of 
Wana people and interreligious negotiations. In the 1970s, when Jane Atkinson conducted 
her research in the Poso regency, Wana had lived for more than half a century in more or 
less close relations with Christian and Muslim neighbors. In accordance with official state 
discourse on religious plurality that refuses to accept indigenous “belief systems” as 
religions, Atkinson states that Wana at that time were aware of the fact that they were 
perceived as religious-free people by government as well as by their Christian-Muslim 
neighbors. In this context religion becomes a highly influential marker of marginalization 
processes within the Indonesian state. Albeit the Indonesian state does not recognize other 
belief systems besides the six world religions as official religious affiliations (see Chapter 
2), Wana in the 1970s did not perceive of themselves as people without religion nor was 
Wana religious identity a category that implied the exclusion from other religions. Instead 
it meant holding on to an “earlier religion” (Atkinson 1989: 332). Moreover, although in 
national discourse, indigenous belief systems were associated with negative connotations 
such as backward and primitive, Wana revealed a strong attitude towards their own belief 
system. Despite the fact that the general reference to indigenous, non-converted people 
was depicted under the term orang yang belum beragama (people who do not yet have a 
religion), denying indigenous belief systems the status of a religion, Wana however 
ignored this outside ascription: “Yet, they claim that they possess a religion, the oldest of 
religions, called agama Wana, ‘the Wana religion’, agama tu’a, ‘the old religion’, agama 
ruyu, ‘the early religion’, agama alai, agama kapir, ‘the pagan religion’” (Atkinson 1979: 
378). Wana who had not converted to either Christianity or Islam, found their own ways 
to conceptualize their belief system and to position themselves within an interreligious 
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context. To use Atkinson’s words, one could speak of “religions in dialogue” (1979). 
Within this dialogue, Wana found a way to construct their very own belief system.111 
4.2 THREE CENTRAL CONCEPTS  
Central for understanding Wana religion and its reformulation are three local concepts: 
The Wana notion of heaven, their idea of Wana religion as the first belief and the 
singularity of God. These themes serve as a framework of restructuring processes of 
religious reconceptualization and transformation among Wana people that evolved in 
response to challenges from Christian and Muslim and state sides. Further, they show 
how Wana have dealt with external pressure concerning religion and how they have 
managed to find their own answers to them (Atkinson 1989). In the following I will 
represent these issues that Atkinson has distinguished almost 30 years ago, extending 
them with examples from my own research. I will do so in order to elaborate upon the 
rationalization of Wana religion against a changed historical and political background and 
within the interreligious context that I examine in this chapter. 
4.2.1 Heaven (and Hell) 
Among the categories that are relevant for Wana and their neighbors concerning religion 
as well as religious boundaries, the concept of heaven is probably the most central one in 
Wana religious constructions. Wana generally declare that they do believe in heaven, 
saruga or sometimes also called suruga, borrowed from the Indonesian term surga.112 
Most Wana maintain that their “earthly misery” will be reshaped in a “paradise-like” 
after-world, “they, who live a poor and filthy life on earth, will enjoy a beautiful afterlife 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 In her article “Religions in dialogue: the construction of an Indonesian minority religion” (1989) 
Atkinson elaborates in detail on this aspect. A great deal of my ideas in this chapter I owe this article and I 
will always come back to Atkinson’s original ideas and research findings. 
112 Surga itself is a term borrowed from the Sanskrit term syurga. The religion of Patuntung among the 
Makassar of Gowa also encompasses the idea of suruga (heaven) as well as naraka (hell). Rössler 
suggests that these concepts have found their way into Patuntung cosmology through the influence of 
Islam and have no indigenous origins in the local religion (Rössler 1987: 81).  
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of leisure and comfort in heaven as a reward for earthly suffering” (Atkinson 1989: 691). 
In an interview Apa nTina explained to me:  
“According to our history, the earth we are living in right now is quite difficult 
and tough to us; but when we die we move to heaven, people there are happy. 
They are free, can move back and forth, wherever they want to go. It is not the 
same like here.”  
By virtue of promising felicity, the concept of heaven serves Wana people as a reversion 
of their earthly poverty, despair – and marginality. It is in this sense deeply connected to 
the cosmological dimension of marginality in which Wana expect an end to their misery 
through the comeback of the Golden Age. In the 1970s Wana had thus constructed an 
idea of heaven that was “a symbol of Wana visions of social justice and a new world 
order” (1989: 691). Following the direction I have given in Chapter 3, I will begin with a 
Wana narrative – although not a cosmological one – that conceptualizes the interreligious 
dialogue and dynamics. Wana narratives like the following continue to play an important 
part in constructing religious relations until today, as I have already made clear in Chapter 
3. Atkinson mentions this continuity as well: “Being Islam or traditional in one’s religion 
came to be a significant choice, one that Wana pondered and mulled over in a manner that 
generated a fascinating body of stories explaining and comparing the origins, practices 
and logic of their own religion and that of Islam” (1979: 30). The following story portrays 
this vision of an afterworld:  
It is the story of Pojanggu Wawu, which is literally translated as pig’s beard or “‘one who 
wears a beard full of pig grease’” (Aktinson 1989: 691). Pojanggu Wawu is a magnificent 
and exemplary Wana who is such a successful hunter that his beard has pig’s grease 
applied all over it. In addition, Pojanggu Wawu is a rather altruistic character who shares 
all his goods and prey with his friends, relatives and everyone else who passes his house. 
The other character of the story is a Muslim man named Pohaji, who lives in a wealthy 
house at the coast and has already been to Mecca. One day he dies and his soul enters 
heaven respectively the after world; meanwhile on earth his body is getting prepared for 
the funeral. His soul wanders around in heaven and detects a gorgeous house, which, as 
he learns, belongs to the Wana Pojanggu Wawu. Pohajis own house in heaven, however, 
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is a mere dirty hut. In the face of this unequal condition, Pohaji quickly hurries back to 
earth where he, alive again, goes to live with Pojanggu Wawu. There he shares the same 
lifestyle like the Wana hunter and even prefers pork over chicken meat. As he finally 
dies, he ends up in Pojanggu Wawus heavenly home (Atkinson 1988: 57-58).  
In this account heaven is a place where Wana are rewarded with a paradise-like condition 
while Muslim people experience the reverse. In the versions of heaven told in the 1970s, 
other ethnic and religious people who did not share the same normative orders and morals 
like Wana, would end up in a situation similar to the one Wana have to suffer on earth, 
exemplified by Pohaji’s fate in the story above. Atkinson explains that  
“[Wana] claim that Muslims live their heaven here on earth, as demonstrated by 
their comparative wealth and preoccupation with purity. In the Muslim section of 
heaven […] people live in filth (pointedly portrayed as pig excrement) and they 
are so hungry that their souls take the form of wild boar that root through Wana 
gardens in search of food. As for Christian souls, they have only scraps of clouds 
to eat (an apparent reference to Bible school pictures of Jesus and angels floating 
about on cumulus banquettes)” (Atkinson 1989: 691).  
Following Atkinson, the idea of heaven is an outsider notion that deeply influenced Wana 
religious concepts: “Whatever indigenous notions of an afterlife were once present in 
Wana culture, they have been radically transformed by the concept of saruga” (Atkinson 
1988: 54).113  
Christian people in Taronggo share this idea. In an interview with Apa Ele, a Christian 
Wana convert, he talks about his non-converted relatives and friends and unravels his 
opinion about Wana belief in heaven: “There exists one belief concerning heaven; they 
only believe in heaven like we do because they already heard a lot about it through us”. 
Apa Ele explicitly denies his non-converted Wana relatives an original concept of heaven 
as part of Wana cosmology – for him it is clear that heaven is a genuine Christian 
concept. Atkinson however perceives the Wana concept of heaven as an answer to 
Christian and Muslim pressure to conversion and points to the fact that Wana have 
rephrased a genuine outside concept for their own good: “No doubt representatives of 
both Islam and Christianity have used images of heaven as enticements to convert […] 
but Wana have reworked the proffered promise of paradise to conform the value of their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 Searching for answers among the earliest source on Wana culture, there is no mentioning of an afterlife 
in A.C. Kruyt’s writings; nevertheless he speaks about heaven in Wana cosmos (see below). 
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own traditional ways” (1988: 54-55) – by establishing an idea of heaven that benefits 
Wana in an exclusive way, dismissing Muslims and Christians.  
In 2011 Wana followed a slightly different version. The story of Pojanggu Wawu was not 
popular during my own research; only some Wana recalled this story but its significance 
was low. Instead the concept of heaven among Wana in Morowali Regency today does 
not distinguish between salvation for Wana and other people. All people are believed to 
end up in the same state of heaven, regardless of their religious orientation.  
However, the notion of heaven is nowadays far stronger associated with the concept of 
sin that deeply affects ones access to heaven. Conversely to Christian and Muslim 
concepts of sin, Wana rely upon their own notion of religious restriction. Wana expect 
after death a final judgement, which refers to the catholic concept of purgatory. This 
judgement decides if they either can access heaven directly or they have to suffer in a 
hell-like space first. Apa Mike, a young Wana from Kayupoli told me the following 
account:  
“In the past there was a man who died; he had no religion just like me. He died 
but after one day he had not yet been buried. Then, he came back. He said, I was 
not allowed to enter [heaven]. The people were scared, they feared it was a demon 
coming to them. He said, don’t be afraid, I am a normal human being. I cannot yet 
live in heaven because I have lived in great sin. I was a very avaricious man 
(orang sekikir). When someone passed my house I would never give any water or 
food. I was very stingy. The people in heaven told me: You have to go back to 
your house first, go, reenter your body, we will not accept you in heaven. Go, 
make a big garden and every time someone comes, you offer to take something 
from it. Offer everyone food and water and be nice to everyone. This is our 
message to you. The man followed the heavenly orders and became very old, 
more than 100 years. When he died, there was no sin left. He went straight to 
heaven.” 
This account is not typical for stories concerned with an after-life. Most Wana accounts 
from Taronggo and Salisarao were centered around the following explanation: Once dead, 
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they go first to Indo Kuliling,114 the female guardian of a blacksmith place. Indo Kuliling 
evaluates the sins they have committed during lifetime. If Indo Kuliling presumes them 
innocent, the way to heaven is open and they may directly enter saruga. If however they 
lived a life of transgression and Indo Kuliling presumes them guilty of sin, consequences 
are inevitable. Indo Kuliling and her assistants, mPande and Kumalangi,115 will let the 
sinners burn in the forge fire and, depending on the level of sins, will hammer his or her 
body, like metal used to forge a knife. This notion of afterlife, contrary to the story of 
Pojanggu Wawu, was widely spread and well known in my research area while Atkinson 
does not mention it at all. People regularly warn each other, often in a joking way, to 
avoid sinful behavior in case they would like to pass Indo Kuliling.  
Similar to the universal application of the concept of heaven, most of my interlocutors 
state that Indo Kuliling will judge people of all ethnic and religious backgrounds. My 
informants applied their concept to all other affiliations since, according to them, all 
people will be treated the same. Interestingly, they also observe their Christian and 
Muslim neighbors on earth and usually they perceive of them as extremely sinful – 
compared to Wana people themselves. Therefore, some of my informants assert, the 
period those “sinners” will need to spend with Indo Kuliling after death will take a much 
longer time. Contrary to Christian concepts, Wana do not believe in an endless state of 
agony after death. They do not believe in Christian stories and warnings about entering 
hell forever – versions they are frequently told by their Protestant and Pentecostal 
neighbors. Although Wana notions of heaven and hell are probably shaped against the 
background of Christian and Muslim ideas, they are, from Wana perspective, their own 
original concepts. Instead, Wana tend to turn the picture around. From Wana perspective, 
the fact that Christian and Muslim people today share some common concepts with them, 
like heaven, is due to the fact that all people have their origin in Wana land as I described 
in Chapter 3.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 The term kuliling might be borrowed from the Indonesian term keliling, sometime also referred to as 
kuliling, meaning extent. 
115 Atkinson notes Guma Langi, the “Sheath of the Sky” (1990). 
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4.2.2 The Singularity of God 
Another extremely significant concept that Atkinson points out and that my informants 
were concerned about was the matter of distinguishing Wana belief from other religions 
by the singularity of God. The belief in one single deity is a highly important aspect for 
the Indonesian state and society. As I have shown in Chapter 2, this condition is set in the 
first and probably most central pillar of the Pancasila which declares the principle of 
Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa, the Belief in One God. The Pancasila thus implies a 
monotheistic imperative, regardless of the religious confession. Widiyanto points out, that 
in so far as the monotheistic principle, i.e. “Belief in a Single Deity is regarded as the 
Indonesian response to religious diversity [,] […] [i]t opens up the possibility to the 
identification of different religions and has judiciously prevented the establishment of a 
purely secular state” (Widiyanto 2013: 166). However, the results are tremendous; 
indigenous groups who do not fall under this category are often disenfranchised: “The 
adherents of ‘local indigenous religions’ [...] and other unrecognised religions do not 
enjoy the same rights as those of recognised religion [for example access to public 
space]” (Widiyanto 2013: 166). Therefore, it is only likely that the issue of belief in a 
single god has become a major concern for non-converted Wana against the Indonesian 
state and, moreover, within the interreligious context of Taronggo. As a matter of fact, 
Christian and Muslim converts and neighbors regularly relegate Wana belief to the fringe, 
simply on the base of a supposed Wana polytheism. Wana however, usually encounter 
such “allegations” energetically and state that they believe in no more than one single god 
alone: Pue or “the Owner” following Atkinson’s translation (1979). In stories of the past 
however, it seems that Wana have relied on a different concept and that this religious 
principle has evolved in accordance with outside pressure.  
Pue in Creation Narratives 
A.C. Kruyt collected a religious account during his time among the Wana, in which he 
refers to two Gods Wana believed in. In this creation narrative, heaven and earth were 
once connected by a liane, the wiaa siwangoe, as I have already explained in Chapter 3 
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(1930: 414-15). Those days there were no more than two Gods, named Poee ri arantana 
(Pue ri ara n tana) and Poee lamoa (Pue Lamoa). Both were also known by the names 
Lai and Ndara.116 These two were siblings who could move between heaven and earth 
without any difficulty. When one day the heavenly part began to move away from the 
earth, the wiaa siwangoe split in two halves. The first God, Pue Lamoa, could save 
himself to the heavenly part while his brother, Pue ara n tana had to stay on earth. In 
another version of the account given by A.C. Kruyt, Lai and Ndara are people who fought 
iKoni, a demon that is known as the notorious man-eater. Lai and Ndara followed iKoni 
to the coast where they managed to kill him in the end. When they returned to the Wana 
homeland, a little mouse had gnawed on the liana so that heaven was moving away. It 
was Lai who could save himself to heaven, while Ndara vanished in the earth, “verdween 
in de aarde” (A.C. Kruyt 1930: 415). Atkinson also listened to stories similar to those 
Kruyt has written down. In Atkinson’s version however, iKoni is displayed as the first 
measa, a human’s liver eating demon. In contrast to A.C. Kruyt’s first account, it is not 
Pue Lamoa who climbed to heaven, but Lai who became the God of heaven, Pue wawo 
yanggi, the Owner above the sky. Ndara descended from the ground to a place beneath 
the earth and became Pue ara n tana, the Owner beneath the earth. Further, in this 
creation account a central hero is proclaimed, Pololoisong, who went up to the sky to talk 
to God (see above). Here, A.C. Kruyt recounts Pololoisong talking to Pue Lamoa as the 
solitary God. However, in Atkinson’s version, it is Pue without any additional suffixes 
who Pololoisong addresses. During my research this creation myth was still familiar. 
Similar to Atkinson’s result, in my own recordings it was also only Pue who Pololoisong 
talked to. Pue Lamoa, I came to know, is not perceived at all as part of this creation myth 
and my questions were answered with astonished laughter.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 Lai and Ndara are also mentioned among other ethnic groups of Central Sulawesi, see for example Stöhr 
(1976).  
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Pue in Rituals 
Atkinson analyses Lamoa (here: Pue Lamoa) in relation to the vow-making ritual, the 
pantoo mako’o.117 She recites a passage of a shaman making a hard vow, while calling 
upon the Owner above the sky and the Owner below the earth, “accepting the conditions 
of a divided world” (1989: 205). Thus, in the ritual of the hard vow, the pantoo mako’o, 
today called nia, two Gods are referred to (Fig. 8).  
The momago, another ritual, involves a passage of a shaman with his spirit allies towards 
a single Pue. The momago is the most central Wana healing ceremony. Although it is 
described in great detail by Atkinson let me briefly explain the ritual since it continues to 
be of great importance for Wana in my research area.118 The momago is usually staged by 
a family of a patient and often follows a nia. As I have just described, if a person gets sick 
the family may choose to make a nia, a ritual vow to prepare a momago in case the 
patient will get cured. Therefore, the nia and momago are closely related rituals. Since for 
a momago everyone can come, the staging house, usually the house of the patient’s 
family, needs to be big enough to offer a great crowd of people enough space (Fig. 9). 
Most important guests are the shamans who do not receive special invitations but usually 
a leading shaman will be asked to perform to assure the momago can be staged. Food for 
the numerous guests has to be prepared as well as enough rice wine. Central for a 
momago are a drum and two gongs. The drum, usually covered with monkey skin, is 
made from tree trunks, whereas the gongs, made of brass, are rare inherited goods, some 
of them dating back to pre-colonial times (Atkinson 1979: 238).119 A momago will not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 Kruyt who calls it mantoo observes the same ritual. The word pantoo was used during my research 
mainly as the word “to say”. With Atkinson the syllable to’o also appears in non-ritualized talk; used for 
paying a vow, people say pantoo mako’o or nia mako’o. The term nia stems from the Indonesian language 
and means vow, the Wana term mako’o means hard. 
118 During my research I had the chance to take part in a number of momago rituals, a ritual that was central 
for my research since it offered on the one hand the opportunity to study Wana shamanism and related 
religious aspects while on the other hand it was a great chance to chat with guest from other regions as 
well as it was also the place for political discussions. Atkinson has well described the first impression of 
the ritual, which takes a longer time to understand its internal chronology: „At first impression, the 
mabolong appears to defy neat and orderly description [....] the occasion seems chaotic – shamans sing, 
drum and gongs sound, youths flirt, people chate, occasionally someone standst o dance, perforemers 
variously orate, gesticulate, and topple over unconscious, mature men ecpouind, some become drunk, 
indivudals curl up an sleep. The scene appears disjointed and confused” (1979:235). For a detailed 
discussion of the ritual see Atkinson (1979) or her ethnography of 1989, which is centered on the 
momago.  
119 In Kayupoli, some gongs that had been broken were replaced by Martine Journet and Gérard Nougarol 
with gongs they brought from Bali. When one of the gongs in the Salisarao area was in a bad condition 
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start before it is dark and before every guest has eaten. The hosting family will prepare 
the duku, a woven offering tray that is placed in the middle of the room where the 
shamans as well as other people sit around. Offerings are put in the duku including the 
obligatory betel nuts, piper leafs and lime – the betel fixings –, tobacco and corn papers, 
rice wine and some cloth, for example a pair of trousers, a sarong or a shirt, served as a 
gift for the shamans (Fig. 10).  
After an introductory phase of playing the gongs and drums for mutual amusement during 
which for example some young adults may imitate shamans’ style of dancing and women 
may perform in the female style of dancing, called salonde (beautiful) (Fig. 11), the 
leading shaman will start with the opening chant of the momago, the patoe. In this patoe 
the leading shaman will summon his spirit allies, his walia (Fig. 12). The walia are 
invited to take part in the momago, to help the shaman to cure the patients. Herefore it is 
necessary to invoke the walia with patience and with so called baku m walia, food for the 
walia. Each walia may have different taste, most are content with tobacco, rice wine or a 
specific plant, but others have developed a unique taste. Once I witnessed a shaman 
eating burning wood for his walia while on another event a shaman called for toothpaste 
that his walia wished for. After the initial patoe he will start to dance, motaro, a specific 
form of rhythmically moving the body up and down (Fig. 13) and may eventually fall in 
trance in the course of the night (Fig. 14). Other shamans will start to call their own walia 
while motaro (Fig. 14). Once a shaman has started singing, he may begin to cure 
assembled patients who are in need of treatment. There are different forms of treatment a 
shaman may use; he may take out objects hidden in the body of a patient (ransong) or he 
may try to get hold of lost parts of the patient’s soul, for instance the koro uli or the 
tanuana. In some very severe cases the shaman will need to go to Pue, yao ri Pue. For 
this purpose he will together with his walia climb upwards, mandake, and see if there is 
anything that can be done to help the patient. In this scenario, yao ri Pue, the shaman and 
his walia will only meet one God, who is located upwards. A momago will always last 
until sunrise since it is considered to evoke dangerous spirits if the sound of the gongs and 
drum stop before daylight (cf. Aktinson 1979; 1989) .  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Wana were worried to stage another momago. The sound of a scattered drum may cause wrong and 
dangerous consequences, therefore I followed Journets and Nougarols example and took care to provide a 
new gong from Bali for the Salisarao community.  
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Another ritual reveals a different picture. While the momago is the most frequent and 
biggest healing ritual, the ritual molawo is usually perceived as the most powerful ritual. 
The molawo serves as an analytical tool to consider the question of a multiple deity-
principle among Wana people. Therefore, only those molawo-rituals will be of concern 
that include a journey to a God. For example, the molawo taw sampu’u cures diseases 
caused by attacks from headhunting spirits like the sangia or tambar. As a result, a 
journey to the Owner is not necessary. Other diseases however are caused directly by Pue 
Lamoa and can be cured with a special type of molawo called wala – a molawo version 
that requires a journey to a God. To begin the molawo-style ritual, the patient and the 
molawo-conductor, who does not necessarily have to be a shaman, come together in a 
house that is usually erected for the molawo by the patient’s family. The ritual head takes 
a chicken provided by the family. The chicken is turned around and guided three times by 
the hand of the ritual leader from the patient’s head to his toes. After that, the chicken is 
turned around and waved into the other direction, from the patient’s toes to his head, 
again, three times. In this performance the head signifies the direction to heaven, the 
place where Pue wawo yanggi resides, the Owner above the sky, whereas the toes, the 
body’s end, stand for the place of Pue ara n tana, the Owner beneath the earth. Later in 
the ritual the walia, spirit allies, summoned by the ritual leader, will start their journey to 
the Owner above the earth.120 There is no molawo-style ritual where walia would travel 
beneath the earth. Apa Jendi explains to me:  
“This molawo [wala] is attributed to Pue ara ntana and Pue wawo yanggi. […] 
Actually, both Gods are the same [siwaju], both are called Pue. But later in the 
ritual the walia go to Pue wawo yanggi, who himself will talk to Pue ara n tana. 
Walia cannot go directly to Pue ara ntana, there is no way (taa ree jaya walia) 
leading to this place. Only up is the direction where the walia take their boat.” 
Later in this ritual, the spirit allies head to Pue Lamoa, the Owner of Thunder, who is 
regarded as the most naughty Lord known to Wana people. In another form of the 
molawo ritual, the molawo rapi, also referred to as the high molawo, a fourth God is 
mentioned: Pue Bulanga. This god was fairly known among my interlocutors. However, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 See Chapter 3.2.2 for details on Wana shamanism. 
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the documentary filmmakers Nougarol and Journet note his appearance during molawo 
ritual as shown in one of their movies titled “Indo Pino”. Here, Apa Rahu, the kepala 
suku of the Morowali area, performs a molawo rapi that lasts three nights. During his 
ritual performance he mentions Pue Bulanga at some point in his ritual talk. According to 
Journet and Nougarol, Pue Bulanga is the God between the Owner of the sky and the 
Owner beneath the earth, “divinité située entre la terre et a plus haute sphère céleste” 
(Journet and Nougarol n.d.). One of my informants states Pue Bulanga as one of five 
Gods – alas not being clear who a fifth God would be – but being the weakest and 
residing below Pue Lamoa. 
To sum up, the ritual speech of making a hard vow, nia, includes the concept of two 
Owners. The molawo ritual, in its diverse styles, presents a variety of deities. In contrast, 
during the momago ritual, another type of healing ritual, the shaman and his walia take a 
journey to a singular Owner, referred to as Pue. Given the plurality of the concept of God, 
either in historical accounts as well as in current rituals, the emerging singularity of one 
Wana God, Pue, has to be regarded as closely connected to a monotheistic imperative of 
the Indonesian state context. Although accounts of a creational past and ritual speech 
trace a variety of Gods relevant for Wana people, in everyday discussions however the 
concept of a singular Pue is promoted. There is but one God, most Wana claim. For a 
couple of weeks I stumbled over this rigorous negation of other Gods existence, since of 
course I was familiar with Atkinson’s results. Atkinson already mentioned a decline in 
importance of a variety of Gods during her research. Instead, she notes, another form of 
God became more and more present, a deus otiosus, a good willing creator God. Taking 
note of Eliade’s postulation of a celestial Supreme Being for shamanism in North and 
Central Asia that lost influence to less smaller deities, the former receiving a new status 
as deus otiosus, Atkinson remarks for her research context that “Pue was the benign deus 
otiosus, the creator and giver of breath, the ultimate justice in the universe (1989: 199). 
However, although Pue as the idle God has withdrawn from the world, it is still possible 
to visit him during a shamanic journey. The Owner, Pue, who more resembles the state’s 
ideology, addressed in momago ritual, cannot be met directly but only by langi m Pue – a 
sort of mediator between walia and Pue.121 Atkinson states, that “Pue has emerged only 
in the last few decades as a focus of both Wana shamanic practice and general cultural 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 Atkinson notes here leangi m pue, “the Owner’s intermediary who speaks with a shaman’s spirit 
entourage” (1989: 347). 
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concern” (1989: 159). Pue Lamoa, by contrast, can be met directly in the molawo ritual 
and can even be tricked by ingenious walia. 
As I mentioned above, the influence of Islam and to some extent of Christianity on Wana 
religious constructions and concerns cannot be ignored. According to Atkinson’s research 
in the 1970s, Wana reformulated their belief in a way they could match competing 
religious claims. The monotheistic imperative of the state’s Pancasila lets other elements 
of a god-like identity, central for certain rituals, get pushed away in favor of one 
omnipotent God or Pue. It remains difficult, however, to evaluate if this process is caused 
solely by other religious agents’ critical voices. It is likewise possible to read the 
occurrence of an Owner, who can be visited in the momago ritual and is more distant than 
Pue Lamoa, as shaped rather independently from other religious influences. From today’s 
perspective, it is almost impossible to argue in one way or another since relevant data 
dating back to a time where Islam and Christianity had indeed only minor influence does 
not exist. Nevertheless, the fact that a plural concept of God has shifted towards a rather 
monotheistic approach, at least in an outward direction, is probably connected to national 
agenda and state-based religious discourse.  
Today most Wana emphasize the equivalence of Pue with a Christian and Muslim God – 
particularly in discussions with their Christian and Muslim neighbors or visitors. For the 
analysis of marginality constructions within Taronggo and its surroundings, this 
intersubjective formation becomes highly significant. The often claimed negation of a 
monotheistic belief system allows other-confessional community members to exclude 
Wana from the category of religious practitioners. Frequently, Wana hear statements by 
their neighbors and relatives, denying a Wana monotheistic belief system; the following 
example illustrates this condition. I recorded this account during a Protestant festivity, 
given by a Christian man in an effort to explain Wana belief towards me: “Oh, Wana 
people pray to everything; they have many, many Gods; for them there is a God in 
everything, in this stone, that butterfly or the mountain over there; there might be even 
one in my shoe.” 
Wana nonetheless refuse to accept this ascription of polytheism or animism. As a result, 
Wana are highly hesitant to speak about additional Gods. Other forms of the single Pue, 
Owner, like the aforementioned Owner beneath the earth or the one above the sky or Pue 
Lamoa are never discussed in presence of other-confessional friends or guests. 
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Figure 9 Guests arriving for a momago in Salisarao.  
 F 
Figure 8 A niat ritual in Salisarao. 
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Figure 10 The duku for a momago, filled with baku m walia, food for the spirit allies.  
Figure 11 Indo Pino performing salonde during a momago, hosted in Taronggo 
Figure 09. 
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Figure 12 Apa Meti calling his walia during a momago.  
	  
	  
 
Figure 13 A shaman falling in trance during a momago. 
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Figure 14 Several shamans during a momago, hosted in Salisarao. 
4.2.3 Precedence of Wana Religion  
The third concept relevant for the reformulation of Wana belief is not as much related to 
inherent features of the belief system but rather portrays an overall assumption of 
religious seniority. Wana perceive of their religion as the first belief, agama ruyu. To 
exemplify the superiority attached to this portrayal, I turn to another narrative recited by 
A.C. Kruyt that illustrates the dialogic dynamics of interreligious exchange nested in this 
approach of religious precedence:  
Hero of this story is Pololoisong, who I have already introduced in Chapter 3 and who 
appears in various narratives of early times. In this narrative Pololoisong lives in a house 
made of bacon walls and is dressed in a loincloth. He has a Muslim brother named Adi 
Banggai. One day Adi Banggai comes to visit his brother but refuses to enter his house 
because it is made of bacon. Instead he tries to convince Pololoisong to convert to Islam. 
The latter refuses and mentions the fact of him being the older brother and therefore being 
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always right, “en het daarom bij het rechte eind had” (A.C. Kruyt 1930: 418). But Adi 
Banggai does not want to listen, turns this argument down and keeps on trying to 
persuade his brother. On the third attempt, Pololoisong suggests to bring their fight before 
God, named here ala tala, another version of Allah but accounting here for a common 
God. 122 Adi Banggai complains before God that Pololoisong refuses to become Muslim 
although his younger brother’s life is great and his heaven is wonderful. Pololoisong 
however, Adi Banggai insists, obviously lives in poverty and his heaven is made of 
bacon. God meanwhile listens and replies that Adi Banggai is wrong because 
Pololoisong’s life and heaven indeed are beautiful and because he is the older brother. 
After this godly advice the two brothers start their march back home. On their way, 
something unexpected happens: the ground just before and behind Adi Banggai suddenly 
opens, detaches him from the rest of the land with the result that he has to stay alone on 
the newly-created island where he is forced to live a life in scarcity (A.C. Kruyt 1930: 
418).123 
A.C. Kruyt’s version of this story continues to be extremely important for Wana self-
positioning in regard to religious affairs today. During my own research, I recorded A.C. 
Kruyt’s account in a variety of slightly differing versions. The story is significant for 
Wana constitution of their “right to believe” and is a popular narrative told frequently 
during social events and evening conversations. Pololoisong, functioning in this narrative 
as a prototypical Wana who adheres to his own faith, does to no point doubt his right to 
follow his own belief. The differences between both faiths are symbolized in 
Pololoisong’s bacon house, a religious taboo for his Muslim brother, forcing Adi Banggai 
to stay outside. A second symbolic differentiation can be found in Pololoisong’s poverty, 
exemplified through his clothing and house. Although in A.C. Kruyts version not 
explicitly mentioned, Adi Banggai is usually portrayed in Wana narratives as a rich 
Muslim man, who has lots of money and fine clothing. Again, as we have already seen in 
Chapter 3, poverty is an important marker of Wana culture and also religion. In this 
narrative, Wana religion receives a label of poverty while Islam is associated with wealth 
– an important distinction that is deeply linked to Wana cosmological assertions on their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 Although I never found Wana referring to ala tala when talking about God, Atkinson states that ala tala 
is part of shamanistic verses, who were taken from Muslim prayers and reformulated and incorporated in 
the own ritual practice: Wana consider the phrase to be a reference to God and to carry special potency” 
(1979: 378). 
123 Translation by Grumblies.  
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own marginality. Although Pololoisong seems to be of economic disadvantage, he reacts 
in a peaceful and deliberate way: Instead of fighting with his brother he chooses to bring 
the problem – which in fact is a problem for his brother alone – to God. One could 
assume that Pololoisong’s decision to pass the responsibility to judge over right and 
wrong to God portrays the numerous occasions when Wana individuals are engaged in 
discussions with other religious people, forced to explain and justify their belief. Some of 
my interlocutors for example stated that they were weary of discussing religious matters 
with Christians and Muslims because they would often receive nothing else than lack of 
understanding. Pololoisong in this narrative thus chooses the only possible way to avoid 
endless discussions: He already knows that God will judge in accordance to Pololoisong’s 
status as the older brother, simply because “seniority confers authority in Wana thought” 
(Atkinson 1983: 690). The calmness of the hero and the moral judgment by the highest 
law symbolize a strong and affirmative attitude Wana display towards their own religious 
status. This narrative is an example how Wana elaborate on other religious influences and 
how they manage to find a strong position within the complex interreligious relations they 
face. The fact that it has been around since at least the 1930s underlines the continuing 
necessity of explaining, defending and constituting a belief system that is until now not 
accepted by state and society as a religion.  
In the 1970s, Atkinson writes, it was common ground that Wana religion was the first 
belief:  
“While not accepting Wana religion as a true religion, Muslims and Christians 
will assert that Wana animism is prior to their own revealed faiths. To Muslims 
and Christians, Wana customs are akin to animistic beliefs of their own forbearers 
before the advent of world religions. They believe their own religions, in contrast 
to such primitive beliefs, represent an important advance from former ignorance 
to current enlightenment” (1988: 56).  
However, the picture, which presented itself to me in Taronggo, was of a slightly 
different character. Most of my Christian and some of my Muslim interlocutors did not 
accept the idea of Wana belief being older than their own. Rather they explained the fact 
that some of their forbearers had followed animist practices by their nescience of other 
religions. To them, it is Wana ignorance that made them adhere to “animism” – and not a 
timely priority of Wana religion. Some Muslim informants, especially those with close 
ties to non-converted Wana or themselves converted Muslim Wana, stressed also a 
common origin of Wana and Muslim belief. Some even pointed to the seniority of Wana 
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belief over Muslim belief – but not all of them. On the Christian side however, there is no 
place for the idea of Wana belief being older than Christianity. According to non-
converted Wana however, first there was Wana religion and it was only later that Islam 
followed, portrayed as a younger sibling. Christianity is a newer introduction and not 
(yet) as deeply connected to Wana religion in a cosmological way like accounts for Islam. 
Although in the 1970s Christianity had been added to the story of siblings, interestingly, 
no Wana in my research area more than thirty years later would grant Christianity the 
status of a sibling of Wana belief. Islam is perceived as the ancient brother, but 
Christianity is referred to as a foreign concept, that has no historical or other superiority 
or at least shared position with Wana religion. For Wana the story of Adi Banggai and 
Pololoisong as well as other narratives mentioned above assert to the fact that Wana 
religion was the first religion of all, “but for them priority does not connote primitiveness 
but rather special claims to validity” (Atkinson 1983: 692). Instead, presenting the own 
belief as the first religion eventually leads to the assumption that Wana belief underlies 
authority: “Wana, in millennial fashion, foresee a time when their now-despised religion 
will be accorded proper honors. If history is to be a succession of eras, as the dominant 
culture asserts, then it is only right that […] history should end where it began – the first, 
who are now last, shall be first again” (Atkinson 1982: 692). This conceptualization 
therefore deeply touches upon the sphere of cosmological marginality and draws a setting 
in which Wana will one day break out of their current standing  
4.3 THE RATIONALIZATION OF WANA RELIGION 
The religious concepts presented above as reformulations of Wana belief have been 
formed and shaped within the field of interreligious dialogue in which Wana manage to 
find and express their own positioning. I have chosen these examples based on their 
relevance in Atkinson’s research and A.C. Kruyt’s early elaborations on Wana religion. I 
have drawn from the descriptions these earlier accounts are presenting and have slightly 
expanded them with insights from my own research thereby already pointing out how 
some aspects have changed between Atkinsons’s and my own research results. Given the 
self-conscious statement concerning Wana conceptualization of their religion in 
Atkinson’s account, I was therefore deeply surprised to find a very different depiction 
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among my interlocutors. During my own first months of fieldwork in Taronggo and its 
surroundings I came to meet Wana who stated to be orang (yang) belum beragama, 
“people without religion”. It appeared to be almost impossible to find a person who 
would self-confidently present or discuss a concept of agama Wana (Wana religion). If at 
all, they granted it the status of kepercayaan (belief) – a term that implicates a certain 
negative valuation. Rössler for example has described how the Makassar of Gowa, South 
Sulawesi, generally differentiated between kepercayaan, describing their pre-Islamic 
belief, and agama, in their case Islam. Kepercayaan for them always implied a negative 
connotation of “backwardness”. This association contrasted with the portrayal of religion 
along the Indonesian idea of kemajuan, development. The adherers of the pre-Islamic 
belief would not call their own belief by its name, patuntung, a word that nowadays is 
almost tabooed, but rather draws back on terms like budaya (culture) or tradisi (tradition) 
to describe their pre-Islamic religion (Rössler 1987: 110-111). 
My immediate observations during my first months of fieldwork led to the idea Wana 
today do not (or no longer) recognize their belief as religion. How then, I asked myself, 
did it come to this modified perception? It was only later that I came to understand that it 
was my own role in the field that influenced the statements I gathered. 
4.3.1 Fieldwork Politics in an Interreligious Setting 
As I mentioned in the beginning, conducting research in a multi-religious setting like 
Taronggo bears some special challenges – to all people involved in the research process. 
My interlocutors and I took a couple of weeks to position myself and my role as an 
anthropologist within the field and its complex spheres of interreligious relations and 
hierarchies. Inevitably my own confession became an important topic. Asked what 
religion I had, I admitted that I had been baptized as a child but that I would no longer 
follow any religion as I rarely attend church in my own country. This was a position both 
sides of my informants struggled to understand. My Christian (and Muslim) interlocutors 
had difficulties to see me as a person without faith. For example, the anthropologist Tamir 
Erez conducted research among Messanic Jews in Tel Aviv; after 7 months of fieldwork 
he was asked to stop his research by a local pastor, portraying vividly the difficulties of 
religious expectations that can occur during ethnographic fieldwork. During his time in 
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the field he was expected by his interlocutors to convert to their religious confession. 
Instead he was conducting his research with “a pathetic but non-believing position [that] 
was more difficult for them to deal with than the regular stance of a critical non-believer”  
(Erez 2013: 49; see also 2015: 45). Having no faith set me, according to Christian 
interlocutors, in the same category as non-converted Wana people. My baptism made it 
even harder for them to grasp my lost interest in church. Nevertheless, I was continuously 
invited to Christian events. Because I intended to do interviews with members of all 
religious parties in Taronggo, I followed some of these invitations during my first months 
of fieldwork to pay respect and to document the events. This however, I realized later, 
complicated my research. Non-converted Wana in Taronggo were confused and highly 
suspicious of my religious affiliation as I had told them I would not be “a religious 
person”. Why would I still go to church from time to time, they wondered. As a result of 
these actions, I hardly gathered any information concerning interreligious relations during 
this first phase of fieldwork. Non-converted Wana kept on telling me that they had no 
religion and that their relation with Christians or Muslims was conflict-free. My Christian 
interlocutors on the other hand were doubtful about my true faith – a faith I always 
pressed I would not have – and my intentions. Seeing me in the morning walking around 
the village, talking to members of the Christian community about their relation to non-
converted Wana and then on the same day in the evening, watching me hiking up the 
mountains to talk to Wana shamans about relations to other religions or indeed taking part 
in Wana rituals left them puzzled and cautious. Just like Wiegele has pointed out: “One 
needs to know how one’s informants interpret specific acts of participation. Does this 
particular action constitute a statement of belief within a context of shared meaning, or is 
this action less significant?” (2012: 85). But I myself had problems to position myself 
properly. It took me a while to realize that I would not be able to keep on doing 
interviews with all religious “camps” since I was focusing on marginality within the 
community and this would inevitably lead me to focus on non-converted Wana. More and 
more I started to emphasize my Non-Christianity. Never before in my life had I dealt with 
my own positioning concerning my belief. Like many people of my generation, I was 
baptized, I was confirmed and I also was a member and leader of Christian youth and 
Scout groups. After high school however, I never dealt with my religious affiliation any 
more, except for the occasional church visit for Christmas where my mother, a member of 
the parish council and church choir, just expected me to go. But I never saw a problem 
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with that for myself. Now, during fieldwork, I suddenly felt the need to reconfigure my 
religion and I came to the conclusion that I still believed in something that, however, I 
could not grasp. Regarding the exclusive and excluding character of Christian faith in 
Taronggo I began to make a kind of belief-statement for my informants. I would believe 
in something, I claimed, but I would not know in what, but for me no belief or religion 
would be higher, better or more appropriate than the other and that I therefore would, of 
course, sympathize with Wana believe to the same amount I would with Muslim or 
Christian belief. This turned out to be a clear statement that over time was accepted and 
approved at least on Wana side. But while focusing more and more on Wana religion, my 
Christian interlocutors began to draw back from me. My questions on meanings and 
experiences with Wana belief began to lead to insufficient answers. On the other hand, 
members of the Wana community opened up and gave me insight on their perceptions 
and interpretations of their own belief. Their hesitation had been nested deeply in between 
historical narratives and current experiences that tell of proselytization, ongoing 
missionary attempts and political-religiously motivated marginalization processes, that 
affected Wana culture to the point that a serious scheme of distrust towards other-
religious affiliates had evolved. This strategy of portraying the own faith as no religion in 
this context serves as a self-conscious and self-cautious act of agency.  
4.3.2 Reformulation of Own Belief System 
Albeit the struggles of fieldwork reality, it soon became clear, that Wana still have a 
strong concept of their belief as equal to other religions. Today, Wana people, lowland as 
well as upland, live in interreligious networks of Muslim and Christian neighbors. Within 
these pre-colonial, colonial and current experiences, amid other religions and a 
framework of surrounding cosmological schemes, Wana hold on to their own belief 
system and they are still conceptualizing in a distinguished way, elaborating a well-
equipped position of Wana religion in a multi-religious environment as shown above. The 
reformulation of the own belief is just one possible way to deal with increasing pressure 
from outside. Another possibility could be a fundamentalization of the own religion – a 
development that can be observed among other groups like the Kwaio of the Salomon 
islands described by Akin (2003). For Kwaio people, the efforts of Christian missionaries 
Chapter IV. Socio-Religious Dimension: Wana in Interreligious Dynamics   
154 
	  
led to an increased concentration on personal moral and religious values. They, a small 
ethnic group comparable to Wana people, are said to be extremely “stubborn” against 
external “advise”. Using creative tactics of isolation, they have managed to resist 
Christian missionary efforts. Their religion has developed in accordance with this external 
pressure. In an article from 2003 Akin describes the ongoing intensification of Kwaio 
religion, “which adamantly rejects modernity, and defined modernity itself as a flagrant 
rejection of community” (Akin 2005: 187). Among Wana, however, this 
fundamentalization is not directly observable. The reformulation of their own belief 
system as presented above can instead be regarded as a necessary objective regarding the 
influence of missionary practices and official standards within an interreligious setting. 
Schrauwers notes a rather similar process among the To Pamona in Central Sulawesi, not 
far away from the Wana region. Like Wana, To Pamona originally had no specific term 
for their own belief. It was only in the 1920s that the processes of conversion entailed a 
new examination of local categories and how they would distinguish between own and 
Christian belief. The word molamoa,124 which Schrauwers translates as “to worship the 
spirits” (2000: 78), gained much attention and served as a disparate signification of 
Pamona belief against missionary and convert claims. As Schrauwers notes: “the word is 
indicative of the rationalization of a traditional religion, its transformation from ‘fussy 
ritual acts’ into an abstract, more logically coherent set of beliefs” (2000: 78). This 
distinction served the interreligious community’s needs. With a reformulation of the own 
belief system, the To Pamona precisely defined those attributes belonging to agama 
(religion), the religious sphere, and those that were ascribed a status of adat attributes, 
serving convert- and non-convert interests to find a common arena. Adat in that context 
was regarded as de-religionized, remaining a mere technical achievement according to 
Schrauwers (2000: 78). This conceptualization of religion and custom can be read as a 
reaction to state (and missionary as well as convert) discourse. While the term adat was 
initially introduced to differentiate Islamic religious law (hukum or sharia, BI) from local 
customary law (adatrecht) under Dutch colonial control, adat and agama nowadays have 
opposite meanings: “today ‘religion [agama] tends to be countered to ‘tradition’ [adat] – 
particularly in those societies which have been Islamized or Christianized” (Picard 2011: 
6). A similar context is described by George who shows how the indigenous Bambang 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 The Pamona and Wana languages are closely related. A fact that explains the similarities between 
Lamoa and molamoa. 
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residents in Sulawesi have suffered under missionary pressure. Since the 1970s, similar to 
the developments in the Wana region, the local belief in Bambang, called ada’ 
mappurondo, is not perceived as a religion by local officials on the basis of state 
legislature: “Owing to a narrow interpretation of Pancasila, the creed of the Indonesian 
state, mappurondo practices go unsanctioned and fall under the rubric of adat (i.e. 
custom, not religion) or animism (i.e. a mistaken pagan enchantment with nature, also not 
religion)” (George 1996: 40). Thus, adherers of ada’ mappurondo, just like Wana people, 
are consequently regarded not as “acceptable citizens” but instead belong to a “former 
age of primitive tribalism”. George further describes how the Bambang community 
became subject to communist allegations or “anti-developmental attitudes” (George 1996: 
40). As in Taronggo, mappurondo people were encouraged to convert to Christianity or 
Islam, “in order to advance scholastically, and [...] to exclude mappurondo adults from 
holding office in desa [...] administration” (George 1996: 40). Again, we can see parallels 
to Wana experiences: The developments described by George led to an immense increase 
in religious conversion among mappurondo people, with the result that in 1990 three-
fourths of the residents of George’s research location had converted to Christian faith. A 
conversion itself does not cause as many problems as one might think. The change in 
attitude, however, that resulted from the numerous conversions clearly left their mark on 
the community. Like Christian converts in Taronggo behave towards their Wana 
relatives, the new Christians in Bambang “look condescendingly upon their mappurondo 
neighbors and kin” (1996: 40). This change in mindset is backed up and even enforced by 
state context: “censorious attitudes have gained ideological and institutional support from 
the Indonesian government, whose state policies continue to champion monotheistic 
religion as the keystone of solid, progress-oriented citizenship” (George 1996: 40). 
Coming back to the differentiation of adat and agama mentioned by Schrauwers, George 
states: “adat and agama can serve as two of the principal terms though which Indonesian 
citizens can articulate and objectify their beliefs and culture” (George 1996: 238). To 
George, adat is a much more fluid term than agama, but both terms are part of an 
“‘exquisitely contemporary’ discourse that both sustains and creates local custom. 
Citizens have to sort out for themselves, though by no means freely, what is to count as 
agama and what is to count as adat” (1996: 239).  
In an interview with a Christian woman from Taronggo, I learned about a similar 
understanding. Ibu Lita described Wana rituals as well as shamans as designated aspects 
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of budaya, culture; a religious conversion towards Christianity or Islam would not result 
in the end of rituals since she clearly separated Wana aspects of socio-religious life into a 
religious and a cultural sphere. One example of George’s research in Central Sulawesi 
illustrates this binary conception towards adat and agama. For a Christian wedding, some 
locals organized a cultural event for George including elements of a mappurondo ritual. A 
local non-converted interlocutor of George was concerned about the devaluation of the 
ritual’s sacral content; George recites the sources’ pledge towards the Christian organizer:  
“I have coffee beans. I will give them to you and you can roast them up and make 
coffee. I have sheaves of rice. Go ahead and take them, and cook up some rice. 
But this is my religion. I will give you my religion. But don’t, don’t turn my 
religion into culture” (George 1996: 8). 
In the context of national ideologies concerned with adat and agama, George’s 
interlocutor was “resisting a civil discourse that denied him a religion and treated his 
sacred tradition as ‘culture’ and ‘art’” (1996: 9). Wana have managed to make sense of 
the outside pressure that is directed towards some central concepts of their own belief. To 
quote Atkinson, “Wana religion cannot be pigeonholed as primitive animism. It is not an 
ossified survival of a Paleolithic past, but instead a dynamic system that has developed 
and adapted to cope with changing circumstances” (Atkinson 1988: 48). For most Wana, 
their belief offers the same qualities that are ascribed to the officially recognized “world 
religions”. However, the situation within the interreligious setting of Taronggo and its 
surroundings has placed severe stress on non-converted Wana. Thus, contrary to the 
situation in which Atkinson conducted research in the 1970s in a single-religious 
settlement of non-converted Wana, Morowali Wana are, due to ongoing pressure from 
their other religious neighbors, relatives and state officials, rather hesitant to express their 
thoughts towards people of different faith – regardless of the above mentioned 
conceptualizations of agama Wana.125  
Against the background of the national discourse on religious minorities, living and in 
some cases working together with Christian and Muslim neighbors leads inevitably to 
marginalization processes that are expressed in collective hierarchies and shaped along 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 Once they understood that I indeed had not at all a Christian intention they started to share their 
interpretation of their belief and their setting within this complex interreligious context. Some would say, 
for example, of course they have a religion since their religion is the first religion of all, following the 
argumentation Atkinson had recorded in the 1970s (see above). But during such a discussion, if a 
Christian or Muslim neighbor would enter the room they immediately stopped on this subject and 
changed the topic.  
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socio-religious categories. Thus, on the local level of Wana life, state ideals and ideology 
are traceable through every day forms of marginalization that situate Wana at the lowest 
rank of the social ladder in relation to their other-ethnic and other-religious neighbors. 
Within the interreligious context of Taronggo and its surroundings, religious conversion 
to either Christianity or Islam can offer a way out of marginalization and the religious 
periphery. However, most upland Wana have successfully managed to resist conversion 
attempts with which they were and are confronted from colonial side, lowland neighbor 
side or contemporary missionaries. Yet there are also Wana who have chosen to convert 
to other religions – a strategy many indigenous groups in Indonesia chose (and continue 
to choose) to avoid problems as I have already mentioned in the example of the To 
Pamona or the indigenous people of Bambang. Therefore, I will in the following sub-
chapter provide an insight into everyday marginalization processes as they happen and are 
experienced in Taronggo and its surroundings.  
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4.4 LIVING TOGETHER: ASPECTS OF EVERYDAY 
MARGINALIZATION PROCESSES IN AN INTERRELIGIOUS 
COMMUNITY 
It becomes clear that although the reformulation of their own belief system that I have 
described above serves Wana people as a tool of dealing with (and often countering) the 
tremendous pressure habitually directed towards groups that adhere to local beliefs, 
religious marginalization continues to be a serious topic. As George’s example has 
already shown, the problem goes further. Interreligious living contexts become a matter 
of concern in the face of the Indonesian perception towards non-recognized religions or 
beliefs within the state context. Thus, for non-converted Wana regular day-to-day 
interactions within the interreligious environment of Taronggo and its surroundings are 
often accompanied with condescending attitudes and tinged with missionary impulses by 
their Christian and Muslim neighbors. It is important to note that the situation between 
the three confessional divisions in Taronggo is not at all characterized by violence or 
aggression. Although tensions between different faiths and even ethnic groups exist, they 
are of insignificant nature. Thus, I will not present in the following a timeline of conflict, 
but rather a setting of marginalization practices that impinge on those non-converted 
Wana either living in Taronggo or frequently visiting the village.  
Horstmann asserts quite rightly, that although a huge amount of literature has been 
written on conflicts that arose around ethnic quarrels, there is nevertheless “relatively 
little [we know] about how ethnically different people live in sustained peace” (2011: 
493). I believe strongly that the same applies as well to multi-religious communities, 
often closely connected to multi-ethnic aspects as well (cf. Aragon 2001). I follow the 
idea of Robinne and Sadan, that “ethnicity becomes just a cultural marker in addition to, 
and just like, others” (Robinne and Sadan 2007: 306). In Taronggo, the category of ethnic 
difference is not, to use Horstmann’s words, “an a priori determinant of identity and 
social coherence” (Horstmann 2011: 493). Instead, in the context in which Wana culture 
is determined predominantly through its alleged “lack of religion”– imputed in state 
discourse as well as legislature – religion eventually emerged as a basic key marker of 
social identity. In this context, as Wana are associated with a lack of religion and the 
underlying negative assumptions I have so far outlined, ethno-religious identity in 
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Taronggo is entangled with forms of social exclusion active and passive (cf. Sen 2000), 
social inequality as well as discrimination via marginalization. Symbolic acts of 
segregation are an everyday routine that Wana experience already at an early age. These 
acts are part of social practice – practice that in itself produces social subjects and is most 
vividly analyzed in practice theory. According to Ortner, one of its most recent 
anthropological agents, this theory aims to explain “the relationship(s) that obtain 
between human action, on the one hand, and some global entity which we call ‘the 
system’ on the other” (Ortner 1984: 184). As Weininger makes clear, “[a]ccording to 
Bourdieu, the hierarchical ‘status’ of a lifestyle is a function of its proximity to or 
distance from the ‘legitimate culture’” (Weininger 2005: 137). Legitimate culture can be 
explained as “the culture endowed with the dominant legitimacy” (Bourdieu and Passeron 
2000: 23) or as Weiniger puts it, as “those elements of culture universally recognized as 
‘worthy,’ ‘canonical,’ or in some other way ‘distinguished’” (Weininger 2005: 137). 
However, although the concept of habitus is a useful tool for elaborating upon social 
inequality, Ortner exhorts that we must be wary when it comes to the interpretation of 
habitus as equal to culture:  
“The idea of habitus is potentially risky […] [when t]reated as just another word 
for ‘culture’ […]. But understood as the internalized (and constantly renewed) set 
of representations of class-defined social location, and as the constant processes 
that naturalize them, it is a very powerful idea” (Ortner 2006: 78–79). 
Pushing forward Bourdieu’s ideas on habitus, Ortner fills a gap in his elaborations 
concerning a picture of habitus that is rather static, unconcerned with power relations and 
ignorant of historicity. Instead, Ortner points to the aspects of habitus that turn the fixed 
concept into a dynamic one that highlights “the processes that constantly denaturalize 
them as well, the little cracks and openings that constantly appear as a result of the 
complex and constantly changing dynamics of practice” (Ortner 2006: 79). Nested within 
such a hierarchical system, power plays an important and special role. Most interestingly 
for the example from Taronggo are those spheres of symbolic power that constitute the 
social positions within the village and its surroundings. For Bourdieu,  
symbolic power “can be exercised only if it is recognized […]. This means that 
symbolic power does not reside in ‘symbolic systems’ in the form of an 
‘illocutionary force’ but that it is defined in and through a given relation between 
those who exercise power and those who submit to it, i.e. in the very structure of 
the field in which belief is produced and reproduced” (Bourdieu 1991: 170).  
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Thus, it is symbolic power that adds to the legitimization of social inequality and the 
reproduction of social distinctions as we find them in Taronggo. Bourdieu defines 
symbolic power as a “worldmaking power” that imposes the “legitimate vision of the 
social world and of its divisions” (Bourdieu 1987: 13). Bourdieu connects the notion of 
symbolic power to the aspect of symbolic violence, defined as different from overt 
violence, and instead as “‘gentle’, invisible violence, ‘unrecognized as such, chosen as 
much as undergone, that of trust, obligation, personal loyalty, hospitability, gifts, debts, 
piety, in a word, of all the virtues honoured by the ethic of honour’” (Bourdieu 1990a: 
24). Nevertheless, I shy away from the notion of symbolic violence and do not see it as an 
adequate point of reference for my analysis simply because it undermines those fields of 
power that non-converted Wana have to their disposal in Taronggo. The notion of 
violence clearly ascribes a “practitioner” and a “receiver” of violence, almost exclusively 
attributing the directing power towards those of a higher social position. As will become 
clear in the following, Wana nevertheless clearly have their own ways of responding to 
and enacting forms of symbolic power. Thus, it is not sufficient to speak merely about 
symbolic power and violence but also to look for the individual’s power within this 
system, the power to act that someone can draw back on. Thus I rather tend to the notions 
of symbolic power and agency, two aspects that are closely related to each other (Ortner 
2006: 137). The latter I understand in Ortner’s terms as “a form of empowerment, a 
source and effect of power” (1999: 147).126 
In the context of Taronggo, the habitus of socio-religious groups receives specific 
meaning through embodied dispositions in everyday life. Religious affiliation provides a 
sense of group identity including the community’s ethic and normative rules of behavior. 
Thus, religious affiliation might be seen as a marker of cultural practice in the context of 
Taronggo and provides the ideas of class stratification within the Taronggo community. 
The reflection of hierarchical relationships between the different groups of the village by 
religious affiliation allows a significant differentiation between the own group and “the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 I further draw back on the meaning of hegemony, a concept closely connected to Bourdieu’s notion of 
habitus. For Comaroff and Comaroff hegemony is “that order of signs and practices, relations and 
distinctions, imaged and epistemologies – drawn from a historically situated field – that comes to be 
taken-for-granted as the natural and received shape of the world and everything that inhabits it. It 
consists”, and here they are referring to Bourdieu, “of things that go without saying because being 
axiomatic, they come without saying; things that, being presumptively shared, are not normally the 
subject of explication or argument […]. This is why its power has so often been seen to lie in what it 
silences, what it prevents people from thinking and saying, what it outs beyond the limits of rational and 
credible” (Comaroff and Comaroff 1991: 23).  
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others”. With this theoretical framework I will now turn to the community of Taronggo 
and its surroundings and the position non-converted Wana obtain here. 
4.4.1  “Praying According to One’s Own Faith” – Interreligious 
Tolerance? 
Let me begin this elaboration of social inequality and symbolic power among members of 
the interreligious community, consisting of Wana, Protestant as well as Pentecostal and 
Muslim community members, with a short vignette from my fieldwork (Fig. 15-17). In 
Taronggo, it is a common habit to start community events with a shared prayer, which is 
an important part of community life. Smith Kipp analyses in her book Dissociated 
Identities: Ethnicity, Religion, and Class in an Indonesian society (1993) the relations 
between adherers of differing faiths among the Karo Batak in Sumatra. According to her, 
an inequality between religious affiliations is most visible in the private sector of 
interreligious communities.127 She draws this insight, for example, from community 
gatherings and social events in her research community, where Karo Batak arrange with 
religious pluralism and, even more, anticipate it. Similar to people in Taronggo, Karo 
Batak start those events with a collective prayer. In a minor sub clause, Smith Kipp 
mentions those prayers to be held according to one’s own faith. It was this sentence that 
struck my interest. The following example displays one of these events in Taronggo:  
Anton, the brother of the sekretaris desa (village secretary), whose grandmother is 
entitled (from Christian side with pride) as the first converted Wana, was organizing his 
wedding with an external woman from another ethnic group and village. The wedding 
was supposed to be held in the bride’s village. Nevertheless, Anton’s family was obliged 
to help the couple perform their wedding with monetary gifts, as is a common form of 
support for members of the religious community of Taronggo. The act of collecting 
money from relatives involves an official invitation of every household that holds family 
ties with the groom. Although a number of relatives do live in the mountains of Salisarao 
no invitation was spoken out to them. On the day of the event, the relatives gathered in 
the groom’s sister’s house. Primarily male family heads came together but also a number 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 As opposed to being situated within a public sphere.  
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of women appeared. Due to a shortage of space the guests divided up in two rooms that 
were connected with each other by an open door. In the back room, the living room, a 
number of chairs were arranged so that guests in that room had without exception an 
opportunity to sit. In the front room, people were seated on the floor, backed up tightly to 
the cooling walls. It was in the back room where most Christians were to be found as well 
as the bride’s family who came for the first time to Taronggo. In the front room on the 
floor, almost exclusively, Wana could be found sitting in hesitant silence listening to the 
loud and energetic laughter that sounded from the front room to the back room. I was 
sitting with them on the floor and after a while Ibu Sek Des, the groom’s older sister, 
owner of the house and friend as well as informant of mine came to us and joined the 
group, trying to loosen up the atmosphere. Were it not for me, she probably would not 
have changed rooms and it was with disappointment that she noticed me sitting on the 
floor instead of socializing with the bride’s family since my presence as a white and 
privileged person was always regarded as something to be proud of and a good 
opportunity to show off a little.  
After a longer waiting time, the groom’s father, Apa Ari, the former kepala desa and 
village eldest, inaugurated the event. After short greeting words, pointing out the 
importance of the wedding and the close ties of the family, Apa Ari summoned all guests 
for the communal prayer. He pressed that everyone could pray according to his or her 
own belief; then he folded his hands for the prayer and closed his eyes. All Christian and 
Muslims closed their eyes as well and thus entered prayer, the only difference between 
them was the way they would held their hands. Some of my Wana interlocutors followed 
their example but many left their eyes open. I could not follow all words of the prayer 
since Apa Ari’s age left him with a hoarsely low voice and I sat on the opposite of the 
room, so I was not able to understand everything. He talked a lot about Jesus and his 
meaning for believers. Then, it was the turn of the bride to lead the prayer, who herself, as 
a matter of fact, is the Christian priest of Taronggo. Her voice was much clearer and 
stronger, and she raised her voice as she prayed for all those who so far had not found 
belief in God and would be subject to an existence in hell; she hoped all those lost souls 
would find their way to Jesus just in time to find salvation. After this prayer people 
started to discuss the details of collecting money.  
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This exemplary situation mirrors the daily situation of living together in a community 
consisting of three different faiths. A shared prayer, used to inaugurate a number of 
events and gatherings, is perceived by Christian and Muslim members as normal. 
Religious diversity is nothing extraordinary in Indonesia and multi-religious villages are 
no exception. Thus, in a similar setting among the Karo Batak of Sumatra, Smith Kipp 
argues for the Muslim and Christian community, “people expect religious pluralism and 
accommodate to it” (1993: 253). But can this rather calm attitude of the Karo Batak 
dealing with religious diversity easily be applied to non-converted Wana in Taronggo? 
Most of my informants expect communal prayers as they are custom on almost all shared 
community events in the village. However, many of them are not “accommodated” by it. 
The common prayer itself is not the bone of contention. What struck my interlocutors the 
most is the explicit mentioning of the specific belief, Christian or Muslim. “How is the 
prayer according to our belief, if they keep on talking about tuhan yesus?”, Apa nTina 
one of my informants asked. He pressed further the conversion imperative found in most 
of those common prayers:  
“I know they talk about us when in prayer; they pray for us and hope we will find 
the way to God. But we already found it, sudah selalu (BI), it has always existed.”  
Here, Apa nTina refuses the accusation of supposedly not believing in God; his claim to 
believe in God and that all Wana have always believed in God illustrates yet again the 
way Wana conceptualize their believe (see above). He feels in some way excluded from 
the allegedly communal act of “praying together” since Wana do not follow this habit in 
the way Muslims or Christians do. Further he is irritated by the mention of specific 
confessional figures like Jesus during those prayers and expresses his perplexity. The 
praxis of communal prayer in the context of the multi-religious situation in Taronggo thus 
deserves some observation in the field of symbolic power. Because Wana do not rely on a 
tradition of active praying, they are de facto excluded from this social praxis simply by 
means of the nature of the communal act. A neutral or rather communal “prayer 
according to one’s own belief” therefore only applies to adherers of world religions while 
non-converted Wana are excluded. Against this multi-religious background, where the 
habit of praying becomes a presupposition of belief itself, the term “prayer according to 
one’s own belief” receives oxymoronic character.  
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The exclusion however, is not the only aspect of symbolic power enacted upon Wana in 
the course of the prayer. References to an after-life in agony are a common theme in these 
prayers, as we have seen in the example cited above, where the Christian local pendeta 
(priest, BI) prayed for “those who so far had not found belief in God and would be subject 
to an existence in hell; she hoped all those lost souls would find their way to Jesus just in 
time to find salvation”. Such statements are usually directed towards non-converted Wana 
– and not towards other-confessional parties, i.e. here: Muslims. Wana “non-believers” 
generally feel that they are the ones addressed with such statements.  
Not all informants from Taronggo see the communal prayer as problematic. Many people 
in Taronggo witness these parts of social events on a regular basis and are used to it for 
years. Wana from the surrounding mountains who do not participate in village 
ceremonies with the same frequency take more offense in these acts of exclusion, related 
for example to the prayers, than their village relatives do. For example Apa Yare who 
would regularly complain about people praying during communal festivities, expressing 
his anger about people calling it prayer when they, according to him, hide behind it a 
missionary imperative for Wana,: “I often feel that it is just for us (when they pray), so 
that we follow (their) religion; they laugh about us when we do not pray”. Felt differences 
here are subject to an upland–lowland divide that is caused by differing levels of 
habituation or customization. According to Smith Kipp, problems resulting from religious 
pluralism are not subject to a public sphere but become only recognizable within private 
circles. For Wana however, communal prayers during village gatherings are part of a 
public sphere that reproduce marginalization and discrimination processes. A general 
consensus towards religious pluralism as described for the Karo Batak, where “everyone 
accepts similar standards of interaction” (Smith Kipp 1993: 253), is for non-converted 
Wana no more than a hypocritical coercion of an alleged tolerant majority, resulting in a 
repetitive indignity for them.  
 
 
 
Chapter IV. Socio-Religious Dimension: Wana in Interreligious Dynamics   
165 
	  
Figure 15 Protestant church building in Taronggo. 
Figure 16 Pentecostal church building in Tarrongo. 
 
Chapter IV. Socio-Religious Dimension: Wana in Interreligious Dynamics   
166 
	  
Figure 17 Mosque in Taronggo.  
 
4.4.2 Embodying Social Orders 
Social distinction is made by social subjects who according to Bourdieu, “classified by 
their classifications, distinguish themselves by the distinctions they make, between the 
beautiful and the ugly, the distinguished and the vulgar, in which their position in the 
objective classifications is expressed or betrayed” (Bourdieu 1984: 6). It is in this context 
that symbolic violence is formed and expressed – a form of symbolic usage different to 
the aforementioned “symbolic power”. The privileged group uses its culture to sustain its 
higher status, excluding others and thereby coming to an understanding of social order by 
decoding symbolic markers of difference (Lamont and Molnár 2002: 168). This binding 
process causes classificatory consequences that are, according to Lamont and Molnár, 
“inescapable and unconscious [...] [and] shape social positions by defining [social] class 
boundaries” (2002: 268). Within this framework, the communal prayer in Taronggo 
serves as an analytical marker that shows how Wana feel in some way excluded from 
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communal life based on their religious affiliation and closely related to it symbolic power 
enacted upon them. The prayer is just one example of everyday social practice in 
Taronggo and its surroundings where social differences are embodied in distinctive 
actions and habits. During the communal prayer in Anton’s house other even more 
obvious forms of symbolic power and signs of formulating or reinstating a lower social 
status for Wana by the host were, for example, sitting on the floor while the pre-
dominantly Christian guests were offered chairs. Further, hospitality during this event 
included the serving of cigarettes. During that day, Wana were sitting on the floor and 
were offered cigarettes of a cheap brand that the host himself would not smoke. 
Meanwhile the Christians who had gathered on their chairs in the backroom were offered 
expensive Gudang Garam – a brand that is wrapped in shiny golden paper and known to 
be smoked by government officials.128 These acts of treating people differently, although 
they were all guests and all had close family relations to the host, portray quite clearly 
how Wana in Taronggo are perceived of as orang gunung, mountain people, or worse, as 
orang terbelakang (backward people, BI). Only seldom are upland Wana officially 
invited to village ceremonies by Christian or Muslim villagers since the latter rarely if 
ever would take the strenuous walk up the hills to invite people living, for example, in 
Salisarao. If upland Wana happen to be in Taronggo while an event takes place they 
follow their kampung friends out of curiosity or leisure.129 During those events that are of 
greater dimensions than the one described in the field vignette cited above, the 
distinctions become even clearer. The following vignette illustrates those dynamics:  
One day during my time of research stay a great Christian wedding was celebrated. The 
preparations lasted for weeks and most Wana in upland Salisarao and even some from far 
away Posangke and Kayupoli had heard the news and were coming to Taronggo for the 
event. The wedding hosts had invited a number of important people, it was stated, and 
even the local camat, the head of the Bungku Utara district, was expected to come. When 
the day arrived, the differences between the guests were quite obvious. Those guests 
accustomed to events of that type, took place among the seating rows of the ceremony, 
were nicely dressed and participated most naturally in the conversations. Upland and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 Gudang Garam is one of the biggest tobacco companies in Indonesia. For a detailed study on smoking 
behavior in Indonesia see for example Mitchell (2013), Nichter et al. (2009: 103) and Reid (1985). 
129 Here, the common prayers are regarded as an insult – disrespecting Wana belief and lying about the 
catch phrase “praying according to one’s belief”. 
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lowland Wana however stayed at the edge of the location, more onlookers than guests, 
some of them dressed in their best cloths while others wore their everyday worn-out T-
Shirts and many had come without shoes. During the communal prayer Wana stood 
silently aside. The food for the wedding was arranged nicely on a long row of tables 
between the two seating rows. Then Apa Ele, the father of the bride, held a short speech. 
He himself was born in Taronggo Tua, a former location of the current village, as the son 
of two non-converted Wana; his father had come from Posangke while his mother was 
born in the old Taronggo. After his first wife had died, he married a Christian woman 
from Mohoni (located in Central Sulawesi) and converted to Christian faith by 1982. He 
later became kepala desa of Taronggo lasting two terms of office until 2007. On the day 
of his daughter’s wedding his speech was probably the longest and also most central of 
the whole event. The main objective of his speech was further to open the buffet for the 
guests. In his speech he addressed first the guests who had come from other villages and 
towns, the family of the groom and then the people of Taronggo. Last he welcomed his 
saudara-saudara dari atas (BI), brothers and sisters from above, meaning those Wana 
who had travelled from Posangke, Salisarao or Kayupoli to attend the festivity. He 
declared himself as nothing more than they are: an orang gunung, a mountain person. He 
pressed his family bonds and his own background and even seemed a little proud against 
the other guests. After this integrating speech, pressing the similarity of all guests, no 
matter from where they had come, he opened the buffet. He invited those guests who 
stand or sat close to the dining tables to the big buffet. Then he turned to his keluarga 
dari gunung (BI), his family from the mountain, and explained to everyone that there was 
not enough space for every guest to eat from the dining tables and not enough chairs. And 
because his mountain relatives were not comfortable with sitting in chairs or eating from 
plates, he invited them to take their meal in the nearby town hall around the corner, where 
they could sit on the floor and eat with their hands as they prefer to; instead of plates the 
food would be served in banana leaves. But the food, he insisted, would be the same, here 
and there; they would make no difference between people. Then he wished everyone a 
great celebration.  
The content of the speech in itself was no novelty to me. I had observed a number of 
festivities in Taronggo, upland and lowland, and everywhere the picture seemed to be the 
same. Usually, upland Wana are seated on the floor, a little away from the main activity 
of the ceremony. They are served the same food, but without plates, spoons or chairs. 
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Sometimes the distinction goes further, and different food is served for Wana who 
generally are believed to dislike beef (a fact that is simply not true; my interlocutors 
stated they indeed like beef, but they rarely get the chance to taste it). “They are happy 
with chicken, why should we serve them cow?”, one of my Christian interlocutors replied 
when I asked about this circumstance. Wana usually were not always aware of such acts 
or processes of (symbolic) violence as directed towards them. Some distinctions were 
internalized relations people were not actively recognizing as actions of differentiating 
just like Bourdieu has amounted to his habitus concept as a “system of acquired 
dispositions […] as categories of perception and assessment” (Bourdieu 1990b: 13).  
Wana in upland regions usually do not possess any chairs; some of their houses simply do 
not accommodate the idea of a chair because the floor is made of elastic bamboo where 
no chair could stand. Plates and spoons however I found in almost every household. If 
upland Wana choose to hold a festivity, often lowland people from Taronggo hike up the 
hills to partake in the ceremonies – mostly village men who look for alcohol and a good 
party as well as a few lowland women who sell their goods like cigarettes, sweets or 
clothing. The guests from the lowland then usually – but not always – are treated special 
and get their food served on one of the few plates available, contrary to the picture we get 
presented by the opposite case presented above. Wana usually feel uneasy when hosting 
an important Wana ritual like the momago in Taronggo; most rituals are held upland 
because these rituals are perceived of as annoying for a majority of the village 
community. I heard Christian interlocutors complain that momago simply serve as a 
reason to get drunk; some were complaining that Wana do not directly search for medical 
help but instead rely on shamanic cures while other tend to critique these forms of rituals 
as connected to setan (Satan, BI). The sound of the gongs necessary for a momago is 
further a source of consternation for some Christian neighbors who complain about the 
noise that lasts until sunrise.130 Some Christians attend these rituals but often behave in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 Interestingly I noticed one night a similar attitude by an upland Wana towards a Christian ritual. Here is 
an excerpt from my field notes from Spring 2012:  
 Last night it was the Easter night and the children in the kampong started to walk around the village with 
guitar playing, singing and blowing through bamboo, making a lot of noise. It started around 3am, 4am. 
Apa Ke’u from Salisarao spent the night at Apa Nevis house and was startled waking up by their noise. A 
very long time they [the children] were standing in front of the house before they left for other houses. I 
also had the feeling they had stayed suspiciously long in front of our house [where non-converted Wana 
live]. Apa Ke’u mentions that maybe they choose the houses of people tawa manggaya [not (yet) 
converted]. He was very angry, as he repeated a couple of time, to get woken up during the night. This 
reminded me of Christian people complaining about momago noise. Both sides seem to feel disturbed by 
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inappropriate ways as mentioned above. Other markers of social distinction between 
upland and lowland, converted and non-converted Wana as well as other religious and 
other ethnic neighbors include language, space, the body and clothing as well as other 
forms of consumption that I do not intend to portray in detail. Wana who were not fluent 
in Bahasa Indonesia often were objects of amusement for others, especially by outsider 
visitors to Taronggo.131 Further, while Muslim and also Christian women in Taronggo 
would dress “properly” according to their social space, Wana have no clothing 
restrictions and openly present naked shoulders and legs — often a stumbling block for 
others. Wana men seldom wear long trousers, too. Regardless of sex, Wana often wear 
neither shoes nor are their clothes free of holes or spots – all factors that lead to outsiders 
feeling offended.  
The habit of smoking and consuming alcoholic beverages serves as another example, 
especially within a gendered field of observation. While neither Christian nor Muslim 
women smoke in the research area, Wana women do.132 Observing who smoked in which 
situations and what kind of tobacco people preferred made many distinctive boundaries 
become clearer to me – boundaries that of course were not always stable.133 For most of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the others acara. But, I also noted last year, that Wana people then were very ok with the noise; they 
made fun of it, but no one mentioned being angry. I believe, Apa Ke’u strong words are part of the whole 
development. The development here refers to a process of change that had immediate effects on the 
locals’ attitude (Wana and non-Wana alike), happened in 2012 and is described in detail in Chapter 5. 
131 Problematic became the situation in case of disease since the local nurse did not speak the local language 
at all. In Baturube or Kolonodale Wana were often unable to express their disease at all. 
132 Only once I shared a cigarette with a female Christian interlocutor. 
133 Another important point was the question what to smoke. For my first two weeks I was accompanied by 
a guide from the nearest city, Kolonodale, who often lead tourists in the nature reserve bordering the 
village of Taronggo. Before we left for the first time to Taronggo we went to the market in Kolonodale 
buying goods hard to get in Taronggo. He told me that cigarettes are an important gift you are expected to 
offer at every visit to Wana people. So we bought lots of them, but while I immediately turned to a brand I 
had seen most Indonesian men smoking, Gudang Garam, shiny packed in golden paper, my guide stopped 
me immediately. They were too expensive, he told me, and for Wana people it would be enough to buy a 
cheap brand, since they were happy if there were cigarettes at all. They would not like the expensive 
brand he insisted. He proved to be wrong. Although I later met Wana who indeed dislike filter cigarettes 
and prefer their own tobacco, most Wana men would always choose the expensive brand – the one most 
Indonesian men of a higher status (and with a higher income) would smoke. This guide was considered a 
good man, however it became clear that he sees Wana in a different light. They did not like his cigarettes 
and the sarungs he brought as gifts were considered inappropriate in a way. Would he bring a cheap 
sarong and the cheapest cigarettes when invited to Christian or Muslim houses in Taronggo, they asked 
me. I myself for my own consumption always turned to a cheap brand of slim white filter cigarettes that 
generally most women did prefer. However, Apa Jendi, one of my main informants and leading shaman, 
preferred those over the expensive brand when we sat together although I always brought packages of 
both brands for him. After a while he could not smoke something else. One of his spirit friends appeared 
to him during a dream and told him he would get sick if he would continue to smoke Wana tobacco or 
other brands than the one I smoked.  
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my Christian and Muslim sources Wana women’s habit of smoking, drinking and 
clothing was a sign of their “backwardness”; they were “hill people” living in the village 
but “still primitive in their thinking and behavior”. However, the fact that I am a female 
smoker never astonished them. Ibu Lita a Christian woman from Taronggo explained, that 
it was not the same when I was smoking because “people from the West were different”. 
Women in Indonesia are said to traditionally avoid smoking at all and Mitchell claims: 
“these pressures stem from sociocultural expectations of women linked to the home, 
notions of reproduction and motherhood, religious ideology, and the demands of an 
associated ritual economy” (2013: 169). It is important to note, that the Indonesian 
tobacco industry is taking aim at boosting female consumption; for example, in 2002 the 
advertisement for tobacco concentrated heavily on young and educated women in urban 
centers like Jakarta, in which smoking is portrayed as connected to a lure of modernity 
(Nichter et al. 2009: 103). However, in rural areas the gendered social distinction of 
smoking habits continues; Ng et al. state that interviewees in rural Java perceived of 
smoking as a pure male business; “Smoking [among women] is only common among 
hookers and bad girls” (2007: 799; see also Mitchell 2013: 177). In the research area, 
smoking among Wana women was considered to be a sign of primitivism. On contrary, 
being white and coming “from the West” was always associated with modernity and 
progress. My smoking, therefore, served my Christian and Muslim interlocutors as a 
marker of “positive” cultural distinction from them and, of course, from Wana in the 
meaning of modernity. For my Wana interlocutors however, my habit of smoking served 
as connection between them and me, knowing that I had a higher status among their 
Christian and Muslim neighbors (see introduction). The cultural or socio-religious gap 
that divided them, the “primitives” from others, was in some way bridged when we 
shared cigarettes and rice wine.134 Smoking, just like consuming alcohol as well as 
clothing and language use therefore served as analytical markers during my fieldwork, 
offering ways to grasp issues of ethno-religious boundary making and -crossing. The 
examples cited above serve as a demonstration of social power and a demarcation of 
social hierarchy in which non-converted Wana often simply obtain the status of the 
“primitive”. Expressed in moments of hierarchy, some of these habits of course are 
connected to religious aspects like taboos in consumption or appropriate clothing norms. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134 The longer I stayed in the field, Wana women more and more started to smoke during public events, 
when I was offered cigarettes by Christian, Wana and Muslim men. 
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For example, the complex relations with interreligious communities and food restrictions 
I could myself observe a couple of times. Here is a short episode taken from my 
fieldnotes:  
“Yesterday a young student from Makassar, who is currently coming to Wana 
area for research for her BA, came to “our” house, followed by her uncle who 
works at the Kantor KUA (KUA (Kantor Urusan Agama; Office for Religious 
Affairs) in Baturube. I offered them coffee, tea and food, but they only wanted to 
drink water. They were promised a meeting with Apa Ensi and Indo Felu, who I 
called via a neighbour to come down from their gardens. I felt in charge since 
they came to our house and Indo Dheri was not around so I technically was the 
host. Later when Indo Felu, Indo De’u and Apa Ensi arrived, the latter asked me 
almost shocked if they had not eaten yet. I told him, they did not want to, but he 
went to ask his daughter, living next door, to prepare food for them. We told them 
they should wait before leaving to get something to eat. But they left although the 
food was already prepared, without even touching the water I gave them. I was 
confused and we discussed whether it was our house that could have raised their 
displeasure. Other than Christian or Muslim houses in Taronggo our house is 
made of wood and stands on poles, the dog and cats are running freely around, 
there are only few chairs and guests usually sit on the floor. There is no running 
water or bathroom facilities besides the river, a 20 minute walk away. But when 
they left, the others assumed that they were highly religious Muslims. Still, Indo 
Ensi complained to me that their behaviour was not very polite. Our neighbor, 
also a Muslim, but rather easy minded, also complained about their behaviour.”  
Muslims from outside, so people in Taronggo tell me, take it “too serious” with their 
restrictions. People within the kampung are not strict and people respect their refusal to 
eat pork.135 That people from outside do not touch plates or glasses when they come from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 Apa Dheri tells me about Lando, who lives in the kampung but also had spent a longer time in Uewaju in 
the mountains among Wana. There he did not care about diet restrictions, he dried his food next to pork; 
people were asking him about it, but he laughed and said that as long as he would not eat it, there is no 
problem for him. Apa Dheri and others pay Muslims like Lando respect for customizing with Wana ways 
of living. However they do see Muslims from outside who do not even touch the glasses they are offered 
as impolite. 
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a non-Muslim house, leads to confusion. However, most habits that I have described so 
far are not connected to religious restrictions and I perceive of them mainly within the 
context of social hierarchies and not primarily within religious rankings. For example, 
another account was told to me about a Christian from outside who came to Taronggo for 
a pesta, probably a wedding. He refused to touch anything from the food, did not want to 
drink from a glass and finally took his shirt, wetted it with water to drink from it instead 
of using a glass. Apa Ensi heard about it and was so angry about it that he immediately 
went to search him for a fight, but he already had left. Apa Ensi was well aware that in 
this case the problem was not connected to religious restrictions, but a sheer matter of 
inpoliteness. Apa Ensi described his reaction: “I was so angry when I heard this; they 
think we are too dirty, they do refuse to eat from our plates, drink from our glasses. So 
why do (they) even come here?”  
 As I have mentioned earlier, on the local level state ideals and ideology are traceable 
through every day forms of marginalization; thus social aspects are always infused by 
state-related influences.  
4.4.3 Interreligious Marriages 
So far I have shown that living in the interreligious community of Taronggo for Wana 
means, on a symbolic level, dealing with social order, social power and meaning. Social 
hierarchies in the described community can further be perceived as demarcations of social 
boundaries. For an analysis of marginalization processes in interreligious community 
settings, it is thus not sufficient to look at aspects of social inequality alone but also on the 
way these borders are contested, (re)formulated and symbolized. What are specific 
strategies utilized to defend them, who overcomes or breaks them and what are the results 
of definite articulations like these? For answering these questions I will turn now to the 
articulation of socio-religious inequality in an even more concrete relation. I have already 
introduced Smith Kipp study on an interreligious community among the Karo Batak, 
where Christian, Muslim and non-converted people live together. For Smith Kipp, 
problems are evident primarily within the area of kinship relations and interreligious 
marriages: “Marriages between persons of different faith, and conflicts among close kin, 
are the primary point of religious tension in the pluralistic society” (1993: 254), she 
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writes. In her example, Karo Batak usually manage to separate religious problems and 
family obligations. Only those she calls “traditionalists”, the non-converted, see both 
factors rather closely intertwined. In one of her examples, a converted Christian dies. His 
wife and two of his children, all non-converts, had buried him according to Christian 
custom but later hold a séance for the soul of the deceased. The third son, himself a 
converted Christian, boycotted the ritual, an act which was interpreted as highly 
conflicted: “A Christian son who fails to sit before the medium to converse with the 
deceased father creates a conspicuous absence” (Smith Kipp 1993: 254).136 Kinship 
relations as well as marriages are heavily affected by religious pluralism and can thus 
serve as a point of analysis for marginalization processes. Since non-converted Wana 
regularly do engage in marriages with other-religious individuals, interfaith marriages are 
a highly important and heavily discussed topic. In the following, I will therefore use the 
field of interreligious marriages to discuss the problems of an interreligious living 
situation in Taronggo and its surroundings. For this purpose I will draw upon the scheme 
of boundary making after Fredrik Barth as a means of analysis in order to show the 
manifold contradictions and connections between the public and private sector that both 
affect the local marriage institution.  
Meanings and Consequences of Breaking Ethno-Religious Boundaries 
Research on boundaries and borders has a long tradition within the humanities and social 
sciences, it is “part of the classical conceptual tool-kit of social sciences” (Lamont and 
Molnár 2002: 167) and focuses on “understanding the role of symbolic resources (e.g., 
conceptual distinctions, interpretive strategies, cultural traditions) in creating, 
maintaining, contesting, or even dissolving institutionalized social differences (e.g., class, 
gender, race, territorial inequality)“ (Lamont and Molnár 2002: 168). These social 
differences can be distinguished between social and symbolic boundaries according to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136In this context Smith Kipp declares the séance a public event and declares religious pluralism as 
belonging only seldom to the private sphere. This statement contradicts with her earlier argument where 
she ascribed a problematic condition solely to the private sector and not the public sector. Regarding this 
contradicting argument, I therefore believe that it is necessary to clarify where in Taronggo the public 
ends and the private begins. A strict separation in Taronggo between both spheres regarding religious 
tensions is not easily assessable. The conversion factor is almost never discussed in big gatherings but 
their specific consequences are always a hot topic in the private sector. 
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Lamont and Molnár. For these authors, the latter are constituted by variations in access to 
resources and possibilities for the social actor:  
“Social boundaries are objectified forms of social differences manifested in 
unequal access to and unequal distribution of resources (material and non-
material) and social opportunities. They are also revealed in stable behavioral 
patterns of association, as manifested in connubiality and commensality” (Lamont 
and Molnár 2002: 168).  
These social boundaries can result from symbolic boundaries in case the latter are 
commonly accepted. Symbolic boundaries are defined by Lamont and Molnár as 
“conceptual distinctions made by social actors to categorize objects, people, 
practices and even time and space. They are tools by which individuals and 
groups struggle over and come to agree upon definitions of reality. [...] [They] 
separate people into groups and generate feelings of similarity and group 
membership. [...] They are an essential medium through which people acquire 
status and monopolize resources” (2002: 168).  
Lamont and Molnár refer to Bourdieu’s work on distinction where he asserts how 
symbolic categorizations do reproduce class privileges (see above). This means, for 
example, a classificatory framework for distinguishing between “us” and “them” and 
legitimizing one group as superior over another by symbolic markers like taste or style as 
I have described above. Crucial for the research on social and symbolic boundaries is the 
work of Fredrik Barth. His ground-breaking concept of “boundary making” lead to a shift 
in general anthropological research; instead of focusing on the mere cultural content of 
ethnic groups, it was the constitution of their boundaries that suddenly became the center 
of attention. For Barth, ethnic groups are “categories of ascription and identification by 
the actors themselves and thus have the characteristic of organizing interaction between 
people” (Barth 1969: 10). This definition encompassed correlations between race, 
language etc. and ethnic membership, pointed to the internal dynamics of ethnic 
belonging and let room for change (Emberling 1997: 299). Therefore, for Barth “the 
critical focus of investigation from this point of view becomes the ethnic boundary that 
defines the group, not the cultural stuff that it encloses” (1969: 15). Here, boundaries are 
the tools for distinguishing one group from another and therefore lead to exclusion 
processes. While ethnicity was regarded as a mere static concept, the new analytic lens 
proposed by Barth made room for a novel perspective on ethnicity as something rather 
situational. The problem in this account can be found in the ignorance of cultural 
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differentiation (Wimmer 2008: 982). Almost 30 years later Barth himself pointed to this 
specific weakness of his approach and suggested a new, improved model to analyze the 
politics of boundary making. In the year 1994, he states:  
“ethnic relations and boundary constructions in most plural societies are not about 
strangers, but about adjacent and familiar ‘others’. They involve co-residents in 
encompassing social systems, and lead more often to questions of how ‘we’ are 
distinct from ‘them’, rather than to a hegemonic and unilateral view of ‘the other” 
(Barth 1994: 13).  
He developed a three-level model seeking a better understanding of how ethnic 
boundaries are constructed. On the first level, the micro-level, social relations of personal 
character are analyzed against their specific environment, “the complex context of 
relationships, demands, values and ideas” (Barth 1994: 21). On the next level, the median 
level, we look at collective identities and how they are formed, constituted, changed and 
saturated. This level is observed “through entrepreneurship, leadership and rhetoric” 
(Barth 1994: 21). The interconnectedness between the varying levels becomes visible, 
according to Barth, at the median level where “processes intervene to constrain and 
compel people‘s expression and action on the micro level” (Barth 1994: 20-21). Situated 
on the macro-level Barth sees global discourses, state concerns and international 
organizations. Connolly (2009) uses this methodological framework for her analysis of 
interreligious marriages among Christian and Muslim Dayak in Sumatra. She critiques the 
overtly dominant focus on macro and median level, “meaning that analyses addressing 
processes of boundary formation tend to ignore the emotional and experiential level of the 
individual and the family” (Connolly 2009: 494). In the following I will utilize her 
analysis for a deeper understanding of the meaning of interfaith marriage for 
marginalization processes in Taronggo and how they are formed and become meaningful 
for socio-religious boundaries.  
The Macro Level  
On the macro level, it is necessary to take a closer look at state regulations and policies 
regarding interfaith marriages within the archipelago. All processes at a local and meso 
level are deeply affected by state interventions and historical national and political 
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processes. The current legal situation has its roots in a long history of law development. 
The Indonesian Marriage Law declares interreligious marriages subject to conversion by 
Law 1/1974.137 This Decree was the last attempt to force a common law on marriage 
since earlier tries had failed to serve the interests of a Muslim majority and the rest of the 
state’s citizens. The new Marriage Law was a new effort “to accommodate the cultural 
demands of Islam while seeking to contain it politically (Connolly 2009: 495). The first 
draft of the new Marriage Law failed to serve the desires of the Islam majority; many of 
the bill’s articles were regarded as opposing Muslim religious values.138 For example, 
marriage was made subject of official registration by Article 2(1) whereas formerly a 
marriage contract between the bride’s father and the fiancé was sufficient. Muslims 
feared that it was a threat to Islamic law, and changing it would be a sacrilegious affair. 
Many Muslims opposed to making marriage a matter of state affair instead of religious 
concern (Katz and Katz 1975: 661). Another point of anger and heated debate was Article 
11(2), making marriages between different religious confessions possible. Already in 
1898 in the Mixed Marriage Regulation No. 158, Art. 7(2) propagated by the Dutch 
(Regeling op de gemengde Huwelijken), marriage was declared independent from 
religious differences.139 A heavy reaction arose from Muslim sides in 1952 when the 
article was tested in a famous case where a Christian male and Muslim woman were 
trying to get married. They formally requested at the Jakarta District Court for a legal 
authorization of their marriage. Although the woman unsuccessfully plead for a religious 
legalization through her penghulu (Islamic “priest”, BI), the court decided they could get 
married, since state law superseded Islamic jurisprudence. The couple finally married but 
the reactions from Muslim side were heavy; still, the court did not change the decision 
(Lindsey 2008: 276). The reconfirmation of the opportunity to marry interreligiously with 
the new draft of the 1974 Marriage Act caused, no wonder, similar reaction:  
“The same Moslem fears were expressed all over again – that the tearing down of 
religious walls through inter-marriage is a rejection of the Islamic belief that 
religion is a way of life and that interreligious marriages will benefit only 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia 1/1974 Tentang Perkawinan (Law 1/1974 on Marriage).  
138 The first draft was edited by General Ali Murtopo who functioned as Chief of OPSUS (Operasi Khusus, 
Special Operations). 
139 Article 1 of the Regulation manifested a mixed marriage as between people who were subjected to 
different laws. Later, in 1901, it was extended by the Dutch in an significant way as it was basically 
against Islamic law that generally forbid interreligious marriages. It was now stating that “difference in 
religion, race and origin is not a challenge to perform mixed marriage” (Aini 2008: 697–98). 
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missionaries because such marriages will increase the ranks of Christians” (Katz 
and Katz 1975: 662). 
Other articles were also subject for indignation on Muslim sides and demonstrations were 
held on an almost regular basis during that time. Soon it became clear that the draft had to 
be changed for the sake of the state’s political peace. President Sukarno ceded to make 
those articles opposing Islamic values subject for deletion, thereby reaching a consensus 
on the law which was finally passed by the House and signed by himself on 2nd January 
1974. Some articles had been changed and adapted to the new guidelines but the article 
concerning interreligious marriage law had been removed completely (Katz and Katz 
1975: 664).  
Therefore, today’s situation concerning interreligious matrimony is to some extent 
unclear. No paragraph states this form of marriage neither legal nor illegal. It is only in 
Article 2 (1),140 that “a marriage is legitimate, if it has been performed according to the 
laws of the respective religions and beliefs of the parties concerned” (quoted in Buchanan 
2010). The same article nevertheless declares that every marriage has to be “registered 
according to the regulations of the legislation in force” (quoted in Buchanan 2010). This 
means in detail that Muslim marriages need to be registered at the local office of 
Religious Affairs (Kantor Urusan Agama) while non-Muslim marriages need to be listed 
at the Civil Registry Office (Kantor Catatan Sipil) after the wedding religious procedure 
(Buchanan 2010; Fig. 18-19). Although these regulatios of the 1974 Marriage Law do not 
state that religious confessions have to be the same, it is genereally accepted and 
interpreted as banning interfaith marriages since a) the ceremony has to be conducted 
according to a state acknowledged religion and b) these religions often prohibit marriages 
between different faiths.  
Nevertheless interreligious marriages are not as rare as one might expect regarding the 
official norms. The number of popular examples from the media reporting on the 
weddings of celebrities like the Muslim Yuni Shara and the Protestant Henry Siahaan, 
who circumvented the law by marrying in Australia, or the Catholic Deddy Corbuzier 
who married the Muslim Kalina according to his bride’s faith without himself converting; 
the ceremony was preceded by a socio-religious NGO. Marrying abroad or turning to an 
NGO are just two options bypassing national law to successfully accomplish 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 Art. 2(1), Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia 1/1974 Tentang Perkawinan (Law 1/1974 on Marriage). 
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interreligious marriage in Indonesia. Further possible is a “conversion of convenience”, as 
Aini calls it (2008: 702). He further refers to census data from Yogjakarta Province, 
stating for the year 2000 a number of twelve per thousand marriages of interreligious 
character.141  
Still, interreligious marriage remains problematic for all adherers of the state’s six 
recognized religions. The situation is even more difficult for people who follow their 
own, unrecognized belief system. Since Wana belief is excluded from the national 
category of religion, it suffers specific disadvantages on the macro-level, i.e. the state 
level, which “result[s] in the denial of other civil and political rights” (Colbran 2010: 
682). One of these rights is the right to marry. According to Article 2 (1), see above, a 
marriage is only legal if it is arranged according to the religion of the couple and later on 
registered with the state. This becomes a problem, if the religions of bride and groom are 
different. It is even more complicated if one or both do not adhere to an officially 
recognized religion.  
Couples who adhere to a faith that is not recognized by the state cannot officially register 
their marriage. Wana usually only get married according to Wana adat (Fig. 20). Their 
wedding thus cannot be listed as legal. If a wedding is considered illegal the situation 
becomes especially difficult in terms of childbirth: In such a case, the birth certificate for 
a born child will only recognize the mother which means the child is born out of wedlock. 
Colbran states, although those children are socially not accepted in Indonesia, parents 
generally “have no choice but to register their child in this manner because otherwise the 
child will experience difficulties enrolling in school, breaching both the child’s right to 
have his or her birth registered and the right to education” (Colbran 2010: 682).  
State rules on interreligious marriage tighten ethno-religious boundaries on the macro-
level. In case of marriages between followers of officially recognized religions, the state 
often serves the interest of the religious community trying to protect and defend its 
borders against change coming from outside. Common aims between those two do not 
necessarily need to be shared on the micro level. This is the case for marriages between 
Christian and Muslim community members in East Kalimantan described by Connolly. 
She points to the fact that decisions made on the macro-level often have devastating 
effects for families and subjects of the community where she did research. At a first 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141 The quote on Muslim communities is much lower than for Non-Muslim ones (Aini 2008: 703).  
Chapter IV. Socio-Religious Dimension: Wana in Interreligious Dynamics   
180 
	  
glance, we might assume decisions made on the macro level might have even more 
distressing effects on Wana people standing outside of religious categories. According to 
state law, their marriage cannot count as legal which makes their children illegitimate. 
However, as I will show in detail while analyzing the following levels after Barth, it is 
rather the opposite we find in Taronggo.  
State impact is felt – and I am pronouncing the word felt – of less importance to Wana 
people regarding marriage law. State rules often diverge on the local level. The problem 
of the identity card (KTP, Kartu Tanda Penduduk) is such an example. An article in the 
Jakarta Post from May 2012 focused on the new option for religious minorities in 
Indonesia. Until recently, the obligatory identity card had to be filled out according to one 
of the six officially recognized religions. Generally, people had to choose between one of 
these religions and put it on their KTP to be officially registered. This caused the 
phenomenon of often-called “Kristen KTP” or “Muslim KTP” – people who are adherers 
of world religion only on their identity card, while in fact they follow their own 
nondenominational belief. Syarbini therefore asks: “On what basis is animism going to be 
considered a religion? If it’s just for the purposes of national identity cards then don’t do 
it, religious life could become messed up”142 (Fardon 2012). Nowadays, faith has become 
an optional category on the new electronic identity cards, “a move lauded by pluralism 
campaigners as a significant step toward ending discrimination against minority groups” 
(Pramudatama 2012). But if we take a closer look at the local realities of Taronggo and its 
surroundings, Wana people usually leave the religious category on their KTP blank.143 In 
most but not all official village data, like census, they are listed without religion. It 
becomes quite clear, that decisions made on the macro-level often do not translate on the 
local dimension. Is it therefore plausible to allege that decisions made on the macro level 
seem to be in concordance with median and micro-level conditions? To answer this 
question in concurrence with the proposed analytic lens let me now turn to the median 
level.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142Translation by Grumblies.  
143 An article from the Jakarta Globe, entitled “Life Still Tough for Believers in Minority Faiths in 
Indonesia” states that in a census from 2010, a number of 270.000 Indonesians listed their religion as 
“other”. These adherers of other belief systems “struggle to get marriages recognized by the state or have 
their children considered legitimate”. The article cites an example of a couple that is wishing to get 
married but for 11 years has tried without success. Thus, these couples, like Wana couples, are living in a 
status of cohabiting which is, according to Article 458, issue to penalty: “anyone who lives together as 
husbands and wives out of a legal wedlock are punishable” (Rayda 2013). 
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The Median Level 
For her analysis of the median level among Christian and Muslim interfaith marriage 
Connolly focuses on aspects of collective ethnic and religious identity of Dayak people. 
Historically, Dayak have experienced a fate similar to Wana. They had close trading 
networks with Muslim coastal inhabitants, resulting in systems of patronage and 
intermarriage for the advantage of both sides, “Malays [...][gaining] the allegiance of 
Dayaks, whereas for Dayaks it offered access to Malay power” (Connolly 2009: 497). 
Still, whereas intermarriage was an important option and led to a change in ethnicity 
conceptions among the converted Dayak, religious conversion outside of marriage 
intentions was not an option since the advantage of gaining more power could not 
compensate for the harm it did to personal ethnic and family relations. According to 
Connolly, the appearance of Christian missionaries who focused on salvation and the idea 
of Christian kinship presented a better solution for Dayak people with the result of 
Christian conversion. Love as one of the key factors of Christian education and the idea 
of equality “has been important in overcoming sub-ethnic differences and building both a 
pan-Dayak ethnic identity and a sense of Christian community” (2009: 498). This process 
fortified socio-religious boundaries between Muslim and Christians with the latter 
expecting to be saved as the former are perceived to be excluded from salvation. Entering 
a Christian identity optimized the social positioning for many Dayak who now were part 
of the privileged majority of “adherers of a world religion”. Dayak used Christian 
discourse and spirituality “as a way of creating an oppositional discourse, defending 
themselves against the state and other ethnic groups who declare that they are dirty, 
backward animists who impede national progress” (Connolly 2009: 497).  
Oppositional strategies of ethnic-religious boundary-making do present themselves in a 
different way to Wana people. As I discussed earlier, most Wana in the 1970s 
reformulated their belief as a strong religious system that can, at its core, claim a similar 
status like Christianity or Islam (see Chapter 4.2). Contrary to Dayak “tactics”, Wana 
tried, on the median level, to find their own ways of dealing with structures shaping the 
macro- as well as other levels. One could ask why the situation among Dayak and Wana 
people took such a diverging process – although one might assume apparently that the 
prerequisites for interaction with external religious influences were of similar character. 
Still, Wana identity is not as sharply shaped along religious categories as it is the case for 
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Dayak today. Some Wana have converted to Christianity or Islam but still follow local 
rituals that are closely interconnected with Wana belief system (see 4.4). For those, their 
ethnic identity has not changed. They still consider themselves Wana, ethnically, and 
many state they still consider Pue, the Owner, as identical with God or Allah. Even 
second or third generation Christians and Muslims present themselves as suku Wana (BI), 
ethnically Wana. A variety of ascribed attributes define ethno-religious boundaries 
between Wana and the rest. Their neighbors often describe Wana as different because 
they do not follow an official recognized religion. Instead they are supposed to “pray to 
trees and believe in demons”, which is considered to be “ridiculous”. Further, Wana fall 
in the category of “wild” and “uncivilized people” who lack any interest in broader 
political themes (see Chapter 1 and 2). Common allegations tht I recorded during my 
interviews and daily chats are, for example: They do not want to be governed; they have 
no education (and do not want it); they live far away in the mountains; they are too lazy to 
follow any economically meaningful strategy and so on. These assumptions, often 
discussed openly in front of Wana themselves, display a boundary that I find hard to 
describe as ethnic. My Christian and Muslim interlocutors formulated the difference 
between “us” and “them” along the “progress” they made and Wana have not. They 
happily embraced world religions, which lead them to a life more meaningful and 
economically fruitful. Sometimes with arrogance, sometimes with regret and sometimes 
with sorrow they talk about their families in the mountains or those in Taronggo, whereas 
the latter made, according to them, “the right move in a brighter future but still refuse to 
enter the world of true believers”, as one of my Christian interlocutors told me. Those 
boundaries are rather shaped along progress – the nation’s sense of it – and religion, 
which are closely interconnected. Therefore I prefer the term of socio-religious 
boundaries instead of ethnic boundaries. In Taronggo, where a number of members from 
different ethnic groups live, they do play a role as well. But for Wana the socio-religious 
boundaries are those they feel most intensely subjugated to and are most aware of. It is 
possible to see the importance of socio-religious boundaries resulting from the rather 
complicated question of ethnic belonging that I described above: “When ethnic identity is 
confusing or ambiguous, religious resources sometimes offer a more solid framework for 
identity” (Mitchell 2006: 1140). Therefore, in short, Wana distinguish themselves 
according to their religious belief. Still, the boundaries are neither fixed nor static. 
Converted Wana who still follow rituals and turn to shamans in case of illness for 
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example, only seldom see their conversion resulting in a strong exclusive new religious 
identity (see Chapter 4.4.). Here it is rather the Christian or Muslim family background 
that makes religious and ethnic differentiation a dilemma – a problem that needs to be 
analyzed on what Barth calls the micro-level.  
The Micro Level 
Interreligious marriages in Taronggo are seldom openly discussed as problematic. 
Carefully promoting a picture of ethnic and religious harmony within the village, the 
median and macro levels are hardly sufficient analyzing the role these marriages play for 
Wana positionings with the interreligious community. The micro level thus focuses on the 
sphere of the individual, identity formation and personal interactions at the local level.  
Connolly sees among Christian Dayak a fear of a Muslim intrusion through Muslim men 
marrying Christian Dayak women. Female Dayak are perceived of in their role as mothers 
and child bearers, thereby being part of the body politic and primarily serving as its 
boundary markers,  
“women [...] become the susceptible gateways through which Muslim men 
encroach on the Christian community, and the relationship between Muslim and 
Christians becomes a gendered hierarchy in which Muslim men are the masculine 
predators and Dayaks are their docile, feminine prey” (Connolly 2009: 499).  
Among Wana gender inequality plays a minor role and is mainly recognizable in 
questions of political power. As I mentioned earlier, religious conversion in case of an 
interfaith marriage almost exclusively happens from Wana to other religions (Fig. 18-19). 
Since Wana women as well as Wana men marry people from other religious confessions, 
conversion does not rest on a gender based inequality. Rather, it is an inequality where 
Wana men and women are, more or less, equally marginalized in national and local 
discourse due to a “lack” of “civilization”, education and consequently world religion.  
Interreligious marriages happen generally more often in Taronggo than in the 
mountainous area (see also 4.4). One Taronggo example is the family of Apa Ensi, a 
vehement supporter and advocator of Wana belief. Five of his six children married 
Muslims or Christians and followed their new partners’ religion. Three of his sons 
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converted to Christianity while the youngest daughter married a Muslim. The third son 
had just married a Christian Pentekosta from Lemo during my research stay and was 
planning to convert in the near future. The last son who has not converted is Ensi, who 
married a young Wana girl from the Posangke area far away in the mountains. In the next 
sub-chapter I will talk in detail about the politics of conversion. Here, however, let me 
pay special attention to interreligious marriage along the example of Ensi, Apa Ensi’s 
oldest son to demonstrate the meanings and processes behind an interreligious marriage.  
Ensi met his wife, Indo Reza, through a scenario we might call a “blind date”. Around ten 
years ago, a time where neither mobile phones nor land lines were easily accessible by 
Taronggo people, Ensi used the chance of a radio communication station, connecting 
Taronggo with people in Bungku. Not knowing her background or her face, Ensi started a 
“radio relationship” with a girl from Bungku and he fell in love with her voice. Before 
ever seeing her, both made marriage promises to each other and their parents made 
arrangements for them to get married. Thus, a wedding soon became inevitable. When 
Ensi finally met her for the first time, his surprise was big: While he had expected to meet 
a young maiden, the woman welcoming him instead turned out to be mature lady who 
already had given birth to a daughter. Married and divorced as she was, Ensi served her 
interest very well, since he owned land in the Taronggo region and was therefore a 
promising groom. Since the wedding plan had already reached an advanced level, Apa 
Ensi insisted that his son would marry the woman due to moral obligations – even though 
Ensi felt tricked. He had no choice but to comply with his earlier wedding promises. 
Because Ensi to this day followed no other religion than Wana, the bride’s family pressed 
Ensi to convert to Christianity before the wedding. A requirement that indeed was 
problematic for the young man since his own family was against a conversion. Ensi 
states:  
“Indeed, they didn’t want it, they did not want to accept that I would follow her 
religion. But if you do get married, you simply have no choice, you must! I 
myself did not want to convert (masuk agama, BI), but I had to get married. Of 
course they, the Christians, would never consider following my belief because I 
do not yet have a religion; that’s why we always have to follow their religion. 
Well, if the kepala desa marries his wife (village chief: Christian, wife: Muslim), 
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there is no problem, because they both have a religion, even though it is different. 
But me, I am Wana and I have to follow my bride.”  
Even though Ensi and his family were not excited about his religious conversion they did 
not seriously try to prevent it since they were aware of their disadvantage regarding 
religious contexts in national discourse and state rules.  
Another example is Indo Mika, also a child of Apa Ensi, who married Apa Mika, a 
Pentecoastal Christian and son of a priest. Indo Mika converted around a year after the 
wedding but, as she said, it was no option for her not to convert. During my main 
fieldwork stay both lived a harmonious marriage, with Apa Mika being highly tolerant of 
his wife’s ongoing affinity with shamanic curing and Wana belief in general. She could 
freely attend healing and other rituals although her husband refused to follow her on those 
occasions. When I returned to the field site in March 2012, Indo Mika had volunteered to 
teach in the newly erected sikola lipu, a school in the upland especially for Wana, built 
solely under Wana auspices but stimulated by NGO activities from Palu. I will later 
describe the school in detail (see Chapter 5); for now, it is important to mention that the 
school was “religious-free” (tanpa agama, BI). Religious people from Taronggo opposed 
this new initiative as was foreseen from Wana people and NGO and so did Apa Mika. 
Still, every third day Indo Mika together with other volunteers hiked up the mountains to 
teach her non-converted upland relatives how to read and write. Her husband became 
furious. People gossiped about it and suspected he experienced pressure from the 
Pentecostal community since he was regarded as a firm believer who could not accept 
such a behavior of his wife. The ultimate goal of bringing Wana in the mountains the 
word of God was seriously disturbed by Indo Mika’s activity. Since Indo Mika did not 
listen to his complaints, one day he simply left the village without leaving a note. No one 
knew where he went and villagers were worried about their marriage. After a few days of 
confusion and uncertainties, he came back and Indo Mika resigned from the voluntary 
teaching. Nevertheless, she did so with great anger and the marriage was predicted to end 
soon. It becomes clear that although religious conversion can offer a way to overcome 
religious difference, it is seldom the case for Wana. A strong orientation towards Wana 
belief is often noticeable among converts, causing confusion among couples like Apa and 
Indo Mika. The pressure from the Christian or Muslim party towards the Wana party to 
convert is strong and almost inevitable (see Chapter 4.4).  
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In the beginning of this subchapter I have referred to Smith Kipp, who states that in her 
example only those she calls “traditionalists”, the non-converted, see religion and 
marriages as closely intertwined. The analysis of socio-religious boundaries along 
interfaith marriages in Taronggo and its surroundings shows that mainly Wana people do 
perceive of interfaith marriages as problematic. One of the reasons for this is the fact that 
Wana are usually the disadvantaged parties in such a wedding. Connolly concludes her 
analysis referring to the three levels with the following words:  
“It is not just the case that the order of the state and the order of the family are not 
scandalized by the same things or that the state’s codes of honor are more 
inflexible than those of the family […]. It may also be the case that the state does 
not even have a grand strategy aimed at achieving religious homogeneity and 
clearly defined religious groups. Thus, what appears to be a formal state strategy 
turns out to be a pact between religious leaders and parties campaigning for 
homogeneity and political actors and parties seeking to retain power” (Connolly 
2009: 503). 
I could easily agree with Connolly in the situation between interreligious parties as she 
described for her Muslim and Christian community, where social power is dictated by 
religious choice. Nevertheless, the situation for indigenous religious groups in Indonesia 
is quite different as my analysis reveals. People who simply do not have an officially 
recognized religion are underprivileged on all levels described above. Even though 
developments on the macro and median level do point in the direction of a more 
reasonable development process that is currently happening within the Indonesian state, 
the everyday realities non-converted Wana experience is still heavily marked by 
marginalization aspects, forcing Wana people towards a religious conversion.  
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Figure 18 Reni, a Wana woman, receiving a ritual washing by the Imam as part of her wedding with 
a Muslim. 
 
Figure 19 Reni after her wedding at the Kantor Urusan Agama. Apa Main, her uncle and a shaman 
from Salisarao, accompanying her.  
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Figure 20 Wana wedding ceremony in Salisarao.  
Figure 21 Christian wedding in the church of Taronggo. 
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4.5 THE POLITICS OF RELIGIOUS CONVERSION 
In this Chapter I have presented so far a picture of what it means to live in the 
interreligious community of Taronggo from the perspective of Wana people. I spoke 
about what it means to follow Wana religion and how socio-religious borders are 
constructed, manifested, defended and, furthermore, frequently broken. Religious 
conversion hereby functions as the most visible (and most extreme) marker of religious 
transformation and concurring marginalization processes. As I have pointed out in the 
introduction of this thesis, the area of Salisarao remains until today an area of non-
converted Wana families. Christian and Muslim households are only found within the 
lowland village of Taronggo. Thus, due to the geographical distance from and lack of 
other religious families, upland Wana can more easily resist conversion attempts; here, 
individuals receive strong support by their families, agama Wana remains the most 
important form of belief. To visualize the relations of conversion between upland and 
lowland I will present in the following three charts of kinship relations. The first, Family 
A, displays the family relations of a family from Salisarao; the second and third, Family 
B and C, both show a family from Taronggo. 
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These families are examples of the interreligious context in which Wana either choose to 
convert or resist religious conversion. In the upland area of Salisarao, Family A 
completely resists conversion attempts; many of those living the upland area have to one 
point in their life lived in Taronggo or other lowland settlements (Fig. 22). So did Apa 
Ester, the male Wana who is listed as temporarily having converted to Christianity in 
Figure 22. He was baptized while he lived with a Christian lowland family in Taronggo, 
who supported him to go to school for further education. Nevertheless, he returned to 
Salisarao and renounced his Christian belief. Many individuals belonging to Family A 
have shamanistic features; to one or another degree some of them are ka walia, shamans. 
When we look at Family B, an interreligious family living in the lowland of Taronggo, no 
Wana there is a shaman. Although in upland regions shamans are of frequent occurrence, 
in Taronggo almost no Wana chose the walia way. Becoming a shaman includes a 
number of prerequisites that are not as easily fulfilled in lowland as it is in upland regions 
(see Chapter 3). Another reason can be found in the low prestige a shaman earns in 
Taronggo; while shamans are usually well respected individuals and healers in Wana 
society (cf. Atkinson 1989), they are met with suspicion by their lowland neighbors. 
Family B clearly reveals the importance of interreligious marriages for Wana society 
(Fig. 23). Although the family’s grandparents all are non-converted Wana, born in upland 
Tingkoba’a, one of their children and ten of their grand-children converted to Islam or 
Christianity (Pentecostal or Protestant). Nevertheless, there remains an important part of 
Wana who have not converted, but the ongoing pressure through schooling and the 
changes I have described above lead to an increasing trend in lowland conversions. While 
most of these individuals do obtain low status jobs or are simply subsistence farmers, the 
only Christian son of Family B became kepala desa for a number of years. Economic 
difference is also an important distinguishing marker for Family C (Fig. 24). This partly 
ethnic Wana, but religiously Christian family obtains most of the important positions 
within the village, for example the first daughter who is sekretaris desa while the father is 
a former kepala desa. All family members are big in the palm oil business and thus 
belong to the richer section of Taronggo villagers. No marriage between a member of this 
family and a non-converted Wana has yet occurred.  
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In the light of the analysis of religious change and socio-religious power relations within 
the research area, it becomes understandable that conversion becomes an important matter 
especially in the interreligious community of Taronggo. Religious conversion needs to be 
analyzed against the framework of current political and social structures. In the year 1979 
Atkinson mentions the pressure caused by state rules and national discourse concerning 
religion:  
“The concept of religion is a central one in Indonesian nationalism. Religious 
freedom is guaranteed to all Indonesian citizens who subscribe to an officially 
sanctioned faith. Indigenous systems of ritual and cosmology are, with several 
notable exceptions, denied the status of a religion. Religion is associated in 
nationalist culture with education, cosmopolitan orientation, sophistication, and 
progress. The Wana are largely nonliterate, unable to speak the national language, 
physically remote from government authority, and live at a subsistence level using 
swidden agriculture. In short, they represent the antithesis of nationalist goals and 
aspirations. Wana failings to match the ideal of a progressive citizenry are 
summed up for nationalist Indonesians in the fact that the Wana lack a religion. In 
cultural terms, conversion then offers a solution to social ‘backwardness’” (1983: 
689).  
More than thirty years later the situation has changed. Many Wana today have followed 
national desires. Most of them are able to speak the national language, acquired reading 
and writing skills or live in centralized villages like Taronggo. However, government 
officials and neighbors do continue to perceive of them as orang gunung, mountain 
people, who have not yet acquired the status of full citizenship – mainly because they do 
not adhere to an official recognized religion as I have shown above. Conversion in the 
1970s, Atkinson states, thus displayed one option to escape this marginal status. In view 
of the manifold marginalization processes still present today the question arises why, 
then, do Wana still resist the pressure to convert? One reason for the ongoing opposition 
against religious conversion can be found in the decrease of official and social pressure 
towards non-converted Wana. In the 1970s intimidation from Christian and Muslim sides 
displayed a serious dilemma: “People tell of being told their necks will be cut like 
chickens, their genitals split open and rubbed with salt, for their human worth is less than 
that of dogs refusing religion” (Atkinson 1979: 32). For Atkinson, fear was the main 
reason for conversion among Wana people in the 1970s; realizing that their non-
converted friends did not end up as described in the warnings mentioned above, many 
Wana quit their new confessions and returned to their own belief. Today, actual fear 
seems to no longer be a motivator for religious conversion. However, the ongoing social 
Chapter IV. Socio-Religious Dimension: Wana in Interreligious Dynamics   
195 
	  
pressure from other-religious people and communities has become a new conversion 
impetus within the interreligious community of Taronggo.  
I already introduced some of my Wana interlocutors, Indo Mika and Ensi, who 
themselves changed their religious confession in order to get married. For people like 
Indo Mika and Ensi, Wana use their own terminology to describe the socio-religious 
differences (and boundaries). The term mangaya refers to people who have converted, 
taw ro mangaya. According to my knowledge it means a conversion to Christianity or 
Islam as well. The term mangaya cannot be used for people who have “had religion” for a 
longer time. Instead it is used in combination with a missionary effort. One of my 
interlocutors, Apa nTina, explains with these words: “follow religion, whatever they teach 
you”. The term is not used for a distinctive ethnic ascription, but always describes a 
religious effort. According to Apa nTina the term was introduced by missionary people in 
the Ue Bone area; therefore the meaning of the term is often immediately associated with 
Christianity and further with Pentecostalism.144 In the following I will give a short 
introduction to the anthropological interest in the field of religious conversion. With the 
theoretical framework in mind I then will talk in detail about the politics of conversion 
and de-conversion in Taronggo and its surroundings. 
4.5.1 On the Anthropology of Conversion  
Conversion in its simplest means entails the process of crossing over to a new “religion”. 
Studies in the past perceived of conversion and conversion movements as a rather sudden 
religious change, in itself a completed and defined act. More recent accounts tend to treat 
religious conversion as a process of rather slow character. Rambo for example speaks in 
this context of a definition problem; the term conversion refers to Evangelic Christianity 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144Another term people use in Taronggo for people coming from outside, from another area moving to 
Taronggo is the general term pendatang, like it is used in general in Indonesia. The Wana term, taw ojo 
jela, means almost the same, meaning “people just coming by”. To describe people who result as a 
daughter or son from a marriage between a pendatang and a Wana person, people use the term pernakang 
(BI). As another distinctive expression, but here for people from above, upland Wana, comes the term taw 
wana to melimbalimba, referring to the Wana agricultural habit of moving houses according to their 
agricultural circle. In the same way people talk about to Wana ntongku, meaning Wana from the 
mountainous area. These terms however are rarely used, people tend to speak from people from atas or 
from the village, taw kampung.  
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where it means radical change (Rambo 2003: 213), confining the Pauline paradigm which 
includes the reversion of former belief, passivity of converts to foreign forces and “an 
unexpected flash of revelation” (Rambo 2003: 213). While conversion for Rambo is a 
Christian idea, for the Comaroffs it is a central European concept: Jean and John 
Comaroff pointed to the critical position that stands behind the problematic terming of 
conversion as a supposed global and trans-historical concept. To beat these underlying 
hegemonic agendas it is essential to keep the concept’s European roots in mind 
(Comaroff and Comaroff 1997). Asad, quoting Morrison, makes clear that on a global 
scale the term always had dissimilar connotations and thus should not be treated as a tool 
of analysis; instead conversion should become the subject of analysis itself (Asad 1996: 
266). Asad attempted to overcome this situation by concentrating instead on narratives of 
conversion that would include the deeper meaning and apprehension of changing one’s 
personal religious affiliation: “in studying conversion, one […] [is] dealing with the 
narratives by which people apprehended and described a radical change in the 
significance of their lives. Sometimes these narratives employ the notion of divine 
intervention; at other times the notion of a secular teleology” (Asad 1996: 266). In studies 
concerned with conversion aspects, the supposed transformation of converts is seldom of 
major character, “often the change is less than a complete 180-degree transformation” 
(Rambo 2003: 214). Therefore, the idea of a thorough and complete convert as the 
product of a successful conversion is arbitrary. Instead, “a complete conversion is a goal 
to work toward, not a ‘finished’ product” (Rambo 2003: 214). Thus, conversion as a 
process can also be read like a passage – a position held by Austin-Broos:  
“Conversion as passage is also quest, a quest to be at home in a world experienced 
as turbulent or constraining or, in some particular way, as wanting in value. The 
passage of conversion is a passage to some place rather than no place. It is not a 
quest for utopia but rather for habitus. It involves a process of continual 
embedding in forms of social practice and belief, in ritual dispositions and 
somatic experience […]. Conversion involves an encultured being arriving at a 
particular place” (Austin-Broos 2003: 2).  
This position however, seems to conflict with Rambo’s picture of conversion as a never 
fulfilled goal, thereby denying the possibility of a true arrival wherever the passage may 
lead the converting person. Nevertheless, both positions underline the meaning of social 
action and positioning(s) along a given social structure for the conversion process. In 
order to grasp the process-like character of conversion, Farhadian and Rambo propose the 
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active term ”converting” as the “most appropriate term to signify that religious change is 
an ongoing complex process” (Rambo and Farhadian 1999: 23). For the authors, religious 
change can be grasped by a detailed cartography of the converting process, which they 
present in a seven-stages-model. A first step in this model includes the thorough 
consideration of the context in which converting takes place. Similar to Barth‘s above-
mentioned concept of ethnic boundaries, it is necessary to distinguish the converting 
context along macro, median and micro level. Further, Farhadian and Rambo talk about 
the converting individual’s crisis that functions as a catalyst for change. A possible 
response to the crisis stage is the “quest” stage, where people try to find personal 
orientation. These motivational structures can for example show the wish to obtain social 
rank (1999: 27). Further stages include the situation of encounter and then, on a more 
intensified stage, interaction – a stage in which rituals, relationships, rhetoric and roles 
can deepen the relation with the new religious community. A sixth stage concentrates on 
the level of commitment while converting and in the last stage the authors assess the 
consequences of converting. In this context, the connection between the process of 
converting and obtaining a new rank through it is deeply connected to the relation 
between converting and modernity. It is nothing new in anthropological literature that a 
conversion to a(nother) religion can be associated with a means of gaining access to 
modernity (cf. Horton 1975a, 1975b). Van der Veer provocatively has pushed this 
relation further with his suggestion that “conversion to forms of Christianity in the 
contemporary period is not only a conversion to modern forms of these religion but also 
to religious forms of modernity”.145 Thus, the wish to obtain a higher social position 
through conversion as Farhadian and Rambo have suggested, becomes even more 
appealing in the context of embracing religious forms of modernity through it. 
Conversion then, as mentioned above, “is not a quest for utopia but rather for habitus. It 
involves a process of continual embedding in forms of social practice and belief, in ritual 
dispositions and somatic experience” (Austin-Broos 2003: 2). Religious converting then, 
in general, cannot be detached from the social and cultural context within which a person 
decides to change his or her religious affiliation. Rappoport summarizes the conversion 
strategy for the South Sulawesi Toraja as follows:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145Quotation taken from the book cover of van der Veer (1996). 
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“Conversions to Christianity increased around the 1960s because of the fear of 
Muslim encroachment and also because the Indonesian government, installed in 
1949, officially imposed monotheism. After ten years of forced conversion in 
1969, traditional religion was at last recognized, but then only as a local variant of 
Hinduism - that is, an Indonesian Hinduism, which was officially construed as 
being monotheistic. By that time, most Toraja had already converted to some 
form of Christianity” (Rappoport 2004: 386) 
I therefore follow Buckser and Glazier in their more general description of conversion:  
“Conversion is usually an individual process, involving a change of worldview 
and affiliation by a single person, but it occurs within a context of institutional 
procedures and social relationships. Religious groups structure the ways in which 
adherents move in and move out, and in many cases they place converts in a 
unique social position. These processes articulate with other dynamics within 
groups – their internal divisions, their authority structures, their political rivalries, 
and more. In many cases, religious groups are also held accountable to the 
restrictions and requirements of state authorities” (Buckser and Glazier 2003: xi).  
The authors’ approach, I believe, serves the peculiarity and specific characteristics that 
we find in Taronggo. It becomes clear that conversion functions as a marker of social 
structure and agency. This relation becomes especially meaningful for the context of non-
converted Wana who are excluded from the “domain of modernity” simply through the 
fact that they do not bear a religion and are (thus) perceived as “primitives”. Religious 
conversion thus symbolizes for Wana a chance to overcome this status and to become a 
“modern citizen”. Further, as I have shown above, social boundaries within the multi-
faith community of Taronggo receive meaning mainly through confessional differences 
and the symbolic power that comes with it. David Gellner points to the importance of 
boundaries for the discussion of religious conversion – certainly translatable also to the 
Wana context and the importance of socio-religious borders for them: “religious change is 
only labeled ‘conversion’ if it occurs across a boundary. Thus, as boundaries have 
become sharper between ‘religions,’ so the issue of conversion has grown in political 
significance” (Gellner 2005: 755; see also Pelkmans 2009: 11). Religious conversion 
then, is also about the character of religious communities and significantly about the 
constitution and the negotiation of their boundaries (Buckser 2003: 69).  
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4.5.2 Further Reasons for Converting among Upland and 
Lowland Wana 
“Conversion highlights the interaction, and in many cases the tension between individual 
consciousness and the structural requirements of community life.”  
(Buckserand Glazier 2003: xii) 
  
At first I believed that the main reason in Taronggo to convert would be marriage just as 
Ensi and Indo Mika who both converted to Christianity for marriage reasons. The often 
mentioned “reordering of one’s world picture, in which novel representations [or beliefs 
or propositions] are imported into the mind” (Swift 2012: 272–73) was not visible in my 
interviews and day-to-day talks. Instead, my interlocutors described converting as a rather 
socio-political process instead of a definite change in belief. Reasons for converting were 
rich – on an imaginative level. Apa Ensi, who never converted, utterly understood the 
social value of becoming part of the government’s acknowledged religious community. 
Why then, he asked me, can he not believe in other religious regimes? Apa Ensi tried to 
be open towards other belief systems. He knows, he stated, that converting would make 
life a lot easier for him and his family – just in the sense Farhadian and Rambo have 
suggested (see above). Through the process of converting he could get a better job, would 
be socially more accepted in the lowland region and he could further participate in the 
social world outside of Taronggo. But he saw no intellectual or epistemic reason to 
change his faith – although he tried hard to understand the concept of Christianity in order 
to elaborate whether a conversion would make sense to him. In the following I will 
present a short episode that happened between Apa Ensi and myself that illustrates his 
doubts towards converting.  
Apa Ensi and I are having one of our intense, open interviews. We sit on the floor 
of his house, drinking our third cup of sweet coffee. His family sleeps around us; 
we can hear their regular breathing through the numerous mosquito nets hanging 
in the large room. “Indo Yohan”,146 he re-enters our talk after a long break of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 People in the research location usually would call me by my local nickname, Indo Yohan, meaning 
mother of Yohan. Yohan was a rooster that I received as a present from Apa Ingus, a shaman from 
Kayupoli and people made a joke out of it calling me “mother of Yohan”, Indo Yohan, since I had no 
children of my own and further kept Yohan as a pet instead of eating him. This appellation however made 
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pondering silence, “may I ask you a question?” “Of course”, I answer 
enthusiastically, always glad to be able to give back at least something to my 
interlocutors. “What is it, Apa?”, I ask, using the polite and kinship-oriented form 
of address Apa, meaning father. He lights a new cigarette with his old one and 
nervously he lowers his voice, turns closer to me. His old eyes wander around the 
house, checking the other household-members’ state of sleep. Then, finally, he 
seems to be at ease; “Indo Yohan”, he opens again, this time in a conspiratorial 
manner, “have you ever seen God?” I am startled by this question. I try to think of 
the right answer, keeping in mind that to this point he had not settled out for sure 
that my Christianity is not a threat to his faith (the interview happened during my 
third month in the field). “No”, I answer, “I have never seen God”. He takes his 
time to think about my answer: “This means the situation is actually similar to 
ours, there is only the name. But He cannot be seen. But”, he insists, “Why can 
those people take a picture of Him?” I am startled again and it takes me a while to 
understand what he means; he helps me and points to a picture of Jesus he was 
shown by some Christians in Taronggo. I feel challenged and try my best to 
explain the situation of making drawings of Jesus as something different to having 
seen God. Then, he replies. “Hmm, indeed. I knew somehow it is like that. Those 
people have stories like this one, that they have met God, so that people like me 
who do not have a religion yet follow them”. Later he adds: “For us Wana, we 
cannot see God, we only talk about him. There are shadows and there is wind; it is 
the same with the wind; he shakes the leaves on the trees and you can see that. 
But you cannot see the wind.” 
This episode illustrates that in Taronggo converting to other religious confessions seldom 
happens due to faith in the first place. Agreeing with the theoretical positions I have 
presented above, I do not wish to elaborate on the “degree of belief” of individual 
converts. But interestingly, in Taronggo, most converts never talked about their faith in 
the new religion. Instead, more present was the feeling that new and old belief all rested 
on the same root, in other words the same God. Through this ontological equation Wana 
converts and non-converts were legitimizing the old as well as the new belief. As I have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
it easier for my interlocutors to refer to me with the more polite version as “mother of” than by my actual 
name. 
Chapter IV. Socio-Religious Dimension: Wana in Interreligious Dynamics   
201 
	  
shown in 4.2.2 most Wana emphasize the equivalence of their God, Pue, with Christian 
and Muslim God – mainly during discussions with Christian and Muslim neighbors or 
visitors. Thus, only very few of my informants stated a complete change in faith in an 
absolute and exclusive manner.  
The main reason for converting instead was, in the first place, interreligious marriage and 
concurrently social pressure by the relatives and church community of the partner. 
Although improved social value or status was often (but not always) a direct consequence 
of conversion, it never served as a sole motivational factor for it. Another reason for 
converting can be found in economic or material motives. In a Southeast Asian colonial 
context Winzeler talks about so called “rice (bowl) Christians”, people who converted 
simply to gain access to food and associated economic goods, “to take advantages of 
resources or services provided by missionaries in order to escape poverty or to achieve 
upward mobility through education” (Winzeler 2009: 49).147 I agree with Winzeler that 
the term itself should not be limited to Christianity alone; “rice Muslims” are an 
imaginable category as well or simply rice converts. Although the term itself remains 
questionable, indeed economic factors sometimes encourage people to convert. Winzeler 
also points to education or protection as a conversion motivator in another regional 
context: “becoming a Muslim in Malaysia or Borneo or Brunei is interpreted as a strategy 
for obtaining development assistance for a village or for improving an individual’s 
prospects for getting a desirable government job” (Winzeler 2011: 208). Among the Akha 
in Burma and Thailand, Kammerer points to the fact that Akha converted less for food but 
rather for opium; because Christianity entails an opium-free environment many Akha 
converted to break out of their own opium addiction (Kammerer 1990: 287).  
A comparable economic reason for converting became visible in the village section of 
Taronggo called Rio Tinto. This area was erected as a resettlement side after a major 
landslide in July 2007. Heavy rainfall had led to disastrous flooding of the entire region 
and a number of Wana were killed during landslides in the area of Posangke. As a rescue 
initiative, 58 houses were built for Wana families coming from Ratobae and the Posangke 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147 Winzeler explains further: “Literally this term refers to persons who are poor and hungry and therefore 
convert in order to obtain food. Both Western missionaries and critics or opponents of Christianity have 
used this term as a derogatory label for what is deemed to be inauthentic or non-spiritually based 
conversion. More broadly it has been applied to people who convert in order to gain material benefit or to 
improve their life chances. Rice Christians in the most literal sense are associated with India and China 
more than Southeast Asia, which lacks a comparable history of famine and starvation” (Winzeler 2009: 
49). 
Chapter IV. Socio-Religious Dimension: Wana in Interreligious Dynamics   
202 
	  
mountains; these families were supposed to live there permanently, as the former village 
head stated. The money had come from the international mining company Rio Tinto (see 
Chapter 5). Soon, a Christian group called Yayasan Alesintowe with organizational roots 
in Surabaya settled in Rio Tinto.148 They built a pre-school (taman kanak-kanak, BI) 
called TK) for Wana children from the upland and further offered them a place to live in 
case their families wanted them to go to school if they wished to return to the mountains. 
The presence of Alesintowe was at least one reason for numerous Wana families to leave 
the village for their home in the mountains.149 The group is deeply connected to the 
Pentecostal church in Taronggo and has an implicit and explicit proselytizing mandate – 
although when I asked them directly whether they would call themselves “missionaries” 
most members in Rio Tinto refused this assumption. In an interview with a member of 
Alesintowe in 2011, I was told that the group had settled among the Wana due to a 
spiritual dream involving Jesus that the wife of the founder of the group had. Jesus, he 
claimed, had told his wife to build a school in Uempanapa for the “lost souls of the Wana 
tribe”. It was their goal to bring Christianity to the poor and primitive, the source 
stated.150 Alesintowe has so far opened more than six so called orphanages, panti asuhan 
(BI), in the region, in the villages of Uempanapa, Lemowalia, Lambentana and Rio Tinto, 
among others. The term panti asuhan, orphanage, itself reveals some irony. Members of 
Alesintowe call those Wana children they teach “orphans” although most of them still 
have parents who live in the mountainous regions. My source stated that more than 50 
Wana children go to school and at least 20 Wana children stay permanently in the panti 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148 Some interlocutors stated Alesintowe simply belongs to the Pentecoastal church; others claimed it had 
roots with the Salvation Army, while other called it Aliran Kharismatik. To receive more information 
about the organization remains difficult; however, they have their own Facebook-Account (https: 
//www.facebook.com/yayasan.a.indonesia.3?ref=br_rs).  
149 Another important reason was also the lack of farmland; even though the aid project provided houses for 
Wana families, no additional land was offered to the former independent subsistence peasants from the 
mountains. As a consequence many returned to their upland homes where they had plenty of land and 
gardens to make a living (see also Chapter 5).  
150 A member of the Yayasan Alesintowe who came from Java to Rio Tinto in 2010 proudly told me that 
she was one of the few who were brave enough for hiking up the mountains in order to reach the scattered 
upland Wana villages. She told me in detail and under a lot of laughter how she and her guide arrived at a 
river and saw a naked Wana man running away, according to her, he was deeply shocked to see a non 
Wana-face; luckily, as she tells me, she still managed to take a picture of the naked bathing man with her 
mobile phone that she showed me with a trophy-like-gesture. For her, this event and the picture she 
managed to take are proof of her legitimate presence in Rio Tinto and her need to teach them the way of 
God and good Christianity according to their own principles. Images of the “primitive” like these serve 
the goals of missionary groups that settle around Wana areas.  
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asuhan in Uempanapa, a settlement north-east of Taronggo, the central and first of the 
Yayasan’s stations, built in 1994.  
In Rio Tinto, the school has “less success”, around 20 Wana children live more or less 
permanently there. Only a handful of Wana families have decided to stay in this desolate 
section of Taronggo, living door to door with Alesintowe people. Members of Alesintowe 
have developed a number of strategies to encourage their neighbors to follow the 
Christian path. Wana families are invited for dinner or lunch if they go to church service. 
Some of them do get small jobs with Alesintowe. Although most Wana living in Rio 
Tinto do attend church service on a regular basis, have quit smoking in public 
(Alesintowe prohibits this habit) and send their children to the TK, only very few have 
gone so far to convert to Christianity. The reasons to convert here are mainly economic 
reasons. When the government provided the settlement in Rio Tinto for landslide 
refugees, Wana did get houses though, but no further land. Consequently, they had no 
opportunity to make their own living from agriculture. Economic dependency therefore is 
one motivational factor for conversion, but mainly for Wana living in Rio Tinto where 
Alesintowe’s presence is at its strongest. Although Alesintowe follows a strong 
missionary goal, immediate, direct pressure to convert was denied by my interviewees. 
However, during my third field stay in 2012, Indo As an old woman with severe 
bronchial health problems who suffered from extensive coughing told me in private, 
Alesintowe members offered her medicine if she would attend church service. Once she 
refused, she was told by Alesintowe she would die soon because she needed the medicine 
immediately. The Christian group would not help without a religious commitment from 
Indo As. Unfortunately this account is just one example of Alesintowe business in Rio 
Tinto. Nevertheless, these actions almost never lead to success in converting goals. If the 
same can be said, however, for Alesintowe’s influence on those Wana children who live 
with Alesintowe remains unclear to this day because those I met were too little to have 
already made a decision in conversion. Nevertheless, most Wana in Rio Tinto who do 
attend Alesintowe church and bible sessions mainly do so to receive food, medicine and 
other material help.  
Economic reasons and social status can be a reason for converting but is usually the 
exception. Apa Ensi, whom I cited in the beginning of this subchapter, clearly states, that 
he would gain a higher social status if he would convert to Christianity or Islam. His 
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brother, Apa Ele, who became a Christian also became the kepala desa – a position he 
would have never obtained without adherence to a world religion. Further, as this chapter 
shows, social power and the structure of social hierarchy within the community posit non-
converted Wana in the realm of the disadvantaged.  
Another reason for converting can be found within the spiritual sphere and is connected to 
the aforementioned “reordering of one’s world picture” (Swift 2012: 272-3) that is, as I 
already mentioned, less common in Taronggo and its surroundings. I was however able to 
observe this different stage of converting among Wana from Kayupoli, a region within 
the nature reserve. People here have closer contact to Wana who have converted due to 
their contact to the missionaries from the New Tribes Mission, a US-based evangelical 
Christian mission, founded in 1944 by American missionary Paul Fleming.151 The New 
Tribes Mission outreach area is in fact far away from Taronggo and Kayupoli as it is 
settled in the area of Ulu Bongka in the North. However, mobility is an important aspect 
for Wana people and visits to other settlements are a frequent habit. One of my 
informants in Salisarao had lived among the New Tribes Mission in the Bongka region 
but came home without having converted; his wife however had chosen the Christian path 
so that both decided for divorce. In Kayupoli I heard about Doni, a Wana man in his mid-
thirties who also lived for a couple of years with the New Tribes Mission. Doni’s father-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151 The group’s doctrine can be found in Duncan’s PhD Thesis (1998). Because it is not published, I will 
recite them once again, although in a newer version accessible on the New Tribes Mission website: 
 “Statement of Faith 
We believe:  
 1. In the word-by-word inspiration, sufficiency and final authority of the Holy Scriptures. 2. In one God, 
eternally existing in three persons: Father, Son and Holy Spirit. 3. In the Lord Jesus Christ as true God 
and true man; His virgin birth, sinless humanity, vicarious death, bodily resurrection, present advocacy, 
and His personal, imminent, bodily return for His church. 4. In the fall of man, resulting in his complete 
and universal separation from God and his need of salvation. 5. That the Lord Jesus Christ shed His blood 
and died as a sacrifice for the sins of the whole world. 6. That salvation is a free and everlasting gift of 
God, entirely apart from works, received by personal faith in the Lord Jesus Christ. 7. That the Holy Spirit 
regenerates with divine life and personally indwells the believer upon his faith in Christ for salvation. 8. 
In the bodily resurrection of both the saved and the unsaved. 9. In the unending life of the saved with the 
Lord and the unending punishment of the unsaved. We hold and teach the following positions: 10. The 
pretribulational, premillennial return of Christ for the church. 11. The historical-grammatical 
interpretation of the Bible. 12. A soul once saved can never be lost. 13. We practice believer’s baptism by 
immersion. 14. We do not practice what are commonly known as the ‘sign gifts’. 
 We value:  
 1. The Word of God as our final authority 2. A Spirit-controlled life 3. Dependence on God 4. The role 
and responsibility of the local church in the Great Commission 5. Readiness to sacrifice for Christ and His 
church 6. Godly relationships and interdependence in ministry 7. The potential of all believers to be used 
by God in the Great Commission 8. Excellence and urgency in all we do to finish the task.” 
 Accessed 13th December 2015. http: //usa.ntm.org/what-we-believe.  
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in-law has been a minister for almost ten years now. Doni converted and became what 
people in Taronggo call a fundamental Christian. On his occasional visits to Kayupoli, a 
settlement within the nature reserve, where his family lives, he aggressively tried to 
persuade his fellow people to come with him and follow the word of God. He left a bible 
translated to Wana language in the house of Indo Pino, a female shaman. With the only 
book in the house, Indo Pino’s son, Pino, a father of three children regularly reads the 
bible – a point of worry for his neighbors.152 Whether or not Indo Pino’s family has yet 
converted is a point of nightlong discussions and often dispute among the people in 
Kayupoli but also in Taronggo and its surroundings. Today, Doni, the New Tribes 
Mission convert, is not very welcome in Wana homes due to his aggressive behavior and 
fundamentalism. However, Indo Pino’s brother, Apa nTunggi, has followed Doni and 
converted. Apa nTunggi was a very powerful shaman who is said to have possessed the 
ability to fly before he became a Christian. Especially among other taw walia his 
conversion was discussed with astonishment and sometimes anger. What struck me most 
concerning Doni (who I personally never met) and Apa nTunggi is their change in their 
belief. The documentary “Gods and Satans” by Journet and Nougarol brilliantly shows 
the problematic of Doni’s conversion and how his relatives interpret the missionaries 
efforts (2005). In an interview for the documentary, Doni states: “Over there they made 
us understand that we were living in sin. And that the people thought it was true that they 
were sinners. […] Now they believe in God; no more in the Waliya-spirits. […]The 
Waliya magic comes from Satan too. Everything that comes from Satan is bad. There is 
nothing good” (Journet and Nougarol 2005).153 For Doni, Wana religion became evil in 
the means of the “reordering of one’s world picture”. On the contrary, although converts 
in Taronggo visit the local church or mosque – some on a regular basis, some not – their 
conversion almost always includes an open mind for Wana belief, a fluid world picture 
that consists of elements of both religions, leaving it up to the individual to make sense of 
it all. Converts from the New Tribes Mission and related missionary efforts have in some 
sense left their former belief behind. Motivation factors for converting are controlled by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152The translation of the bible into the local language is a primary method of the New Tribes missionaries. 
The NTM website reveals a new form of bringing the bible in local language towards those Wana who are 
not able to read the book themselves – though audio bibles: “The Wana New Testament has been recorded 
by Faith Cometh By Hearing, and soon the machines with the recording will be in the hands of the Wana 
believers. ‘Older people who never learned to read or whose eyesight is failing will still have access to 
hear the Word in their language,’ wrote Steve and Linda Rosengren. Pray that the machines arrive soon 
and are a great blessing to the Wana people.” (https: //usa.ntm.org/wana-people-group). 
153 Translation taken from the documentary’s subtitles.  
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the New Tribes Mission who seem to have a much more powerful structure than it is the 
case for Alesintowe efforts in Taronggo.  
4.5.3 Resisting Religious Conversion 
The motives and politics of converting are important frameworks for grasping the realm 
of marginality relevant for Wana. However, as was pointed out in the foregoing chapter, a 
much more common scheme among Wana is the practice of resisting religious 
conversion. Winzeler puts forward the view that in Southeast Asia: “pressures on the 
indigenous ethnic minorities to convert to a world religion will probably continue to 
increase […]. The real question in most places will be which world religion to embrace 
rather than whether to do so at all” (Winzeler 2009: 59). Resistance to converting, as 
earlier discussed examples made clear, thus is a similar important topic as is the 
converting process itself. However, resistance to conversion seldom is a topic in 
conversion studies. Duncan is one example, describing religious change among the Forest 
Tobelo.154 However, although the Tobelo have successfully resisted missionary strategies 
until recently, they finally converted to Christianity in the 1980s. Referring to Heirich 
(1977), Duncan points in this context to the analytical significance of studying resistance 
to conversion as well as the conversion process as well:  
“Just as there were those who embraced this new religion, there were others who 
did not. These individuals were subject to the same influences and conditions as 
those who did convert and thus their refusals can shed as much light on 
conversion as the willingness of others to this new worldview” (Duncan 1998: 
151).  
If we go back to the theoretical ideas on the anthropology of conversion, converting was 
perceived as a passage or a “quest to be at home in a world experienced as turbulent or 
constraining or, in some particular way, as wanting in value. The passage of conversion is 
a passage to some place rather than no place” (Austin-Broos 2003: 2; see above). The 
main theoretical premise behind Duncan is, that non-converts however are subject to the 
same interreligious context in which individuals make their decision to take part in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 Connolly also speaks in detail about this aspect in her unpublished PhD thesis from 2003, focusing on 
Dayak Christian conversion . 
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religious conversions. Thus, non-converts experience the same influences and often 
pressure like converts. Therefore, I argue that non-conversion cannot be less a passage 
than its counterpart conversion. As I have made clear in the course of this chapter 
Christian and Muslim religious influence have left their mark on Wana concepts of their 
own belief system. Wana have eloquently come up with a construction of their belief that 
rests on some similarities with so-called world religions and thus made its position within 
the Indonesian nation state strong and firm – at least from Wana perspective. The 
rationalization of Wana belief thus is nothing less than a process as well, and therefore 
needs to be perceived as a passage in the sense that Wana have actively reformulated their 
belief. By this means, resistance to conversion usually is a rather passive process then. 
Sometimes, however, the pressure to convert becomes so great that resistance requires 
courage and nerves.  
I could record a single case in which an individual successfully resisted conversion within 
the context of interreligious marriage: Bodi is a young non-converted Wana man who 
married a Pentecostal Christian girl from Lemo. From the beginning of his courtship he 
assured his and her family that he had no intention to give up his faith, and that a 
conversion to Christianity would be no option for him. His own family was deeply 
worried for him since Bodi is the sole local example of resistance to conversion in case of 
interreligious marriage. They had no idea what would happen in such a case. Although 
the girl still wanted to marry him, the bride’s family was furious. Because their efforts to 
hinder their daughter to marry the heathen Wana man were to no avail and they did not 
manage to cancel the wedding, they refused to give any money at all for the ceremony. 
Still, Bodi found his own way and got the necessary money together. He could finally 
arrange a huge wedding celebration, which is rather atypical for usual Wana wedding 
rituals. Although Bodi and his wife got married according to Wana adat, the festivities 
afterwards were carried out in the manner of Christian and Muslim weddings. The bride’s 
family was until today highly critical about their daughter’s choice and her husband’s 
lack of religion. Bodi is a sole example but the exceptionality of his case makes the 
pressure to religious conversion in case of a marriage for Wana living in Taronggo very 
clear. 
Resistance to conversion is for many of my interlocutors nested in cosmological 
constructions that portray millenial raisons among Wana adherers. Those who resist the 
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conversion imperative have found contrary strategies to deal with conversion pressure, 
“some […] claim salvation lies in keeping alive the Wana religion, a system formulated 
out of traditional cultural practices through contrasts drawn to what Moslems and 
Christians do” (Atkinson 1979: 33). As I have shown in Chapter 3, Wana believe in a 
future Golden Era. Based on powerful cosmological narratives non-converted Wana 
believe that one day, their powerful allies, the taw baraka, will return to pusen tana, the 
Wana homeland, and introduce a new Golden Era for them. In the meantime, it is 
essential for Wana not to break out of their current state of misery as the following 
tendebomba by Indo De’u underlines:  
  
  
  
  
 
 
In this tendebomba, Indo De’u portrays her ongoing resistance to religious conversion. 
She describes her belief as a gorgeous rooster that she needs to take care of; she shall not 
let loose of him because the eagle might get hold of him and eventually kill him. In her 
interpretation the eagle symbolizes Christian religion and its adherers, who try to 
convince her to renounce her own belief, the rooster, for the sake of religious conversion. 
Resistance to conversion for Indo De’u is a necessary objective: her own belief is 
portrayed as a precious good, that she worries about and thus reflects the danger of losing 
it once and for all. For Indo De’u as well as other non-converted Wana the cosmological 
dimension of Wana marginality plays the most central role in resisting converting: Only 
those Wana who remain in the current powerless state of pity and have not converted to 
another religion will be rewarded by the returning taw baraka (see Chapter 3). 
Manuku laki wu’alo 
La’u ku taka taka mo 
 
Taa longko nakayako 
Meka nya tonjou rao 
My beautiful flecked rooster, 
I keep him safe, so he cannot go 
far, 
because the eagle is out there in 
the sky and I am scared for him. 
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4.5.4 Reconversion to Wana Religion 
An important aspect of resisting religious conversion can be found in the more drastic act 
of reconversion – the return to Wana religion of a previously converted individual. 
Reconversion by this means is a term that circumscribes the process of turning away from 
a religion one has converted to, accompanied by a reorientation to a previous religious 
affiliation.  
In the 1970s religious affiliation with either Christianity or Islam for Wana people were 
rather labels instead of an aforementioned reordering of one’s world picture. Pressure 
from outsiders was the main reason to convert, often the fear of governmental actions 
acted as the conversion motor. However, converting at that time was a fluid process of 
minor significance. Changing one’s affiliation was an easy thing to do and people 
converted and reconverted easily: “A common picture is to convert when afraid, then 
revert to traditional ways when the threat of persecution recedes a little” (Atkinson 1988: 
46). However, this “fluidity of religious affiliation”, to speak with Atkinson’s words, was 
not visible to me in Taronggo. Converting in Taronggo still happens to be an often 
utilitarian motivated act, just as it was in the 1970s (Atkinson 1988: 45-46). But people 
take it per contra as a serious matter. My interlocutors stated that, inter alia, one reason 
not to convert was grasped by the fact that they do not entirely comprehend the other 
religion and its framework. As a matter of fact, a Wana convert, who had to follow a 
world religion due to social pressure or other reasons stated above, is socially obliged to 
give up his old belief and to “convert completely”. Here I turn back to Ensi, the Wana 
husband who converted for his wife to Christianity (see above).  
Ensi entered Christianity but was by no means fully enthusiastic about it. He never felt 
accepted in the Christian community and could not understand how Christians in the 
church would insist on moral rules they later would definitely break. After a couple of 
years he left to Kayupoli for work, the Wana settlement within the nature reserve, far 
away from churches and priests. There he met Fe’i, a young Wana girl he fell in love 
with. He and Indo Reza, his Christian wife, separated and divorced soon after.155 Ensi and 
Fe’i married according to Wana adat and Ensi never went to church again. He told me 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155 Indo Reza never left Taronggo, where she made a living from the land Ensi was obliged to grant her. She 
married again, a Christian man from the Toraja area. 
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although he was interested in Christian teachings, he had never liked attending church 
service; understanding Christian obligations and liturgy was difficult for him. 
Nevertheless he insisted that Wana people cannot convert merely superficially. I had told 
him about other Indonesian ethnic groups who declared themselves as Hindu or so-called 
Kristen KTP (BI) or Muslim – people who are adherers of world religion only on their 
identity card, while in fact they follow their own indigenous belief – in order to practice 
their own belief untroubled and in private, for example some Dayak groups in Kalimantan 
practicing Kaharingan, but are listed on their KTP as Hindu. Those “alibi-conversions” 
however remain an unfamiliar habit in Taronggo. On behalf of my accounts on this topic, 
people reacted often with unwilling disapproval. An incomplete conversion was regarded 
highly precarious for my Wana interlocutors. Ensi explained:  
“Maybe this is why I got sick. Many friends tell me I got sick because I do not go 
to church any longer. That is the way it is for us Wana people. If you decide to 
follow (masuk) a religion and then you do not go to church you’ll get a problem, 
for example, you getting sick. Well, that’s not because it is a sin. Rather, for us 
Wana, if we enter religion, then we have to enter completely and we need to know 
how this religion functions. But me, I do not know how this religion works, I do 
not go to church any longer and that’s probably why I am not feeling healthy. If 
you follow a religion just a bit, just a little, that’s not possible, you have to go 
home [to your former belief]. They [Wana people] say, I am using this [new] 
religion wrongly because I do not truly follow it.”  
In the beginning, Ensi tried his best to understand Christian doctrine. He was baptized 
without understanding anything about the process or the content of his new confession. 
This situation he describes as highly problematic, since he had no clue how to behave in 
church, did not know any songs to sing or how to read the bible. He felt very lost, he told 
me. He intensely tried to learn all about Christianity but more and more he started to lose 
interest in church. Based on a belief in One God he does not see a fundamental difference 
between Wana Pue and Christian God. The faith, he states, is the same but Christians 
need a church to pray and Wana do not; everywhere they can communicate with God. For 
Ensi it was mainly the contradiction between imparted teachings and lived praxis of the 
church community that disturbed him. Here is one example he gave me:  
Chapter IV. Socio-Religious Dimension: Wana in Interreligious Dynamics   
211 
	  
“But the way our pastor talks, I don’t like that. She speaks a lot about people who 
make problems, gossip she talks, like, that man over there is supposed to have 
taken this and that, stolen and stuff like that. I am not happy about that. I rather 
prefer not to talk about our community members; instead I would like our pastor 
to talk about the bible, what is written in it. Because that is where we get the true 
claim from God. In Wana teachings for example when we do nia (a ritual 
involving a vow to Pue) there is no one talking like, oh that friend over here and 
there has did this or that, there is no gossip from the past, we truly just talk with 
God, we ask how we can heal the patient, ask for help, there is nothing else. But 
there (in the church) of course is more (talk), about whatsoever. A long time I 
followed the Christian path but now no longer.”  
Contradictions like these often serve Wana as factors of differentiation. Wana 
interlocutors stated how paradox they perceived of Christian rules. They know about the 
Ten Commandments but the point of consternation lies for some of them in the Christian 
necessity to insist so strongly on these rules, teaching them, praying them, using them as a 
difference to “primitive” Wana people while at the same time breaking them constantly. 
For Ensi, this was one cause of his disillusionment of Christianity – and finally lead to his 
reconversion. Moral criticism is only one reason for reconversion I found in Taronggo. 
Another is the loss of social membership. Indo Alvi, a Wana woman from Taronggo, 
married a Muslim teacher in her early twenties. She converted for him to Islam, but he 
died early in a tragic accident and she was left alone with their three children. After his 
death she received minimal support from her husband’s family and the small Muslim 
community of Taronggo. Indo Alvi had to work hard to make a living on her own and 
experienced great support from her non-converted Wana family and friends. She saw no 
reason to follow the Muslim way any longer and finally reconverted to her initial belief.  
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The Ritual of De-Conversion: Magule Manu 
The act of reconversion from Christianity or Islam to agama Wana is a process that 
involves a specific ritual.156 This ritual’s goal is not the act of conversion to Wana 
religion but instead aims to re-affiliate from other religious confession. It is therefore a 
de-conversion rather than conversion ritual. One converted Christian Wana woman, Indo 
Besi, told me in an interview she would feel sick since she did not follow Christianity the 
way she was supposed to. Her only solution lay in the hope of the de-conversion ritual 
that would lead her back to agama Wana and reestablish her health. Similar to Ensi’s 
situation mentioned above she feared for her wellbeing as a “dishonest” convert and were 
currently trying to prepare the ritual called magule manu. The de-conversion ritual, 
however is not easily accomplished simply because ritual experts are rare. Indo Besi 
explained that no Wana in the surroundings of Taronggo was able to perform the ritual. A 
couple of months later I finally met Apa nSa’er, a Wana senior living within the Cagar 
Alam. Other sources stated that Apa nSa’er was a ritual expert for de-conversion but he 
himself refused this status and instead referred to his wife as the actual expert. While I did 
not get a chance to meet his wife Apa nSa’er explained the ritual in detail to me, which is 
“actually not much to talk about, very easy and quick”, as he claimed.  
The decision to stage a de-conversion ritual does not include a big amount of preparation; 
Apa nSa’er claimed only two people would be necessary but usually the ritual included 
the closer family. The ritual does not incorporate a big party crowd, as it is the case for 
the momago for example; naturally people will not make invitations since the fear of 
Christian or Muslim appearance is common. As with most Wana rituals, magule manu 
includes the duku with the typical offerings such as betel and rice wine just as it is 
necessary for momago or other rituals (see Chapter 4). The central object of the ritual is a 
chicken to be offered by the person wishing to de-convert. The chicken’s color, sex or 
size is hereby of no specific importance. After sharing some betel and tobacco first, all 
family members and guests sit in a circle and touch the chicken wherever one can get 
hold of it. The de-converting person then takes the chicken’s throat and wrings its neck 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156 People never discuss the ritual in public or in presence of Christians or Muslims. It was only after a 
couple of months of fieldwork that people in Taronggo started to share their knowledge with me. As I 
have already shown, the politics of conversion and religious membership are subject to conflict in 
Taronggo leading to severe confidentiality among Wana people. In the mountain area people living in a 
fair distance to government or religious centers, my informants far more easily took me in on the details 
of de-conversion. For sake of confidentiality I will present here only some details of the ritual. 
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until its death. At the same time the ritual expert speaks the necessary words, according to 
him not difficult:157  
 
Aku si’i da magule manu 
Meluba muni ri wakaku 
 
Rata tempo nya nipantima (ambil) 
Aku taa di kay pelinjaku 
 
Taa mo daku podosa 
Taa mo daku pomonggoyo 
 
 
I will wring this chicken’s neck 
and go home to my own place 
 
Until the time has been taken  
nothing will hamper me 
 
I will not sin anymore 
I will not feel sick again 
To these introducing words the de-converting person and the ritual leader will add 
specific promises and talk about their experiences with the former religion. After the 
chicken is dead and enough talk has been made, the chicken will be cooked by the 
households’ women. The dosa, sin, made by the de-converter by his behavior towards his 
former confession, now has entered the chicken. Killing the chicken symbolizes killing 
the sin. The chicken later on is eaten and shared ritually by all people present. The name 
of the ritual expresses the action of wringing the neck, magule, of a chicken, manu. 
Atkinson already mentions this practice during her fieldwork as a ritual for de-converting 
from Islam – but Islam only:158 “since food is such an important issue to Muslims, diet is 
taken to be both the way in and the way out of Islam” (1983: 690). For her, wringing the 
chicken’s neck breaks with Muslim butchering practices and therefore symbolizes 
finishing one’s association with Islam. Magule manu therefore only counted for a Muslim 
de-conversion during Atkinson’s research, “Christianity, which lacks dietary laws, offers 
no such easy exit. Once one has converted to Christianity, simply resuming pagan ways is 
regarded as ritually dangerous and a source of illness” (Atkinson 1983: 690). During my 
own research none of my interlocutors claimed the ritual exclusively for a Muslim Wana 
de-conversion. It was always discussed instead as practicable for all religions. According 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157 Presented here in a reduced version. 
158 The ritual was called in the 1970s maluba – the meaning of the word remaining unclear for Atkinson. 
She suggests hesitantly a connection between the Indonesian word lupa, to forget (In Indonesian one 
speaks of forgetting one’s religion) (1983: 695).  
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to Apa nSa’er it would be of no concern which religion one would want to de-convert 
from. Further, food taboos exist also among Wana people as dogs and cats are excluded 
from Wana diet. Christians in Taronggo however regularly eat dogs and some also eat 
cats. The latter would be a sin towards Pue and especially Pue Lamoa, the Owner of the 
Thunder, who disapproves of torturing animals but especially from cat maltreatment, 
including washing or sprinkling them with water. Dogs are less sanctified but Wana will 
get skin diseases if they would include them in their diet, it is said – both, cats and dogs 
are also perceived as valuable pets, who defend either the home against intruders or the 
rice field against mice. I believe, Atkinson’s argument, eating and killing a chicken serves 
as a way out of Islam due to Islam specific slaughtering restrictions is therefore rather 
misleading. Instead, one might argue, it could serve as a way into Wana religion since 
chickens are the main meat provider for Wana people, at least nowadays. Furthermore, 
nowadays Muslim dietary restrictions do play a minor role in questions of conversion 
compared to Atkinson’s result. This is due to dietary differences between Christians and 
Wana, as discussed by the example of dog and cat meat. Second, the prohibition of pork 
also does not play a role as big as it did during Atkinson’s time of research; today, pigs 
are very rare due to deforestation, demographic change, road access and palm oil 
plantations in my research area.159 
While magule manu serves in the first sense the reconversion from a former religion, it 
can also function as a conversion ritual to Wana religion although I have met only one 
case. Zuma, a young Christian, who was neither ethnically nor religiously Wana had lived 
for years among Wana within the nature reserve. He was planning to marry a young 
Wana woman; since he was accustomed to Wana culture and society, he was planning to 
convert via magule manu to Wana religion. Zuma’s case shows that in absence of a 
traditional conversion ritual the de-conversion ritual can function as a conversion ritual as 
well. Zuma however was an exceptional case for questions regarding socio-religious 
frameworks among Wana people. 
The de-conversion ritual is practiced occasionally I was told, but exact data were hard to 
come by. The politically explosive nature of the ritual is very clear to most Wana due to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159 Only now and then Christian households in Taronggo eat pork. Only at one festivity I attended during 
my research stay, a Christian wedding, pork was served to the guests, eaten by Wana and Christian guests 
together. For the few Muslim guests and the vegetarian anthropologist a special meal was served in 
another room. 
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news from terrifying events caused by interreligious tension in other regions in Indonesia. 
The Christian-Muslim escalation of the Poso conflict in the early 2000s is still very 
present (see Chapter 1), also for Wana living in the mountainous area and is often 
employed in discussion about religious pluralism in Taronggo. Regarding the wish and 
need for interreligious “harmony”, the ritual is rarely known by Muslim or Christian 
neighbors. One informant told me, this was also the reason why no Wana living in the 
critical area of Taronggo ever learned the arrangement and words necessary for the ritual. 
Ritual experts usually are invited from settlements far away. They make sure to arrange 
the ritual outside of administrative village units to avoid unwanted witnesses.  
4.6 RESISTING RELIGION, RESISTING EDUCATION? 
One of the most important aspects of socio-religious marginality deeply affecting Wana 
people is its connection to knowledge and access to it. As I have shown in Chapter 3, 
Wana usually portray themselves as taw bea, dumb and unknowing people. This 
assumption is deeply entangled with and rooted within the cosmological framework of the 
taw baraka who left Wana behind without the attributes that demarcated the former 
Golden Era: power, wealth and knowledge. These attributes continue to play an important 
role in Wana culture today and knowledge has probably emerged as one of the most 
important markers of Wana marginality (see Chapter 3).  
In this context access to education and especially school education thus plays a special 
role for Wana. However, the entanglement between education and religion within the 
Indonesian nation-state has serious effects on people without an official recognized 
religion. School education always implies religious instruction that is part of the 
curriculum all over the country, dating back to the foundation of the Indonesian nation. 
With the implementation of the state’s Pancasila in 1945 and its inherent monotheistic 
principle, religious education became a matter of state concern. Development was to be 
pushed forward through the religious development of Indonesian citizens. Implemented 
through the National Education System Bill (SPN or Sisdiknas, Sistem Pendidikan 
Nasional) in 1950, still these educational guidelines were in fact reinstalled with the Bill’s 
Chapter IV. Socio-Religious Dimension: Wana in Interreligious Dynamics   
216 
	  
resubmission through the Education Law 20/2003 (Assyaukanie 2009: 119–20).160 Until 
1966, people could still choose between a religious course or other complementary non-
religious lessons like moral education (Bagir and Abdullah 2011: 62). A regulation of 
1960 permitted “students [to] have the right not to take a religion course, if they or their 
guardians (for younger children) state their objections” (quoted in Bagir and Abdullah 
2011: 71). 161 This clause however was cancelled in the decree of 1966162 – a change in 
policy that was caused by the political turmoil that shattered the Indonesian Nation 
between 1965-1966. With the September 30 movement in 1965, the Indonesian 
communist party was banned and under the new Suharto government a new explicit focus 
on religion in government policies was but one result, commenced by significant changes 
on religious issues (Bagir and Abdullah 2011: 71). Thus, for educational facilities and 
institutions all over the archipelago, obligatory religious teaching became part of the 
curriculum. Religious education in Indonesia is not subsumed under interreligious 
discursive praxis, but instead focuses on the “study of one’s own religion. It is a mono-
religious education – some would say instruction” (Bagir and Abdullah 2011: 62). 
Applied in schools, the students or pupils are separated in different classrooms during 
religious lessons, according to their religious affiliation (Bagir and Abdullah 2011: 62). 
While at universities, one semester is regarded as sufficient, for elementary and secondary 
schools, two lessons of religious teaching every semester are mandatory (Nala 2004). A 
recent plan from 2013 is to increase the amount of religious lessons from two to four. 
Religious education is perceived as a moral education that shapes an individual’s 
character. The secretary of the directorate general of Islamic education at the Ministry of 
Religious Affairs, Kamaruddin Amin, cited in a New York Times article, said that  
“religious values could prevent misbehavior. […] ‘Right now religion doesn’t 
contribute significantly to building character because the time allotted to religious 
education is very limited […]’. ‘Indonesians are religious people, they are very 
much attached to their religious teachings, their religious values […]That is why 
religion must be taught in school’” (Schonhardt 2013).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
160 Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia 20/2003 tentang Sistem Pendidikan Nasional. 
161 Ketetapan Majelis Perwaratan Rakyat Sementara Republik Indonesia II/1960 tentang Garis-Garis Besar 
Pola Pembangunan Nasional Semesta Berencana Tahapan Pertama 1961-1969,	  Bab II Pasal 3 (Decision 
of the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly of the Republic of Indonesia II/1960 on Outline of 
National Development for the Period 1961-1969). 
162 Ketetapan Majelis Permusywaratan Rakyat Sementara Republik Indonesia XXII/1966 tentang 
Kepartaian, Keormasan Dan Kekaryaantap (Decision of the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly 
of the Republic of Indonesia XXII/1966 on Political parties, Mass-Organisations and Functional Groups). 
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As I have pointed out in Chapter 2, religious freedom in Indonesia embraces world-
religions but neglects indigenous belief systems. Access to school education for Wana is 
thus difficult in a two-fold way.  
First, for upland Wana it is quite a problematic matter due to geographic reasons. Those 
Wana living in the mountains are too far away from the village infrastructure to be part of 
the state school system. Some send their children to live with relatives in the village of 
Taronggo. And few give their children to Alesintowe, which offers Wana parents the 
opportunity to take care of their child and give them a bed, food and a roof over their 
heads in Rio Tinto.  
Second, and most importantly, once Wana children attend the Taronggo village 
elementary school they are part of the abovementioned national policy that connects 
school education with religious instruction. Wana children attending the school are thus 
encouraged to follow religious education. The school in Taronggo is a private school 
(sekolah swasta, BI) and belongs to the Christian Church of Central Sulawesi, (GKST).163 
Thus the curriculum offers religious courses on Protestantism. Muslim pupils are allowed 
to leave the classroom during these lessons since the school cannot provide a Muslim 
teacher for the religious course. Although Wana children could not be legally forced to 
stay and learn during the Christian lessons, but due to social structures in Taronggo, 
Wana children usually follow the Christian curriculum. Against the background of socio-
religious power constellations and experiences of marginalization in Taronggo portrayed 
above, leaving the school building during these lessons thus is simply not an option for 
Wana children. Further, all children enrolled in a school need to be registered according 
to an officially recognized religion. In Taronggo, Wana children are thus all registered as 
Christians.164 In an group interview I took with Apa Nevi, a non-converted Wana, and Ibu 
Lita, a Christian woman, both living in Taronggo, I asked Apa Nevi who went to the 
village’s elementary school when he was little, whether he felt he became a Christian 
during his school education:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163 The national school system offers pupils a three-staged model, starting with a six-year lasting primary 
school, beginning for children at the age of 7. Afterwards, education continues in the junior secondary 
school lasting three years, with the opportunity of an additional three years of higher secondary education; 
the latter “paves the way for higher education, which is imparted through a variety of academies, 
polytechnics and universities” (Bedi and Garg 2000).  
164 No person I talked to had ever heard of someone earning a school degree without adhering to a world 
religion. I asked numerous schoolteachers and government officials about the legal situation for such a 
case but no one could give me a clear answer. It was just an unthinkable option. 
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 He answered: “No, no. I went to a Christian school, the teaching and learning 
was Christian. But I did not become a Christian.”  
Ibu Ibu Lita interrupts him: “He got Christian religion (dapat agama Kristen, BI). 
All Wana people get Christian religion once they go to school, because the school 
is a Christian school.”  
Although Apa Nevi nevertheless resisted religious converting and did not become a 
Christian, Ibu Lita describes what many Wana fear for their children or what the kids 
themselves do not aspire. Another Christian interlocutor explains:  
“Once we want to go to school we need to have religion. Here, not everyone has 
religion, but if we want school we need to follow religion. But it is not allowed to 
urge someone; we only talk about God. When they start to believe and follow us, 
that is not a problem, we only cannot force them.”  
Once the children have passed the local elementary school, Christian or Muslim children 
usually leave Taronggo for further school education in towns like Kolonodale or 
Betheleme, the Christian stronghold of Morowali. Some Wana children do so as well. In 
most cases the local teacher, as he told me, organizes home stays for Wana children 
among his own relatives or friends who are in need of a housekeeper. Wana kids by the 
age of around 13 then make a living among these new, usually Christian, families by 
babysitting, cleaning, washing, cooking and so on; others are working in the family 
business. They attend school but time for homework is often rare and I have heard one 
story of abuse and distress. Usually the hosting family expects the child to attend 
religious service as well; keeping an orang (yang) belum beragama under one’s roof is 
often regarded as a threat. All those school children I have met or heard of, soon 
converted to the guest family’s religion. Apa Ele, a Christian from Taronggo shares his 
thoughts on the topic. I asked him, why these children often convert once they have left 
Taronggo;  
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Apa Ele: “They do so because they feel intimidated (malu, BI). Because there, the 
people every Sunday go to church service, or to the mosque every Friday. They 
start asking, hey, maybe you want to follow to the mosque? Or maybe to church? 
Ha, staying alone then by yourself you feel ashamed, right?” 
Me: “Hmmm” 
Apa Ele: “This is true, that is why we [they] must have a religion. They follow 
anyway. And when they come home, they no longer do so (begitu pulang ke mari 
tidakmi, BI).”  
Sia, a 15 year old Wana school girl who goes to school in Betheleme, told me on one 
occasional visit to Taronggo that, “of course people expect you to convert”. Life in the 
new environment is hard, she says, and going to school without a religion is even harder. 
Converting was the only way of becoming socially accepted and she is very happy to 
follow now the Christian way, she said.  
It becomes clear that the correlation between conversion and education is clearly nested 
within the framework of state ideals and societal pressure. Therefore, some Wana families 
in Taronggo refuse to send their children to school and consequently cause offence and 
even anger among Christian and Muslim villagers who interpret this behavior as a lack of 
responsibility and inadequate parenthood.165 A similar approach accounts for Alesintowe 
in Rio Tinto; as I have pointed out above, the great majority of Wana oppose their offer to 
host Wana children from upland because of the proselytizing objectives of Alesintowe. 
Only a few Wana parents want their children to be raised in a missionary environment.  
The equation of resisting religion and resisting education however is too simple. The wish 
for school education is a huge topic in Wana discussions as the next chapter will reveal in 
detail. Education is perceived as a moment of power and agency, an opportunity to 
oppose marginalization at the local and national level. The intertwining of religious 
conversion and education however puts Wana in a paradox dilemma that is difficult to 
escape. Apa Ensi for example, wished that his children would advance their education by 
attending a secondary school:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165 I will come back to this issue in Chapter 5 in regard to a religious-free school in Salisarao. 
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“I tell my children, go to school, get smart, so that you can counter the 
government (people) when they are lying to you. […] Two of my children went to 
the sixth grade of SMP (Sekolah Menengah Pertama, Middle School). But then 
they were to become Christian; they experienced a lot of pressure to convert. Ha, 
but they did not want to; they ran home. I told them it doesn’t matter, go, become 
Christians, get baptized, so that you will get smart first. If you come back here 
then, we have medicine here (obat, BI; he means the ritual of de-conversion) to 
finish with that. But important is that you get smart and don’t stay stupid (bodoh, 
BI) like us old people. Ah, but they don’t want to hear; they don’t want to become 
Christians. So they come back, are still stupid and get lied to by the government. 
But I can understand them. If only there wasn’t the problem of religion...“ 
The problem of religion thus hinders Wana to gain access to knowledge that could 
potentially help them to better their marginalized standing. In 2012, Wana gained a new 
solution for this problem when they opened a school especially aimed at Wana desire and 
free of religious content that I will describe in detail in the upcoming chapter. However, 
religious conversion that is, in local practice, entailed to school education thus portrays a 
central obstacle for Wana people. It becomes clear, that the connection between school 
and religion I have outlined here, forces Wana to pay the highest price for education – a 
price most Wana do not wish to pay.  
4.7 INTERIM CONCLUSION  
In its social construction, Wana marginality is deeply entangled with questions of religion 
and interreligious relations as this chapter has shown. Against the background of the 
Indonesian state, national discourse has added significant influence towards the local 
level to marginalize people with a minority religion as the Wana do – also in historical 
perspective. Wana, perceived of as the “anti-thesis of national goals” (Atkinson 1983) and 
“primitives awaiting conversion” (Aragon 2000: 33) have found their own answer to 
social and national pressure. The rationalization of their belief has provided non-
converted Wana with a tool to counter missionary demands and communal expectations 
of religious conversion. Nevertheless, the difference between Wana living upland and 
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lowland becomes meaningful in questions of an interreligious living situation. Those 
Wana living in Taronggo next door to Christian and Muslim neighbors face a 
stigmatization that is based on their lack of officially recognized religion. Social power in 
Taronggo lies mainly with those who go to church or mosque. Socio-religious boundaries 
and power relations thus become palpable for example along marriages that remain 
practically illegal between non-converted Wana or, in an interfaith marriage, imply a 
religious conversion by the Wana party. In this case refusal is an act almost impossible 
although I could present one counter-example. The conversion of a Christian or a Muslim 
towards Wana belief is simply, albeit the sole example cited above, unthinkable.  
Another aspect relevant to religious marginality is access to education. In Taronggo Wana 
children can attend the elementary school, but many parents are highly reluctant since 
school attendance means first that Wana children have to attend Christian education 
lessons and thus, second, school education often eventually encourages Wana children to 
religious conversion. I have not heard of one Wana who attended school beyond the 
fourth grade and has not converted.  
Thus, Wana are constituted as a marginal group without religious affiliation, expected to 
become part of a religious center – or adherers of a center acknowledged belief. Instead 
they constantly resist state power and discursive powers they experience within the 
interreligious environment. Religious conversion here would be an “easy solution” to 
“social backwardness”, a way out of their marginalization in relation to the political 
center. But for Wana their cosmological center serves as the point of hope and promise; 
they need to remain in their constant state of religious marginality in order to reverse the 
current center–periphery relation that, in the meantime, is disadvantageous for them. 
Resistance to religious conversion thus is hope for salvation, which is further also the 
hope for a process one could call demarginalization. 
	    
	  	  
5 POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC POSITIONINGS AND 
DYNAMICS OF RESISTANCE 
The previous chapters revealed how Wana conceptualize their marginality in terms of a 
cultural-cosmological worldview that is intertwined with millenial aspirations and 
expectations. Further, in its social meaning, for non-converted Wana marginality becomes 
meaningful along socio-religious boundaries that exclude Wana from national discourses 
of modernity and citizenship while neglecting indigenous people’s rights and often 
pressing people to convert to “modernity” and “citizenship” who are usually the very last 
in the social order of local communities. Marginality then, receives yet another meaning 
in terms of Wana political-economic standing. In the following, I will show how the 
political-economic dimension of Wana marginalized status is mainly constituted by the 
on-going risk of land loss, a well-known point of contention for Wana people. In this 
context, specific marginalization processes are, for example, resettlement programs by the 
government that were aimed at moving Wana permanently from the uplands into 
centralized lowland villages. Wana however have developed strategies of resistance, 
“weapons of the weak” as Scott has called them (1985: 1). The focus of this chapter thus 
lies on strategies of resistance and dynamics of opposing; it is not the goal to give a mere 
historic overview of the region or detailed description of Wana economic-political 
standing but rather to show how Wana find their own ways to resist within fields of 
changing power constellations. In his book Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of 
Peasant Resistance (1985), Scott describes the daily forms of resistance of the poorer 
members of the small village of Sedaka in Malaysia and their struggle against the 
negative outcomes of power relations, inequalities and forms of domination within the 
community. Although the setting of Sedaka resistance is a more everyday form of 
counteracting class-based oppression, rather similar to Wana ways of daily resistance 
living in an interreligious setting as I have described in Chapter 4, Scott’s analysis makes 
clear “that between the poles of complete passivity [that is, no resistance at all] and active 
resistance, a variety of motivations, goals and actions may be present” (Oliver-Smith 
2010: 35). Everyday forms of resistance are a result of the cultural understanding of 
power and the transformation of its historical context. It is in this way that Wana 
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resistance, as a meaning of a “diagnostic of power” (Abu-Lughod 1990: 42) is the only 
way they can hope to change their situation for the best.  
I will start with a brief outline of Wana political positioning in pre-colonial interactions 
with outside authorities to show how Wana have engaged their agency with various 
regimes and governments. I will then continue with colonial influence in Central 
Sulawesi uplands and the way Wana people resisted colonial pressure. I will focus in 
detail on resettlement actions aimed at Wana people that started with colonial intervention 
in Indonesia and continue to play an important part for upland groups not only in 
Indonesia until today. The history of Taronggo itself as a resettlement site and the 
concurring erection of the first Christian school thus portray important markers of Wana 
opposition to outside influence. Resettlement strategies continued to play an important 
part for Wana people although the underlying reasons and motives were not always alike. 
In 2007, several Wana were resettled after a natural catastrophe, and in 2011 a new 
resettlement plan was formulated aimed at moving Salisarao Wana to a newly built 
lowland village. The motives behind these actions as well as the entanglement between 
government, companies and local inhabitants reveal important factors for ongoing 
marginalization processes that continue to severely affect Wana livelihood until today. 
The concurring Wana strategies of resistance and rebellion I will present afterwards 
highlighting the role of “powerful friends” and the politics of “being Wana, becoming 
indigenous”, to follow Hodgson’s study on the indigenous movement in Africa (2011). 
Since “every historical moment constructs its own forms of agency” (Ortner 1995: 186), 
we have to regard resistance and its agency and temporal orders in a process of transition, 
especially in times of changing regimes and outside economic pressures.166 
5.1  EARLY POWER CONSTELLATIONS: WANA IN TIMES OF 
KERAJAAN, 16TH – 20TH CENTURY 
Wana have been affiliated with a wide range of sultanates in the past – an era called 
kerajaan (BI). In those days, Wana were incorporated in early state systems, dating back 
to the far-reaching sultanate of Ternate during its heyday in the 16th century, covering 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166 A reduced version of this chapter has already been published elswhere (Grumblies 2013). 
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most of the Eastern islands of Indonesia’s archipelago. Although data on Wana for these 
early days are absent, Atkinson mentions her informants recalling the Ternate ruler as one 
of their first dependencies (1979: 23). My research showed that Wana in the region of 
Morowali Regency do not align their history in accordance with a Ternate ruler – a fact 
that can be caused by micro-regional differences between Wana in Atkinson’s study area 
and my own. However, Central Sulawesi sultanates and their rulers later replaced the 
Ternate Raja’s influence. Wana still were part of a far-reaching network of political 
obligations and were connected to a state system long before Dutch colonial rule 
stretched its arm to the Central Sulawesi uplands. Under Central Sulawesi sultanate rule, 
Wana were obliged to pay tribute in form of honey to their ruler in the North, the Raja of 
Tojo, and in form of white chickens and bamboo tubes filled with rice for the Raja of 
Bungku in the South, as Atkinson research shows.167 The raja of Bungku is remembered 
for giving Wana people their ada-system168 – the local law system. Before the invention 
of this new system “’people would kill people’” (Atkinson 1989: 267) but with the new 
ada rules, a system was established that regulates most notably matters of marriage but 
also important acts that threaten communal peace like violence and theft.169 The Central 
Sulawesi rajas did not exert direct control over Wana people but exercised indirect power 
through local Wana leaders called makole or basal, functioning as representatives of the 
raja (Atkinson 1989: 188,345). These makole were part of the Wana ranking system, 
including makole kin, common people and debt slaves (Atkinson 1989: 267). Regarding 
Atkinson’s account of Wana makole, Morowali Wana remember only one Wana leader 
who lived in the area of Posangke. The descendants today are still believed to have 
special powers. 
During the time of kerajaan, Wana were involved in a range of wars with surrounding 
ethnic groups, mainly about territorial claims. They fought with their Eastern neighbors, 
the To Loinang, and with groups from Poso in the East. During their visits to the coast, 
sea pirates often attacked Wana people. The biggest enemy Wana had to face were the To 
Lage, a Pamona speaking group who tried to capture the Wana territory in the East 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167 While A.C. Kruyt and my interlocutors refer to a strong dependence of Wana to the raja of Bungku, 
Atkinson’s interlocutors stated an affiliation with the raja of Tojo. I agree with Atkinson who refers these 
differences to the geographical distances between the research areas.  
168 Ada is the local expression for adat (BI).  
169 Similar to Atkinson, I did not become an expert on Wana ada matters although I was able to observe a 
number of ada gatherings. Compensation was generally made in form of cloth and money if available.  
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(Atkinson 1989: 262). A.C. described these people as Bareé speaking Toraja; today they 
are generally referred to as To Pamona. It is also in these early wars and regional 
competition that Atkinson sees a cause for Wana residential mobility. She refers to A.C. 
Kruyt who mentions Wana people as constantly living in a state of possible flight. For 
instance, they used to keep their pigs with nose rings to be able to escape quickly in case 
of an emergency. During Atkinson’s research, pigs were kept without this attribute and 
during my own research no Wana I met was in possession of pigs or remembered older 
generations keeping them – with or without nose rings. It is only in the village of 
Taronggo where a few Christian people breed pigs, although without any historical 
connection to upland Wana habits. Residential mobility nevertheless played a highly 
important part for Morowali Wana as well. Above all, it was an important strategy to 
avoid outside influence regardless of where power was temporarily located or from where 
it was executed. Wana merely never appeared to openly challenge the governing regimes 
or other oppressors; they showed no obvious motivation to straightforwardly oppose 
processes of marginalization. Instead, avoidance of direct confrontation seems to be a 
historically congruent matter among them. The To Lage told stories about Wana magical 
powers that helped them to disappear. In case of enemy attack, they could convert their 
fireplaces into red tree ants when the enemy approached or they could make themselves 
shrink so that they fit under tree leaves to hide from the enemy (Aktinson 1989: 262).  
Since Wana usually chose to flee instead of fighting back, A.C. Kruyt and Atkinson both 
came to the conclusion that Wana were historically rather “shy victims” than heroes 
during times of war: “timidity [among the Wana] had its roots in the endemic regional 
warfare of the nineteenth century. In the regional game of headhunting the Wana were 
often the heads” (Atkinson 1989: 226). Atkinson recounts the story of Liwa, the paternal 
grandfather of one of her interlocutors and head of a Wana settlement, who was under 
such continuing pressure to flee that he would eat every morning a full meal in order to 
manage to escape with a full belly. Atkinson states: “Wana openly acknowledge their 
cowardice as a people” (1989: 262), making clear that historical experiences of being 
disadvantaged during fighting regimes lead to a self-victimization. Wana agency and 
resistance in pre-colonial times thus was rather signified by subtle forms of opposition. 
While they were engaged in loose forms of government by a range of sultanates and 
rulers, the obligations towards these rulers were marginal and also partly positively 
remembered with the example of the ada system. In wartimes, however, fleeing instead of 
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attacking was the strategy to deal with outside violence and pressure according to 
Atkinson. This self-stigmatization of Wana as victims I could only partly find during my 
own research. The timidity Atkinson describes for Wana society rooted in early warfare 
activities was either no longer part of Wana collective memory or differentiated between 
both research sites significantly.170 The ”timidity” is still an important point of self-
reference and is deeply connected to a self-marginalization process that I have already 
described in Chapter 3, in which Wana often portray themselves as “stupid”, “poor” and 
“helpless”. However, when retelling stories of early wartimes, Morowali Wana usually do 
not present themselves as victims. Instead they emphasize their own creativity, their 
notorious fighting skills and strength and furthermore state that they were extremely 
feared by their enemies. Thus, Wana “timidity” in my own research context is rather 
rooted in cosmological narratives and experiences other than war. Both, timidity in 
accounts of war as Atkinson describes as well as timidity nested in cosmological accounts 
nevertheless can be read as a marker of marginalization processes and functions as a 
symbol of resistance. Albeit resistance is always a “historically specific response”(Abu-
Lughod 1990: 52) to transformation processes, this subtle form of opposition described 
above represents an ongoing pattern for Wana people as will become further clear in the 
course of this chapter.  
5.2  COLONIAL INTERACTIONS AND FORCED RESETTLEMENT, 
EARLY 20TH CENTURY 
Headhunting and other warlike activities found an end when the colonial government 
entered the region in the beginning of the 20th century. This however did not mean that 
violence was erased. Wana historical accounts today are dominated by ferocious stories 
that vividly display the pressure the colonial government exercised towards upland 
groups: “Although the imposition of Dutch rule in the region at the beginning of this 
century put an end to raiding, it inaugurated a new form of local terrorism” (Atkinson 
1989: 226). In the early 20th century, the colonial government was eager to resettle 
upland groups to the lowland, closer to the administrative apparatus in order to make 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170 If it ever has been – the difference between Atkinson’s and my own research, again, might be explained 
by micro-regional differences.  
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them “controllable” and thereby “civilizing” them by means of what Scott has called “the 
great utopian social engineering schemes of the twentieth century” (1998: 4). Thereby, 
they introduced a new era of violent interaction. Colonial efforts were regarded as 
“traumatic […]; big men in boots with guns” (Atkinson 1979: 24) displayed a so-far 
unknown enemy who Wana tried to oppose. Atkinson recalls stories of Wana who killed 
Dutch officials in Pindulu, at least in some way changing the picture of “being the heads 
in headhunting”. Informants in my research are in Morowali Regency and also recall 
bloody interactions with Dutch officials.171 However, the overall strategy of resisting 
colonial power can nonetheless be traced back to patterns of hiding and escaping 
government officials and their endeavors. 
5.2.1 Extending Power to Central Sulawesi Uplands 
Central Sulawesi was not of special interest for the Dutch colonial government in early 
years (see Chapter 1). Although the island’s Western region experienced some occasional 
visits by colonial administrative personnel it was not until the late 19th century that the 
remoteness of Central Sulawesi gained attention by the colonial undertakers. This era 
signifies a time of change in Dutch colonial history for the archipelago. The Dutch East 
Indian Company (Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie, VOC) had largely ignored most 
islands outside of Java but with the VOC’s end in 1799, the colonial government put a lot 
of effort in the task of extending their power over the archipelago (Cribb 2000: 113–14). 
The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, the extension of the spice trade over the islands, 
the Agrarian Law of 1870 and an increased need of colonial goods in Europe during the 
times of industrialization led to a massive transformation of colonial practice. By 1850, 
the colonial project of forced cultivation on the main island of Java (cultuurstelsel) came 
to an end and a fresh “liberal spirit” (Weber, Kreisel, and Faust 2003: 405) enabled a new 
economic drive throughout the colonial sphere. The long run colonial policy of abstention 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171 Interestingly, for Atkinson’s informants, the Dutch regency was far more shocking and hurtful than 
former wars, whereas my studies revealed an opposite picture. The Dutch times are remembered as a time 
of bloody oppression but also as a positive development, for instance in form of road construction. Early 
warfare with their ethnic neighbors is remembered as far worse and violent. Apa nTee, (kepala suku, 
administrative head of Taronggo Wana), summons up: “The Dutch only wanted to govern us, that was all; 
the others were far worse”. This difference in Wana accounts could be traced back to differing Dutch 
interactions in Northern and Southern Wana lands. 
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underwent a complete modification when direct rule was extended to remote islands like 
Sulawesi, Borneo and Sumatra. Expanding colonial power to the remote areas of the 
archipelago where colonial actors had so far no access to became a new goal. This of 
course required a whole new administrative apparatus. For Central Sulawesi, the 
Netherlands Missionary Society (Nederlandsch Zendeling Genootschap) served as a very 
first key to extending control to the uplands with the missionary A.C. Kruyt establishing 
the first missionary post in Poso in 1892. Two years later the first permanent colonial 
station in Poso was erected as late as 1894. The colonial administrative personnel of the 
new region nevertheless was left without any real power to exercise in the very 
beginning; “the controleur remained a powerless figurehead, his hands tied by the policy 
of abstention, and by ignorance of the language and culture of the area” (Schrauwers 
2000: 46). This however changed soon. A couple of years earlier, in 1888, the Protestant 
Anti-Revolutionaire Partij, a right wing Christian party, was elected for Dutch 
government and the development of the Indonesian population became one major goal of 
the new Netherlands government. The “Dutch middle-class displeasure with what was 
perceived in Europe as a lack of moral and economic commitment to the betterment of 
the colonies” (Aragon 2000: 100) resulted in a new moral impetus of the so-called Ethical 
Policy of the Dutch Colonial government. The Ethical Policy was instigated through two 
publications published in the Netherlands,172 that were deeply criticizing the way Dutch 
colonial practices had exploited the local population, appealed to the Netherland’s honor 
and “called for the formulation of a policy that would protect native rights and promote 
moral and material development, in contrast to the past policy of exploitation” (Adam 
1995: 90). A strong focus on Christian missions and associated moral values that were 
believed to be “the only way to achieve ‘the spiritual and cultural development of the 
[indigenous] population’” (Coté 1996: 90) became the new strategy in extending power to 
Indonesia’s outer islands. Economic and state-power oriented motives were covered well 
by the ethical impetus of the new colonial direction when in fact the invention of a new 
tax system and the urgent need for colonial products were driving forces behind the new 
approach to colonial outreach in the Central Sulawesi uplands.173 The Ethical Policy 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172 A pamphlet published in 1901 by the journalist P. Brooshooft: “The Ethical Direction in Colonial 
Policy” (1977) and an article titled “Een Ereschuld” by the Liberal leader C.T. van Deventer (1899; 
quoted in Adam 1995: 90). 
173 Tania Li’s chapter “Contradicting Positions” in The Will to Improve summarizes and analyzes these 
paradoxes of colonial arguing und acting. See Li (Li 2007b: 31–33)) 
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started, paradoxically, with an armed initiative. Between 1905 and 1907 the highland 
regions of Central Sulawesi became a colonial target in a wave of military maneuvers to 
extend colonial control over the area; it was believed that “[t]he blessings of Dutch 
civilization were unavailable to the inhabitants of the formerly uncolonised areas of the 
Outer Islands without such intervention” (Coté 1996: 97). It was A.C. Kruyt and Adriani 
who had been travelling in the upland area of Western Central Sulawesi who 
recommended military action to the colonial government (Schrauwers 2000: 47). Eastern 
Central Sulawesi, administratively subdivided in the kingdoms of Tobungku on the coast 
and Mori in the interior, had so far not experienced any colonial presence at all (Henley 
2005: 242).174 A.C. Kruyt and Adriani’s efforts and research conducted in the upland 
region before Dutch intervention showed that progress in the hinterlands was slow to 
come by. The assistant-resident of Central Sulawesi A.J.N. Engelenberg wrote about A.C. 
Kruyts and Adriani’s suggestions 
“[t]he rottenness of the political circumstances makes their work unfruitful. And 
the rottenness could only be cut away by the violence of a Government. […] We 
are confronted with abuses which can only be eliminated with a rough hand and 
we need to clean it up because the interests of this people themselves bid us” 
(Engelenberg, quoted in Schrauwers 2000: 47).  
As a result, in 1905 military forces landed on the coast and overpowered the sovereign of 
the area, the King of Luwu. Dutch colonial troops entered Central Sulawesi by means of 
“pacification” and to get hold of so called short contracts, korte verklaring, signed by 
local leaders opening the door for Dutch authorities to grant political rights and 
sovereignty over the region (Weber, Kreisel, and Faust 2003: 407). The invading troops 
handed out the information that the King of Luwu had accepted the Netherlands’ Queen 
as new sovereign and so were the interior chiefs in the region around Luwu to follow. 
Once local leaders had become compliant to the colonial regime, the Dutch troops 
demanded corvée labor (Aragon 2000: 100). In 1907, Dutch troops overran the Mori 
kingdom in the inland and by 1908 the kingdoms of Bungku as well as Mori became part 
of the ”Government of Celebes and dependencies” (Makassar).175 The uplands took 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
174 A census by 1930 shows a very small combined population density of the two kingdoms with only three 
persons per km2, in total under 42.000 people (Henley 2005: 243). However, exact numbers for the region 
of the Wana were not available: “in 1930 there must have been some peripheral groups, particularly 
among the remote To Wana [...] which were not included in the census” (Henley 2005: 227).  
175 In 1924 they were administratively integrated in the residency of Manado in the North (Henley 2005: 
243).  
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longer time to be controlled when resistance from the uplanders was formed. Opposition 
by indigenous groups however was silenced with the help of weapons and a great number 
of uplanders died in the military fortification (Schrauwers 2000: 47–48).  
After these initial military interventions, the colonial government further defined power 
and influence in the uplands. Beginning in 1906 upland people of Central Sulawesi were 
subjected to another new form of rule: The resettlement of upland inhabitants to 
centralized villages in the lowland.  
5.2.2 Colonial Resettlement  
As I have described earlier (see Chapter 2), by forcing households to move from up- to 
lowland areas, the government could implement rule on the “uncivilized” and “wild”, 
either through administrative proximity, new forms of village rule, the implementation of 
a new tax system, the banning of cultural specifics such as headhunting (Schrauwers 
2000: 65) that were believed to be a hindrance to progress and last but not least the 
protection of the spread of Islam through simultaneously offering Christian alternatives in 
the newly erected villages.176 That these initiatives were not easily realized, shows the 
following description by Kruyt who had come to the Wana area himself in 1928 for an 
exploration journey. He describes the suffering of Wana caused by early colonial state 
intervention:  
“The To Wana have been a much disturbed folk. […] Peace did not become their 
share either, when the [Netherlands] government put its powerful hand on them. 
In the beginning of the occupation the administrative government supposed that 
these shy people would get to know order and law most easily if they were forced 
to live near the coast. But the people did not wish that with the result […] that 
many patrols of soldiers were sent repeatedly into this land to draw the people 
down to the coast. […] The misery of these people must have been great. Of those 
who had let themselves be forced to settle near the coast, many died” (A.C. Kruyt 
1930: 403–4).177 
Taronggo itself was established as such a resettlement site for Wana from the upland 
regions of Posangke, Ratobae, Salisarao and probably Uewaju. During A.C. Kruyts 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
176 While Central Sulawesi’s uplands remained “animist”, lowland states like Luwu had come under Islamic 
influence the lowlands since the 17th century (Roth 2007: 129) 
177 Translation by Grumblies. 
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voyage in 1928, the village of Taronggo had already been erected, but success was a long 
time coming. The following description is taken from A.C. Kruyt’s account while visiting 
the village of Taronggo:  
“Where this plain ends is situated the village of Taronggo, in which the To 
Posangke [Wana] have gathered. This new village, and at all the other villages 
that I have visited later on, clearly shows that the To Wana have remained faithful 
to their old habit of living scattered on their fields. The kampongs, which they 
built by order of the authorities, are not inhabited, of which the houses clearly 
show signs. Many have become uninhabitable, others miss their stairs; not the 
least bit of furniture is found inside. There are no rice sheds – nor pounding 
blocks. When a visit from a civil servant is announced, the Chief of a field returns 
home, followed by his wife and some other folk who carry the necessary food and 
cooking gear in baskets, enough for a stay of several days. Some other people, 
probably from nearby gardens, come as well to accompany their Chief. No sooner 
is the visitor gone, though, or the village is empty again. On my journey through 
this land I often found not even a dog or chicken in some villages” (A.C. Kruyt 
1930).178 
Kruyt describes Taronggo as an uninhabited village, a proof of Wana strategies of 
resisting resettlement initiatives by the colonial government. Wana people regularly fled 
upland to escape the colonial administration and developed own creative strategies to 
trick them. The missionary’s account vividly shows the strategy of resisting resettlement 
initiatives and how little success colonial initiatives among the Wana had. However, 
colonial violence left traces among Wana who still today recall bloody accounts of these 
early days of forced “civilization”. Apa nTee, the kepala suku of Taronggo, for example, 
recounts a story figuring iDao, also called Njao or Apa iMangka, who is well remembered 
by my Wana interlocutors as Taronggo’s first kepala desa who came from the area of the 
Salisarao Mountains. Some people recall that many Wana followed him when he left the 
mountains to make kampong in Taronggo, forced by colonial intervention, simply for the 
reason that he was one of them. In Apa nTee’s account iDao’s role functions as an 
example of the violent colonial forces to which Wana people often had not opposition:  
“Honestly, when they [the Dutch] arrived here, they governed us in the most 
violent sense. Wana had to work for them, were hit when they got tired. The 
Dutch were very naughty. They shot many Wana dead. My grandma came from 
Ratobae [in the mountains close to Posangke] and told me the following story: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
178 Translation by Grumblies. 
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Many Wana people had fled the Dutch to Ratobae [in the mountain], but what did 
the Dutch do? They followed them, climbed the mountains until Sangkioe at the 
mountain Toba. So there is this one Dutch man and he sees a man in the grass, 
walking by, carrying a large snake around his neck. The Dutch gets frightened 
although he his far away, more or less a kilometer, but he is so scared that he 
shoots and hits the Wana in the neck. Shot through. But only through the bone, 
fortunately the lungs have not been hit. He still lives and does not fall. He 
bandages up his wound and goes home to his house in the forest where his wife is 
shocked by all the blood.  
Meanwhile people start hearing the sound of shooting guns, the Dutch keep on 
shooting Wana people and many got shot but no one dead so far. There is one 
Wana man who is brave and wants to defend himself with bow and arrow. At this 
point the Dutch hesitated and asked iDao, the stupid kepala desa, who had 
accompanied them to the mountains. They ask: Shall we shoot this guy? iDao 
does not know their language and wants to answer NO, but he does not know the 
words. The Dutch ask again: We want to shoot this guy? And iDao answers with 
wrong words: yes, let’s shoot him. To this point the Dutch start shooting for real. 
EEEEHHHH: There is a Wana sitting on a cliff, defending himself with bow and 
arrow and then there are the Dutch who shoot once and dead he is, habis. From 
this day on, many Wana followed the Dutch government, left the mountains to 
build villages; they were just scared to get killed.”  
As Apa nTee’s portrayal shows the founding time of Taronggo is remembered not in a 
positive way. iDao is presented in accounts of these early days as a man who, on the one 
hand, tried to protect his community but on the other hand failed since he had not much 
knowledge to resist colonial efforts. Apa nTee presses iDao’s missing education as a 
point of failure: “He was a stupid man, he had no school(-education) [laughing]”.179 
Another story of violent interaction with Dutch officials is also dated around these first 
years of Taronggo as a village:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
179 See Chapter 4.4.5 for the importance of education and knowledge for Wana.  
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There was a very first school for Wana people located in Lemo, a settlement in 
the East. Numerous Wana from other areas in the mountainous regions around it 
were sent to Lemo for means of education. One day, the account goes, the 
residential Dutch officials who were living in Lemo at that time, pressed a number 
of Wana people to arrange a typical Wana funeral ceremony which was supposed 
to last seven days and seven nights. The ceremony had to be held in the school 
building of Lemo according to Dutch instructions. The Wana bended to the 
Dutch’s will and began with the ceremony. On the seventh day the ritual members 
were exhausted and fell asleep in the school house. Those Wana who had come 
together in the school house were said to have constantly refused Dutch attempts 
to agree with Christian conversion. Therefore, the Dutch missionaries had given 
up effort on them. Instead they now followed a cruel plan: When the weary Wana 
in the school building fell asleep, the Dutch locked the door of the school building 
and set fire. More than 300 Wana are believed to be killed by the flames. Only 
one woman had managed to escape the building and fled to the mountains from 
where she could see the fire burning her friends and relatives; “from this day on, 
Wana decided again to keep away from the Dutch; they left for their mountainous 
homes”, an informant recalls.  
Considering missing data on the colonial era in Morowali Regency I cannot account for 
the reliability of this narrative. Nevertheless, the importance of this story has to be seen in 
the light of Wana experience with Dutch officials, in their struggle to keep their own 
belief system and their felt victimization and relative helplessness against violent assaults. 
Other stories of these early days account for Wana creativity finding their own strategies 
to fool government authorities. As I have shown above, Wana were obliged to build their 
own houses in the centralized villages in which they did not intend to live, for example in 
Taronggo. Similar to A.C. Kruyt’s account describing Taronggo as an empty village, my 
interlocutors told me how their ancestors would by night light resin lamps in these houses 
of the kampung to trick patrolling officials. They would leave in the dark for the 
mountains or their fields to sleep among family members who not yet had been forced to 
resettle. In the morning they would return, unnoticed by their colonial authorities.  
Chapter V. Political and Economic Positionings   
234 
	  
5.2.3 Schooling and Education 
Although colonial intervention was not very fruitful in the beginning among Southern 
Wana, Kruyt was very successful in his missionary goal in the area of the Pamona 
speaking people of Central Sulawesi. The government as well as the mission put a lot of 
effort in the introduction of Christian education, that was perceived as “the best medicine 
to cure the indolence and immorality of natives in the colonies” (Aragon 2000: 101).180 
For the region, A.C. Kruyt was mainly left in charge of educating the local Pamona 
population, which he accomplished with great success. He opened a vast number of 
Christian schools in the area around Poso and although he received heavy criticism from 
the government side due to ongoing disagreements on schools, hospitals as well as 
economic ventures. But the Dutch government’s lasting fear of Muslim infringement 
eventually allowed A.C. Kruyt, and, after 1921, his missionary son, Johannes, called Jan, 
“to maintain a relatively firm grasp on eastern Central Sulawesi schools and 
communities” (Aragon 2000: 107). In the Wana region, missionary and government 
actions needed a longer time to note some success. This changed when the colonial 
initiative entailed further missionary strategies. In 1924 the onderafdeling Poso received 
the status of an independent station; the former assistant-controleur Emile Gobée was 
ascribed the new status as the Poso assistant-resident (Noort 2006: 101). It was under 
Gobée that the first inventions from Dutch side to begin missionary work among the 
Wana started (Noort 2006). A year after A.C. Kruyts visit, in 1929, the missionary path 
was opened and the Nederlandsch Zendeling Genootschap (Netherlands Missionary 
Society) erected the first local school in Taronggo aimed at educating and Christianizing 
Wana children.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
180 Interestingly, although the Dutch government and the associated missionaries put a lot of effort in the 
quest of “modernizing” and “civilizing” Wana people, Atkinson states that her informants did not evoke 
religious attempts in accordance with colonial endeavors: “Asked what religion the Dutch had, older 
informants speculated that the Dutch probably possessed their own traditional religion just as the Wana 
do” (Atkinson 1988: 45). According to Atkinson, missionary attempts began only with the end of World 
War II. On the contrary, in Taronggo, itself built as a kampung by the colonial government, the first 
interaction with the Dutch is associated with early missionaries like A.C. Kruyt and his son, J. Kruyt. Ibu 
Lin, one of my Christian informants in Taronggo stated: “My grandmother was born in the mountains, in 
Posangke, where she lived. Then she came down from the mountains to Taronggo, which was newly built 
that time and she settled there, in the kampung, together with the orang Belanda (BI, Dutch man). She 
was the first Wana who converted to the Christian faith.”  
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In 1925, Gobée, who was already quite familiar with missionary work, had already asked 
to open schools for the Wana. He saw missionaries as best suited people for the act of 
searching the trust of local people (J. Kruyt 1933: 21). In 1926, a conference of the 
Nederlandsch Zendeling Genootschap agreed to Gobée’s plan; his initial plan included 
the spread from the Northern territory,  
“[f]rom there could then be gradually expanded. But because messages had come, 
which sanctioned the expectation that further contact would lead to fruitful 
activity also in the southern part of To Wana, which belongs to the administrative 
area of Boengkoe, the Conference took the proposal missionary K. Riedel there to 
make an exploration. This took place in September 1926. The people received 
him warmly throughout, when they learned who he was and what he was” (J. 
Kruyt 1933: 21).181 
Albeit the initial approval by the Nederlandsch Zendeling Genootschap, some 
restructuration within the government positions required another delay of the “To Wana 
schooling project”. After a new resident had been placed in Manado and a new assistant-
resident replaced Gobée in Poso, the first two Wana missionary schools were opened in 
1929: one in Dasari (Barangas in the North) and one in Taronggo. J. Kruyt (1893-1978) 
born in Poso and educated in the Netherlands also came to work in Central Sulawesi as a 
district-missionary for the Nederlandsch Zendeling Genootschap. Working as an assistant 
to his famous father, he also held the position of the director of the schoolmaster’s 
training college in Pendolo (Kappelhof et al.; J. Kruyt 1970). J. Kruyt took a trip through 
the Wana region as well, a couple of years after his father had visited the area. In the short 
article “Een reis door To Wana” he writes in 1933:  
“The Civil Service has been committed for years tried to get the To Wana to build 
some roads around their land and villages along these roads to live in.  
This free folk was unwilling to do so, as is understandable. In the beginning the 
bestuurders [rulers] believed that they had had to force them with the help of 
soldiers’ patrols. The result, however, was that the people in the mountains drew 
back and were now quite impossible to get under the [Dutch] influence” (J. Kruyt 
1933:24).182 
During this voyage J. Kruyt also came to visit the settlement of Taronggo. At first, his 
impression of the village and its relatively new school was rather positive. Compared to 
his father’s description (see above) who only found an empty village a couple of years 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
181 Translation by Grumblies. 
182 Translation by Grumblies.  
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earlier, J. Kruyt describes the jovial idea he got from the teacher’s house, which was 
neatly built by the community. The missionary teacher himself was a married man who 
came from the Minahasa area and had already been living for three years in Taronggo. 
Albeit the presence of the teacher, for J. Kruyt the initial (but fragile) optimistic 
appearance of the village was mainly caused by the positive influence of the Wana local 
chief whose name was Njao. I have already introduced Njao in the foregoing subchapter 
as recalled in an account by Apa nTee, there called iDao.  
Njao died during the short visit of J. Kruyt’s exploration tour on 13th June 1932. His 
death was a point of concern for J. Kruyt’s expectations for the local school’s progress; 
“what is going to happen with Taronggo, now that the village head is missing? What is 
going to happen to this school for which the deceased showed a special interest?“ (J. 
Kruyt 1933: 26).183According to J. Kruyt, Njao seemed to be the only person to keep the 
village together, making clear how resistant the local community of Wana people were to 
the resettlement initiative and schooling idea:  
“This death has important implications, because this head [Njao] was deemed to 
be the only man who managed to hold the village. It is expected that the official 
village Taronggo practically will not become less a place of living for people than 
it already was. In general the Wana villages are not much more than mock 
villages [schijn-dorpen]: people do not live here what becomes visible upon first 
sight as soon as you enter the village. The walls of the houses are often made of a 
floor on poles and a roof and often with walls but mostly the back wall is missing. 
A fireplace is only rarely found in these homes; a proof that they are not 
occupied” (J. Kruyt 1933: 26).184  
In J. Kruyts account the role of the local school becomes well apparent. At that time two 
teachers from the Nederlandsch Zendeling Genootschap were located in the Southern 
Wana area: For Taronggo the above mentioned Minahasa, a second one was located 
further North-East in the Dasari school. J. Kruyt describes both schools for the still 
“comparatively primitive people” as pioneering schools whose first task it was to 
establish its position within a society that actually has no felt need for a school as a place 
of learning. In this regard, it was also to further clarify how it can be established within a 
place where enough adults and children do actually live since most Wana did not live in 
permanent villages. A second task would be to estimate the results of the school-chiefs 
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Chapter V. Political and Economic Positionings   
237 
	  
themselves. These goals however were not easily accomplished although missionary 
work by the means of evangelization itself, at least in Dasari, seemed to be an easy task. 
The Dasari school received its pupils from the places of Salea, Dasari and Oee Karoeroe, 
all of them Boerangasi villages,185 J. Kruyt writes (1933: 34). During times of kerajaaan 
the ruler of Bungku had pressed people there to ”convert” to Islam, “upon his order the 
people had to be baptized [zich laten doopen]”186 (J. Kruyt 1933: 24). According to J. 
Kruyt this fact had made it easy for the missionaries to convince Wana to “shake off” 
Islam and instead convert to Christianity (1933: 24).187  
Looking at the numbers, J. Kruyt remarks a clear difference between Dasari and 
Taronggo “progress” in schooling. Both schools opened in 1929; Taronggo in March and 
Dasari in August. Taronggo in its beginning had a number of 20 children but soon nine of 
them were not noted any longer as pupils. The reason for this was that some of them 
simply did not show up any longer and went back to their far away gardens. They were 
listed as “stay-aways [weggebleven]” (1933: 35). From this first group of schoolchildren 
another six “stayed away” so that only five of the original group remained, J. Kruyt notes 
(1933: 35). In Dasari, 40 children were listed initially, of these 21 were not listed any 
further; 19 of these were stay-aways. The Dasari teacher complained heavily that during 
rainy season many pupils could not come to the school because of the flooded river 
people were unable to cross. J. Kruyt reports these numbers as “not encouraging [niet 
bemoedigend]”. He notes that Taronggo was a bad example against the situation in 
Dasari; the latter however had way more contact with the outside world compared to their 
Taronggo equals. By contrast, in Taronggo there were “still real, unbounded wild people 
[nog echte, ongebonden wildernis-menschen]” (1933: 35). In 1931, both schools accepted 
another group of children; in Dasari children were already more accustomed to the school 
idea and arrived on time in January; however, in Taronggo the curriculum still delt with 
tardiness. The numbers of pupils were quite comparable to the first year; 15 children were 
enlisted, then 6 of them were depreciated (afgeschrieven), four of them as stay-aways. 
However, in Dasari no children were depreciated for the second year of 1931. For J. 
Kruyt, this was a result that showed “how the To Boerangasi began to understand the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
185 Today called Barangas, see for example Atkinson (1989).  
186 The mentioning of baptism for a conversion to Islam is of course misleading in this context since 
according to Muslim faith no such act as baptizing is necessary for succesful conversion.  
187 J. Kruyt further notes an ongoing temporary misfeeling between the two confessions (1933).  
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purpose of the school and its nature and is therefore a very satisfying target, while the To 
Pesangke [To Posangke] had not come one step further in this regard” (1933: 36). J. 
Kruyts account on the first school of Taronggo makes clear how reluctant Wana in the 
area around Taronggo were to following government orders and accepting outside 
administration. It further underlines the significance of the forced resettlement of Wana 
from the uplands to the village of Taronggo and the question of marginality among the 
Wana. Apart from Wana who finally resettled in Taronggo there still existed a great 
number of those who successfully resisted resettlement strategies. Dutch troops continued 
to search for Wana upland settlements with unregistered inhabitants, forcibly taking 
resisting individuals to Kolonolade “to become familiar with ‘society’, whereupon they 
would be allowed to return home on the condition that they ‘build a village at a mutually 
agreed upon place’” (Aktinson 1989: 264). Most of them however would “’disappear 
again into their inaccessible hiding places” (A.C. Kruyt 1930: 405; quoted in Atkinson 
1989: 264).  
Although reluctant to Dutch government intrusion, many Wana started to engage soon in 
the evolving regional resin market, a natural resource used for the production of 
varnishes. Resin became a popular product before and after World War II and Wana 
“energetically tapped wild damar trees and traded resin for cloth, knives, pots, salt, and 
other coastal luxuries” (Atkinson 1989: 264). While Wana were interested in the “benefit 
and hardship” (Atkinson 1989: 264) they saw in the opportunities of the resin market, 
political changes in form of World War II, the Japanese occupation and the political 
tumults of the 1950s and 1960s sent Wana, who had formerly accepted government 
impositions in favour of trade advantages, immediately back to the mountains.  
As a matter of fact, resettlement again became a threat to Wana in the North, when the 
Indonesian government built new villages at the northern coast to relocate upland locals 
in the 1970s. This happened in a nationwide attempt by the Department of Social Affairs 
(DEPSOS) to “civilize” uplanders by relocating them in centralized villages in a similar 
manner the Dutch had started (see Chapter 2; cf. Colchester 2009; Haba 1998). Northern 
Wana were highly critical of these actions. By contrast, for other upland groups in Central 
Sulawesi Li recalls how they “had no nostalgia for life in the hills” (Li 2007b: 91) but 
were eager to “escape their isolation and improve their lot” (Li 2007b: 91). She notes 
hundreds of upland families in Rahmat who were willingly applying for resettlement 
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programs in hope for better access to education and markets. Atkinson recalls a very 
different picture for the Wana:  
“Opposition to these plans was widespread among Wana, who felt that the coastal 
plains were unsuitable for farming, feared exploitation by local officials, and were 
anxious about forced conversions to Islam and Christianity. Plans to resettle 
interior peoples replaced any government interest in sustaining interior villages; 
they also provoked withdrawal by many Wana who would have been willing to 
cooperate with the government so long as they be allowed to remain in their 
hinterlands” (1989: 264).  
In the Southern Wana area of Morowali, no new resettlement projects were initiated by 
DEPSOS but the scheme of relocating Wana from their upland livelihoods has continued 
to be a matter of concern until today. Hiding and escaping to the mountains functioned 
and still functions thus as an avoidance and resistance strategy to ongoing outside 
opposition to Wana culture as I will show in the following sub-chapter.  
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5.3 NATURAL DISASTERS AND RESETTLEMENT EFFORTS: THE 
DUSUN RIO TINTO 
Up to today, Wana have thus more or less silently boycotted resettlement strategies. More 
current resettlement strategies do have different reasons and motivations but the effects 
on Wana livelihoods remain more or less the same. In Chapter 4 I described the 
settlement of Rio Tinto as a showplace of missionary action in the research area. The 
dusun (sub-village, BI)188 of Taronggo is a relatively new part of the village, located 
south of the main village. It is situated at the border of the nature reserve to the north and 
surrounded by palm oil plantations to the south, east and west. The dusun was built in 
2007 as a refugee resettlement site for Wana from the upland. Heavy rainfalls killing 
around 55 people in total in the Bungku Utara area (The Jakarta Post 2007), had also 
caused a disastrous landslide in the region of Ratobae, located in the mountains north of 
Taronggo and West of Salisarao. Eleven Wana died in this catastrophe.  
Facing this tragic emergency in Morowali Regency, a help force consisting of experts 
from Tadulako University in Palu, funded by Rio Tinto, a multinational mining company, 
was soon established. The help force brought sorely needed medical and other supplies to 
Taronggo and erected a temporary refugee camp for those Wana from the upland who had 
lost their houses and families. In those years, the company Rio Tinto was heavily 
interested in investing in Central Sulawesi; internal research that was conducted in the 
2000s showed an immense nickel deposit in Morowali Regency, “enough to support 
between 40 and 100 years of production” (Mills 2008: 5). The company was eager to 
show its commitment to the project and did pay attention to its overall image in Central 
Sulawesi: “Local communities in Sulawesi and Indonesian national political parties are, 
naturally, excited by the economic potential of a Rio Tinto project” (Mills 2008: 5), so 
Mike Jolley, the former president director of Rio Tinto Indonesia stated in a publication 
published by the company. He further determined:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
188 While desa is the official administrative village unit, a dusun describes a hamlet that administratively 
belongs to the desa but may as well be located geographically outside of the desa (Novaczek et al. 2001: 
12). See also Law 5/1979 on Village Government, paragraph 5. The desa of Taronggo consists of four 
dusun; dusun dua for example comprises administratively all Wana living in the area of Salisaroa and 
Ratobae and a number of other Wana settlements within the upland region. Each dusun has an 
administrative head, the kepala dusun.  
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“To keep the project ‘alive’ in people’s minds, but without raising unrealistic 
expectations, Rio Tinto is committed to investing US$500,000 in a long term, 
broad based community development programme that is currently being planned 
and which will take place whatever the outcome of negotiations” (Mills 2008: 5). 
Part of the money was spent for the immediate help of those families acutely affected by 
the floods and landslide or as Jolley noted, “[t]he Morowali disaster kick started this 
concept in a meaningful way” (Mills 2008: 5). Rio Tinto had been working with Palu’s 
state university, Tadulako University (UNTAD), before and transferred money to the task 
force from the university. The company gave an amount of 250,000 USD for two projects 
to help the victims; one project was meant to ensure education for children from flooded 
villages, the other project consisted of the building of a new settlement site close to 
Taronggo. This undertaking took place in order to “re-house an entire village” (Mills 
2008: 5) and aimed at the resettlement of those families from Posangke and Ratobae up in 
the mountains that were directly affected by the causes of the natural disaster. Together 
with a local inhabitant from Taronggo the team from Tadulako University under the 
direction of Muhammad Marzuki (P4K – Research Center for Peace and Conflict 
Management) chose the location of the new settlement. Exactly 46 houses were built, 
“using traditional designs but modern materials and techniques” (Mills 2008: 5). The 
settlement became a sub-district of Taronggo village and was named after the sponsor: 
Rio Tinto. The immediate reactions were positive according to local sources since people 
were in deep shock by the catastrophe and were frightened to return to the uplands and 
thus relieved to have a new place to stay. The company Rio Tinto stated “that both 
projects have been well received by local people and by local and national governments” 
(Mills 2008: 5). So far, the project seemed to be a success.  
Yet, when I entered the field for the very first time for a preliminary research stay in early 
2011 and spent a day in the settlement of Rio Tinto I was astonished to find an almost 
empty village (Fig. 25-26). The 46 houses were still standing but most of them looked 
very damaged, some had missing walls and doors. Many of them were recaptured by 
nature and fast growing vegetation had entered the houses. It felt indeed like walking 
through a ghost village. It was only after this first stay in the area that I got to read A.C. 
and J. Kruyts accounts on Taronggo and their impressions of the village as a mock 
settlement in the early 20th century. It felt like reading a mirror of my own experience 
when I visited Rio Tinto. Although the resettlement site of Rio Tinto was an immediate 
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well-received accomplishment, those Wana resettled to the new dusun were soon 
beginning to return to the upland regions where they had lived before the natural disaster 
struck them. According to the camat of Bungku Utara and various local sources, location 
of the settlement was not well chosen. Although the new inhabitants of Rio Tinto 
received new houses in an environment relatively safe from flooding and landslides, no 
further land was included in the resettlement package. There was simply no chance to 
make a living from agriculture at all. The only proper way to earn a living was 
employment at the palm oil company. Except for the aforementioned small Christian 
group Alesintowe that has settled there and has opened an orphanage for Wana people 
(see Chapter 4), only the occasional Wana family has settled there permanently. Most 
Wana have returned upland, leaving behind an abandoned settlement, as a testament to 
unsuccessful resettlement goals. Therefore, resettlement in the context of Rio Tinto was a 
failure in the end and Wana people reacted in a similar manner as they did to other 
resettlement efforts; they refused outside administration and returned to their homes in the 
upland area.  
Although the intention for the Rio Tinto resettlement was oriented towards direct help in 
times of a catastrophe, studies show that resettlement initiatives as solutions for natural 
disasters often fail to offer long-term acceptable living conditions and may add to social 
inequalities.189 In their study of a resettlement project at Mt. Tungurahua in Ecuador that 
included the relocation of 26,000 people, Whiteford and Tobin reveal how such a project 
strongly marginalizes those who already have fewer resources to rely upon, whether they 
be economic or social. The authors thus ask provocatively: “If we accept as a given the 
world has become a more hazardous place […], then the question is ‘How do we protect 
those who are most vulnerable’? The unmasking of social policies that reify class-based 
discriminations while masquerading as aid is one way” (Whiteford and Tobin: 198–99). 
The Mt. Tungurahua and Rio Tinto resettlement projects are hardly comparable since 
they differ in a number of ways, let alone the size of the population that was displaced. 
Both examples were overall surely well intended. Nevertheless, a discriminative nature is 
certainly lying underneath the example from Ecuador as well as underneath the Rio Tinto 
project. As Hohmann points out: “When states marginalize or ignore certain populations, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
189 See for example Cernea (1999), Hohmann (2013), or UNDP (2010).  
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placing them at greatest risk of loss of housing, even seemingly natural forces such as 
floods may amount to forced displacement” (Hohmann 2013: 194).190  
In an interview with a local source from Taronggo who was working together with 
UNTAD for the resettlement project, I learned about a conflicting motif. The source was 
a middle aged, well-educated man who came from another region from Sulawesi and only 
moved to Taronggo a couple of years ago. In an interview he explained his main 
motivation to help to resettle the Wana from Ratobae:  
“It is good for them, those up there, if they come down to make a living in a 
village. If they have their own village here. You know, they are practicing 
swidden agriculture and do not want to go to school, the poor people from the 
mountain (kasihan). They want to come down, want to work, their children need 
to go to school.”  
This position illustrates a highly important aspect: The intention underlying the UNTAD 
help force and the government involved was possibly mainly focused on the immediate 
recovery of a disaster-struck area and its inhabitants. However, in some way the will to 
improve upland peoples’ livelihoods according to “modern” ideas of state citizenship and 
progress played an important role in the whole project. Hohmann highlights how “[…] 
forced displacements and relocations have repeatedly been used as tools in policies to 
assimilate and to ‘modernise’ indigenous people. […] it was always implicitly accepted 
that removing indigenous individuals and communities from their lands could be used as 
a tool of acculturation” (Hohmann 2013: 194). It is in this context that the parallels 
between colonial resettlement projects and the relocation in case of natural disaster 
become clear.  
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
190 However, the project of Rio Tinto was not a forced relocation as people in the beginning were moving 
lowland due to a emergency situation. 
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Figure 25 The dusun Rio Tinto. 
Figure 26 Empty house in Rio Tinto. 
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5.4 CURRENT LAND CONFLICT AND RESETTLEMENT PLANS: 
UPLAND WANA IN THE PALM OIL GRIP  
After the installation of Rio Tinto it took only four years until another resettlement idea 
started to affect Wana in the area around Taronggo. This time however, Wana faced 
another, third reason nested behind relocation concerns. It was economic profit combined 
with political endeavor that put a new plan of forced resettlement for Wana into focus. 
Although Wana had already had some experiences with palm oil, Indonesia’s second 
largest export product, the pressure caused by this economic sector and government 
related concerns reached a temporary peak in 2011. It sincerely affected Salisarao Wana 
who were in order to make space for a new plantation area to be relocated to a new 
lowland settlement. To gain a better understanding of Wana political-economic standing 
and their concurring spheres of agency and resistance within this situation it is necessary 
to depict the motives and strategies of company and government aimed at resettling Wana 
first.  
The palm oil industry is a fast growing branch of Indonesia’s economy; together with 
neighboring Malaysia, both countries produce over 85 percent per cent of global palm oil 
products. The overall plantation area for palm oil plantations currently cultivated in 
Indonesia are estimated more than 10 million hectares of land and currently producing 
over 27 million tons of crude palm oil (United Nations Development Programme 2011). 
The country is planning to increase palm oil production up to 40 million tons by the year 
2020 (Yuniar 2014). A heavy side effect of the palm oil sector are environmental 
damages and effects on biodiversity (e.g., Fargione et al. 2008; Butler and Laurence 
2009; Belcher and Schreckenberg 2007; Fitzherbert et al. 2008). While the palm oil sector 
is known to be a major cause for deforestation, it comes as no surprise that Indonesia “has 
recently been acknowledged as the country with the highest rate of deforestation” (Pirard 
et al. 2015). Although palm oil industry is sometimes described as “an attractive pathway 
out of poverty for many rural households” (Teuscher et al. 2015: 307) palm oil 
plantations and companies have received heavy criticism from numerous NGOs and land 
right activists as a cause for deforestation, natural disasters such as landslides and forest 
fires, changing socio economic conditions in a negative way, land grabbing and 
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supporting illegal logging (e.g., Colchester and Jiwan 2006; Pye and Bhattacharya 2013; 
Rist, Feintrenie, and Levang 2010; Steinebach 2013). 
The forests of Sumatra and Kalimantan are so far Indonesia’s areas with the highest 
number of palm oil plantations. Central Sulawesi as the archipelago’s greatest producer of 
cocoa with plantations covering in 2010 an area of around 126,000 hectare has a 
relatively young history with the palm oil sector. Cocoa, copra, cloves as well as palm oil 
are the main products of the province. Palm oil productive outcome “in this region is very 
low, which is about 6 tons per hectare per year” (UN+REDD), covering an area of 1,600 
hectare in four different kabupaten (Wulan 2012). However, Central Sulawesi has several 
palm oil companies investing in the region, companies like PT. Astra Agro Lestari, a sub-
company of the global Astra International Group as well as local companies like PT 
Kurnia Luwuk Sejati.  
The latter has its head office in Luwuk, Kabupaten Banggai, to the east of the research 
area of Taronggo and operates on a mere Central Sulawesi based outreach. No exact 
numbers on the size of PT Kurnias land were available but WALHI Central Sulawesi 
suggested an overall amount of planted and non-planted plantation land belonging to PT 
Kurnia to 20,000 hectares in total. The company mainly operates in Banggai in the 
regencies of Toili, West Toili, Luwuk and Batui, but is currently expanding its territory in 
the kabupaten of Bungku Utara (WALHI n.d.). In 2010 this company aimed to establish 
their oil palm plantation in the Salisarao area and was thus deeply involved in an ongoing 
threat for Wana people living in the area. 
Already in 1997/8 PT Kurnia started to buy land in the area around Taronggo and 
established a great amount of oil palm fields. The village today is nested in an ocean of 
palm oil plantation coming from the South; to the West lies the border of the nature 
reserve, to the East another dusun and a river and to the north the mountains of Salisarao 
(Fig. 26). Like other palm oil companies, PT Kurnia used the nucleus-plasma system 
(Perkebunan Inti Rakyat) to allocate land for the plantation of oil palms. The nucleus-
plasma model has a long history in Indonesia and has become a common form of 
plantation cultivation for the country. Between 1978 and 2001 it played an important role 
for Indonesia’s resettlement strategy project called transmigrasi, where citizens from the 
densely populated islands of Java and Bali were relocated to the archipelago’s less 
populated outer islands “to start a new life” (Vermeulen and Goad 2006: 19; see Chapter 
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2). Policy support from the government and financial support from the World Bank 
provided the foundation of the nucleus-plasma system in the transmigrasi programme and 
companies could allocate land for small holder plots that “would be transferred to 
individual smallholders after 3-4 years” (Vermeulen and Goad 2006: 19). After 2001, 
government support for the Perkebunan Inti Rakyat stopped but it is still widely practiced 
in Indonesia’s palm oil sector. The nucleus-plasma process follows a complex scheme: 
the government gives land to the palm oil company according to its development plan. In 
a second step the government decides how much land of the plantation is fixed for the 
nucleus estate and how much for the communities’ smallholders. Usually the share 
happens in a 5: 2 or 6: 4 ratio, so that smallholders generally receive between 2 or 4 
hectares (Colchester and Jiwan 2006: 12). The problems in this process are manifold and 
deeply influence local communities. For example, land allocations are usually not 
discussed with the local inhabitants nor are local people asked what land parcels shall 
become smallholder shares and what hectares shall become inti – the part of the 
plantation area used only by the company. Even in cases where the community or 
individuals protest, their complaints are usually objected or ignored by the deciding 
government. Further, a lack of information often adds to unequal share of profits since 
often small holders were unaware “that the lands allotted to the nucleus estates would 
thence be considered as State lands […] [e]ven when the leaseholds granted to the 
companies expire […]“ (Colchester and Jiwan 2006: 12–14). The chosen land is usually 
well-cultivated land from local peasants that is handed over to the company. White and 
Dasgupta refer to Sirait’s study on indigenous cultivators from Kalimantan where local 
peasants usually gave around 7.5 hectares for the plasma model while the company takes 
5.5 hectares for their own profit and convert it to state land; 2.0 hectares remain with the 
individual but “will be charged by credit loan for the land clearing, planting materials, 
maintenance, road construction, and land certification” (Sirait 2009: 31; see also White 
and Dasgupta 2011: 28). 
The irony behind this system is critically portrayed in the following statement:  
“The idea that taking away 7.5 ha of sustainably cultivated land from local 
cultivators and returning only 2.0 ha planted with a single low-value monocrop, 
with many costs attached, represents progress for indigenous cultivators is a 
remarkable construction to justify the process of expropriation” (White and 
Dasgupta 2011: 28). 
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Wana people in Taronggo and its surroundings were lured into the nucleus-plasma system 
with similar promises that were only partly fulfilled. Every local person would receive 2.0 
hectares of plasma for individual smallholding, it was told, but many upland Wana claim 
they never saw any hectares of plasma to cultivate.  
In the past, PT Kurnia had already received heavy criticism for its plantation business in 
Toili and raised public awareness. In 2009, the local community in Toili protested heavily 
against the company when PT Kurnia evicted local farmers from their “disputed 275 
hectares of land, arguing that it owned the property. The farmers, however, claimed the 
land was theirs because the company, which initially granted concessions to 100 migrant 
families, later asked them to pay for the fields in installments, citing financial problems” 
(The Jakarta Post 2009). A great number of local farmers in and around Taronggo claim 
that they as well have lost land that was tanah adat to the company. The ultimate promise 
by the company that every inhabitant would receive two hectares of land was never 
fulfilled for many local families living in the area and no one received compensation. The 
arbitrary allocation of land as well as uneven share of economic profit had been a thorn in 
many Wana’s sides right from the start. The feeling of being disadvantaged and 
marginalized compared to their lowland neighbors and kin nests deep among those who 
were left without any benefit from the palm oil boom in the area. Apa Ensi explains:  
“What is happening now, well just look how it started. The PT Kurnia came in 
with a lie, said once the conversion [of the land] is done there will be a 
distribution [of the land]. [But] there are Wana without any share at all. There are 
some people who get 30 are only, others get dozens of hectares. This is always the 
case in Taronggo. People who are already smart (pinter, BI), those who are rich, 
those who indeed have a [nice] life; those people want to take more …. Even if 
there is a community that is poor, here and here. Their poverty is because of the 
actions of the leader (dari ulah pemimpinnya, BI) so that the pressure on the 
people continues.” 
However, Wana cannot easily be described as victims of market forces in agricultural 
terms; they adapt to a changing market, and increasingly engage in cash crop cultivation 
evidenced by the intensification of cocoa cultivation in the uplands. Numerous studies 
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show that indigenous groups are indeed successful cultivators (Sitorus 2002) and Li for 
example has shown how the modern agriculture of the Indonesian uplands have been 
mainly based on the initiative of upland cultivators; thus “the complaint is not against 
market oriented production, but against terms under which such production takes place, 
terms which reflect the uneven distribution of power” (Li 1999a: 31).  
These unequal power relations in Taronggo were driving forces of the new resettlement 
strategy in 2011. People were well aware of the questionable nature of the activities by 
those actors in power who were pulling the strings of the palm oil expansion plan. 
Although the company played its own part in the unequal share of land and production, 
the role of the local government was also critically assessed by local people as the 
following extract of a group interview that I took with three middle-aged Wana men of 
Taronggo in March 2011 exemplifies. Apa Fero who worked together with Apa Dheri for 
PT Kurnia (Fig. 27) and had a positive attitude towards the company, while Apa Tolo was 
rather skeptical: 
Apa Fero: Well the company is good because they have to listen to the 
government as well, the camat, the bupati, all of them. If the camat tells them this 
and that, the company has to follow.  
Apa nTolo: But the camat is also willing to listen to the company when they pay 
money. 
Apa Fero: Oh yes, of course. He [the camat] came in to report that the company is 
going [to open] a plantation around here for example palm oil. We are going to 
need so much land, we need around 1.000 hectares, he said. He already talked 
about inti, how much for inti, he said it should be fifty-fifty or pola [pola= Pola 
Patungan191]. So he maybe already talked about pola but the community does not 
know about the shares of pola. Things like this were always hidden in the dark, 
always kept a secret from the community. So he just ordered 2 hectare per person 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
191 Pola is a slightly different version from the plasma inti system, where smallholders can choose whether 
they work only in plasma cooperative or in the nucleus staff. A model, that tries to “pr-empt conflicts 
arising from the variable performance of individual blocks, but another outcome was greater efficiency” 
(OECD 2012: 276). 
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although his game in fact was not like that, so that people gave all the land to him. 
After planting the land, he already planted so many hectare, that the land was 
already over here; he just went to the people down there to start again.  
By the end of 2010 the situation had come to the point that land had become very scarce 
in the area of Taronggo but the company PT Kurnia was still trying hard to expand its 
plantation territory. The fast growth of the plantation resulted in a new goal for expansion 
that was located in the upland area of Salisarao – the same region where Salisarao Wana 
were living and cultivating their swiddens. In an interview with the village headman, the 
kepala desa, he told me that the plan “was already fixed”. The kepala desa and PT Kurnia 
seemed to have closed a deal while no person from Salisarao was asked for his or her 
will. At that time many Wana households were located in the area of Salisarao. However, 
the kepala desa had new plans for them already: The whole community from Salisarao 
was to be relocated, resettled to a new village that was still to be built. In early 2011, a 
day or so after I had heard for the first time about the new resettlement plan, I was able to 
attend a meeting between PT Kurnia and the kepala desa. In this get-together it was stated 
that plans were already in progress and as soon as by April 2011 the first oil palm was to 
be planted up in Salisarao. Both company affiliates as well as government officials stated 
on further occasions that they were highly enthusiastic about the new plan to provide 
upland Wana with a new modern way of living in a brand-new village with road access, a 
church and a school for the children. The new joint plan completely ignored Wana 
realities living in the upland. Wana in the area of Salisarao were active swidden 
agriculturalists plus they had been successfully engaged in cocoa smallholding farming 
for more than 15 years. The government as well as the company narrowed their goal to 
the expansion plans and disregarded that a resettlement would result in a new lowland 
community of Salisarao Wana as landless peasants similar to their kin from Ratobae, who 
were resettled to Rio Tinto only a couple of years earlier (see above). Neither independent 
cash crop cultivation nor subsistence economy would be possible for them. Additionally, 
most locals did not wish for road access to their community nor did they ask or aim for a 
church in their settlement (see Chapter 4).  
Interestingly, when I asked my Wana interlocutors shortly after I had learned about the 
plan for their opinion on the resettlement, they had not heard about it at all. I was startled 
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that such a plan could progress so far without even trying to include the community in 
question. 
The situation was alarming to everyone and especially threatening for Salisarao Wana 
who were facing the actual loss of their land.  
This novel case of resettlement threat adds another dimension to this chapter and shows 
the economic entanglement between a profit-oriented company and the government. 
Although in the scenario described above, the first goal for both main players was clearly 
the expansion of the palm oil plantation for increasing productivity and profit. However, 
the other impetus was simply given by Wana marginal standing. Through resettlement, 
Salisarao Wana could have easily been transformed to “civilized people” and letting them 
become part of the Indonesian mainstream according to the national discourse as I have 
described earlier. Statements pointing out how those unfortunate Wana could now live 
with electricity and finally could find a way to religion easily exposed the neocolonial 
structure and thinking that were conveniently utilized by the company and the 
government while presenting their idea. It is in this regard that that all three resettlement 
projects stand in one line and are part of the same underlying discourse of control 
mechanisms and progress orientation. 
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Figure 27 Palm oil plantations around Taronggo, 2011; view from the border of the nature reserve. 
Figure 28 Apa Dheri during his work on the palm oil plantation, harvesting oil palm fruits. 
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5.5  MARGINALITY IN TRANSITION: DYNAMICS OF RESISTANCE  
As I have shown above, Wana in the past rarely used open and active resistance to 
counteract government actions aimed towards them. Instead, they insisted on subtle 
resistance strategies that seldom aimed to oppose outside pressure in an active way. 
Silently boycotting resettlement strategies while moving back to the uplands or, as in 
early colonial times, faking a living in early “mock” villages can be portrayed as acts of 
indirect and elusive resistance against a changing system of political government and 
timeframe. This time however, the usual practice of being resettled and then escape back 
to the mountains was no solution, since land in Salisarao was about to be transformed into 
a plantation that would never be used as land to practice swidden agriculture afterwards. 
This time, they needed a new strategy.  
5.5.1 Finding a Way to Resist 
One of the biggest problems counteracting the resettlement plan that my interlocutors 
referred to was the missing information about their rights to their land. Apa Jendi 
expresses his thoughts in an interview about the new resettlement plan: 
“You know, I am worried. I am not sure if he (the kepala desa) is right or not. He 
says we have no right to the land, so we have to believe it. It’s like that, of course 
it is our land, we here (in Salisarao) have been living here a long time, I know this 
land, we have everything here. And now, shall we go there (to Taronggo) and 
work for the palm oil (company)? Ha, no I say, that is not going to happen.”  
Since most upland Wana have no or only little knowledge about land rights, most people 
believed the words spread by PT Kurnia and the government that the land in focus was in 
fact state land (tanah negara, BI) and Wana, although living there for generations, had no 
right to it. In fact, many Wana from Salisarao had no legal documents certifying their 
right to their land. It is indeed a matter of complicity to receive a certificate for land that 
is only used as a swidden. As I have discussed in detail in Chapter 2.2 natural resource 
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management in Indonesia is declared as subject to special property rights to land that is 
hak ulayat, i.e. part of customary tenure systems. This means, that individuals cultivating 
a part of communally owned land may in fact receive individual land rights. Once he or 
she is no longer in need of the land, for example in case of shifting agriculture, the land 
goes back under the responsibility of the community (Barkmann et al. 2010: 146).192 
However, it is also noted in the Basic Agrarian Law that all land that is not permanently 
cultivated by wet-rice and tree crops or in fact is habituated is regarded as state land, 
tanah negara; “the state thus reserves the ultimate right of disposal rather than the land 
being allocated under jurisdictional rights of access (hak ulayat) dictated by local adat” 
(Acciaioli 2007: 312). Fitzpatrick has described how only around 20 percent of the 
Indonesian people hold formal land certificates (Fitzpatrick 2007: 139). Even more 
significant is Sangaji’s result for Central Sulawesi: He showed that of 6,803,300 hectares 
of total landmass in the province, about 4,634,904 hectare were allocated to plantation, 
forestry and mining concessions and another 2,447,637 hectares belonged to protected 
areas. This makes a sum of already allocated land of 7,082,541 hectares – more land than 
Central Sulawesi encompasses, individual land certification holders not even included 
(Sangaji 2007: 326). In 1991 the governor of Central Sulawesi decreed that in his 
province no customary land exits and all land is thus to be perceived as state land 
(Barkmann et al. 2010: 146). It is by this means in sum that the local government of 
Taronggo referred to the upland Salisaro region as state land and ignored the 
community’s call for acceptance as tanah adat.193 Apa Ensi described the difficulties 
obtaining legal land certificates, called SKT (Surat Keterangan Tanah):  
“It is difficult to get SKT for the land in Salisarao. There are gardens that always 
change location (pindah-pindah, BI). Nobody owns a single piece of land; it is 
shared communally, because we always move our gardens. But now then, the 
government comes and says, go get your SKT, you need that document if you are 
scared to move and lose your land. But for which land shall I get a certificate? In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
192 Purchasing land from community own tenure areals is a common scheme for migrants. They often obtain 
SKT for this communally owned land, which often results in conflict with younger members of the 
masyarakt adat. Therefore, Galudra et al. show in their example from Jambi, Sumatra, how migrants 
usually prefer to buy land that is cultivated with typically monocultures so that no further land claims 
from the local community are to be expected (Galudra et al. 2014: 724). 
193 Tana adat is a term that is used in Indonesia synonomously to ulayat (Steinebach 2013: 65; see also 
Benda-Beckmann and Benda-Beckmann 2011). 
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the past no one owned it. We moved to another place, made new gardens and 
nobody said: Take your fingers of my land, it’s mine! But now, the government 
does not understand we up there are different from us here in the kampung or in 
other villages.” 
However, as I have already described, peasants from Salisarao do not merely rely on 
swidden agriculture. Many of them are successful cocoa cultivators nowadays, so that at 
least some of them would easily be able to obtain a SKT for the land. Apa nTina gives 
another example:  
“Take for example Apa nTolo, he is planting cocoa, maybe around 1 hectare. But 
then he takes around 4 hectare to get an SKT. So he can apply for this with a 
complex of land. 4 hectares in which he can plant cocoa but also practice swidden 
agriculture (kebun pindah-pindah).”  
In the national regulations, Salisarao Wana thus did find some way to make their claim 
for SKT eligible. Yet the kepala desa responsible for getting these land certification 
letters issued through the National Agency of Land Affairs (BPN, Badan Pertanahan 
Nasional) and handing these certificates to his local community had long promised to do 
so; despite this, by 2011 most people were still left without any legal document. Instead, 
the kepala desa claimed that the land in Salisarao was currently not in use but only alang-
alang with no use for the community up there – a statement that simply was not true. He 
insisted that land in Salisarao was tanah negara, state owned land, and people had no 
claim to it – a declaration to the effect that most community members from Salisarao and 
also numerous Wana from Taronggo believed his words. Legal uncertainty, as Tania Li 
has called it, provides persons in power at the local level with the opportunity to act on 
the one hand in favor of the local community while on the other hand to follow their own 
intentions, to sell and resell land (Li 2007a: 342) and thus theoretically can act arbitrarily. 
Local headmen thus may “act as sovereigns who can dispossess a land holder when they 
want to access the land themselves” (Li 2007a: 342). “New” rules are then coming in 
charge when headmen tell the community that customary rights to their swiddens are 
heavily restricted as it was the case in Taronggo. These rules that Li describes are also 
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part of the whole argumentation that I found in Taronggo: customary land rules would not 
apply if the land in question encompasses for example more than 2.0 hectares per 
individual, if there was no payment of taxes or a legal certification letter like the SKT 
noted with the village government as well as when land had not been used for more than 
five years. As Li puts this situation in Central Sulawesi together:  
“The legal standing of any of these ‘rules’ would certainly be disputed by legal 
experts on customary land rights. But in the absence of countervailing knowledge 
and support, a headman’s bullying is sufficient to unsettle villagers who are 
isolated and unsure of their ground” (Li 2007a: 342). 
Indonesia has undergone major changes and the process of decentralization has 
transferred more rights to the provinces, regencies and villages. Nevertheless, although 
regional autonomy was introduced to strengthen local level entities like the desa, in early 
2011 the situation in Taronggo looked very frustrating to the local community. In a 
situation where it seemed to my interlocutors as if no right existed for Wana people, it felt 
hard to believe in the outcome of decentralization or as the authors such as Erb et al. 
argue: that decentralization and regionalism has not always worked in favour of 
masyarakat adat who “are still not being given the kind of autonomy that they desire, to 
design and arrange their own culture and communities” (Erb, Beni, and Anggal 2004: 
150).  
For instance, declared in the Law 22/1999 on Regional Autonomy is the invention of the 
Badan Perwakilan Desa (BPD), also called village representative body. According to the 
1999 Law, the BPD consists of a number of people whose job it is to guard a community 
in the way that local adat is protected and accepted; “to make the rules of the desa; to 
make sure that the needs and desires of the population are heard; and to make sure that 
the local village government acts properly and does its job”.194 The BPD is also supposed 
to watch over the kepala desa, the village head. In sum, the village representative body 
was acknowledged in Law 22/1999 as a motivator for local participation and functioned 
as an effort to finish the era of KKN (korupsi, kolusi, nepotisme, BI; abbreviation for 
corruption, collusion and nepotism), that was part of the New Order era until 1998. 
Because of this immanent position, the BPD is described as a highly important and even 
critical medium in local community affairs or as Erb et al. explain the setting: As a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
194 Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia 22/1999 tentang Pemerintahan Daerah (Law 22/1999 on Regional 
Government), Passage 104, translation by Erb et al. (2005: 170).  
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counterpart to the kepala desa, the BPD will remain the target of the former, who if “he 
still wants to be involved in corruption, etc., will do his best to keep control of power in 
the village and obstruct the BPD” (Erb, Beni, and Anggal 2004: 170). Nevertheless the 
power of the BPD was significantly weakened in the new legislation of 2004195 which 
retitled the BPD from “Village Representative Council” to “Village Deliberative Council” 
(Badan Permusyawaratan Desa) (McCarthy et al. 2014: 256). However, neither in the 
Law 32/2004 nor in the current Draft Law of 2012 the BPD is elected by the community 
but receives its status by appointment.196 Antlov and Eko point out that while the village 
unit is currently receiving increased funds and functions, “it would be desirable to further 
strengthen the independence and oversight function of village councils [...]. With proper 
guidance and facilitation, village accountability bodies can improve service without 
causing disorder and conflicts) [...]”. The authors suggest that a return to the original 
formulation to the Law 22/1999, when the BPD was still elected by the community, could 
strengthen the role of the BPD; “Making the village government accountable for the 
community and the BPD would improve its responsiveness and capacity to manage funds 
and provide services” (Antlov and Eko 2012: 14). Although the function of the BPD has 
nowadays less power as was originally proclaimed in Law 22/1999, it nevertheless is still 
the local medium that can become a guardian over the village head’s operations, in more 
than just cases of conflict. This circumstance becomes remarkable when looking at the 
situation in Taronggo where Salisarao Wana were facing resettlement plans by kepala 
desa and PT Kurnia. The BPD could have functioned as a mediator between community 
and government interest and probably could have helped clarify local community rights 
and needs that clearly differed from the kepala desa’s standing. However, the head of the 
BPD (Ketua BPD) in Taronggo was no less than the kepala desa’s very own father. Thus, 
it is no wonder the BPD did not play a role in countering the resettlement plan for good.  
Another instance showed how power on the local level is essentially nested in the position 
of the kepala desa. Apa Asan was kepala dusun dua, the elected headman of one 
administrative sub-village of Taronggo,197 that included people from Salisarao, Ratobae 
and those Wana living not in the area of the actual kampung. When he heard about the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
195 Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia 32/2004 tentang Pemerintahan Daerah (Law 32/2004 on Regional 
Government), Passage 209-210. 
196 According to a local source the current BPD consisted of individuals that appointed themselves. 
197 See also fn. 163.  
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plans of the company to expand to the area of Salisarao he went directly to the kepala 
desa to ask for the background of this new initiative. He explains:  
“I was very upset when I heard about the plan that he let [them, the company] 
enter because there was in fact no approval; so I went to ask him: Why does the 
company already has the data [about the land]? I heard there already was a 
meeting? I said, I alone am kepala dusun, I do not know about this meeting, even 
though I have people up there (warga di atas). How in fact did held the meeting? 
Who invited [the people]? Wah, he said, that’s wrong the way you say it. [..] He 
fired me. He said I am not organizing the people well; that I am doing my job 
disorderly (kacau). He fired me. So I said, silahkan pecat.” 
For my interlocutors it was a situation where they felt left without any power for 
opposition or counteraction. Although after the end of the New Order the law had 
changed significantly, but without access to it (or knowledge about it), the situation for 
Salisarao Wana had not changed much after 1998. 
5.5.2 “Powerful Friends” 
Within this field of uneven allocation of power and knowledge it became clear for Wana 
that they needed legal advice and assistance in order to resist the current resettlement 
plan. In this threatening situation they turned to their, as I call it, “powerful friends”. This 
category is in need of some thorough explanation.  
Cultural Anthropology has a long history of dealing with questions of what may be called 
activism. Early anthropologists like Franz Boas, Ruth Benedict and Margaret Mead have 
placed their research to some extent in the field of critically assessing the role of the own 
academic discipline and thus inspiring a later emerging field that is variously called 
collaborative anthropology, action anthropology, public anthropology or engaged 
anthropology (Lassiter 2009: 72). 198  In the 1990s the American Anthropological 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198 The AAA also refers to the role of engagement within the goal of the disciplines: “Anthropologists 
collaborate closely with people whose cultural patterns and processes we seek to understand or whose 
living conditions require amelioration. Collaboration helps bridge social distances and gives greater voice 
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Association was pushing further towards a deeper focus on engaged anthropology and 
Nancy Scheper-Hughes called for a militant anthropology (1995). Coming back as an 
anthropologist to a shantytown in Brazil where she formerly had worked as a community 
worker, she faced the dilemma that community members did not understand how her role 
was different now and that this would prevent her from helping them the way she had 
helped them 20 years ago. She tried to explain how her focus as an anthropologist was 
now “to observe, to document, to understand, and later to write about their lives and pain 
as fully, as truthfully, and as sensitively as I could” (Scheper-Hughes 1995: 410). When 
community members asked her to further engage in bettering local conditions, she 
answered “I cannot be an anthropologist and a companheira at the same time” (Scheper-
Hughes 1995: 410). But when the community gave her an ultimatum to support them as a 
companheira, she became more and more involved in political work and realized that “the 
times and anthropology had changed” (Scheper-Hughes 1995: 411). She concludes  
“that cultural relativism, read as moral relativism, is no longer appropriate to the 
world in which we live and that anthropology, if it is to be worth anything at alI, 
must be ethically grounded: ‘If we cannot begin to think about social institutions 
and practices in moral or ethical terms, then anthropology strikes me as quite 
weak and useless’” (Scheper-Hughes 1995: 410). 
Scheper-Hughes’ call for the “primacy of the ethical” opened the stage for a thorough 
approach to engaged anthropology within the discipline, for instance exemplified with the 
appearance of a new journal called “Collaborative Anthropologies” in 2008.199 Low and 
Merry present a detailed overview of the development of the field of engaged 
anthropology and provide a typology that helps to sharpen the plural attempts that are 
hidden within in this field, including sharing and support, teaching and public education, 
social critique, collaboration, advocacy and activism. Advocacy is the type of engaged 
anthropology that encompasses those actions that aim to “assist local communities in 
organizing efforts, giving testimonies […]” (Peacock 2010: 210) and includes the role of 
the anthropologist as intermediaries between local people, government and various 
institutions. It is in this sphere in which the category of the “powerful friend” can be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
to the people whose cultures and behaviors anthropologists study, enabling them to represent themselves 
in their own words. An engaged anthropology is committed to supporting social change efforts that arise 
from the interaction between community goals and anthropological research”. Accessed 13th December 
2015. http: //www.aaanet.org/about/whatisanthropology.cfm. 
199 Collaborative Anthropologies. Accessed 13th December 2015. http: //coll-anth.anth.ubc.ca/. 
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located.200 Engaged anthropology is made by engaged anthropologists claims James 
Peacock righteously (Peacock 2010), but when we combine local agency with the role of 
engaged anthropologists, I believe the local perspective becomes even further meaningful. 
Although anthropology needs to think of its commitment and usefulness in new and more 
engaged ways, the question of why anthropologists become engaged should not be 
neglected. As Scheper-Hughes’ example shows, it was her local contacts that brought her 
in the situation to broaden her focus during fieldwork and to become an active, militant or 
collaborative anthropologist. Dorothy Hodgson has shown how she perceived her role as 
an anthropologist as an interlocutor within the Maasai indigenous movement. She refuses 
to see herself as a collaborator but instead describes her position as a:  
scholar who shares her ideas and work with Maasai activists and organizations in 
ongoing, constructive, and perhaps, even occasionally contentious dialogues and 
debates in an effort to inform and shape their policies and practices, without 
directly aligning myself with one group or faction of the movement (Hodgson 
2011: 15).201  
Although I completely understand and agree with Hodgson’s description of her role in the 
field as an interlocutor, I cannot apply it easily for my own research setting. The rather 
neutral term of an interlocutor would not fit the idea my local informants had of me. The 
people I met, lived with, engaged in interviews, and so on perceived of me as a person 
with significant power – something they lacked substantially while facing the threat of 
land loss. Even though Wana people did not approach and issue an ultimatum to help 
them as was the case for Scheper-Hughes, the sheer fact that I received information about 
the resettlement before they had, put me in a position where they simply expected me to 
suggest a solution. For them, it was no matter of debate if I would use the power they 
believed I had, to support them as their “powerful friend”. I do not think that using any 
other word than friend makes sense in the specific setting. Yuno, friend, is the word they 
used for me, it was a role they ascribed to me, just the way Scheper-Hughes was not only 
anthropologist from her perspective but also companheira from her local counterparts’ 
point of view. It is in this sense that the power aligned with their “friend”, the 
anthropologist, became part of Wana agency. Aligning myself with one group or one side 
of the protest was a decision that I thought I had to make – but it was also already made 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
200 Alas, I believe the distinction between activism and advocacy as found in Low and Merry’s typology is 
not a very helpful one since I believe both encompass the same form of commitment. 
201 See also Grumblies (2013).  
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for me by my Wana interlocutors. However the category does not apply only to the 
anthropologist but is extendable to those actors that were in possession of power and 
knowledge that would and did offer Wana support and help in their way of practicing 
resistance in the specific situation of land struggle I have described above.  
5.5.3 Chronicles of Resistance  
After a number of discussions and debates about the scope of the opportunities Salisarao 
Wana had to resist, actual and active resistance began finally with the idea to put a 
signature list into life. This idea – but not its implementation – was my responsibility. I 
suggested this form towards several Wana, among them Apa Asan, as a first solution to 
reveal whether indeed most Wana in Salisarao were against it and as a document for 
further communication with government officials and PT Kurnia. It is important to note 
that Apa Asan as one of the leading figures of the process of “becoming indigenous” is 
himself a Muslim from Bungku who had come to live in Taronggo several years ago, 
searching for work. He married Indo Asan, a Wana woman who converted for him to 
Islam but still has very close ties with Wana – in terms of belief as well as culture. Apa 
Asan and his wife are frequently in the upland region of Salisarao, where they also plant 
cocoa and they were widely accepted as mutual and trustworthy kin. In the following I 
will describe the process of enabling a new form of resistance among Wana people, 
drawing on field notes and interviews I took during this time. 
In mid-February 2011 Apa Asan together with Apa Jendi, Indo and Apa De’u as well as 
Apa Yare and Indo Felu organized a meeting for all Wana that were interested to hear 
about a way to offer resistance in a house in the Salisarao area. Just as we had expected 
not many people came; the distances are far, the weather was not good but most 
importantly, people from Salisarao were hesitant to easily believe their kin from the 
kampung and feared personal interest and profit were the main intention of one of the 
main speakers. However, most of them had meanwhile heard about the new resettlement 
plan and as I knew from many discussions I had in advance with people from Salisarao, 
the majority was upset and alarmed by the plan. Two individuals nevertheless were 
skeptical and declared on that evening they indeed wanted the company to invest in 
Salisaro since they were hoping for road access which would make the smallholder cocoa 
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plantations easier to manage. When I was asked about my opinion I explained that the 
signature list was a chance to hinder the government plans to enter Salisarao. However, I 
made clear to those two who were skeptical, without the company there would probably 
be no road to Salisarao. Although the main speaker of this meeting, Apa Asan, made it 
clear how it was very crucial that everyone put his signature under the list, I insisted that 
no one should feel any pressure. After the meeting, Apa Yare, one of the elders of 
Salisarao took the list back to his house and would circulate it from lipu to lipu so that 
people could sign it. The list was backed by the following text (Fig. 29):  
Surat Pernyataan / Letter of statement 
We the community who signs this list does not agree with the development of oil 
palm in Salisarau.  
Only four days later I wrote in my field diary:  
“Around sixty signatures have already come together. There is an excitement in 
the air that everyone seems to be part of. There is no talking about something else; 
everything circles around the idea that no palm oil should be planted in Salisarao” 
(18.02.2011).  
As I have shown above Wana usually never actively opposed government plans, but this 
time they had made their veto very clear. The letter thus signifies in some way the 
genuine beginning of “open Wana resistance”. Once all signatures were given, the letter 
was sent to the bupati, the forest office and various other instances. While numerous 
discussions followed with neighbors from upland as well as lowland, finally the kepala 
desa as well as the company planned to initiate a community meeting on that matter. It 
was initially planned to be obtained in the upland region of Salisarao; Pak Muhrad, the 
local representative of PT Kurnia, and the kepala desa planned to hike upland and had 
already commanded Apa Nevi, one of the village Wana, to organize a couple of chickens 
to be slaughtered for the upland meeting. People were curious why the meeting would be 
held upland, since many people who had signed the letter were in fact also lowland Wana. 
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The strategy behind this was simple: If the meeting would be held in the upland region 
not many people from the village, who were brave enough to speak in public and more 
fluent in Bahasa Indonesia compared to their upland neighbours, would join because of 
the hiking distance. Apa De’u explained to me: 
“We will go to the kampung, we will meet them there, where everyone can come 
and listen. We do not want them up here, where they can keep on telling lies to us. 
Look, Apa E. (Wana from Taronggo) for example, he supports this, but will he 
come and hike up all the way? He is too tired and old. But when we are in the 
kampung, he will come and will get angry.”  
Salisarao Wana thus aimed instead for a meeting in the community hall of Taronggo 
where meetings were usually held; they basically had high hopes for support from their 
“more educated” kin and neighbors in the village.  
Thus, when the day of the planned meeting arrived, 27 February 2011, Salisarao Wana 
interfered with the initial plan and instead hiked down to the village to hold the meeting 
there. Preempting the kepala desa, they had to wait a very long time. The day chosen by 
kepala desa and PT Kurnia was a Sunday and interestingly the kepala desa decided to 
attend church service, followed by an unofficial gathering afterwards. It was said that as 
the waiting people were starting to get upset, the kepala desa feared to discuss the matter 
within the “realm of the law” and they were sure that an upland meeting had strongly 
supported kepala desa and company to keep on lying about rights and manipulation the 
non-educated citizens from above (Fig. 30). Here, it becomes clear again how the upland 
served the idea of a stateless and lawless hinterland, where the uncivilized and primitive 
dominated. However, in the end the meeting took place with a serious delay. The 
representative from the palm oil company explained how the development of a new 
plantation in the upland would bring progress and the opportunity to buy a car for 
everyone; one of my interlocutors whispered during the meeting that no one in Taronggo 
owned a car although PT Kurnia had been around for a couple of years. The 
representative continued to ask whether Wana did not want their grandchildren to be rich 
and happy one day. Apa Yare from Salisarao replied and asked where his grandchildren 
should take land from when every parcel of land would be covered with palm oil one day. 
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He and his upland neighbors further complained about the unequal share of land that they 
had already experienced when PT Kurnia initially started their business in Taronggo. 
Although only few of the lowland villagers attended, Salisarao Wana were speaking up 
for their rights, bravely, loudly and in their own language.  
In the end, the representative of the company explained that if the community did not 
want them to establish a new plantation in their area, they would not further continue their 
plans; they would not force anyone against their will (kami tidak akan paksa, BI). This 
decision marked the end of the meeting. The statement was celebrated as a first success of 
resistance and Salisarao Wana as well as myself, were momentarily relieved. 
Nevertheless, as the days passed, more people in the community began to lose faith in the 
decision. More and more people reported that the official’s “helping hands” had intimated 
them. I was myself cautious about my own involvement in the affair; even before the 
meeting I wrote an episode in my diary that made clear, that the government as well as 
the company knew about my involvement in the act of resistance:  
“Two days ago I was walking through the village and passed the house of the 
kepala desa and we had some small talk. He mentioned that Pak Muhrad 
(representative of PT Kurnia) had visited him the evening before and they had had 
a look at my letter (surat, BI). I became suspicious, how did he suddenly came to 
look at my research permit that he never had been interested in before?”  
Later, in March 2011 I spoke to a contact from outside who himself was a member of a 
political organization of the region and thus knew local politics and the government very 
well. He told me that chances were very low that the plan could still be hindered; the 
company was strong and its head had very solid ties with the regency’s government in 
Luwuk; according to my source, he had invested a huge amount of money in the 
kabupaten. My source warned me to stay out of this conflict if I wanted to continue my 
research, because it might become problematic for me. Not long afterwards, as my 
fieldwork was coming to an end, I met the local representative of the company while 
walking alone through the area of Salisarao. I was curious what he was doing in the 
upland region and while chatting with him, he asked for the exact day of my departure. 
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He then told me that once I returned to Germany, the original plan for expansion and 
resettlement would immediately start again.  
It became clear that the signature list had been a good start but in a setting where legal 
expertise was hard to come by, it was simply not enough. Because of the continuing 
threat to lose their land, Wana people searched for more “powerful friends”. They turned 
to NGOs to help them further. A member of Yayasan Sahabat Morowali (YSM), a local 
NGO from Kolonodale, came to Taronggo for a meeting with Salisarao Wana. As YSM 
already had worked with Wana within the Cagar Alam, they were well familiar with 
Wana culture and needs. He explained a lot about their rights and opportunities and 
requested a copy of the signature list. Furthermore, it was the cooperation with NGO 
Yayasan Merah Putih (YMP) that was an urgent wish by Salisarao Wana. I had met 
members from YMP a couple of times when I went to Palu. The NGO is based in Central 
Sulawesi’s capital Palu and already had a lot of experience working with Wana people 
from the northern area of Bulang. 202  The staff of YMP provided me with great 
knowledge about the northern area and insights into land right questions and indigenous 
peoples’ struggles in Central Sulawesi. YMP had, among other things, successfully 
supported Northern Wana’s fight against a resettlement plan in that region. Additionally, 
they had invented the sikola lipu, a special form of school named after the Wana word for 
their local settlements, the lipu (see introduction). This self-organized school teaches 
basic skills and offers at least some education for Wana people, for example writing and 
reading. It is led by NGO-trained Wana individuals and thus organized by Wana people 
themselves. Most importantly, it is a school without any religious commitment.  
Because YMP had focused in their work on Northern Wana I had only mentioned the 
NGO once and more in passing towards my local interlocutors. I was surprised by the 
great interest from Salisarao Wana side. As I have shown in the previous chapters, Wana 
ground their marginalized standing also partially on insufficient education. Although the 
distances from their upland lipu to lowland schools are one reason, most importantly 
upland Wana are reluctant to send their children to Christian schools. While lowland 
Wana do encourage their children to go to school they are not too excited about it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
202 For a description of Bulang Wana (Kabupaten Tojo Una Una) and their entanglement with YMP, see the 
work of Nasution Camang (2003).  
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because, as I have shown above, teaching Christian values, praying and singing religious 
songs are perceived of as tools to missionize Wana children.  
After I had told them about this NGO initiative of the sikola lipu, my local interlocutors 
kept on discussing this option and on numerous nights people were asking me over and 
over again about the details of this school. They decided to write a letter to the NGO and 
asked YMP for help in their current situation. Here are some extracts of the letter:  
“Our community of Salisarao, area of desa Taronggo, is asking the bapak-bapak 
and ibu-ibu of Yayasan Merah Putih for help. For around eight months we have 
been alarmed that PT Kurnia wants to enter our area, although still we do not 
agree [with this plan] because this land is our ancestor’s land and adat land. If 
palm oil enters this area we will have no place left to cultivate our gardens […]. 
Also, many members [of our community] still follow our culture and have 
swidden gardens (kebun pindah-pindah). In 1997 PT KURNIA entered the region 
of desa Taronggo. At that time they already had promised that every person 
would get 2 hectares of land but many of us only received 70 area or less and 
some did not receive anything at all. There are many problems with PT KURNIA 
for Taronggo, currently around 90 percent of the land that belonged to Taronggo 
is now owned by people from outside. There is not much land left. Therefore PT 
Kurnia now wants to enter Salisarau, dusun of Taronggo. [Explanation of 
signature list and meeting with company and kepala desa] Pak Muhrad from 
Kurnia had sworn during that meeting not to enter Salisarau. Now we know that 
he was not telling the truth. After the community meeting they still tried to talk to 
people to make them sell their land […] We are very worried […]. We wish that 
our children will become smart so that if there are more problems like the one 
with PT KURNIA and village government or with Alisintowe [sic] we can help 
ourselves. But we probably need a school for that. We already got some 
information from the people of YMP about your help for other suku-suku in 
Sulawesi. We already saw a movie about palmoil and we have already been 
talking long about the YMP program of sekolah lipu. We were really gad to get 
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these information and we hope that YMP will maybe help us as well. So, we 
really beg YMP: Please help us before it is too late.”203  
As a result of this initiative, the NGO invited Wana people for a visit. In July 2011 two 
members of the Wana community, Apa Asan and Apa Feli, went to Palu to meet with the 
members of YMP (Fig. 31). I helped them arranging transportation and accommodation 
but since I was soon about to head back home to Germany I decided not to follow them. 
They had never been to Palu so it was an exciting experience for all of Salisarao Wana. 
At that moment it seemed to be important that this interaction between Wana and their 
new “powerful friends”, the NGO, would happen without my involvement. When Apa 
Asan and Apa Feli came back, they were very excited and brought with them many new 
ideas, new knowledge about right and the feeling that they were not alone with their 
problems. It was shortly after that I returned to Germany and meanwhile kept out of the 
dynamics between the NGO and Wana. It took around six months before I returned. 
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  Translation by Grumblies.	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Figure 29 Collecting signatures in Salisarao. 
Figure 30 Waiting at the community hall in Taronggo for the meeting with kepala desa and PT 
Kurnia. 
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Figure 31 Apa Fik discussing community boundaries during a meeting with Yayasan Merah Putih in 
Palu (Photo: Apa Ester 2011). 
Figure 32 Indo Laku with an NGO magazine focusing on palm oil. 
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5.6  BECOMING INDIGENOUS: SUDDENLY MASYARAKAT ADAT 
When I returned to Indonesia for my last research stay in March 2012, something was 
different; “the atmosphere in Taronggo changed a lot, people seem to be way more 
enthusiastic about the whole situation. The plans for the sekolah lipu have become very 
serious” I wrote in my field diary. The community I met in 2012 had a very different 
attitude than the one I had left when I returned to Germany the year before. Cooperation 
with NGOs was in its infancy while I was still around and Salisarao Wana still had not 
much knowledge about other indigenous groups fighting for their rights; they had not 
much heard about NGOs at all and about a movement concerned with indigenous 
communities like they themselves were. In 2012 however, they were suddenly using a 
different scheme to describe their setting. They presented themselves no longer as 
uneducated and poor victims in a palm oil conflict but were now using the term 
masyarakat adat (adat community) as a way to describe their standing as a unique 
indigenous group that comes along with a specific status and set of rights. The change 
was obvious: While I had been gone they became part of a nationwide process often 
called masyarakat adat movement.  
Let me briefly recall the outset of this movement. A global indigenous peoples movement 
started in Australia and America and spread to Asia and Africa by the 1990s. In Indonesia 
the revival of local custom that marked the indigenous peoples movement in the 
archipelago started with the decentralization and democratization processes after the 
downfall of Suharto regime in 1998. Especially the marginalized standing of indigenous 
communities and factors like poverty and suppression added to the nationwide movement. 
Thus, the movement was not simply formed and directed by global structures and 
processes but had specific national historical roots or as Henley and Davidson describe: 
“the current interest in adat is not just a national offshoot […]. The revival also reflects a 
specifically Indonesian ideological tradition in which land, community and custom […] 
provide the normative reference points for political struggles” (Henley and Davidson 
2008: 849). 
Wana entered the movement out of the necessity to find opportunities to resist 
resettlement plans and thus to fight for their land. This is the same reason why the 
movement in Indonesia started 1999 with a first meeting of the Aliansi Masyarakat Adat 
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Nusantara (AMAN) in Jakarta, using the slogan “If the state does not recognise us, we 
will not recognise the state” (Moniaga 2007; Hauser-Schäublin 2013: 6; see also Chapter 
2). Adat communities came together to find a way to express violations of their rights; for 
example, in the case of land loss and other experiences of suppression and neglect that 
were not a mere product of the New Order regime but a result of specific historical 
circumstances and constellations beginning in the colonial area (Hauser-Schäublin 2013: 
7). The masyarakat adat movement gained widespread interest and became a powerful 
organ for indigenous peoples in the country.  
Against the background of a debate around the ecological noble savage (Raymond 2007, 
Redford 1991; see Chapter 1), NGOs have often been criticized for painting a 
romanticizing picture of indigenous peoples as the only possible protectors of the 
environment. Tania Li has shown how AMAN activists in Central Sulawesi in 2003 were 
still upholding such an image of masyarakat adat as “ecologically noble savages” 
(Raymond 2007; Redford 1991) and were stating “that there still exist communities in 
Indonesia living in harmony with their environment, possessed of indigenous ecological 
knowledge” (Li 2007a: 343). Additionally they would share communal land right systems 
and practice an indigenous form of democratic autonomy, described by activists as “an 
oasis in the middle of the desert” (Li 2007a: 343). In this sense, the idea of an indigenous 
group in Indonesia “that is reminiscent of the noble savage of earlier times” (Hauser-
Schäublin 2013: 12) but likewise as “self-organized people” uncovers a national context 
in which the imagination of indigeneity is closely connected to local or countrywide 
experiences. For Li, in Indonesia the idea of masyarakat adat  
“presented […] the direct inverse of everything that was problematic about New 
Order development: individualism, greed, ecological destruction, an emphasis on 
modernity understood as Westernization, control by international financial 
institutions, burdensome glossed as globalisation” (Li 2007a: 343).  
However, a definition of indigenous people still does not come easy since it is a highly 
political issue not only on a national but international scale (Göcke 2013; Cabrera 
Ormaza 2013; Dove 2006; Kuper 2003; Pelican 2009). Masyakarat adat in Indonesia are 
quite diverse and have multiple motivations and interests entering the movement (Klenke 
2013, Hauser-Schäublin 2013), a reason why Li insists on a “difficulty of locating the 
perfect adat subject” (2007a: 343). Dove et al. elucidate on anthropologist’s exaggerative 
interest in the concept of indigeneity itself and ask: “What do we make of the 
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extraordinary coincidence that anthropology (and the social sciences) began to critique 
the concept of indigeneity at the very time that it was being legitimised by mainstream 
global organizations like the United Nations and the International Labour Organization?” 
(Dove et al. 2007: 147–48). 
Thus, instead of trying to find a fitting definition of indigenous people or to assess the 
relevance of the adat movement for the nation itself, I focus here on the politics of 
becoming masyakarat adat for the Wana.204 Framing them as masyarakat adat has far-
reaching consequences for Wana people since it meant empowerment through indigeneity 
or as Li has called out: “the discourse of adat is a political force” (2007a: 338). Adat can 
be an important source of power for historically marginalized people, as the Wana of 
Central Sulawesi are; but Wana first had to learn how to gain access to it, with the help of 
their “powerful friends”, and then faced the task to handle it properly. As I have already 
mentioned, Salisarao Wana were not aware of the power that lies within the labeling as 
masyarakat adat nor had many of them heard about AMAN, YMP or Sawit Watch – 
NGOs that could definitely play a role as a “powerful friends” for them. As Li has shown: 
“Most Central Sulawesi villagers are not aware of definitional debates among activists 
and scholars taking place in the provincial capital Palu and in other urban centers” 
(2007a: 345).  
However, in 2012, the situation had changed: suddenly Wana people had become 
masyarakat adat. When I returned to the field, almost every household I visited in 
Salisarao and also lowland Wana households were now equipped with information 
material from NGOs in form of leaflets, magazines and books about indigenous groups, 
land rights and the palm oil problematic in Indonesia (Fig. 32). In the kampung of 
Taronggo, Wana from the upland as well as from Taronggo, came together to watch 
explanatory DVDs handed out by NGOs. I learned that a great number of meetings with 
YMP and other NGOs had happened while I had been gone. Salisarao Wana even met the 
wakil bupati (vice bupati) in December 2011 – an incident that had great motivational 
effect for them. Apparently three members went to the regency’s capital to meet the wakil 
bupati. Every masyarakat adat was invited to send three representatives, so people not 
only from Taronggo but also from Lemo, Salubiro and other places went to follow the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
204 For a detailed overview of the politics of adat in Indonesia, approaches and definitions see the edited 
volume Adat and Indigeneity in Indonesia (Hauser-Schäublin 2013).  
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invitation. The wakil bupati, so it was told to me, gave a long speech and promised to 
back up everything the indigenous groups wanted. According to local interlocutors, he 
was very fond of Wana culture and mentioned that it was important to write down Wana 
law (hukum, BI), so that it could officially be recognized. The Wana representatives 
expressed their needs and mentioned that many people were keeping up the idea of Wana 
people as people who belum punya agama. “Who says that (Siapa bilang? BI)? The 
government is stupid if it does not want to deal with Wana people”, he is supposed to 
have said – coming from the mouth of a government man. I was not there to witness this 
episode and cannot count for the accuracy of the details. However, what is relevant for 
the process of becoming indigenous is the changed attitude that comes with this incident 
and signifies the change that took place among Wana people. The feeling and impression 
of being marginalized had experienced serious transformation at least for some people. 
Many of my interlocutors, though not all of them, expressed enhanced self-confidence 
when talking to officials or merely outsiders. Now they were using Indonesian language 
in a sense of using the authority’s language, although not always fluent, but were thus 
“able to speak to power” (Jackson and Warren 2005: 557). Had they felt highly shy (mea) 
before, they now were content to have learned how to express needs and how to address 
political matters. Tania Li has observed similar transformations during interviews she had 
conducted between 2001 and 2003 at AMASUTA (Alliansi Masayarakat Adat Sulawesi 
Tengah, Alliance of Indigenous Peoples of Central Sulawesi) meetings in Central 
Sulawesi. Here she met leaders of indigenous groups who stated that they had learned by 
NGOs like WALHI practical tasks to make their needs more visible for government 
officials and who had “’learned to talk bravely’” (2007a: 346) in a similar meaning as my 
interlocutors stated in 2011, when they further described how they were now no longer 
afraid to speak up for their rights and had now learned how to behave berani 
(courageous). Now they knew about their rights and would no longer shy away when 
facing a government official. 
Apart from these changes in attitude another and probably more important change that 
occurred among Wana people was connected to the aforementioned wish for their own 
school, the sikola lipu. Members of YMP had recognized this urgent wish when they 
received the letter from Salisarao Wana in 2011. Accordingly they soon started with their 
schooling program. In January 2012 a group of YMP affiliates, including the 
organization’s head, Nasution Camang, arrived in Taronggo to assess the area. In a two-
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day workshop they trained six locals to become teachers for their community. 
Nevertheless, no one from the area of Salisarao had attended; an instance that was also 
explained by weather conditions. Thus, the six individuals were in fact four Wana women 
and one man who were living in Taronggo, all of them closely connected to their upland 
kin. One man, Apa Eka, also received training although he was no Wana but had married 
a Wana woman; he was Muslim and his wife had turned to Muslim faith as well. 
Nevertheless, he was very understanding and cared a lot for Salisarao Wana. However, 
his involvement as a teacher was a bone of contention for some Wana. The most 
important aspect of the idea of sikola lipu was its independence of any religious content. 
With Apa Eka some Wana worried that he would use his position as a teacher to hide 
Muslim intentions behind his efforts. Further, he was not able to communicate in Bahasa 
Taa and was not very well known among upland Wana. By contrast, Apa Asan, one of 
the leading figures in the process, was a Muslim and outsider as well as I have mentioned 
above. But he was frequently in the upland region and had developed very close ties with 
Salisarao Wana so that distrust towards his person was not as big as it was against the 
person of Apa Eka.  
Four months later, two of the trained teachers among them Apa Eka went to Palu to 
receive further training in the NGOs headquarter. Meanwhile, a group of Wana from 
upland who were highly enthusiastic about the whole idea, started to build a house for the 
school project in the area of Salisarao. When I came back to Taronggo for my last 
research stay I stumbled right into the preparation for the opening of the school. I took the 
chance and talked long to the trained teachers and community members that had been to 
Palu.  
By mid of April a meeting was announced to happen in Pumbatuu, a place half way 
between the village and Salisarao. This meeting was announced to discuss the 
inauguration of the sikola lipu and to ask for everyone’s opinion. Around 60 people came 
which was considered a big success. Three of the trained teachers appeared as well and 
explained the idea of the school to the community. Apa Eka, the Muslim teacher, was 
worried that his involvement would hinder Wana to send their children to the sikola lipu. 
He gave a long speech about his involvement and insisted that religion will not be a 
matter for the school and that people should not worry about him being a Muslim. In the 
end, the outcome was in favor of the school, although some Wana were still skeptical 
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about the concept. The community decided together that the school should take place 
every Monday and Thursday.  
Two days afterwards, on 19 April 2012, the first day of the sikola lipu started.  
While six teachers who were literate had been trained, two of them had already resigned 
from the task and I was not sure whether the school would be a success. But when the 
remaining four teachers hiked uphill to the schooling house they were startled by their 
welcome committee (Fig. 33). More than 50 children and around 15 adults from the 
upland region had gathered in the school building, some of them had hiked for more than 
two hours to attend their first day of school (Fig. 34-35). While Apa Eka started to teach 
the adults in writing, the children were given a first introduction to counting. It was a loud 
and enthusiastic atmosphere and pupils and teachers were more than excited. This 
inauguration day again was thus celebrated as a great success. The school is of course and 
first of all an opportunity to gain knowledge and education. It is in this meaning that the 
sikola lipu becomes a highly meaningful marker of self-determination and will-power for 
Wana people. The school thus expresses Wana agency in its purest form. For them, it is 
part of becoming masyarakat adat.205 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
205 In addition, YMP and other NGOs are currently working on a PERDA (Perarturan Daerah), a regional 
regulation, for the Kabupaten Morowali, to monitor the protection and recognition of Wana people and 
their rights.  
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Figure 33 The teachers of the sikola lipu crossing the Soelato river ton their way uphill. 
 
Figure 34 Old and young learning at sikola lipu. 
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Figure 35 First day of sikola lipu in Salisarao. 
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5.7 CONTESTED INDIGENEITY 
The changed attitude described above however does not apply to all Wana in the same 
way. The general change in form of new interaction with NGOs had come fast and of 
course only a handful of people so far had got to know closer contact to NGO allies. 
Those had clearly profited a great deal in terms of how to discuss important matters with 
officials, a process an interlocutor of Li has described as “’learning how to conduct 
politics’ (belajar berpolitik), and his recognition that political involvement is not an evil 
to be eliminated […] but rather an entitlement, something to be encouraged” (2007a: 346) 
– all with the help of NGO allies. Others, however, were facing these new developments 
with hesitation and reluctance. 
No wonder such a rapid change of what I call “being Wana, becoming indigenous” was 
not going to happen without any contestations. The aforementioned politics of 
representation produced new constellations and understandings of power within a 
community that had come to embrace a completely new concept of themselves in a 
relatively fast process. Consequently, the idea of indigeneity as a form of empowerment 
was not achieved and used in a uniform and even way by all community members. 
Understanding, imaging and applying the concept of masyarakat adat to a community 
that had long perceived of themselves in a mere marginal stance, deeply embedded in 
cosmological and historical traits, did not happen without any problems.  
One field of problems was settled in the field of shifting power relations within the 
community. As I have described above, access to knowledge is an important source of 
power. Wana “powerful friends” like the NGO as an agent of this knowledge, however, 
could not communicate with every individual equally. This lead to some difficulties 
between old leaders and new leaders. There were Wana who had taken a central position 
in communicating with the NGO; they had developed closer ties to the organization, were 
regularly keeping community and NGO updated about the developments via telephone 
and had for example traveled to their headquarter in Palu. These individuals thus were put 
in a position as a new kind of leader in the current development. While, on the one hand, 
they were the ones who had pushed the development in the current direction, they were, 
on the other hand, regarded with distrust by some people. Their motivation seemed to be 
somehow doubtful to the community. Further, coming back from the province’s capital 
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where they received new information and training, some had developed a new vocabulary 
filled with NGO phrases, a phenomena Li has described as “talking the language of 
customary rights” (2007a: 346) – a language that was somewhat incomprehensible for 
their upland kin and thus produced a sense of distance among Wana members. 
The discussions with NGOs happened mainly with these new leaders while respected 
elders were often not included or were not summoned to informal meetings. This 
happened partly because of allegations of corruption towards some elder leaders, usually 
those living in the village, who were regarded with distrust in relation to their former and 
current involvement with the village government. As a result of these new alignments of 
power, some elder leaders intensified their bonds with the official sector and highlighted 
their role as administrative, although not elected, representatives of the suku. By this 
development, new poles of power were becoming more and more visible. Tyson has 
noted a similar process: “a return to adat has, in many places, been found to perpetuate 
clientelism by creating ‘opportunities for powerful groups to advance their interests in the 
name of a revival of distinct traditions’” (Tyson 2011: 660). 
Another big problem was ascribed to the status of the teachers of the sikola lipu. They 
were believed to be receiving money from the NGO for their job and making a big profit 
with their new occupation. Jealousy, a general threat for community solidarity, played a 
big part in these frictions but distrust paired with religious fears was also a matter of 
concern. The initial six teachers who received first a training by YMP partially were 
converted Wana from Taronggo now officially following Christian or Muslim religion. 
Although they were still very close to Wana religion and would not be involved in 
missionary attempts, distrust was still noted by upland Wana. This was in some way 
caused by a general reluctance towards the celebration of the school as a sekolah tanpa 
agama (BI), a school without a religion. Some Wana individuals had difficulties with this 
declaration and were suspicious that the school indeed had either a Muslim or Christian 
missionary background connected to it. In face of the historical experiences of strong 
religious pressure described in the chapters above it is no wonder religious motives were 
a matter of concern and distrust among community members. Many Wana still do not 
fully trust the NGO – or me, the anthropologist – to be free of religious intentions. 
Nevertheless, Christian and Muslim Wana teachers also experienced high pressure from 
their religious communities. The school was not very welcomed among Christian and 
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Muslim lowland neighbors and was instead perceived of as a source of trouble. Apa Ela 
for example was frustrated, “this school is forbidden (dilarang), don’t let them go there”, 
he told me. The school itself was regarded as illegal, strongly backed up by the kepala 
desa who stated this a couple of times and complained that he was not included in the 
planning. The NGO had tried to contact him and the ketua BPD twice but not one of them 
followed their invitation, I was told. One Christian woman in Taronggo complained 
towards me:  
“How is this up there a school? There are no teachers, they are just normal people. 
There are some who never went to school themselves, I do not understand what 
they want to teach them. They (Wana children) should come down here. Here is a 
school, a good school, where they can really learn. But this (school) up there I do 
not understand the point in it.”  
The so far missing acknowledgment of the school by the state as well as its missing 
religious curriculum leaves non-Wana community members suspicious about the purpose 
of the school. Thus, converted Wana teachers experienced high pressure by their religious 
communities (see Chapter 4, the story of Indo Mika). Within the first month of the sikola 
lipu, four of the trained teachers already resigned and were followed by other, non-trained 
Wana. 
Religion was also a cause for another important concern. Not all of my interlocutors in 
the area were immediately enthusiastic about the new development due to cosmological 
explanations. As I have shown in Chapter 3 marginality among Wana is deeply rooted in 
cosmological explanations and reasoning. According to their belief, their current 
condition of poverty and marginality makes them suitable for the predicted Golden Age 
that is expected in cosmological narratives. Breaking out of this current marginalized 
standing by becoming powerful, educated and rich due to their new empowerment will 
make them no longer suitable for their spiritual friends, the taw baraka. They would no 
longer fit the bill of the pitiful marginal people; a picture that they needed to attend. Thus, 
some of my interlocutors expressed fears that once they would experience empowerment 
they would no longer be proper candidates for the taw baraka. Indo Felu for example told 
me that although she was very pleased with the school and the success they had in the 
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fight against the resettlement plan, she also felt insecure if this progress would go to far, if 
they would become too powerful, too educated.  
Based on these consternations, the involvement in the current masyarakat adat movement 
is, at least for some Wana, not an easy task. The contestations resulting from the process 
of “becoming indigenous” showed how heterogenous the positions among Wana in the 
upland as well as lowland came out. Individuals are looking at the new developments 
with mixed feeling and are reluctant towards their new political status as masayarakat 
adat. It is thus a complex process of becoming indigenous by taking on modern means of 
empowerment that raise suspicions among Wana members. Hirtz has talked about the 
bureaucratic orientalism, a term he borrows from Said (1978), and shows how it takes an 
idea of modernity to embrace the indigeneity category,  
“it takes modern means to become traditional, to be indigenous […]. Modernity 
needs the contrasting concept of indigeneity and tradition, whereas traditional 
societies in pre-modern or pre-colonial times did not need to establish their 
‘otherness’ in opposition to modernity or their own history. In other words, 
through the very process of being recognized as ‘indigenous’, these groups enter 
the realms of modernity” (Hirtz 2003: 889). 
For the Wana, it is this modernity that, against the described cosmological background, 
might hinder their way towards salvation. This is for some a tragic paradox in itself. 
While salvation implies the outbreak of the current marginal stance through 
cosmologically founded expectations, it is also the labeling as masyarakat adat that 
would bring salvation in the form of political empowerment. However, the latter conflicts 
seriously with the former.  
Further, the recognition of the Wana ethnic group as masyarakat adat as a solution for the 
current situation is, according to the movement, a way to empowerment. This process 
however implies at the same time the recognition of the nation state, its power and its 
apparatus from Wana side, although as Li rightfully asks: “Why should masyarakat adat 
demand recognition from a state whose claims to sovereignty they wish to challenge?” 
(Li 2001: 653). It is in fact a contradiction: Following the rules of the state and adopting 
its strategies by those who originally were challenging the state in itself, the legitimacy of 
the state itself first obtains acknowledgment (Li 2001; Tyson 2011). A circumstance that 
in fact, based on their experience-based and millenarian point of view has never been the 
goal of Wana people.  
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Entering the masyarakat adat movement did not come about effortlessly for Wana. 
Adopting this label, the process of becoming an indigenous people is a political decision 
that Wana used for their own empowerment – a decision that was at least thought to be 
their last resort in the struggle against land loss and resettlement. However, the process 
was no unilateral decision and with shifting power relations, internal consequences are at 
this point not fully visible. It is a process that takes time to settle; the Wana have not 
transformed immediately “from peripheral minority groups with little recognition or 
power vis-à-vis their nation-states to transnational activists with formidable international 
lobbies and leverage”, as Hodgson explains for the Maasai (Hodgson 2011: 2). Wana 
turned towards a movement with growing international entanglements in times they were 
looking for “powerful friends” that would be able to help them. They had no high 
expectations, since action-based discourse on adat and adat rights is rather a subject to be 
discussed among educated activists in far-away cities and not among people who are 
actually deeply affected by it. Like many other indigenous groups all over Indonesia, 
Wana have engaged in a movement where they have “found […] a language, a sense of 
solidarity, and a set of allies that have helped them articulate and advance their claims, 
especially claims against the state for control over ancestral lands” (Li 2007a: 346). The 
acceptance of their status as an indigenous people, thus turned their marginal position into 
a more or less powerful masyarakat adat, against the background of a society that is 
experiencing a revaluation process of formerly called suku terasing, backed up by 
international discourse and organizations like AMAN and WALHI recognition. Thus, 
their indigeneity and the acceptance of their new status brought with it a new concept of 
their ethnic identity and explained at least part of their marginalization to them. It is by 
this means that their redefinition as masyarakat adat became a strong weapon of 
resistance and opposition for the Wana. The process of becoming indigenous is thus an 
expression of specific Wana agency. 
5.8  INTERIM CONCLUSION 
The relocation of Wana settlements to lowland centralized villages has been a continuing 
peril for upland Wana, threatening their social life, culture and economic standing as 
swidden agriculturalists. Involuntary relocating of ethnic minorities has a long history in 
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Indonesia, beginning with times of colonial rule. Just like other upland people Wana were 
facing resettlement initiatives by the colonial government at the beginning of the 20th 
century. The village of Taronggo itself evolved from such a project. Wana were reluctant 
to get relocated to the lowland and incorporated in a state system that induced them with 
Christian values and a new political system. Resistance against government schemes 
happened in a subtle way, opposing resettlement claims and continuing to make a living 
in the upland regions. Although a small number stayed in Taronggo, most Wana remained 
in the uplands and kept away from the state initiatives. When the New Order government 
followed colonial schemes in the 1970s while relocating upland suku terasing in 
centralized villages all over the nation, Northern Wana were again opposing these threats 
and resisted continuously. In 2007 a resettlement after a natural catastrophe in the 
Posangke area resulted in a failed initiative that left an almost empty settlement next to 
Taronggo, now claimed by a Christian missionary group. Wana again, left the lowland 
settlement in a silent pose of opposition to continue their way of life in the uplands. In 
2011 Salisarao Wana experienced a serious threat for their land rights, when in order to 
make place for a new palm oil plantation the local government again planned to relocate 
them. Resettlement schemes are thus recurring processes of marginalization that affect 
Wana political standing. In 2011 the long well established strategy of resisting 
resettlement schemes would not serve them since ultimately they would have lost their 
land. Instead many Wana decided to search for help and entered a process of reframing 
their very own identity as indigenous people. Their new alliances with NGOs offered 
great support to oppose the 2011 relocation project. It also offered them the new 
opportunity to receive at least some education with the erection of the sikola lipu.  
Becoming indigenous happens in Central Sulawesi generally in opposition of unequal 
power constellations; the region’s whole movement as described by Sangaji, an insider, 
“is in the first place a reaction to restricted and unjust forms of economic development” 
(Sangaji 2007: 333). Wana, as I have shown, entered the movement for just the same 
reasons. However, their reframed identity positioning is a way of articulation that came 
from outside or as Li formulates: “Those who demand that their rights to be 
acknowledged must fill the places of recognition that others provide” (Li 2001: 653). 
Indigeneity has the lure of global meaning and importance; it “is a worldwide field of 
governance, subjectivities, and knowledge […]. Indigeneity itself materializes in an 
intricate dynamic among converging and competing agendas, visions, and interests that 
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transpire at local, national, and global levels” (La Cadena and Stan 2007: 9). When Wana 
decided to become indigenous they however did so by searching for “powerful friends” 
agents; they had no motivation of entering neither a global nor a mere Indonesian 
movement. Therefore, the process of Wana becoming masyarakat adat is less part of an 
international movement but shows mainly the importance of actual local aspirations and 
circumstances. 
 
	  	  
6 CONCLUSION  
This thesis set out to explore the idea and meanings of marginality from the perspective 
of people who are often described as marginal. It has shown how the concept of 
marginality is perceived, formed and framed in academic positionings and how it is 
applied to upland groups in Indonesia. It has moreover presented a heterogeneous picture 
of the concept, as it is in itself a social construction and thus receives manifold 
interpretations and understandings. The study has sought to investigate whether the 
conception of marginality changes profoundly when taking a new viewpoint, particularly 
the perspective of a “marginalized people”, and whether such a new perception can help 
to enhance the idea of marginality. Therefore this thesis has sought to answer the question 
of how marginality is constructed in a cultural sense by Wana people in the Central 
Sulawesi uplands. The general theoretical literature on the subject of marginality in the 
context of Southeast Asia and particularly Indonesia is deficient with regard to three 
highly important issues:  
1) The role of religion in the discourse on marginality for Southeast Asian upland 
groups.  
2) The role of “powerful friends” for marginalized people and the formation of 
marginalization processes.  
3) How knowledge and the access to knowledge influences power relations between 
margins and center. 
This thesis has attempted to address these three deficient areas and sought to discover 
how these three issues impact upon the Wana and their marginal status, both ascribed and 
self-ascribed. 
 
In Chapter 2 I have presented the idea of marginality as a theoretical concept and outlined 
its connotations for upland groups within the Indonesian context. The birth of the use of 
the concept of marginality in academia can be traced back to personality studies where 
individuals’ identities are to some extent shaped by their experiences of marginality. 
However, these applications of the concept were soon followed by ideas of structural, 
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geographical and cultural marginality within sociological approaches, all of which are 
somehow still relevant for research, though none of them proved to be sufficient on their 
own. Nevertheless, in anthropology marginality has become an important term in 
scholarly discourse to guide debates on social and economic inequalities. The works of 
scholars like hooks, Shields and Tsing have revolutionized the idea of marginality, 
revealing the potential that marginal spheres have to resist and counteract hierarchical 
center–periphery relations.  
Within the Indonesian context, territorialization, historicity, and the dynamics of politics 
are important issues for the investigation of marginalized regions all over the archipelago. 
People’s socio-religious, economic and political environments on Indonesia’s outer 
islands are comprised by, and related to hegemonic schemes, which constitute them as 
peripheral. Upland groups have continuously been framed as backward communities, 
distant and excluded from the Indonesian mainstream. Beginning in colonial times, 
upland groups were subjected to marginalization processes, for example in the form of 
unjust management of land rights, and also resettlement projects. During Indonesia’s New 
Order, upland people were considered as isolated tribes (suku terasing, BI) and a 
hindrance to national progress. Land-rights formulations continued to ignore indigenous 
claims and upland communities were still subject to intensive resettlement strategies. 
With the era of decentralization a new form of empowerment for indigenous and upland 
communities was established: the masyarakat adat movement offered new opportunities 
to counteract their marginal standing within the society. Wana people as a “classic” 
Indonesian upland group have thus been deeply affected by historical relations, 
territorialization and state rule – all aspects of the framework in which upland marginality 
in Indonesia is constituted. 
Against this general background Wana have developed their very own notion of their 
marginality. The empirical findings showed that marginality has a number of 
representations relevant for Wana people: The cosmological foundation of Wana 
marginal standing in which marginality can be explained as a self-constructed identity 
discourse (Chapter 3); the socio-religious dimension, in which Wana as people with a 
marginal belief system are excluded from the Indonesian mainstream and experience 
processes of marginalization, including on a day-to-day level in terms of interreligious 
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dynamics (Chapter 4); and finally, political and economic positionings, access to 
knowledge and education, and dynamics of resistance (Chapter 5).  
In Chapter 3 I have shown how Wana perceive themselves only partially as marginal. 
Drawing upon cosmological narratives, they have constituted a cosmological center that 
through its mere existence becomes a tool of contestation against patterns of political and 
economic inequality. Wana need to remain in their constant state of religious marginality 
in order to reverse the current center–periphery relationship that, in the meantime, is 
disadvantageous for them. Religious conversion would block the way towards a new 
Golden Era with Wana people at the center. Instead they have elaborated a notion of self-
marginalizing performance in order to break out of their marginality; they choose their 
cosmological center as the point of hope and promise. By this means, Wana marginality 
in a cosmological understanding is a temporary condition that will be reversed in the 
future.  
For Wana as a group following their own agama Wana in a state that does not officially 
recognize other religions than “world-religions”, religious affiliation becomes a highly 
politicized marker of identity. In regard to marginality-related issues religious association 
is closely intertwined with a Wana self-marginalized positioning and socio-religious 
hierarchies. In Chapter 4 I have discussed how, within the interreligious community of 
Taronggo, Wana obtain a marginalized standing among their Christian and Muslim 
neighbors if they have not converted; for example, marriages between Wana people of the 
same faith have no chance of being officially recognized. Another aspect relevant to 
religious marginality is access to education. In Taronggo, Wana children can attend the 
Christian elementary school, but many parents are highly reluctant since school 
attendance encompasses Christian education and is interpreted as leading Wana children 
towards religious conversion. Since Wana oppose most conversion attempts education 
becomes a highly important aspect of marginalization processes. Wana can be portrayed 
as marginal people with a marginal belief, who are expected to become part of a religious 
center as adherents to a center-acknowledged belief. However, as I have shown, Wana 
constantly resist state power and discursive strategies to make them reorient towards a 
national ideal. Religious conversion here would be the solution to “social backwardness”, 
a way out of their marginalization in relation to the political center. 
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In the introduction to this thesis I made clear that I use the term Wana in a way that 
includes a religious meaning. Nevertheless, I have shown how the category Wana is not 
an easy one to define. A number of people living in Taronggo who are ethnically Wana 
have converted to other religions, either recently, or as second-generation converts, and 
are presented as either Christian or Muslim Wana. Then, even for (non-converted) Wana, 
the category Wana cannot be but oversimplifying and homogenizing. The category Wana 
in the way I used it in this work is based on individual representations and actions of 
individuals that I met and documented during my research. However, the category Wana 
is conceived as a complicated heterogeneous picture of individuals following their own 
specific agenda. While religion played a significant role, the category upland and lowland 
were also of high significance affecting individual’s living and positionings. 
Chapter 5 has shown how Wana more or less embraced the idea of being “indigenous”. 
Historically Wana have avoided direct confrontation with people and institutions 
affecting them in a marginalizing manner. Resistance against resettlement strategies for 
example happened in a subtle way, with the Wana remaining in the upland terrain instead 
of openly opposing government initiatives. When in 2011 a new government initiative 
threatened Wana in the upland region of Salisarao, Wana turned to a new strategy to 
counteract the resettlement plan. Drawing back on the help of people who had more 
access to sources of power than they did, they established long-lasting relationships with 
several NGOs, which educated them about their rights. Ultimately the resettlement plan 
was cancelled and instead Wana have managed to establish their very own school, the 
sikola lipu, dedicated to Wana children and adults and celebrated as a new form of 
empowerment. In this process Wana have welcomed their new status as indigenous 
people that are part of a national movement to strengthen the role of masyarakat adat all 
over Indonesia. Nevertheless, their new status as masyarakat adat ultimately led to a set 
of new problems. Some members of the community perceive this new positioning as a 
chance to one day break out of their marginalized status – a status they in fact need to 
keep, at least in some sense, to enter their millenarist idea of a new Golden Era as I have 
described in Chapter 3. This has become a point of solemn distress among Wana families 
in the area of Salisarao. “The process of becoming indigenous […] does not end when 
one acquires the label. It begins there”, Pratt notes (2007: 399). The occurring problems 
described in Chapter 5 are part of this process; its outcome still remains to be seen. Some 
Wana are using the discursive power of their new label as masyarakat adat, while others 
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might back away and keep out of these new initiatives while returning – some in a 
metaphorical, some in an actual sense – to the uplands, waiting for the taw baraka, while 
others will keep on searching for new strategies. These are just some examples of 
consequences that arise due to their entering the masyarakat adat movement. Becoming 
indigenous in Taronggo is a highly political decision and its consequences are at this 
moment not fully visible.  
Dynamics between upland and lowland, center and periphery, Wana and non-Wana, 
inside and outside are thus continuously challenged and reformulated, bringing to light 
the cultural specifics and symbolic meaning of Wana marginalization. Wana turned to 
their “powerful friends” or searched for them in times when the Wana marginalized 
standing was becoming a source of land loss. Their distance from the political center 
prompted them to look for allies with close ties to centers and more access to center-
related power. Once Wana became part of the masyarakat adat movement, they 
themselves moved a little closer to a center. This however increased, in a spiritual sense, 
their distance from their cosmological center. The hope of becoming once again part of 
the cosmological center, the future Golden Era, is closely linked to Wana current 
marginalized status. Only by upholding the current condition of misery will their future 
“powerful friends” in the form of the taw baraka recognize them. Therefore, a positioning 
between margins and centers is highly complex and often conflict-laden for Wana.  
Marginality is a highly relational concept and its character must be critically examined. 
Thus, I ask with Ferguson: “When we say marginal, we must always ask, marginal to 
what?” (Ferguson 1990: 9). Wana refer to a political center to explain their political and 
economic marginal status (see Chapters 4 and 5), a center that is in some way analogous 
to state power. On the other hand, a more important center for them is the cosmological 
center that transgresses time and space and is not easily graspable.  
Anna Tsing has engaged deeply with perspectives on marginality within the realm of 
anthropology. Looking at precisely how the Meratus Dayak in Indonesia “engage their 
marginality by protesting, reinterpreting and embellishing its exclusion” (Tsing 1993: 5), 
she approaches the idea of margins as sites of constructed meanings and identity, where 
processes take place that shape a marginal distinctiveness, to be taken on by mainstream 
opinions: “the Meratus are defined by their marginal status in nationally and regionally 
dominant ways of thinking” (Tsing 1993: 253). The same counts for Wana, themselves at 
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least partly living in the mountainous terrain of Morowali Regency, who are interpreted 
as primitive uplanders, not-yet-full citizens of the Indonesian state. But they have 
developed their own notion of marginality, which is not so deeply connected to outside 
marginalization processes as it is rather culturally constructed according to cosmological 
explanations. Therefore, Wana are not casualties within a static model of state-periphery-
based marginality; nor have they become specialists in avoiding state power altogether. 
They are, however, creative agents of their culture and of their own concepts of their 
marginal standing, constantly renegotiating and reformulating their position as an upland 
group.  
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GLOSSAR 
 
adat (BI) local right system but also culture, customs, traditions or 
values 
adi adi  part of a spell in the baraka myth 
agama (BI) religion 
AMAN (Alliansi 
Masayarakat Adat 
Nusantara) 
(BI) Alliance of Indigenous Peoples of the Archipelago (NGO) 
AMASUTA (Alliansi 
Masayarakat Adat 
Sulawesi Tengah) 
(BI) Alliance of Indigenous Peoples of Central Sulawesi (NGO) 
baraka  power 
bartapa  keepig vigil as part of seeking to become a shaman 
bea  stupid, dumb 
BPD (Badan 
Perwakilan Desa) 
(BI) village representative body 
budaya (BI) culture 
Cagar Alam (BI) Nature Reserve 
camat (BI) head of a district 
DEPSOS (BI) Department of Social Affairs  
desa (BI) village, can also mean sub-district 
do'a  Wana spell 
du'e  music instrument, also called geso-geso 
duku  ritual offering tray 
dusun (BI) sub-village  
geso-geso  See: du'e 
hak milik (BI) private ownership right 
hak pakai (BI) right to use land  
hak ulayat (BI) customary land rights 
hukum (BI) law 
inti (BI) land within the Nucleus-Plasma-System reserved for a 
company 
joe n tana  go to the end of the word 
kabupaten (BI) regency 
kaju parambaa  the felled tree in a Wana myth  
kampung (BI) village 
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kasugi  wealth 
katuntu  powerful creation myth 
kayori  artistic verse form, only used in connetion to katuntu 
kecamatan (BI) district 
kepala desa (BI) village head 
kepala suku (BI) head of a clan 
kepercayaan (BI) belief 
lipu  Wana settlements  
LKMD; Lembaga 
Ketahanan 
Masyarakat Desa 
(BI) village community resilience board  
LMD; Lembaga 
Musyawarah Desa 
(BI) village consultative assembly  
mabolong  see momago 
mafuti  to lie 
magule manu  Wana ritual of deconversion 
makole  Wana leader in the past, also called basal  
mangaya  converted Wana 
masi yasi  pitiful  
masyarakat adat (BI) adat community 
measa  Wana demon 
molawo  most powerful healing ritual 
momago (BI) healing ritual 
motaro  a shaman’s dance during a momago 
naraka  hell  
niat   a vow-making ritual 
orang (yang) belum 
beragama 
(BI) people who do not follow a religion yet 
orang gunung (BI) mountain people  
Orde Baru (BI) New Order 
pagansani  knowledge  
Pancasila (BI) preamble of the 1945 Constitution  
panti asuhan (BI) orphanage 
patoe  opening chant of a shaman during a momago 
pembangunan (BI) development 
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pemekaran (BI) blossoming; a process of evolving numerous new regencies 
ann districts, initiated after the New Order 
plasma (BI) land within the Nucleus-Plasma-System reserved for a 
indiviual smallholding 
popondo  music instrument 
propinsi (BI) province 
Pue  the Owner, God 
Pue lamoa  The Owner or God of thunder  
Pue ri ara n tana  The Owner below the earth  
pusen tana  the navel of the earth  
Puskesmas, Pusat 
Kesehatan 
Masyarakat 
(BI) local community health station 
sanga  the true name 
Sawit Watch  Indonesian network against oil palm plantations (NGO) 
sekolah dasar (BI) elementary school 
sikola lipu  Wana school, see lipu 
SPN or Sisdiknas. 
Sistem Pendidikan 
Nasional)  
(BI) National Education System Bill  
suku terasing (BI) a term created by the government in 1976 and meaning 
isolated tribe.  
suruga  heaven  
taw bolag  invisible people living in the Wana forests  
taw walia, kawalia  shaman 
tempo baraka  the lost Golden Era 
tendebomba  artistiv verse form 
timbuso watu  stone statues 
tolali  flute-like music instrument  
Toraja (BI) ethnic group of South Sulawesi 
tradisi (BI) tradition 
Tunda’n tana  seat of the world in creation myths 
transmigrasi (BI) a resettlement project that stareted in 1978 and aimed at 
relocating peoplpe from the densely populated regios of Java 
and Bali to the outer islands 
wali m pantoo  the becoming of the word 
WALHI (Wahana 
Lingkungan Hidup)  
(BI) Indonesian Form for Environment (NGO) 
walia  spirits 
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wiaa siwangoe  liane connecting heaven and earth 
YMP (Yayasan 
Merah Putih 
(BI) The Merah Putih Foundation (NGO) 
YSM (Yayasan 
Sahabat Morowali) 
(BI) Friends of Morowali (NGO) 
yuno  friend 
	  	  
	  	  
 
